RISE AND FALL OF THE MUGHAL EMPIRE

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BY

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Note to the Second Edition

The present edition is being issued with necessary typographical and other minor corrections. The credit of revising it goes entirely to Sri S. R. Mehrotra of Saugor University and Dr. S. A. A. Rizvi of U. P. Educational Service. The author wishes to express his gratitude to their Labour of Love.

The second volume of the Rise and Fall is almost ready, and most likely will go into print by January 1961. It will bring the political history to the end of the reign of Muhammad Shah. Incidentally, it will include an account of the Europeans in India only so far as they are relevant to the history of the Mughal Empire.

As soon as the second volume goes to the Press, the author intends to devote his time and energy (D. V.) to the preparation of a separate work which will embrace the economic, institutional, and cultural developments during the Mughal rule in India. He has been collecting materials and trying to understand them for over a decade and a half.

8, Mall Avenue,
Lucknow.
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PREFACE

An apology is probably needed for writing a general history of the great Mughals. In view of the numerous able monographs published on them, and a large number of articles contributed to the learned journals bearing on some aspect or the other of their reign, it was felt desirable to weave the data contained in them into a general history. During the last thirty years hardly two or three works on the general history of the Mughals have been produced. Such general histories, being expressly written for the undergraduates, have been prepared under unavoidable or self-imposed limitations. The authors of such works, therefore, did not consider it desirable and safe to step beyond the current and popular views both in the interest of the students and their own. The object of the present work, however, is not to launch another text book, but to re-state the history of the great Mughals for whosoever interested in it, in the light of the latest studies and researches. It does not claim to be a handy compilation of the views of other scholars, though full weight and attention has been given to them. It embodies briefly the results of the author's studies of primary and original sources as well as the works of modern writers. The views expressed by special monograph writers have been given respectful consideration. The author has taken the liberty of differing from them only when his own study of the original sources made it necessary to do so. Some of the monographs have gone out of date and require drastic revision.

In a book of a general character, with its limitation of space and vastness of the subject, it was obviously not possible to enter into elaborate arguments, display *criticus apparatus*, or give and discuss the various authorities either for or against a particular viewpoint or conclusion. At times, for critical reasons one has to differ from the opinions expressed even by contemporary

writers. It is a delicate task and requires very close scrutiny and alertness. For example, one may be allowed to refer to the attitude of Khalifa towards the question of succession after Babar's death, or to the behaviour of Bairam Khan after his dismissal from Regency. Scores of pages have been written on those or similar questions and more might yet be written. Such discussions are more suitable for learned journals or monographs; they can hardly find a place in a general work without throwing the narration out of proportion and making the book too bulky and almost unreadable. As it is, the first volume covers over five hundred pages. Two more have yet to come. If many such controversial questions have been summarily treated and conclusions breifly stated, a seeker of fuller information should look for reasons in the original sources. A comprehensive and critical study of original sources would show that the author of the present work has based his conclusions on them and tried to discharge his responsibilities honestly and as best as his competence could permit. He does not claim to have said the last word on any question, no one could do so; but he does claim to have examined the available evidence as honestly and as impartially as possible. He, therefore, craves the indulgence of readers and scholars to form their judgment about his statements after careful reference to the works of the specialists in general and the original sources in particular.

For a general and casual reader it is easier to follow if history is treated topic-wise. But such a plan would have necessiated frequent cross-references and repetitions, without which proper and necessary historical perspective of changes and developments could not be correctly appreciated. After all, chronological sequences and total and circumstantial stresses largely determine the attitude, character, and policies of the individuals, movements and peoples. It is not free from grave risk to pull out the threads of a particular hue and quality without spoiling, if not utterly damaging, the general pattern of historical texture and set-up. Historical events are so closely related and interwoven that

their proper significance can be understood only in their diverse complexity and not in their detached and isolated simplicity. The author has, therefore, tried to strike a middle course between the two extremes, for otherwise, this book would have become either a collection of topical essays or a mere chronicle. For these reasons it was thought best, in the interest of accurate appreciation, to keep as close as possible to the chronological order of events and their inter-relations, and psychological reactions.

At the risk of making the narrative somewhat heavy and cold, but in the interest of accuracy and truth, an effort has been made to eschew all involved, metaphorical, or florid expressions or epigrams, and dubious comparisons of personalities and situations. Flashy sentences, quotations or sayings, and sentimentalities have been scrupulously avoided. The writer of these pages believes that the essence of history is accuracy; and an undiluted and unvarnished presentation of facts in a straightforward, masculine and clear style. The charm and romance of history lies in adjustments, conflicts of personalities, the regeneration or degeneration of persons movements and peoples, and in the unfoldment of life in varying circumstances and patterns. The kaleidoscopic character of historical and cultural dynamism is enough to produce the necessary awe, romance, thrill and fascination. As far as humanly possible no religious, communal, commercial, racial or provincial sentiment has been allowed to colour the estimates of men and movements. History here has been treated as a complex, social, economic, political and cultural phenomena which happened in India during the Sixteenth, Seventeenth and the first four decades of the Eighteenth Century.

Although every event or fact is important in one way or the other, its relevance and value are determined by the relation it bears to the specific problem under consideration. The author has tried to eschew such facts or events as are not strictly relevant to the issue in question. He has taken into account only such factors and facts as, he thought, were relevant to a particular

issue. If by inadvertance he has missed anything vital he would feel grateful to those who might kindly draw his attention to it. After all the aim of every serious student of history is to discover as much of truth as is possible in the present state of our knowledge. In this task co-operation and constructive help would be welcome from whatever quarter they may come.

The part played by the European powers in the political history of the period concerned is relatively small. The Portuguese had come in close contact with provincial dynasties and sometimes had made themselves felt seriously, but their contact with the Mughal empire was generally speaking casual and inconsequential. However, important their history might be otherwise, it did not form an integral part of the main current of the history of the Mughals. The position of the other European powers was very feeble. In fact, they did not come in the lime light till the second quarter of the eighteenth century. The account of European activities during our period will be given at the end of political history as a sort of addendum to the history of the Mughals.

In the general history of the Mughal rulers it was not necessary to give a full bibliography of the period. Important original and modern works have been mentioned for reference purposes. Those who wish to go in for research will find bibliographies attached to the monographs dealing with individual Emperors or some aspects of the history of those times, and to the various catalogues of historical sources, particularly *Persian Literature Section II Fasculus* 3, by C. A. Storey (Luzac & Co.). Besides important references a chronology of important events has also been given at the end of each reign. The chronology of official histories in Persian is generally reliable in spite of occasional confusion due to intercalary days, and the fact that the lunar year is shorter than the solar year by eleven days and the arbitrary adjustment of the days of accession of several Emperors. The chronology of unofficial Persian histories is not so reliable, while that of Maratha and Sikh history is

still worse. However, the author has made the best of whatever could be gleaned from the works of the well-known authorities and hopes that the tables will be found quite serviceable for practical purposes of a general reader or students.

Owing to multifarous duties the author could not find leisure enough to arrange for printing and publishing the work. Credit must go to the enterprising publishers, Central Book Depot, for their persistence, and to the printers for their patience and pains. The author expresses his thanks to them. He is grateful to Dr. A. Mukerji, and Shri S. R. Mehrotra M. A., who corrected the proofs, prepared the index and supervised the technical aspects of printing of the first volume. But for their unstinted labour the author might have been guilty of many ommissions and Commissions of language. The responsibility for accuracy of facts, interpretation, and chronology entirely rests with the author.

R. P. .T.

Saugar University,
30-4-1956

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CHAPTER I

BABAR

The descendants of Timur who ruled in India called themselves Chaghtai Turks and looked down upon the Mughals or Mongols as half-barbarians. Nevertheless they took pride in tracing their descent from Chingiz Khan and drew constant inspiration from the life, work and the *Yasaq* (laws) laid down by that great conqueror and founder of one of the greatest empires the world has ever seen.

Timur was the son of Amir Turaghay Barlas, a Turkish chief of Kesh, now known as Shahr-i-Sabz. By 1370 he virtually made himself master of the territory ruled over by the descendants of Chaghtai Khan. Attached to the house of Chaghtai Khan, these Turks called themselves Chaghtais. In 1363, Timur defeated Iliyas Khwaja Khan, the Mongol ruler of Eastern Turkistan and a descendant of Chingiz Khan. He married a grand-daughter of Kazgan Khan, the *de facto* ruler of Transoxiana, and after the death of his brother-in-law Amir Husain married his wife Dilshad Agha, who belonged to the family of Chingiz Khan. In this way Timur established matrimonial relationship not only with the *de facto* but with the *de jure* rulers of Transoxiana. Moreover, it was somehow discovered that like Chingiz, Timur was also a descendant of Kajuli Khan and thus belonged to the Royal Mughal race. With all this prestige and power Timur chose to rule as an Amir on behalf of Sayurhatmish, a Sultan of the house of Chingiz Khan, who was considered as the *de jure* sovereign.

Timur built an empire which extended from the Lower Volga to the Jamuna and included Asia Minor, Persia and Afghanistan. But Central Asia remained his homeland and Samarqand the capital of the empire. He was not only a great empire-builder but also a

patron of art and culture. His political and military ideas had a close affnity with those of Chingiz Khan. His attachment to the Tourai Chingizi (laws) was so deep that he was charged of relegating even the *Quran* to a secondary position. In his own lifetime he came to be regarded as a counterpart of Chingiz and like him continued to inspire awe and respect among his descendants and the people of the Central and the Middle East.

After the death of Timur (1404) his loosely-knit empire was involved in a civil war. His grandson, Pir Muhammad whom Timur had bequeathed the empire, was murdered in Qandahar (1406). His second grandson Sultan Khalil who had taken possession of Samarqand proved to be so extravagant and thoughtless that he lost it within a few years and died in Khorasan (1409). Samarqand and the empire then passed to Shahrukh Mirza (1409), who succeeded in restoring law and order in Transoxiana. He himself preferred to remain at Herat but left his son Ulugh Beg Mirza to govern in his name from Samarqand. Ulugh Beg was a great patron of science, particularly of Astronomy and Mathematics, and during the long period of his governorship Samarqand became the 'most beautiful of Asiatic cities'. Shahrukh Mirza died in 1448 and Ulugh Beg Mirza became the ruler of the empire. He was, however, not destined to enjoy the imperial power for long. His own beloved son, Abdul Latif, raised the standard of rebellion, defeated, imprisoned and executed him (1449). This dastardly and disgraceful act was soon revenged when a devoted servant of Ulugh Beg assasinated the patricide (1450).

The throne of Samarqand was claimed by Abu Saīd Mirza, grandson of Miran Shah, who was treated with great kindness and affection by his uncle, Ulugh Beg Mirza. He sought the help of the Uzbek chief, Abul Khair Khan, who marched into Transoxiana and threatened to capture Samarqand for himself. With considerable difficulty he was persuaded to turn back, and it was not before (1465) that Abu Saīd succeeded

in establishing his authority over Transoxiana, northern Persia and Afghanistan as far as Makran.

Abu Saīd Mirza's relations with the Mongols and Uzbeks were not happy. His grand-father, Ulugh Beg had come into conflict with the great Khan of the Mongols, Sultan Weis, and had captured Kashgar treacherously. On another occasion he had pretended to offer shelter to Sultan Weis's eldest son, Yunis Khan, but treacherously killing most of his followers, sent him as a captive to his father, Shahrukh Mirza.

During the confusion that followed the murder of Ulugh Beg Mirza, the then great Mongol Khan, Isan Bugha Khan, invaded Transoxiana. He plundered freely and annexed Tashkant and certain territories to the north of Jaxartes. Abu Saīd Mirza then took up the cause of Yunis Khan, brother of Isan Bugha, and encouraged him to re-establish his authority in Mughulistan. In 1458 Isan Bugha died and Yunis Khan was hailed by the Mongols as the Great Khan (1465-66). The Mongols not only disliked the Timurids intensely but hated them heartily. They resented the policy of interference adopted by the Timurids whom they accused of fomenting trouble among them. What embittered them most was the blunt repudiation by Abu Saīd Mirza of even the nominal allegiance offered by Timur and his descendants to the royal house of Chaghtai Khan, and the assumption of royalty by himself. The fact that he had made Yunis Khan promise to give one of his daughters to each of his three sons became still another factor destined to arouse jealousy among the Mongols and sow the seeds of future trouble.

The Timurids got on no better with the Uzbeks. These rugged people, comprising Turks and Mongols, were stationed by Batu, son of Chingiz Khan, in Dashti Kipchak Steppes, which stretched to the east and north of the sea of Aral. They were led by Shaibani Khan, the fifth son of Juji. In 1320 a successor of Batu, named Uzbeg Khan, had embraced Islam, and those Shaibanis who had recognized the leadership

of Uzbeg Khan came to be known as the Uzbeks. The policy of Timur had been to sow seeds of discord among the various leaders of the Uzbeks and thus prevent them from uniting. By the middle of the fifteenth century, however, they were united into a confederacy under the leadership of Abul Khair Khan, a descendant of Shaiban Khan.

After the death of Ulugh Beg Mirza, a civil war broke out among the Timurids. Abu Saīd Mirza invoked the aid of Abul Khair, who overran part of Turkistan and Khwarizm. He placed the Mirza on the throne of Samarqand and secured in marriage the hand of one of his daughters. In 1469 he was killed along with his several sons by a band of discontented chieftains. With his death, the Uzbek confederacy was broken up and the leaders of the various tribes were dispersed. Nevertheless, some of their leaders faithfully rallied round Abul Khair's son, Baruj Sultan, who also was not allowed to live long. The great Khan Yunis Khan soon falling upon him, slew him and destroyed his family. One of his sons, Muhammad Shaibani also known as Shah-i-Bakht, fled for his life of Transoxiana with his younger brother, Muhammad Sultan Bahadur. They received no help from Abu Saīd Mirza who looked with equanimity on the ruination of the house of his benefactor, Abul Khair. Muhammad Shaibani did not forget the ingratitude and callousness of the Mirza, who owed his throne of Samarqand to the help of his grand-father. He was, therefore as inimical to Abu Saīd and his descendants as he was to the Mongol Yunis Khan and his house.

The influence of the Timurids began rapidly to decline after the death of Shahrukh Mirza. Herat was plundered by the Turkomans or Iranian Turks as the warlike and troublesome people living on the south-west of the Caspian were called. These people were divided into two rival groups—the Black Sheep and the White Sheep. The Black Sheep had been defeated by Timur and their strength had since declined.

The White Sheep, however, had become strong in Diarbakr and Gilan and, under their leader Uzun Hasan, gained considerable power. To curb the rising power of this group, Abu Saīd Mirza marched against them, but was utterly defeated, taken prisoner and handed over to his enemies who executed him (1467-68). The only Timurid who exercised influence in northern Persia was Sultan Husain Baiqra, a descendant of Umar Shaikh Mirza, who ruled with distinction at Herat, and was reputed throughout the Muslim world as a great patron of art and culture.

Uzun Hasan had given his sister in marriage to Junaid, reputed to be a descendant of Imam Musa Kazim, the seventh Imam of the Shias. The family to which Junaid belonged was held in great honour by the White Sheep tribe, for it was through their influence that they were saved from the wrath of Timur. Junaid was killed in a local skirmish. His son Haider, who had married a daughter of Uzun Hasan, was also killed. Haider left three sons behind. The eldest of them, Sultan Ali, was killed by the son of Uzun Hasan. The saintly family of Safiuddin was thus gradually drawn into politics. On the youngest brother of Sultan Ali, Ismail, famous in history as Shah Ismail Safawi, devolved the religious and political responsibilities when he was in his fourteenth year.

Ismail proved to be an ambitious and able leader. With the support of Gilan, he conquered Azarbaijan. In the course of time all the seven tribes of the Turks known collectively as Qizilbash(viz.'Golden Heads' for using Red Caps) accepted this leadership and he became the ruler of the Empire of the White Sheep. Having consolidated his power in the north-west and western Persia, he began to cast his eyes on Balkh, Khorasan and Herat. The neighbouring kingdoms viewed with consternation the rise of Ismail not only because he was an ambitious conqueror but also because he had declared Shism as the state religion. The suppressd nationalism of the Persians and the pent-up hostility of the

Shias now found a free and full expression under his leadership. National enthusiasm, religious fanaticism and the aggressive militant spirit of the Turko-Persians were at his command. No ruler of the Muslim world, not even the Ottoman Sultan, could claim so much influence, loyalty and fervour as did Shah Ismail.

The empire of the Timurids was surrounded by unfriendly and ambitious powers almost on all sides. Yet with an amazing short-sightedness, the successors of Abu Saīd Mirza divided the empire among themselves and scrambled for supremacy. The division of the vast empire by Chingiz Khan among his sons was a necessity and, therefore, justified. It was held together by the Great Khans for a few generations or at least so long as the inspiration of Chingiz Khan and the influence of Kuraltai, the Grand Council of the Mongols, survived. But the system did not work with the Timurids. There was hardly any justification for its continuance by Abu Saīd Mirza particularly, because the empire had shrunk substantially in dimension and was surrounded by threatening dangers on all sides. But the traditions left by Chingiz and Timur and the fierce rivalries, jealousies and ambitions of princes and clannish leaders would not allow a clear appreciation of the political situation.

Abu Saīd had divided his empire among his sons. His eldest son Sultan Ahmad Mirza held Samarqand and Bukhara. Mahmud Mirza was assigned Hissar Kunduz, Badakhshan and Khutlan. Ulugh Beg held Kabul and Ghazna, while Umar Shaikh Mirza possessed Farghana. Of these, Umar Shaikh Mirza, the father of Babar, was the most quarrelsome. He was eager to extent his principality in every direction, but Samarqand excited his cupidity most. He might have been egged on to it by his father-in-law, Yunis Khan, who came whenever his help was sought for by Umar Shaikh and frustrated all efforts of Sultan Ahmad to subdue Farghana. The Mongol Khans regarded Farghana as theirs by right, but were not in a position to swallow it up without serious complications for which they were not quite prepared.

The power and prestige of the Mongols had suffered badly in the time of Yunis Khan. He was under a very heavy obligation to Abu Saīd Mirza ; his so-called victory over Baruj Khan was won by chance ; and finally he had sustained three defeats at the hands of Aba Bakr, the young ruler of Yarqand and Kashghar. His prestige rested on his position as a great Khan, but its basis was largely sentimental. After his death, the title of the Great Khan devolved on his second son, Sultan Ahmad Khan, who, for that reason, had to stay in eastern Mughulistan. His elder son, Sultan Mahmud Khan, was given the western regions of the Mongol Empire which touched the boundaries of Farghana. Both Yunis Khan and his son Sultan Mahmud were anxious to capture Akhshi, a well fortified town, just to the north of Farghana, commanding the river Sir. It was considered as the key to Farghana. Its conquest would have given the Mongol Sultanate a natural boundary and unlocked the door of Farghana, which the Mongols were anxious to conquer. Umar Shaikh Mirza had once promised to transfer Akhshi to Yunis Khan, and had allowed him to occupy it for sometime. But it was precious strategically; hence he snatched it back from the Mongols. Akhshi became a bone of contention between the rulers of Farghana and the Mongols just as Tashkant and Shahrukhia were between the kingdoms of Samarqand and the Mongol Sultan.

There was yet another danger. Aba Bakr Doghlat, the ruthless, unscrupulous and warlike ruler of Kashghar and Khotan, had extended his kindgdom to the confines of Tibet. He had built a fort at Uzkend and made it a base for his encroachments and ultimate conquest of Farghana.

Thus, by the last decade of the 15th century Central Asia was broken into five principlalities which were threatened from almost all sides by dangers. The eldest of the Timurid rulers, Shah Husain Baiqira, was, broken by soft culture, fast living and old age ; while the youngest of them Umar Shaikh Mirza of Farghana, the father of Babar, was a stormy petrel. He suffered from restless

ambition which invited frequent conflicts between himself and his brothers and maternal uncles. Without adequate means—political, material, or moral—he wished to rival the achievements of the great heroes of Firdausi's epic, and with the help of strong liquor and *majun* (an intoxicating concoction) he had worked his imagination up to a dangerous pitch. He was constantly at war with one or the other neighbouring kingdom.

In 1494 Farghana was attacked from the north by the Mongol prince, Sultan Mahmud , and from the east, by Sultan Ahmad of Samarqand. At this critical juncture, Umar Shaikh, who had not reached his fortieth year died by an accidental fall (1494). His eldest son, Babar (b. Feb. 1483) , who was destined to found later the Mughal Empire in India, was only in his twelfth year. It was not simply the resolute defence of the people, but a combination of lucky circumstances, which saved the kingdom of Farghana for the time being. The outbreak of a fatal epidemic among horses, the loss of cattle and men by the collapse of the bridge over the Kaba river, and his own illness compelled Sultan Ahmad to listen to favourable peace proposals. He was probably given to understand that he would be allowed to keep the territories he had already captured. Anyhow, a sort of peace was patched up. The Mongol Sultan Mahmud had captured Kashan and the town of Akhshi, but the fort of Akhshi was holding out vigorously. On hearing of the retreat of Sultan Ahmad, he raised the siege in disgust and went away. On his way back to Samarqand, Sultan Ahmad died. Since he had no son to succeed him, the throne of Samarqand excited the cupidity and ambition of all the rulers of Central Asia and the Mongol Sultans. The consequence was, that the whole of Central Asia was thrown in confusion which ultimately led to the destruction of the Timurids, first in Central Asia, and then in Persia.

Babar, a promising, cultured, brave and ambitious youth could not resist the temptation of trying for the throne of Samarqand. That town was the heart of

Central Asia, politically, commercially, and above all culturally. Its climate, fertility, beauty, glory, prosperity and historical associations cast a spell on all the Timurids. Undeterred by the unsettled condition of Farghana and the lurking danger from ambitions, untrustworthy and even disloyal nobility, Babar made his first bid for Samarqand in 1496, a year after the death of his uncle Sultan Mahmud Mirza of Hissar, whom the nobles of Samarqand and Bukhara had invited to rule. Mahmud's son, Baisunghar Mirza, ascended the throne but failed to get the unanimous support of the nobles of those towns. Some of them invited the Mongol prince Sultan Mahmud, but he was beaten back by Baisunghar Mirza. Failing in their designs, they invited Sultan Ali, younger brother of Baisunghar to take the throne. A civil war between the two brothers gave an opportunity to Babar, who marched upon Sammarqand and laid siege to it (1496). He failed to produce any impression and owing to the advent of cold weather had to retire without achieving anything.

In May 1497 Sultan Ali and Babar jointly besieged Samarqand. The siege was pushed so vigorously that Baisunghar, in his despair, called the help of Shah Beg Khan, the warlike leader of the reorganized Uzbek power. Since Shaibani could not break the obstinate resistance of Babar's troops, Baisunghar lost faith in him and offered him a cold reception. Disgusted with this treatment, Shaibani turned back leaving Samarqand to its fate. Losing heart, Baisunghar slipped out of Samarqand. The people of the town invited Babar, who realized, though temporarily, his ambition of ruling at Samarqand (Nov. 1497).

Babar was not destined to enjoy the first fruit of his ambition. His nobles were displeased with him for not only did he peremptorily refuse their request to allow them to plunder Samarqand, but insisted on treating them on terms of equality with the conquered people. Taking advantage of his serious illness, Babar's followers began to desert, till only one thousand men remained with him. Moreover, the affairs of Farghana

took a bad turn. A proposal was sent to him by some leading nobles to transfer Akhshi and Andejan to his brother, Jahangir Mirza. Another came from his maternal uncle, the Mongol Sultan Ahmad, to transfer Andejan to him. Of course, Babar could not accept such proposals, but he lay helpless in bed. Failing to get a favourable answer from Babar, two powerful nobles, Auzun Hasan and Tambal laid siege to Andejan. As soon as he could ride, Babar left Samarqand , but on his way he learnt that Andejan had fallen to the rebels. Not long after, he was informed that Sultan Ali of Bukhara was invited by a faction and had taken possession of Samarqand. The loss of Andejan and Samarqand in quick succession taxed the endurance of Babar severely. He sought the help of his maternal uncle, Mahmud Khan, but could not secure it. Still he thought of returning to Samarqand but had no means. He smarted at Khojend and could not for some time see any way out of his difficulty. There was no alternative for him ; hence with only three hundred followers he passed the winter as a guest of Muhammad Hussain Doghlat at Aurtippa.

Auzun and Tambal were not liked by the people of Andejan. They began to rally round Ali Dost Taghai, the brave and influential leader, who had offered resistance to those two rebels. He extended a cordial invitation to Babar from Marghilan, which was readily accepted. The people of Akhshi rose against the garrison, drove it out and declared for Babar. Andejan and other towns followed suit. Meanwhile, reinforcement arrived from Mahmud, the Mongol Khan, which encouraged the partisans of Babar. Farghana was recovered, but the nobles insisted on its division. Andejan was to remain with Babar while Akhshi was to go to Jahangir Mirza. The arrangement was to last till Samarqand was reconquered, after which Babar would kept Samarqand and leave the whole of Farghana to Jahangir. Babar accepted this proposal on the understanding that both the parties would make united efforts to reconquer Samarqand.

At Samarqand and Bukhara the relations between Sultan Ali and the Tarkhan Chiefs, Muhammad Mazid and Baqi, who controlled the revenues of the two cities respectively, were strained. Sultan Ali wanted to control the revenue affairs which the Tarkhans were unwilling to hand over. Failing to muster support from other quarters, the Tarkhans invited Babar. Disgusted with the overbearing manners of his nobles and anxious to get Samarqand, he accepted the invitation gladly. In spite of the alarming news of the fall of Aush in the hands of Tambal's brother, Babar decided to forge ahead with his plans to capture Samarqand. With a small army he commenced his march. He had hardly reached the border of his kingdom when he was informed that Shaibani Khan had captured Bukhara from Baqi Tarkhan and was marching against Samarqand. Babar now began to hesitate and demanded an open declaration in his favour from Mazid and his supporters. The latter promised to do so when Babar reached near Samarqand. While the negotiations were dragging on, Shaibani Khan took Samarqand with the help of the mother of Sultan Ali Mirza. She delivered the town on the understanding that Shaibani would marry her and make liberal provision for her son. Her hopes were never fulfilled and she could not rise above the position of a concubine. Her son was also killed by shaibani's men three or four days after the surrender of Samarqand.

Babar changed his plans and, although deserted by his men, he moved on to Hissar. It was obvious that he had lost the confidence of even his supporters and could not expect a friendly welcome in Farghana. The number of his followers had dwindled so deplorably that he had to turn his reins from Hissar to seek the hospitality of Sultan Ahmad, the Great Khan of the Mongols. On his way he decided to take a chance at Samarqand where, he was informed, great discontent prevailed against the boorish Uzbek conqueror.

One dark night his supporters managed to smuggle him and his followers into Samarqand. Immediately he was hailed by the people who rose up in arms against

the Uzbeks. At that time there were only five hundred Uzbeks in the town, for their main army was quartered outside. Shaibani was startled from his slumber in the palace. Panic-stricken, he made good his escape and safely joined his army. Babar's joy knew no bounds. He celebrated his success by marrying one daughter of each of his two uncles who had ruled at Sarmarqand and thereby reinforced his claims to rule there (1500).

Burning with revenge, Shaibani retreated to Bukhara where he began to reorganize his forces for a final struggle. Babar also appealed for help to all the Timurids within his reach and even to the Mongol Khan, but had no assuring response. Fearing the consolidation of Shaibani's power and hoping to inspire his Timurid kinsmen by an energetic action, Babar moved out of Samarqand in 1501. Shaibani welcomed this move and decided to force a battle before any reinforcement could arrive to help Babar. A well-contested battle was fought at Saripul, on the Kohit, in which Babar was defeated. Samarqand was so vigorously besieged that the inhabitants of the town began to starve. Losing all hopes of saving the town, Babar sued for peace. He had to surrender the city, and give his elder sister in marriage to the hated foe, but was allowed to go away to wilderness with his family. He could not return to Farghana which was ruled over by his brother Jahangir Mirza. After knocking about in utter misery, destitution and helplessness he decided to seek asylum with his maternal uncle, Mahmud Khan.

Babar was received with kindness by Mahmud Khan. At that time the Great Khan also had come. Both the uncles and Babar decided to reconquer Farghana from Jahangir Mirza's right hand man and virtual ruler, Tambal. The plan seemed to work well but Akhshi and Andejan held out. Tambal showed a remarkable power of resistance. He tried even to win over Babar and separate him from his uncles. Having failed in his attempts to hold Farghana, he invoked the help of Shaibani Khan. The Khan readily responded and came to Farghana as quickly as possible. The

Mongol Khans were not prepared to face the formidable invaders. They beat a rapid retreat from Farghana. Babar was left in the lurch. He tried to make a bold stand, but the odds were against him. At last, he had to seek safety in flight. After a very narrow escape and thrilling adventures he succeeded in joining his maternal uncles.

In 1503 Babar and his maternal uncles returned to conquer Farghana. Shaibani was also ready to meet them. His movements were so dexterous and unexpectedly quick that the Mongol Khans were taken by complete surprise at Archian. They were utterly routed and taken prisoners. This decisive battle sealed the fate of the Timurids in Transoxiana. The Mongol Khans were allowed to go. Babar had managed to escape but he was so doggedly pursued that he hardly found time to rest. After wandering about and enduring every kind of hardship and misery he recluctantly said good-bye to Central Asia. During this period Shaibani had conquered Hissar and Qunduz, and this brought the third kingdom of the Timurids also to an end (1504).

While wandering about and marking time Babar was told at Tirmiz that it was useless for him to loiter about in Central Asia, and that he would do well if he tried his luck in Afghanistan where the government was unpopular and unstable. In case he decided on the invasion of Afghanistan he would be able to secure a decent following. The affairs at Kabul were favourable for such an advance. Ulugh Beg Mirza had died in 1501, leaving his infant son, Abdur Razzaq, to succeed him. One Muhammad Muqim Arghun, backed up by the Hazaras , captured power at Kabul, married a sister of the little king and tried to replace the old nobility by one of his own creation. This led to defiance and disorder in the kingdom. So, when Babar descended upon Kabul in Octorer 1504 there was hardly any resistance. Muqim was allowed to go to his father at Garamsir near Qandahar. Babar assigned Ghazni and Ningnahar respectively to his two brothers Jahangir and Nasir Mirza.

The work of pacification and consolidation of Afghanistan and her warlike tribes was in itself a difficult task. It became more complicated owing to the disloyalty of Babar's Mongol followers and his kinsmen. In 1505 he led an expedition against the Hazaras and Bangash tribes and reconnoitred the country to the west of the Indus rivers, as far as Jamrud, Kohat and Dera Ismail Khan. Nasir Mirza left his post at Ghazni to take over the rulership of Badakhshan, from where he had to return after a few months. Next year (1506) Jahangir Mirza rebelled and after sacking Ghazni went over to the hostile Mongols.

Although conditions in Afghanistan were so unsettled and disquieting , Babar readily responded to the call of Sultan Husain Baiqra to all the Timurids to join his colours and make a united effort to deal with the Uzbek menace. He hastened to join them. On his way he heard that the Sultan was dead but his two sons acting jointly as his successors were eager to carry out the plan. So he pushed on. On reaching their camp he found that the princes were unbusinesslike, worthless, and quite incompetent to lead a compaign of great magnitude. He, therefore, turned back and luckily reached Kabul just in time to suppress a dangerous conspiracy to place Wais Mirza, his cousin, on the throne.

The most engaging developments for Babar, however, were taking place on the frontiers of Persia. Shaibani Khan captured Herat in 1507, and without much difficulty became the master of the whole of Khorasan. This finished the fourth important Timurid kingdom. It was feared that Shaibani would next concentrate his attention on Afghanistan, the only surviving principality of the Timurids, and his first move would be directed against Qandahar. At the request of the Arghuns of Qandahar to take charge of it before the impending attack of Shaibani, Babar hurried up. But the Arghuns acted treacherously and attacked him. Success, however, remained with Babar, and for a short time, Qandahar came into his possession. He

established a sort of claim over Qandahar though on the arrival of Shaibani it had to be evacuated (1507).


The arrival of Shaibani Khan made Babar extremely anxious. He thought of moving towards India should it be necessary. But to the great relief of Babar Shaibani went back. During the next three years the only event of a serious nature was a deep laid plot to set aside Babar and place Wais Mirza on the throne. But his courage, coolheadedness and resourcefulness saved him (1508). He was generous enough to allow Wais Mirza to go to Badakhshan, where he was well received. Babar fully realized that one of the important causes for discontent and disaffection was his inability to make liberal provision for his kinsmen—Turks and Mongols—and their followers. But the resources of Afghanistan were so meagre that he could not help it. Although he had been casting greedy eyes on India for some years, he could not make up his mind to leave Afghanistan. The attraction of Central Asia was as great for him as was the danger from Shaibani Khan. His authority was not so well established in Afghanistan as to encourage him to provoke a war with Sikandar Shah, the Afghan ruler of Delhi, whose reputation among the powerful rulers of northern India was quite high. On no account was he prepared to lose Afghanistan, which occupied a safe and strategic position from where he could see both east and west.

In December 1510 was fought a decisive battle at Merw between Shaibani Khan and Shah Ismail Safavi. After the conquest of Khorasan by Shaibani and the penetration of the Uzbeks in Kirman, a conflict between the two great conquerors had become inevitable. Nobody could, however, forecast that the Uzbek power would receive a formidable set-back in the very first clash. But this was what precisely happened. Fortune declared in favour of Shah Ismail , and Shaibani Khan was killed. Babar welcomed this capital news. Leaving Nasir Mirza at Kabul he left for Central Asia with his infant sons, Humayun and Kamran (1511).

At Qunduz, Babar was delighted to meet his sister

Khanzada Begam who was captured after the death of Shaibani and was honourably escorted to her brother with a gracious message of Shah Ismail. Babar availed himself of the opportunity, gratefully acknowledging the friendly message of the Shah and sent him presents through an embassy. The result of the negotiations was satisfactory to both the parties. The Shah probably realized that it would be a most difficult and almost impossible task to rule over the Sunni population of the warlike Turks, Uzbeks and Mongols of Central Asia. If Babar, a popular Timurid, could be persuaded to act as his vassal, the task would become easy. Babar, on the other hand, was aware of the fact that, in spite of the defeat of the Uzbeks and the death of Shaibani Khan, the power of the Uzbeks was far from broken. The confederate Uzbek chiefs, as usual, would come together under a new leader and soon give another proof of their amazing recuperative power. With the friendship of the Shah of Persia, he could expect to rule with peace at least till his position became unassailable. But the Shah was not simply a military leader nor his new empire secular. Himself a fanatic, he was the leader of a fiercely fanatic people. The price demanded by the Shah from Babar amounted to the reading of the *Khutba*, issuing of coins in the name of the Shah, observing of Shia court etiquette, and the encouragement of the Shia creed. Babar was liberal and catholic, and intensely keen on ruling over Samarqand. He agreed to issue coins in the name of the twelve Imams, and adopt Shia dress himself, but wanted to exercise the right of issuing coins in his own name in Farghana and Kabul. In doing so he did not feel that he was seriously compromising his faith or his sovereignty over Farghana and Afghanistan. Since the Shah was anxious for some sort of a workable agreement, the terms of Babar were accepted.

The joint armies then moved on to Bukhara which surrendered readily. Encouraged with the enthusiasm of the population of the country and the town but apprehending serious misgivings of the people of



EMPIRE
OF
BABAR
&
HUMAYUN
Babar
Humayun
English Statute Miles.
Ghazdwan
Bokhara
Samarkand
Andijan
Kashghar
Merv
BADAKHSHAN
Balkh
Qunduz
Sar-i-pul
Herat
Kabul
KASHMIR
Ghazni
Qandahar
Sialkot
Lahore
Dipalpur
Multan
Sirhind
Panipat
Hissar
Mewat
Delhi
Sambhal
INDEPENDENT
RAJPUT
STATES
Bhakkar
SINDH
Jaisalmer
Jodhpur
Ajmer
Umar kot
Alwar
Biyana
Agra
Gwalior
Kanauj
Lucknow
Jaunpur
Chausa
Benares
Kalinjan
Chanderi
Chittor
Pattan
Mandasor
Sarangpur
Raisen
Garah
Ahmadabad
Champaner
Baroda
Cambay
Junagarh
Diu
Broach
Surat
Champaran
Surajgarh
Gaur
R. Brahmputra
R. Mahanadi
Ahmadnagar
Bidar
Bijapur
Vijayanagar
R. Cavery

Samarqand owing to the presence of the Persian army, Babar sent them back with thanks and presents. Even Wais Mirza was sent back to Badakhshan. Freed from uncomfortable allies, Babar moved on to Samarqand where he received a spontaneous and enthusiastic welcome (Oct. 1511). Mirza Haider drove out the Uzbeks from Farghana. He could now boast of ruling over an empire which included all the territory which owed allegiance to his grand-father Abu Saīd Mirza—the whole of Central Asia to Tashkant and Kabul.

Babar was not destined to retain the empire for more than a year. With all his regard for the Shah of Persia he could neither persuade himself to persecute his Sunni brethren of Central Asia nor submit to the airs and graces of Muhammad Jan, the arrogant representative of the Shah at his court. He could neither share the proselytising or destructive zeal of the Shia fanatics nor could he forget that he focussed in himself the honour and dignity of the house of Timur and the hopes of his Sunni countrymen. Muhammad Jan's exaggerated accounts of the behaviour of Babar gradually led the Shah to believe that the latter was arrogant, faithless and disloyal. On the other hand, the people of Samarqand felt that Babar was a tool in the hands of the heretic Shiaites and lacked the courage of asserting his authority and defending the dignity either of his own house or his subjects. Thus Babar was between the devil and deep sea. He could not make up his mind on any definite action for he was aware of the fact that the Uzbeks were far from crushed and were only waiting for an opportunity to retrieve their honour and recover their empire.

As could be expected, the Uzbek chieftains rallied their forces under the leadership of Ubaidullah Khan, the nephew of Shaibani Khan, and Jani Beg. Of the two, Ubaidullah, from whom Bukhara was snatched, was more keen and energetic. Taking advantage of the coolness and growing hostility between Babar and the Shah, he invaded Bukhara. Babar marched out from

Samarqand to save that important town. But in its vicinity at Kul-i-Malik he was beaten in spite of a spectacular display of personal valour. His retreat to Samarqand was cut off. With the Uzbeks close at his heels, he managed to reach Hissar. Wisely enough the Uzbeks did not waste their energy and time in besieging that town. They engaged themselves in re-establishing their authority and consolidating their gains.

The Shah of Persia had not anticipated the rapid recovery of the Uzbeks, much less their aggressive and amazingly swift counter-attack. He had sent his most aristocratic and wealthy officer, Najmuddin Sani, with eleven thousand men to teach a lesson to Babar. Before he could reach the frontier of Khorasan, Najmuddin came to know of the debacle in the fortune of Babar. He was non-plussed. He waited for instructions. He was directed to change his plan and to give full support to Babar, who after all was less dangerous than the Uzbeks. As usual the Persian army, fired by sectarian fervour and fanaticism, carried fire and sword as it moved along, to the utter disgust of Babar and dismay of the Sunni population. The joint army of Babar and the Persians, however, reached Bukhara and laid siege to it. A few months elapsed which gave time to the Uzbek chiefs to bring their forces together and launch an attack against the invaders. On he 12th of November, 1512, a bloody battle was fought at Ghajdawan in which the Persian army was annihilated and their general killed. Merv was revenged. Babar, who had shown indifference on that occasion owing to the arrogance and furious fanaticism of the Persians, and had lost the sympathy of the Central Asians on account of his association with them, had no alternative but to fall back upon Hissar and then to return to Kabul, disillusioned and disappointed. His hope to rule over Central Asia was dashed to pieces although its echoes continued to haunt his dreams to the end of his life.

The next few years Babar spent in consolidating his authority in Afghanistan. He must have been watching the developments in the west. The Uzbeks

were, of course, his enemies, and his relations with Persia were no longer friendly. In 1514 a bloody battle was fought between the Shah of Persia and the Ottomon Sultan, Salim, the Grim, at Khaldiran. In spite of their amazing heroism the Persians were defeated because they had no fire-arms while the Ottomons possessed the finest park of artillery in the world. The effectiveness of fire-arms in warfare captured the attention of Babar. Although his means were very limited, he secured the services of Ustad Ali Rumi to introduce the use of fire-arms in his army. While this was being done Babar carried military expedition against Qandahar and several Afghan tribes. Early in January, 1519 he made an experiment with his newly created matchlockmen on the Yusuf Zais and found them so effective that in 1520 he called another expert Mustafa Rumi to strengthen his war-efforts. These preparations were, most likely, connected with his intention to open his campaigns in India. The opportunity was favourable for neither the Persians nor the Uzbeks could seriously think of the conquest of Afghanistan. A sort of balance of power existed in Central and Western Asia, between the Osmanalities, the Persians and the Uzbeks. Babar could, therefore, turn his attention towards India, where the affairs of the Lodi Afghan empire were shaky. The Afghan ruler Sikandar Lodi had died in 1517 and the question of succession had had precipitated a civil war and widespread unrest.

CHAPTER II

THE LODI EMPIRE

The invasion of Timur and sack of Delhi at the close of the fourteenth century precipitated the slow disintegration of the Tughluq Empire. On its ashes grew up numerous kingdoms. In fact, anyone who could afford sufficient strength to assume independence did so. Even northern India became a congeries of states of varying strength and dimensions. Of these states Gujrat, Malwa, Jaunpur and Bengal were more or less organized and promised to gain stability. Besides these Muslim states, there were the numerous Hindu states of Rajputana among which that of Mewar had forged ahead and, in the latter part of the fifteenth century, acquired the hegemony of the Rajput Confederacy. The Hindu states of the Central Provinces had ceased to play any part in the general history of India, while Orissa was more interested in the affairs of South rather than those of North India. The newly formed states of Nothern India waged constant wars among themselves either to extend their sphere of influence, or settle their boundaries, or to acquire a dominant position among the neighbouring states. Some of them even entertained a remote ambition of occupying the throne of Delhi, but either the distance or the opposition of other powers seemed so insuperable that they had to give it up.

It was not till Bahlul Lodi ascended the throne of Delhi in 1451 that it seemed to acquire some prestige. The Saiyids depended for their power largely on the support of the Afghans and for their prestige on the title they had gained from Timur. The latter they lost when the affairs of the Timurids were thrown in confusion and no help could be expected from them, even if they were willing to give. Their Afghan followers were adventurers and fortune-seekers and had little reason to feel any sense of loyalty or respect for the

imbecile Saiyids. These adventurers had spread over the Southern, Central and Eastern Punjab and infiltrated into the heart of the U. P. where they acquired large fiefs. They felt some obstacles in their way. One was the opposition from the rulers of Jaunpur, the other from the ruler of Kabul, and the third from the Khokars, the warlike community of the Northern and Western Punjab, who had caused some headache even to Timur. The Khokar leader, Jasrat, was won over by Bahlul who promised not to invade his homeland provided he did not interfere with his design to capture Delhi. Freed from danger in the west, he manoeuvred out by force and fraud the imbecile Saiyid ruler Alam Shah and secured for himself the succession to the throne of Delhi (1451).

The Afghans were popular neither with the Hindus nor with the non-Afghan Muslim population of India. By the old nobility they were almost despised as the most unscrupulous and undependable brutes. They could not, therefore, evoke any enthusiasm towards themselves; on the other hand they expected tough opposition. The most formidable opposition came from the Sharqi rulers of Jaunpur. Failing to get adequate support in India, Bahlul sent an appeal to the people of Roh in eastern Afghanistan to come and save the honour and power of their brethren. He promised therein that "the title indeed of sovereignty shall vest with me, but whatever countries we may conquer shall be shared between us as brothers". It was, indeed, a spacious promise which could lend itself to varied interpretations. Having liberally interpreted it, the Afghans of Roh commenced their trek, which could be compared with the Gold Rush of the United States of America. Persian historians in their usual style have compared it with the march of 'ants and locusts'.

The arrival of a large number of Afghan tribes with their leaders strengthened the hands of Bahlul and stabilized his power against the Sharqis and other neighbouring states. But he had to adopt a policy which had no parallel in the history of either the Hindus

or the Muslims of India. He had to import in the vast plains of India a system which might have worked in a way in the dales and valleys of Afghanistan but had to be rejected by subsequent Afghan rulers including Sher Shah. The ties of common blood and interest could not work for long with a people wedded to the principle of blood feud, and their interests were bound to clash in the rich plains and still richer towns of India. Bahlul, however, stuck to his promise and treated the Afghans "as companions rather than subjects". The country was parcelled out into fiefs of varying sizes which were distributed to the tribal leaders on principles not clearly known. Even the public treasure, was divided among them. In deference to their sentiments or for a theatrical display of humility, he would not sit on the throne before them, or issue orders in the form of a command. If anyone of them got displeased for any reason Bahlul would go up to his house and whine till his mood changed for the better.

The plan of Bahlul Lodi had no doubt some temporary advantages. By pandering to their whims, fancy and vanity, he minimised for the time-being the possibility of intrigue by the nobles for the throne. It brought him some immediate advantages but in the long run it proved disastrous. For while it lowered the dignity of the sovereign by reducing him to the position of a peer, it ushered in the rule of innumerable autocrats instead. Feudal and baronial regime was most likely to be the outcome of Bahlul's policy. It was as dangerous for the common people as for the sovereign. Such a policy might have been appreciated by the exotic Afghans but could not inspire any confidence among the non-Afghan peoples of India. It was clearly based on racial, tribal and parochial considerations and was, therefore, narrow, unprogressive and heavily lop-sided in a country like India. It carried in its core destructive elements which were likely to explode in tribal jealousies and the dissolution of the artificially-bolstered-up Afghan power.

Sikandar Lodi, the son and successor of Bahlul

Lodi, had to reap the first fruits of that policy. As soon as he came to the throne (1489), the Afghan tribal leaders insisted on the division of the empire. Had he agreed to the principle of division between his brothers, the logical conclusion would have been the dismemberment of the empire into six principalities. With great reluctance, he agreed to share it with Barbak Shah, but he changed his mind soon and after fighting several battles reunited the empire. Able, warlike and shrewd as Sikandar was, he discovered the impracticability of his father's policy and decided to enforce discipline and obedience to the sovereign authority. He gave up the policy of meekness and humility and assumed a high tone in his orders and court etiquette. As a set-off against the power of tribal leaders he mobilized the active support of religious leaders , even at the risk of some persecution of the Hindus. His successes in wars, his personality, liberality, demeanour and his popularity with Muslim divines combined to restore, dignity, authority and power of the crown. But the tribal instincts of the Afghans and their greed for wealth and power were so strong that they looked forward with suppressed longing to the return of the days of Bahlul.

Sikandar Lodi died in November, 1517. His son Ibrahim had to go through the same trial of strength. The Afghans were divided on the question of the division of the empire. Those who were for a united empire rallied round Ibrahim Lodi and a civil war ensued which ultimately ended in his triumph. In this war, the part played by Azam Humayun Sharwani was very suspicious. He had changed sides and was charged of allowing prince Jalal Khan, the leader of the pro-division party, to escape from Gwalior. Consequently, with one of his sons, he was thrown into prison. At this, his other son, Islam Khan openly rebelled and captured Agra, the capital of the empire. To meet this defiance, Ibrahim marched back but was deserted by Azam-Humayun Lodi and Saīd Khan. They demanded from him the release of Azam Humayun Sharwani, but the

Sultan peremptorily refused the request. He defeated the rebels and executed Islam Khan. Azam Humayun Sharwani died, or was killed in prison. Another noble, Shaikh Husain Mian Maruf Farmuli, had deserted to the Rajputs at such a critical moment that it almost exposed the Sultan's army to the risk of being defeated. Miyan Bhua was the chief financial officer of Sikandar Lodi. He was aged and experienced and therefore respected. He considered Ibrahim a child, flouted his authority and managed the financial affairs as he liked without any reference to the Sultan. He was therefore dismissed and his son was placed in his office.

The sternness of Ibrahim in dealing with the disloyal, recalcitrant and defiant nobles, irrespective of any consideration of blood, status or office, had the desired effect. His authority in the central portion of the empire was firmly established. He had good reasons for adopting a firm attitude because Husain Shah and Nusrat Shah of Bengal were worming their way into Southern Bihar. Rana Sanga was trying to extend his influence in Eastern Rajputana, and Babar was threatening to open an attack from the west. An empire threatened on three frontiers could not afford the dubious luxury of a long-drawn civil war or allow narrow-minded and mischievous tribalism to stalk freely in the land. Ibrahim was following the policy of his father with a momentum added to it by the circumstances in which speed was a very important factor.

The successes gained by Ibrahim in the Eastern Punjab and U.P. (the modern Uttar Pradesh) alarmed the powerful nobles, who were the wardens of the marches. In the east were the Nohanis, who were strong in Bihar; and in the west the Lodis, his kinsmen, were almost supreme. Ever since the days of Bahlul Lodi they had been enjoying all but sovereign title and therefore had come to regard the Punjab as if it was their own kingdom. Their leader, Daulat Khan, son of Tatar Khan, who was "one of the bitterest opponents of Sultan Sikandar Lodi", ruled at Lahore as an uncrowned king for twenty years. With him was Alam Khan Lodi, an

uncle of Ibrahim Lodi and an old claimant to the throne of Agra. Ibrahim was anxious to assure himself of Daulat Khan's loyalty. He called him to the court but Daulat did not go in person though he sent one of his sons. The Sultan did not like this behaviour and threatened to take action should it become necessary. On his return Dilawar Khan conveyed the hint of the Sultan to his father and also informed him of the suppressed discontent among some of the nobles. Daulat Khan's chief object in life was to retain supreme authority in the Punjab. It was his house, which had extended the authority of the Afghans there and had dispossessed the Mughals of the the Western Punjab. Daulat Khan, therefore, naturally feared the movements of Babar on the western side of the Indus.

In 1519 Babar crossed the Indus, raided Bhira which was governed by Ali Khan, son of Daulat Khan, and compelled the people to pay a good ransom. From there he despatched Mulla Murshid to the court of Ibrahim Lodi, whom he considered the lawful ruler of the Lodi Empire, with the proposal of returning portions of the Western Punjab which belonged to his uncle, Ulugh Beg Mirza of Afghanistan. Daulat Khan refused to see the envoy and prevented him from proceeding beyond Lahore. He probably feared lest Ibrahim should deliver those districts and make friends with Babar, or reject the proposal and thus provoke a war with him in Punjab. Since Babar was not prepared to stay longer in India or embark upon extensive operations he did not push the matter further. None the less, he "was resolved" to get them into his hands "whether peacefully or by force". After he recrossed the Indus the Afghans drove out his officers and re-occupied the district.

Next year Babar again conquered Bhira and pushed on as far as Sialkot and Saiyidpur (Aminabad). He might have pushed further on but the news of the raids of Shah Beg Arghun of Qandahar compelled him to retrace his steps. So far the expeditions of Babar were of a reconnoitring character. He must have found out

that the road to the Punjab was clear after the Indus was crossed, that the Afghans were either incapable of resistance or for some reason were anxious to avoid a serious clash with him, and that Qandahar must be conquered before any extensive operations in India could be undertaken. The conquest of Qandahar was also necesssary for the peace and safety of Afghanistan, which for obvious reasons was to remain for the time-being the base of his operations anywhere. Moreover, whether for Herat, Kabul or Hindustan, Qandahar was a very strategic place. Babar relates that the districts of "Bhira, Khushab, Chinab and Chiniut were held by the Turks" down to 1504. It was during the confusion following the death of Ulugh Beg Mirza, the uncle of Babar, that the Afghans had annexed them to the Punjab. With a view to recovering them Babar had led two invasions (1518-19), the first against Bhira, "the gateway of Hindustan", and the second against Sialkot. In 1519 he had sent an envoy, Mulla Murshid, to Ibrahim with the proposal of transferring those districts of the Western Punjab to him. Not only was he not allowed to proceed to the court of Ibrahim, Daulat Khan even refused to grant him an interview. This annoyed Babar.

The policy of Daulat Khan was to avoid a conflict both with Babar and Ibrahim Lodi. He would have preferred to be left alone in the Punjab and from there watch the development in the east and west ; and in the ripeness of time decide upon his final course of action. He must have been aware of the policy of Ibrahim Lodi, but probably expected that the nobles opposing him would settle with him. He did not even offer any serious resistance to Babar either to keep on his good side or to show to Ibrahim the impending danger from the west and make him look more important than ever for the defence of the empire. But the successes of Ibrahim Lodi on the one hand and of Babar on the other made him realize that he was between scylla and charybdis. He had to decide one way or the other. Ibrahim Lodi had offered him an opportunity of which he would not avail himself, either owing to his

guilty conscience, or selfishness or fear. Then came a hint of a threatening nature from the Sultan which seemed to have frightened him out of his wits. Equally alarming was the news that Qandahar which was a thorn by the side of Babar, had surrendered to Babar in 1522, and the Shah of Persia had done nothing about it. No serious obstacle now stood in Babar's way to carry out large-scale operations in the Punjab. Babar had good reasons to be angry with him for Hindu Beg and other officers who had been sent to govern the territory claimed by Babar were driven out by the Afghans. For Daulat Khan the moment for final decision had arrived.

Ibrahim Lodi was not too keen on precipitating a conflict with Daulat Khan. His attention was for the moment rivetted on consolidating his power and keeping his energies reserved. The situation in Rajputana was no less, if not more, alarming than in the Punjab. Rana Sanga had won a great victory over Mahmud II of Malwa and taken him as a prisoner (1519). He had defeated Mubarizul Mulk and captured Ahmadnagar in 1520. These conquest had brought him into conflict with Gujrat, the results of which were of considerable importance for the Lodi empire. The struggle was dragging on and the armies of Gujrat were getting the better of the Rajputs. It did not matter which side won. If the Rajputs won they might turn their victorious arms towards Eastern Rajputana. If they lost, the road to Agra would be open for the ambitious and resourceful Muzaffar Shah II.

The situation on the eastern front was not so serious yet, but the clouds of trouble were gathering there also. In 1521 Nasiruddin Nusrat Shah had moved his troops towards Bihar. He conquered Tirhut and pushed the frontiers of his kingdom as far as Monghyr and Hajipur. In case the Lohanis failed to stop his progress, he could easily threaten Jaunpur and Chunar. If, however, they sought for his friendship the two could threaten the whole of the eastern portion of the empire which was not till then properly consolidated, and where some trouble was yet smouldering.

Ibrahim was not fully posted with the affairs of the Punjab. Daulat Khan had kidnapped the envoy of Babar and drawn an iron curtain for he feared lest an understanding between Babar and Ibrahim Lodi should throw him into an insignificant position and the supremacy over the Punjab might pass to one or the other. Ibrahim, therefore, could not fully appraise the situation on the north-western frontier, though he must have heard of the raids of Babar. There was nothing startling so far in the career or achievements of Babar, which could strike terror in the heart of any of the important rulers of India. Such raids as Babar had led so far were not unusual at least during the regime of the Saiyids.

In 1523 peace was established between Gujrat and Mewar. Ibrahim could now act more freely. The Afghan nobles at Lahore decided upon sending Alam Khan and Dilawar Khan, son of Daulat Khan, to Babar to persuade him to help them in removing Ibrahim Lodi and placing Alam Khan on the throne. The reasons given for such a course of action were firstly, that Ibrahim was an incorrigible tyrant, of whom the Afghan nobility was thoroughly tired, and secondly, that Alam Khan would be friendly and highly deferential in his attitude towards Babar. With a view to absolving themselves of the charge of treachery, they gave a highly exaggerated account of his evil doings, foolishness, haughtiness and greediness, and painted him in the blackest colour. They promised that they would obey the instructions of Babar and act under his guidance. The line of action taken by the nobles of Lahore was intended to direct the attention of Babar from Dilawar Khan and his officers to Ibrahim Lodi, and, without making any positive commitments, show their anxiety to co-operate with him in deposing the Lodi Sultan. Such a spacious proposal had latitude enough to lend itself to different interpretations. If Dilawar was cunning enough to keep it vague, Babar was equally clever in not demanding clear elucidation or precision. Babar, however, was convinced that there was no solidarity among the Afghans and the opportunity was favourable for

an adventurous drive. So far Babar had been thinking only of those districts of the Western Punjab which once formed a part of the kingdom of Kabul. Now his vision seems to have included the whole of the Punjab, if not the entire Lodi empire. If the plan worked well he could rival the achievements of Timur in Hindustan, which would be an adequate compensation for his failures in Central Asia. Moreover, it would solve effectively and permanently his serious economic and financial problems for which he had originally turned his attention and energy towards the Punjab.

Whether Ibrahim Lodi knew or not the details of the negotiations between Daulat Khan and Alam on the one hand and Babar on the other he must have got an inkling of them. He therefore decided to send an army to capture and occupy Lahore. Biban Khan and Mubarak Khan reached Lahore without any serious opposition and occupied it. Dilawar had evacuated that town and gone to Multan probably to wait there till the arrival of Babar. The force of occupation was not strong enough, ncr its position so consolidated as to offer a successful resistance. It was defeated by Babar, who captured, sacked and burnt Lahore. To take full advantage of the initial and easy success, Babar pushed on to Dipalpur and captured it (1524). Here came Daulat Khan to pay respect to him. Babar was pleased to appoint him as governor of Jullundhar, Sultanpur and some other districts. This was not what Daulat Khan had bargained for. The loss of prestige along with the governorship of Lahore came as a rude shock to him and opened his eyes.

Daulat Khan then began to think of some way to get rid of Babar at least for the time being, and then workout some plan independently. He advised Babar to disperse the Afghan insurgents who had collected near Dera Ismail Khan before moving further. But Dilawar Khan, who had ingratiated himself with Babar and was trying to serve his own ends, revealed to him that the plan suggested to him was intended to divided his forces and then destroy them. On this, Babar had Daulat Khan

and Ghazi Khan arrested. This was the bitterest pill of humility Daulat Khan had to swallow. Babar carried them as prisoners with him till he reached Naushehra, on his way back to Kabul, and there released them. The return of Babar was due to his failure in evoking enthusiasm for himself in the Punjab, the disaffection of Daulat Khan and Ghazi Khan, the raids of the Uzbeks in Badakhshan, and the unpreparedness of his nobles for prolonged and vigorous operations.

Meanwhile, Daulat Khan received a note from Ibrahim Lodi expressing his utter surprise and disappointment at his policy of inviting foreigners to settle of affairs of the Afghans, and promising him his rights and privileges in the Punjab as before. Although he would not take the blame and ascribed it to the short-sighted and heartless policy of the Sultan, the note also might have contributed a bit to determine his actively hostile attitude towards the Mughals. He girded himself with two swords, probably to fight for the Punjab both against Babar as well as Ibrahim Lodi . Had he done it before, and opposed Babar in 1518-19, he might have fared better. But, in the words of Babar "far from sense and wisdom, shut off from judgment and council must people in Hindustan be, the Afghans above all, for they could not move and make a stand like a foe, nor did they know ways and rules of friendship". Daulat Khan captured Dilawar Khan and drove out Alam Khan from the fiefs assigned to him by Babar.

Alam Khan Lodi had his own plans. He made a definite proposal to Babar to transfer to him the Punjab if he helped him to get the throne of Agra. It might be that about that time Rana Sanga also had expressed his willingness to allow Babar to attack Ibrahim Lodi unmolested, provided that in his turn he was allowed to capture the eastern portions of Rajputana, which formed a bone of contention between Mewar and the Lodi Empire. These proposals strengthened the determination of Babar to launch an invasion on a scale larger than ever, since it was likely to bring him in conflict with the Lodi Sultan.

After leaving Babar, Alam Khan allowed himself to be seduced by Daulat Khan. In consultation with other nobles, a new plan of action was decided upon. While Alam Khan and Dilawar Khan were to attack and capture Delhi, Daulat Khan and Ghazi Khan should regain their power in the Punjab and consolidate it. The object of these nobles was probably to settle the affairs of the Punjab and face Babar with accomplished facts before he could bring his large force into the country. It was expected that the plan would satisfy the interests of Alam Khan as well as Daulat Khan without the intervention of Babar. If it worked successfully it would enable them to deal with both Ibrahim and Babar.

Alam Khan then called upon the Mughal officers posted with garrisons in the Punjab by Babar to join him in the conquest of Delhi. Babar, he added, would come himself as soon as he had settled the affairs of Balkh, for which he had gone there. They expressed their inability to do so until either definite instructions came to them directly from their Padshah, or Haji Khan and the sons of Ghazi Khan were sent as hostages to them. Without waiting for them, Alam Khan ceded the Punjab to Daulat Khan and marched upon Delhi with him. By the time they reached Delhi, an army of thrity or forty thousand, had collected round them. Delhi was laid under siege. Ibrahim Lodi came by forced marches, gave them battle, defeated and dispersed them. Their plan thus fell through. Dilawar Khan and Alam Khan fled to Babar.


Early in December 1525 Babar started for Hindustan. What precisely he meant by Hindustan is difficult to say since he had used it loosely in his *Memoirs*. Of course, he intended to reconquer the Punjab and anticipated opposition from Ibrahim Lodi, which might oblige him to enter Hindustan (beyond the Punjab) but there is no reason to suppose that he hoped to bring the Lodi empire to an end and establish his own instead. Hearing that Daulat Khan was marching on Lahore, Babar pushed on rapidly. The news of

Babar's arrival demoralised the followers of Daulat Khan and they deserted him in such a large number that he had no alternative left but to offer submission to Babar. His property was confiscated, but no harm was done to his person or family.

The surrender of Daulat Khan and the flight of Ghazi Khan brought the Punjab under the control of Babar without any opposition. His prestige and spirit rose higher than ever before, which encouraged him to try conclusions with Ibrahim.

Ibrahim was not idle. He marched out of Delhi with a large army to fight an open engagement with Babar. Hamid Khan, *Shiqdar* of Hissar Firoza, who was coming with some force to join Ibrahim was defeated at Hodal by Humayun. For this the prince was rewarded with the *jagir* of Hissar Firoza. An advance party led by Hatim Khan was defeated by Junaid Barlas. Realizing that the situation was getting serious, Babar halted at Panipat and made preparations to meet the enemy. The total strength of Babar's army has been estimated from eight to twenty-four thousand. It was not a very large army; hence he had to take such a defensive position which under favourable situation could be converted to an offensive one. His knowledge and experience of warfare were wide and he had seen the tactics employed by the Mongols, the Uzbeks, and the Persians. He had moreover the advantage of commanding the services of two Turkish officers who knew the Osmanalite methods of warfare and the effective employment of fire-arms. For the first time the Afghans were going to face an effective combination of heavy cavalry and fire-arms.

Babar made use of the town of Panipat to protect one of his flanks while the other was safeguarded by a ditch and a palisade of felled trees and thorny shrubs. In front he placed a row of hundreds of wagons tied together by ropes of raw hides. This was, however, not a continuous line. Between a set of wagons there were gaps in which small breastworks were erected to give


INDIA & CENTRAL ASIA
IN 1525
100 0 100 200 300 400 500 Miles.
MUGHALISTAN
Tashkand
Akshi
Andijan
FARGHANA
Khojend
Bokhara
Samrkand
Hissar-i-koh
Kashghar
Merv
BADAKHSHAN
Meshed
Balakh
Qunduz
Kashan
Chaldiran
KABUL
Kabul
Herat
Ghazni
ABBASIDES
Qandhar
Sialkot
Bhera
Khushab
Lahore
Julundhur
Sultanpur
Dipalpur
Sirhind
Multan
Bhatinda
Bhatnair
Hissar
Panipat
Mewat
Delhi
MULTAN
RAJPUTS
Sambhal
Hodal
Alwar
Biyana
Jodhpur
Ranthambhor
Gwalior
Kalpi
Kanauj
Lucknow
Kara
Jaunpur
Champaran
Saran
BIHAR
Gaur
Chunar
Chanderi
Bundi
SINDH
Chitor
BENGAL
Sarangpur
Raisen
Gurrah
GONDWANA
Ahmadabad
Navanagar
Mandu
KHANDESH
Junagarh
Diu
GUJRAT
MALWA
BERAR
AHMADNAGAR
Ahmadnagar
Bidar
BIDAR
GOLCONDA
ORISSA
Golconda
Bijapur
BIJAPUR
Vijayanagar
VIJAYANAGAR
AFGHANS
45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 100 105 110
65 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95
45 40 35 30 25 20 15 10 5

reasonable protection to musketeers and artillery men; and at the same time give passage for the deployment of his cavalry at an opportune moment. Behind this line, he arranged his troops in the traditional Timurid fashion; and combined it with the loose and mobile flanks of the Uzbek style.

Ibrahim Lodi came with a large army, which has been roundly and roughly supposed to be a lac, but was probably not less than fifty thousand. He had no doubt two thousand elephants which has not been trained to face the new fire-weapons and therefore were likely to prove an encumbrance, if not a positive danger. The two armies faced each other for a week. Babar was anxious to force Ibrahim to open an attack. To both, delay was likely to cause demoralization and complications. Tired with provocations caused by the Mughals, Ibrahim held a feast, like those of the Spartans and Rajputs, gave away to officers and men the jewels, pearls and gold which he had brought with him and asked them to prepare for a decisive blow. Next day a determined attack was opened.

The Afghan army galloped for a vigorous frontal charge, but finding the front line of the enemy narrow, the flanks hesitated and then converged on it. In doing so, the formation of his army was badly broken and the troop were crowded towards the centre. This was exactly what Babar wished for. He directed his flying flanks to take the enemy on the flanks and the rear and ordered the fire to be opened. These tactics rolled up the Afghans army into a solid mass. It was paralyzed, and it could not be properly deployed. It was mercilessly exposed to deadly fire. The cramped mass was thrown into utter confusion. Ibrahim Lodi was requested by Mahmud Khan to run away for safety before the enemy closed upon him. The Sultan thought it would be disgraceful to choose safety for martyrdom. He refused to listen and rushed into the thick of battle with five or six thousand devoted soldiers, and was engulfed with them in the vortex of annihilation. Panic

overtook the Afghan army which broke and fled only to be slaughtered (April 21, 1526). The head of the dead Sultan was severed and presented to Babar. Babar's success was indeed a success of consummate leadership, scientific methods, superior weapons and good luck. But it was decisive for the Lodi Empire, if not for the whole of India. Delhi and Agra fell into the hands of Babar.

The victory of Babar at Panipat shifted the gravity of his political interests to Agra. It brought new problems for him to solve. The first problem was to restore confidence among the people, who either ran away from the towns, or closed their gates and took whatever measures for defence they could think of . The cohesion of the Afghan army was broken but tribal leaders with their armed followers roamed about not knowing exactly what to do. The big Afghan lords assumed independence. Peace and order could be introduced either by attracting them to the conqueror by kindness and generosity, or compelling them by force of arms to submit to his authority. Some of these chieftains like Nasir Khan Nohani and Maruf Farmuli, held sway over districts beyond Kanauj. They were backed by the Nohani ruler of Bihar, who had assumed independence even in the time of Ibrahim Lodi. Babar employed both the methods. He offered protection and large *jagirs* to those who chose to submit to his rule. For example, Bayzid Farmuli was granted a *jagir* in Oudh worth a crore. Several Afghan chiefs willingly joined Babar, who treated them generously.

To deal with the remaining ones, he parcelled out the unconquered territories and assigned them to his Begs. They were to go to their assignments, establish law and order and keep the administrative and revenue machinery going. Thus Sambhal, Etawah, Kanauj, Dholpur and such other districts were brought under control. The case of Afghan war-lords to the east of Kanauj was different. They were very powerful and could be tackled afterwards more methodically and effectively by operations on a larger scale.

The victory at Panipat was decisive. The same days, (April 21, 1525) Humayun was sent to occupy Agra, and Mahdi Khwaja, brother-in-law of Babar, was despatched to take Delhi. On Friday, 27 April, *Khutba* was read in the name of Babar in the metropolitan mosque at Delhi, and alms were distributed to the poor and needy. From Delhi Babar moved on to Agra, reached there in the afternoon of 10 May and took his abode in the palace of Sultan Ibrahim Lodi.

The battle of Panipat brought Babar to the end of the second stage of his Indian conquest. It sealed the fate of the Lodi dynasty as effectively as his anscestor Timur had done of the Tughluqs, and told seriously on the morale and already weak organization of the Afghans. The soldiers and the peasantry alike ran away in fear of the conqueror ; gates were shut of every fortified town, and people busied themselves in organizing defences everywhere. The supposed solidarity of the Afghans was broken, and the leaders of its various tribes were rent asunder and demorialized. Rana Sanga could not take part in the battle of Panipat probably because of the danger from Muzaffar Shah of Gujrat. The Shah died on 5 April 1526, only fifteen days before (21 April) the battle of Panipat was fought. It was, therefore, not possible for him to organize an effective army and reach Panipat within such a short time. Finally, the victory of Panipat laid the foundation of the great Mughal empire which in grandeur, power and culture was the greatest in the Muslim world and could even claim equality with the Roman empire.

Babar gave away to his Begs and soldiers by thousands the treasure which he found in Delhi and Agra. He did not forget to send presents and gifts to his relations in Samarqand, Iraq, Khorasan and Kashghar, and to the holy men of Samarqand, Khorasan, Macca and Madina. He went so far as to send one Bahluli for every soul in Kabul and the valley-side. For this generosity he got the name of "*Qalandar*". Yet, most of the greater Begs and best braves began to grumble and expressed their unwillingness to stay on in

India. The murmur was not without some justification ; for, the northerners just after the conquest found themselves face to face with terrific heat, which India had not experienced for several years ; violently hot and dusty winds "struck people down in heaps together". Not only was Indian society new and uncongenial to the sons of hills and valleys, but the people also fled away in terror and disgust, which resulted in scarcity of even ordinary provisions ; "neither grain nor corn for our horses was to be had". Moreover, they found that Babar had made up his mind to stay in India, which meant that the battle of Panipat, though a substantial step, was only the first towards the conquest of Hindustan. The prospect of a prolonged stay in the monotonous plains and an endless series of military engagements was quite disgusting to his followers. Babar called a council, and with his characteristic eloquence frankly told them ; "By the labours of several years, by encountering hardship, by long travel, by flinging myself and the army into battle, and by deadly slaughter, we, through God's grace, beat these masses of enemies in order that we may take their broad lands. And now, what force compels us, what necessity has arisen that we should, without cause, abandon countries taken at such a risk of life ? Was it for us to remain in Kabul, the sport of harsh poverty ? Henceforth, let no well-wisher of mine speak of such things. But let not those turn back from going, who, weak in strong persistance, have set their face to depart." The expression of unflinching determination, in plain and unequivocal terms made his followers "willy-nilly, quit their fears". But a few men, particularly Khwaja Kalan, who "had many retainers," would not stay; indeed, he had become so homesick that he had incribed on the walls of his residence in Delhi.

If safe and sound I cross the Sind,
Blacken my face ere I wish for Hind!

From the point of numerical strength Babar's army

did not suffer at all, for some Afghan nobles offered homage to him.

The determination of Babar to stay in India was bound to bring him into conflict with the greatest Rajput ruler, Rana Sangram Singh of Mewar, the victor of eighteen battles. While the Rana nursed boundless ambition in his bosom, for clear political reasons he would certainly have preferred the less formidable neighbour, the Lodis, even if he had failed to win the glory of ruling over a northern empire from the capital of Prithviraj or transfer "the banner of supremacy from Indraprasth to the battlements of Chitor". It was equally bound to encourage the great Afghan leaders, who had not yet experienced the steel of Babar, to make a desperate effort to recover the empire and retrieve their honour

Pending the movements of the Rana, Babar decided to deal with the Afghan in Hindustan. Biyana, Dholpur, Sambhal, Rapri, Etawah and Kalpi were yet in the possession of the Afghan governors, while the whole country from Kanauj to the confines of Bengal was under the independent sway of the (Nohani) Lohani and Farmuli tribes. Babar adopted the old, and the only feasible, method for the time being, viz. of distributing among his prominent followers the yet-unconquered territories and asking them to conquer and consolidate them. Against the Afghans, who were led by Nasir Khan Nohani and Ma'aruf Farmuli, and who held sway over the entire country east of Kanauj, he sent his eldest son, Humayun, who himself had volunteered to subdue them. On the whole, the plan worked well. The prince left Agra on 21 August and as he advanced the Afghans steadily retreated till he had taken Jaunpur and Ghazipur. It appears that the Afghans preferred to watch further development before making a supreme effort to strike back.

Perhaps to keep a watch over the movements of the Afghans and the Rajputs, Babar decided to stay in Agra Although his mind was not quite free from the whirl and strain of things, he beguiled himself by laying out

gardens, constructing chambered wells and baths. But his main idea was to do away with the petty Afghan chiefs of Dholpur, Biyana and Gwalior before coming to grips with the Rana. By his order, Ustad Ali Khan constructed a monster gun for bombarding Biyana and other forts.

Biyana was the key to Rajputana. The Peela-Khal (yellow rivulet) near it was supposed to be the northern boundary of Mewar. Babar naturally desire to capture this fort of great strategic importance, for it could be used either as a bulwark for the defence of his kingdom, or as a base of operation in case he decided to enter Rajputana. It was held by Nizam Khan, whose elder brother Alam Khan, the *Qiladar* of fort Tuhangarh in Karauli, had offered to help Babar. Tardi Beg was accordingly sent with 2500 men and was joined by Alam Khan. But Nizam Khan relying upon his numerical superiority made such a furious sally that the assailants were put to flight. Failing in this enterprise, Babar promised to leave him unmolested in his territory.

Since the capture by RanaSanga,of the fort ofKandar, which was situated a few miles east of Ranthambore Babar anticipated further developments. He had also felt keenly the cold indifference with which the Rana hadignoredhim. Lack of sufficient military preparations, and the necessity of dealing with the Afghans, his immediate enemies, had probably prevented Babar from taking the field against the Rana immediately. But the attempt of Babar to capture Biyana, followed by friendly negotiation with Nizam, hastened the crisis, for the Rana could no longer keep his eyes shut against the growing influence of Babar and his drive to capture Biyana. Babar also knew of the possible effect of his move against the Rana; hence he announced his intention to wage a Holy war; and on November 30, 1526, sent a messenger to Humayun asking him to leave Jaunpur in the charge of some reliable officers and hasten back to Agra for Rana Sanga the Pagan is conveniently close."'

Since it was difficult for the small chieftains to

resist the might of the Rana, they readily accepted the proposal of Babar to deliver themselves to his care, and in lieu accept *jagirs* of almost equal value in safer provinces. Thus, Gwalior, Biyana, Dholpur and other fortresses quietly passed into his possession, and were garrisoned by Mughal officers. His only failure was in the case of Hassan Khan of Mewat (Alwar), one of the biggest Afghan chieftains, who lost no time in declaring his hostile intentions as soon as his son (Nahar or Tahar Khan), who had fallen in the hands of Babar at Panipat, was allowed to join him. Babar afterward repented his generosity. Hasan had declared Mahmud Lodi as a successor to the throne of his brother Ibrahim Lodi, and secured for him the support of Rana Sanga.

While preparations on both sides were progressing, Babar narrowly escaped death. The old mother of Ibrahim Lodi contrived through Ahmad, a Hindustani taster, to poison Babar. Fortunately it was not put into the cooking pot but was sprinkled on the dishes, and Babar felt nauseated before he had eaten much. Suspicion was roused and an inquiry unveiled the whole plot. The conspirators were duly punished, and the mother of Ibrahim was sent to Kabul. On her way, while crossing the Indus, she threw herself into the river and was drowned. The stars were favourable to Babar for had he been murdered "nothing could have saved the kingdom, which he was building up, and the Rajputs would have been supreme in Hindustan".

Reports were continually arriving from Biyana of the rapid movements of the Rana. Babar, therefore, came out of Agra on Feb. 11, 1527 for the Holy war, and pitched his camp outside the city. Besides adding moral strength to Babar, a *jihad* was expected to arouse the Muslims to make a united effort against the Rana. Here he heard that the combined forces of Hasan Khan and Sanga had reached Biyana and an attempt at a sally by the garrison of the place ended in its rout. Brave officers, like Shah Mansur Barlas and Qismati, and all those who had come from Biyana "praised and lauded the fierceness and valour of the Pagan army".

Babar, therefore, sent word to the Biyana garrison to come and join the main army without delay.

Babar knew that there was no good water-supply except at Sikri which had a large lake. Fearing lest the Rana should take possession of it, he sent his men to fix a camping ground within easy reach commanding the lake. Meanwhile a scouting party of about 1500 men, which had gone under Abdul Aziz, was overwhelmed by a detachment of the Rana and an attempt to reinforce and relieve it also failed miserably.

Undeterred, Babar, moved forward with his army and dismounting on one side of the lake, set about fortifying his camp. In the front was placed, as at Panipat, a long line of strong carts, especially constructed for the occasion, and linked together by iron chains at a distance of seven or eight yards each. This line was to serve partly as a check to the onrush of the enemy, but chiefly as a protection to the matchlock men and cannoniers stationed behind. Where carts could not reach, a ditch was dug later on with a view "to hearten our men and give a look of strength of the army". The camp was defended and shut in, where there were no carts, by stretching ropes of hide on wooden tripods set seven or eight yards apart. The device of wheeled tripods, which could be trundled forward or backward, was indeed a most useful novelty as it offered a movable protection to the musketeers.

Babar had been showing much energy and giving most careful thought to defences and preparations, but his Begs and soldiers trembled with fear. They had heard that the Rana was the most powerful prince of northern India with whom the Sultans of Delhi, Gujrat and Mandu could not cope, and that his vast army, estimated at the usual figure of a lac, consisted of born-fighters who were prepared to lay down their lives at his call. The episode of Biyana and the fate of the reconnoitring parties had confirmed their worst apprehensions and greatly weakened their morale. Babar's anxiety was further increased by the movements of the Afghan chieftains at Rapri,

Koel, Chandwar, Sambhal and Kanauj who had recaptured their territories from the Mughals. Besides, some notable Afghans like Alam Khan, Haibat Khan and Hasan Khan deserted him. " No manly word or brave counsel was heard from anyone whosoever." Babar now summoned a council and after a stirring address asked them to take a vow to fight till death. The appeal went home. "All those present Beg to retainer, great and small, took the Holy Book joyfully into their hands and made vow and compact."

To make his decision more serious as also to win divine help he renounced wine, broke the golden and silver vessels and distributed the pieces among the poor and the faqirs. His example was followed by about three hundred Begs—an alms-house was ordered to be erected at the place where wine was thrown, and a general order was issued prohibiting the use, sale or manufacture of "strong drink". To win their sympathy a decree was passed that "in no city, town, road, ferry, pass or fort" *tamgha* (tax on merchandise) would be levied on the Muslims. It is needless to add that these orders could hardly have been carried out without a good administrative machinery, which then did not exist, but it held out a promise of better days in times to come.

On Saturday, March 17, 1527, Babar came to a newly prepared ground where he intended to meet the Rajputs. A few tents had been set up, a few more were being set up when news of the approach of the enemy was brought. "Mounting instantly, I ordered every man to his post and that our array should be protected with carts."

The Rajputs, who were many times more than the army of Babar, and were certainly in a good morale, launched an attack on Babar's extreme right at about 9.30 A. M. This section was intended by Babar for the *tulughma* charge. A *tulughma* is indeed terrible in attack but weak in defence. Babar realized the danger quickly and relieved the pressure by a well-calculated and determined attack on the Rajput left with picked Mongol troops under the gallant Chin Timur Sultan.

Since that move opened a gap between the Rajput left and centre Mustafa Rumi took advantage of it and moving forward opened a destructive fire. But the Rajputs were not quickly disconcerted. Wave after wave of the deadly warriors dashed upon the Mughal right which was only saved by straining the entire resources of Babar's centre.

The battle on the right was fierce and prolonged and did not yield the results expected by the Rajputs. A mass attack on the centre, where the artillery was most active, being out of the question, they now engaged the Mughal left and delivered some fierce charges. The Mughals, however, stood firm on their ground declining to yield even a foot, in spite of the sustained pressure exerted on them. About this time a *tulughma* charge was successfully launched and the Rajputs were surrounded on all sides. At this juncture furious charges were made by the special royal corps from each side of the centre. The battle now raged all along the line. Huge stone balls, were discharged from the centre with terrible effect, while matchlock men were very active. "The charge of the household troops forced back the Rajput centre, and the firearms blasted a lane of death into the thick of the foe." The Rajputs once more picked up and made a dash upon the wings of Babar which were driven back; indeed, once it seemed that the Mughal left was on the point of breaking up. But the Mughals also were fighting desperately. They had gained distinct tactical advantages and with the help of their new-fangled fire-arms took a heavy toll. At last, after ten hours of gruelling fight, the Rajput tide ebbed, only to be charged upon with decisive effect by the enemy flanks. The dash and chivalry of the Rajputs gave way and they cursed their fate and the new war-engine before which the stoutest hearts and the sharpest steel were rendered helpless. The fateful battle was over before the sun sank in the horizon, and ruthless slaughter closed the bloody episode.

Once more superior generalship, cool courage, skilful manoeuvres and artillery brought victory to Babar.

If the Rana had not allowed Babar to complete his preparations, and acted, with alacrity after the capture of Biyana, the result might have been very different. Moreover, fate was fighting against him. He was wounded at an early stage of the battle and removed senseless from the field. To prevent a panic one Jhala Ajja was hurriedly covered with royal paraphernalia and place in h is seat on the elephant. The soldiers continued to believe that they were being led by the Rana, but they were deprived of the advantage of his ability, experience and leadership. There was, however, no case of desertion or treachery among his followers.

The consequences of the battle were indeed far-reaching. It broke the Rajput confederacy which depended for its existence not on any enlightened conception of race, community, religion or civilization, but on the prestige of the Udaipur House, the military and diplomatic victories of its warlike leaders, who had now lost their moral prestige. With the break-up of the confederacy vanished the nightmare of Hindu supremacy which had kept the Muslim states in northern India in anxious suspense. The destruction of many of the most redoubtable Rajput chiefs and the disintegration which set in after Rana Sanga became helpless, once more laid open Rajputana to the ravages of the neighbouring powers, which were only too ready to step in. Kanua removed the most formidable obstacle in the way of the foundation of the Mughal empire. Babar assumed the title of *Ghazi* and his throne in India was now quite secure. The centre of gravity of his power now definitely shifted from Kabul to Hindustan. Finally, the defeat of the Rajputs weakened the hands of the Afghans. With the help of the powerful and independent chiefs of Rajputana they would have been certainly far more formidable rivals to the Mughals than when single-handed.

Rana Sanga was taken to Baswa (Jaipur) from where he went to Ranthambore. It is alleged that he had taken a vow not to return to Chitor till he had defeated Babar. He began to prepare for another war.

When he learnt that Babar was marching on Chanderi he also moved his forces with a view to take him in the rear. Since he had refused to listen to the advice of the nobles not to get involved in a fresh war so soon, a conspiracy was hatched and he was poisoned. At Kalpi he died on January 30, 1528, but his body was taken to Mandalgarh where it was cremated.

After the victory, Babar moved on to Biyana. His intention was to push on into Rajputana but the hot weather would not permit him to go beyond Mewat (Alwar) which, later, he brought under his subjugation. His generosity and far-sightedness prevailed upon him to grant amnesty to and bestow on Nahar Khan a *jagir* of several lacs in spite of his father's hostility.

Finding his position now quite secure, Babar gave leave to some of his officers and soldiers who were pining to go to the snowy hills of Kabul and Badakhshan. Personally, however, he did not sit idle. Expeditions were sent against the Afghans of the east.

Babar was anxious to take up the problem of Rajputana as early as possible. But the situation in the east had become serious, for Nursrat Shah, the ruler of Bengal not only welcomed the fugitive Afghan nobles from the Lodi kingdom but even married the daughter of Ibrahim Lodi, and thus established a sort of claim to the leadership of the Afghans. He began to take keen interest in their affairs. Encouraged by this accession of strength on their side and the exhaustion of the army of Babar following the battle of Panipat, the Afghans had captured or driven out the Mughal officers from their posts and assumed independence. Iliyas Khan in the Doab, Qutb Khan at Chandwar, Husain Khan Nohani at Rapri, Baban (Biban) and Bayazid in Oudh, besides the numerous Hindu chieftains, had defied the Mughal authority. Babar sent some of his best commanders to deal with the Afghans in the east while he toured form Alwar to Sambhal.

Babar had confidence in the capacity of his Begs to subdue the Afghans, for without waiting further he planned an attack on Chanderi. Situated on a table-

land, the town of Chanderi had high commercial and strategic importance. The prosperity of the town can be gauged from the fact that within its walls were supposed to be twelve thousand mosques, three hundred and eigty-four markets and fourteen thousand well-carved houses of stone. Looking over the town stood the famous fort Chanderi on a rock 230 feet high. The strategic importance of the place was due to its position. It lay on the borders of Malwa and Bundelkhand and commanded the high road running between Malwa and Hindustan. The town had had a chequered history. Within one generation it had changed three masters. It was given to Sikandar Lodi by one of the claimant to the throne of Malwa as a price for his help. Since his supporters did not succeed, it passed on to their vanquisher, Medini Rai, who had supported Mahmud II of Malwa. But Medini Rai, owing partly to the machinations of the jealous Muslim nobility, and partly as consequence of it, and also due to his aggressive interference with the government, became intolerable to the Sultan. Being unable to control the rugged and fiery Rajput, Mahmud called in the help of Muzaffar Shah of Gujrat. To counteract the formidable combination, Medini Rai sought the protection of Rana Sanga and offered to hold it for him as his Jagirdar. Mahmud attacked Chanderi, but was defeated and taken prisoner. Thus Chanderi passed on to the Rana. Medini Rai had fought at Kanua under the Rana. After the victory of Babar, he refused to surrender his *jagir* or submit to him. Babar's claim over Chanderi was doubly established by his victories over Ibrahim and Sanga. He therefore, sent a strong force to punish him but it was defeated in spite of reinforcement. This was an evil omen at a time when Babar was going to begin his drive against the Afghans.

Babar's plan to open his campaign in Rajputana was far-sighted. Furious rivalry between the Muslims and Rajputs would have easily secured for him the strong

local support of the former. From Chanderi Babar could watch the developments in the Valleys of the Ganges and the Jamuna and also in Rajputana. Moreover, Malwa was a rich province and was likely to supply Babar with the sinews of war. It was also easier to penetrate in the heart of Rajputana through Malwa. The conquest of Malwa, besides substantially advancing the enveloping movement against Rajputana, would have prevented the possibility of any combination between his enemies there and in the east. To secure the co-operation of different sections of the Muslims he gave this war the character of a *jihad*.

In December 1527 Babar mobilized his forces and reached Chanderi on Jan. 21, 1528. He issued an ultimatum to Medini Rai to surrender or to fight to the bitter end. He also promised to take him into his favour and give him Shamsabad in exchange for Chanderi. But the offer was declined. January 28 was fixed for launching an assault. In the morning on that day Khalifa, the Prime Minister, brought a very disquieting news. The Afghans in the east had defeated the Mughal army and had compelled them to evacuate Lucknow and fall back on Kanauj. The minister seemed to be very much perturbed, but Babar took a different attitude. He refused to let the news interfere with his plans against Chanderi; rather it strengthened his determination to capture the fort as soon as possible.

Next morning a determined attempt was made and the fort was taken by assault in an hour or so. It is really difficult to explain how the gallant Rajputs and their indomitable leader Medini Rai should have allowed the fort to be conquered in such a short time. Whatever the reason, the slaughter which followed the evacuation of the fort has been variously estimated from three to six thousand. Chanderi was restored to Ahmad Shah, a scion of the ruling house of Malwa. Two daughters of Medini Rai were captured of whom one was presented to Kamran and the other to Humayun.

The original plan of Babar was to conquer Raisen,

Bhilsa and Sarangpur, and then to attack Chitor. But the disquieting news from the eastern quarter obliged him to move against the Afghans in the east. Leaving Ahmad Shah in charge of Chanderi, Babar started for the east on 2 February. On his way he learnt that the Afghans had taken Kanauj and Shamsabad, so he pushed on vigorously. On the 25th he reached Kanauj.

On the news of Babar's approach the Afghans went over to the eastern side of the Ganges and prepared to resist his march. Under cover of artillery a bridge was thrown over the river and the Mughals crossed it in the teeth of opposition. Finding all opposition hopeless the Afghans decamped. Chin Timur Sultan was ordered to pursue the Afghans, while Babar proceeded by way of Lucknow to Ayodhya. The Afghans were driven into Bihar and Bengal. Babar himself seems to have gone as far as Buxar.

The Afghan danger was for the time being over. Babar, therefore, returned to Agra, were he spent the rains in literary work and laying out a garden (Charbagh). In September Babar went out for a hunt towards Dholpur, but utilized the opportunity to pay visits to Dholpur and Gwalior. In spite of opium sickness he visited the building of Man Singh and Vikramajit which were famous for their architectural beauty and were destined in future to influence the architecture of Fatehpur Sikri which stands to this day as a monument to Akbar's greatness.

Rana Sanga had left behind three sons. Everyone of them expected to succeed Rana Sanga, but Ratan Singh, the third son whose mother belonged to the house of Jodhpur, and who "possessed all the arrogance and martial virtue of his race" was hailed by the people. His elder brothers, Vikramaditya and Udai Singh, were at this time in Ranthambore with their mother, Rani Padmawati of the house of Bundi. Ranthambore was assigned as *jagir* to them by Sanga and their maternal uncle, Suraj Mal Hada, was appointed as their

guardian. As the ruler of Mewar, Ratan Singh asked Vikramaditya to send to him the crown and the golden belt which had been captured by Rana Sanga and were then in his possession. Vikramaditya was not prepared to deliver those trophies. Moreover, Ratan Singh did not like the idea of leaving a *jagir* of about fifty lacs with Vikramaditya and Udai Singh. Fearing further complication Vikramaditya sent his representative Ashok Mal to Babar offering submission on condition of receiving an annual subsistence of seventy lacs. Babar accepted the terms and probably asked him to deliver the fort of Ranthambore. At Gwalior, Ashok Mal saw Babar again and told him that his master was prepared to exchange Ranthambore for the fort of Biyana if Babar liked. Babar was unwilling to accept the bargain but promised to give him Shamsabad instead of Biyana. These negotiations lingered on for some time more, but they seem to have little historical importance. The object of Vikramaditya seems to have been to show to his brother that he was prepared to go any length if he brought any pressure to bear upon him. Ratan was wise enough not to open the matter; hence Vikramaditya also slept upon the proposals of Babar, which eventually fell through.

Babar had not abandoned the idea of conquering his paternal kingdom if he could. Indeed he longed for an opportunity to recover Samarqand, the city of his dreams, and watched with eagerness the ebb and flow of the fortunes of the Uzbeks. He was very much perturbed to hear that the Uzbeks were once more gathering enormous strength and had got the better of the Persians ; and that Humayun instead of showing energy and vigour was harbouring idle thoughts, betraying symptoms of weakness, and thinking of running away from the toils and turmoils of the world. It is said that he even announced his intention of going to Kabul, but this is extremely doubtful. In November his anxiety was relieved on hearing that the Young Shah Tahmasp had defeated the Uzbeks at Jam with great slaughter (Sept, 1528). He, however, wrote a

strong letter to Humayun asking him to be energetic, prudent and cautious, to banish all thoughts of retirement, and endeavour to conquer Hissar, Herat and Samarqand. Accordingly, Humayun collected a large army which produced an impression upon the Uzbeks, who had not recovered from the shock of their defeat, and they sued for peace.

In December 1528 Babar called a council and after some discussion decided to despatch Askari Mirza towards the east. Orders were sent post-haste to all the Amirs of the east to join Askari and to deal with the Afghans who had taken shelter in Bihar and Bengal and were meditating mischief. They were, however, advised to make an explicit representation to the ruler of Bengal to ascertain his attitude towards the Mughal government. This suggestion was evidently made to prevent any unnecessary and premature conflict with Nusrat Shah, the Sultan of Bengal, whom Babar did not want to molest, as he had professed amity and even sent a *peshkash*.

Babar was also thinking of organizing a punitive expedition against the Bilochies who frequently raided the Imperial territory, but he got disquieting news. On January 13, 1529 he learnt at Dholpur that Mahmud Lodi, son of Sikandar Lodi, had captured Bahadur, made himself master of Bihar and was gathering strength. Forthwith he cancelled all his programme and returned to Agra.

Sultan Mahmud Lodi, brother of Ibrahim Lodi, was proclaimed by Hasan Khan of Mewat and Rana Sanga as the rightful successor to the throne of Ibrahim after the battle of Panipat. He fought gainst Babar at the battle of Kanua, but after the disastrous defeat he found shelter in Mewar. From there he was invited by by the Afghan nobles, Biban, Bayazid, and Azam Khan, his father-in-law, to come over to Bihar. The opportunity was favourable, for the Nohanis had been throw in the shade and Sher Shah Sur had not yet been able to consolidate his power. No complications from Bengal

could be expected as the ruler of Bengal was friendly to the Afghans. Mahmud gladly welcomed the invitation and joined the Afghans nobles about the end of 1528, who hailed him as their ruler and mustered strong under his banner.

On Jan. 20 1529 Babar left Agra to deal with the Afghan menace. His march was leisurely. He reached Dugdugi, a *pargana* in Kara, where Askari came to pay his respect. Here he was informed that the Afghans had organized a three-pronged drive. Bayazid and Biban had been sent towards Sarwar ; Fateh Khan Sharwani and Sultan Mahmud himself were marching along the Ganges towards Chunar ; and Sher Khan Sur and others had crossed the river and were marching towards Banaras. Babar, therefore, decided to march cautiously. It was arranged that while he marched along one side of the Ganges, Askari would go along the other. Both armies were to move and halt simultaneously. On March 23, Babar reached Chunar and visited the fort. A few miles from Banaras he heard that Sultan Mahmud Lodi was near the Son, so he moved on at a quicker speed. At Ghazipur Mahmud Khan Lohani and Jalal Khan came to offer submission. Submissive letters were received from other Afghan chiefs such as Jalal Khan and Farid Khan, and also from Sher Khan Sur. As the Afghans had fled towards Bengal and were believed to be negotiating with the ruler of Bengal, Babar pressed on till he reached the confluence of the Ganges and the Karmanasa. Exchanges off communications between Babar and Nusrat Shah ended in nothing. Babar was genuinely anxious to avoid any conflict with the Bengalis but the attitude of the latter seemed to him ambiguous and unsatisfactory. Indeed it was not yet clear whether the Bengalis were afraid of the Mughal invasion of Bengal, or were acting in concert with the Afghans or they wanted to prevent an Afghan influx in Bengal. There is no doubt, however, that they had marched twenty-four divisions under the command of Makhdum-i-alam, governor of Hajipur, which were posted on the bank of the Gandak. In

view of the hostile attitude of the Afghans of Bihar and the ruler of Bengal, Babar assigned Bihar to Muhammad Zaman Mirza and honoured him with an umbrella (*Chatr*) which was an emblem of royalty. With him was deputed Murshid Iraqi as his *Dewan*. This measure was calculated to impress upon his enemies the extent to which he was prepared to go in case no satisfactory solution could be reached.

Babar called a council of war and it was decided to cross the Ganges. On May 1 the Ganges was crossed. Three days later, the Mughal army tried to cross the Ghagra river. The division of Askari was first to cross it. Although the Bengalis made a determined stand Babar forced the passage under a heavy fire. These demonstrations of strong will and power produced the desired effect. On the 6th the Bengal army up without any further resistance. This was the third and the last of a series of brilliant victories which made Babar master of Northern India.

Now that Nusrat Shah and the Afghans of Bihar were in a chastened mood, Babar did not think it advisable to enforce his threat of wholesale annexation of Bihar. He modified his previous order substantially, allowed a part of Bihar to remain under Jalal Khan, reserved for himself as Crown land an area yielding five lacs of rupees, and directed Muhammad Zaman Mirza to confine his jurisdiction to the territory of Jaunpur. Without formally annexing the kingdom of Bihar, Babar established some sort of sovereignty over it. These modified terms seemed to be agreeable to Jalal Khan and Nusrat Shah and they readily promised to respect the terms. Babar was also pleased to confer large *jagirs* in the east to those Afghan chieftains who had offered their submission. Since the rainy season was approaching Babar turned his reins towards Agra.

The battle of Ghagra broke the back of the Afghan rebellion but it did not crush it. The two gallant Afghan commanders, Biban and Bayazid, crossed the Ghagra and besieged Laknur (now Shahabad in Rampur)

and captured it. But the news of Babar's westward march terrified them. They turned to Dalmau, but being pursued by a Mughal detachment sent by Babar they fled to Mahoba.

Babar reached Agra on 24 June, having covered the last 157 miles by a rapid ride in forty-five hours.

Babar was not pleased with the development of affairs in Central Asia. Humayun had taken advantage of the occupation of the Uzbeks in Khurasan, and sent armies against Samarqand, Hissar and Qubadian. Some measure of success was reported from the latter two places but further reinforcements were called for. Humayun and Kamran were ready to lead a general attack but the decisive battle of Jan. 1528 changed the situation. The Uzbeks were always famous for their rallying power. They quickly hastened to their posts to offer resistance to Timurid advance. The grand plan of Humayun and the dream of Babar ended in nothing except the addition of Qubadian to the Mughal empire and peace with the Uzbeks. The failure to reconquer Central Asia was laid at the door of Humayun.

After his return from the east to Agra, Babar recalled Humayun from Badakhshan which he assigned to Hindal. Giving the charge to Hindal's preceptor, Mir Fakhr Ali (June 6, 1529), Humayun left for Kabul, where he celebrated the Id festival with Hindal and Kamran, and then left for Agra. By rapid marches he reached Agra on 27 June to the great satisfaction of his father.

The sudden departure of Humayun from Badakhshan, despite the protests of the officers and the people, was a bit risky. In their fear of the Uzbeks they invited Saīd Khan, the then ruler of Kashghar, to take charge of the place. Fortunately Hindal reached there a few days prior to Saīd's appearance. Nevertheless, Saīd Khan besieged the fort for three months, but had to return disappointed. He might have lingered on, but winter was threatening to obstruct his return. Moreover, Babar had sent Sulaiman Mirza to take charge of Badakhshan, which was once ruled by his

father Khan Mirza, and was himself moving towards the west. Since the affairs of Badakhshan were settled, Babar returned to Agra from Lahore.

From 1528 Babar's health had been slowly declining. The strain of a continously busy life, the hot climate of Hindustan, the after-effect of the poison, and above all, an inordinate fondness for liquor and intoxicating drugs like opium, *bhang*, numerous concoctions and even quicksilver, combined to undermine his otherwise strong constitution. He had been getting frequent attacks of fever of fairly long duration. He began to suffer from physical exhaustion and mental depression. Sometimes he felt tired of reigning and ruling and expressed his desire to lead a quiet and retired life in the Zarafshan garden. To make matters worse, he earnestly believed that God had accepted the sacrifice of his own life to save Humayun. This psychological obsession made him feel that his end was not far. Five or six months after the recovery of Humayun, Babar's health began to decay rapidly so that he was confined to bed in July. Still he dragged on till December when all hope of recovery was given up. Either immediately after Humayun's recovery or sometime during his protracted illness, Babar had declared him to be his successor.

It is alleged that during the last days of Babar his Prime Minister, Nizamuddin Khalifa, who was as anxious about his own future as that of the infant Mughal empire, intended to set aside Humayun and his brothers and place Mahdi Khwaja, husband of Babar's sister, Khanzada Begam, on the throne. The Khalifa is alleged to have been afraid of Humayun for some unspecified and personal reasons. Moreover, he is said to have entertained a poor opinion of Humayun's capacity to rule. He was, however, disillusioned when Muqim Harvi, the *Diwan-i-Bayutat*, told him that Mahdi Khwaja intended to flay him alive for treachery after he had ascended the throne. The Khalifa then quickly changed his mind, interned Mahdi Khwaja in a house and called Humayun to the capital.

This episode has led to a keen controversy, numerous speculations and different conclusions among modern historians. The story, however, is based almost entirely on a statement recorded in the *Tabqat-i-Akbari* written by the son of Muqim Harvi, and on a broad reference in the *Akbar Nama*. A critical examination of of the passage in the *Tabqat* shows that, apart from the motive of the writer, the statements there are highly dubious and contradictory. A clear cut and direct statement is not necessarily a guarantee of its veracity. It appears that Mahdi Khwaja was exploiting the friendship, kindness and name of Khalifa for his personal aggrandizement and high ambition. As soon as the Khalifa was apprised of his real intentions he ordered his internment and clipped his ambition for good. Whatever the truth, the episode had little practical importance except that it has brought undeservedly a slur on the Khalifa's otherwise unquestionable loyalty and devoted services to his master.

Unfortunately Humayun could not attend on his ailing father. He had been despatched by Babar to deal with the Raja of Kalinjar and the Afghans, who had taken advantage of the Emperor's illness and encroached upon the Mughal dominion. Babar died on Dec. 26, 1530. Since Humayun had not arrived from Sambhal, his death was kept a secret. But it leaked out. Fearing an outbreak of lawlessness, it was felt necessary to make a public announcement that Babar had become a recluse (*Dervish*) after appointing Humayun his successor. Four days after, the Crown prince arrived and ascended the throne (December 30, 1530). Babar's body was laid in the Aram Bagh, just on the side of the Jamuna. In the time of Sher Shah it was taken to Kabul by an Afghan widow, Bibi Mubarak, and was finally laid in a most beautiful terraced garden, where he sleeps to this day.

Babar was a man of extraordinary talents and ability. In him were combined a host of fine qualities which few among the Timurids possessed. As a man he was endowed with large-hearted generosity,

charity, compassion, sympathy and naivety. He was a good friend, a loving husband, an affectionate father and a boon companion in every society. He possessed a virile intellect and an all-round culture. A deep scholar of Persian and Arabic, he was master of the Turki language which he wrote in a most elegant and effective style. As a prose-writer he had no equal, and his famous memoirs are recognised as one of the masterpieces of world literature. He possessed an unusual insight, power of keen observation and a remarkable sense of realism. The character of men or movements, the peculiarities of a country or people, the flora or fauna of a country, the social and general condition of a community, in fact, whatever struck his inquisitive mind and comprehensive vision, has been described by him in a most pleasant and masterly way. As a poet and a composer of songs in Persian and Turki he was much above the average. He was supposed to be the next best poet in Turki after Mir Ali Sher Beg Nawai. He composed in Turki a *masnawi* called *Mubin* for his son Kamran. It contained two thousand verses bearing on theological, legal and ethical wisdom. Besides, he rendered in Turki verse the *Risala-i-Walidiya*, a work written by the venerable preceptor and teacher, Khwaja Ubaidullah Ahrar. On Rhetoric he wrote a work known as *Risala-i-Uruz*. He is credited with the introduction of a new script, styled as *Khat-i-Babari*. Thus his literary contribution was as remarkable as his military achievements.

As a soldier and general he holds a high rank. In him were combined the vigour and hardihood of the Turks and Mongols with the dash and courage of the Persians. He was a fine fencer, a good archer and a superb horseman. He was never discouraged by defeats and never shirked hard life. He never allowed himself to be cowed down by the superior strength of his opponents. He loved action. In grave crisis and heat of battle, he was resourceful and his manoeuvres were flexible enough to adjust themselves to the ebb and tide of a battle. In strategy and tactics he was undoubtedly much superior to any of

his opponents in Afghanistan and India. Whether he was amilitary genius or not, he was the best among the Indian generals of his day.

Although a great soldier and general and a man of letters, Babar had other interests and hobbies. He was fond of laying out gardens and making experiments in horticulture. His love of flowers and gardens would seem to have been as much a national as a personal characteristic. He has been described a "Prince of Gardeners". Not only did he plan and supervise gardens, he took delight in working with a shovel and watching the results of his experiments from day to day and season to season. His experiments helped in improving substantially the quality of melons and grapes in India.

He was equally interested in architecture. One of his aims was to make cool residential buildings on the border of Rajputana. Under his direction buildings were constructed at Agra, Sikri, Biyana, Dholpur, Gwalior, Kol and other places.

Babar loved music. Himself he could sing fairly well, but he was more fond of composing music and setting it to a proper tune. He confesses that at times he was overtaken by a strong impulse to compose songs. His love for wine, song, verse, flowers, gardens, streams, aqueducts and buildings was largely inspired by his Persian contacts and culture in which he was well steeped.

It is often said that Babar was at best a military and a literary man, but no statesman. The remark may be true in as much as he left no institutions of his own brand, and did not introduce any reforms in the systems of administration either in Afghanistan or India. In the socio-political structure of Afghanistan tribal sentiments and institutions were deeply rooted and it would have been extremely risky to interfere with them and experiment with reforms. Only once did he try to introduce some economic changes in Afghanistan, with the result that he had to face a revolution and quickly retrace his steps. Babar survived only three years and eight months after the battle of Panipat. During this short period he had to

face the combined opposition of the Rajputs and the Afghans. The people were frightened by the violent political upheavals and unrest in the country. The need of the hour was to inspire confidence in the common man and restore law and order. Without a full inquiry into the laws, institutions and customs of this ancient land, it would have been a folly to undertake any reforms in the administrative, the agrarian or the financial system of the country. Alauddin Khilji and Muhammad Bin Tughluq before him, and the East India Company after, had to suffer for their precipitate or ill-informed attempts at reforms. Unlike Sher Shah or even Akbar, Babar was a complete stranger to the land and its people. Under the circumstances, the only and the best course for him was to avert a crisis by respecting the traditions,customs, laws and regulations existing in the country before his invasion. Such a policy was calculated to preserve law and order, inspire confidence and give the requisite time and opportunity to study the complexities of the socio-economic structure of the country. His judgment was wise when he appointed responsible nobles to pacify the country and carry on the administration according to local practices and traditions with the help of local officials and staff. With all that, the government of Babar kept roads between Agra and Kabul quite safe and established *serais* at a distance of fifteen miles each. By his order distances between the various places in his empire were measured. He also tried to re-established the postal system.

It will be wrong to judge Babar's statesmanship by what he did not or rather could not do. He should be judged by what he actually did or aimed at doing, To begin with, he had to restore to the Crown the dignity and respect which it had lost at least since the death of Firoz Tughluq. Balban, Alauddin and Muhammad bin Tughluq were more feared than loved. Firoz Tughluq enjoyed affection and respect, but was not feared. The Afghan leaders could not reconcile themselves to the idea of an all-powerful ruler. But Babar was, both feared and respected. He enjoyed confidence as a leader

and affection as a ruler. He knew how to deal with nobles, both as individuals and as a class. In Babar tolerance, charity and forgiveness were combined with sternness and action. Few could dare defy him except at their own peril. When at war, he sometimes showed amazing ruthlessness, a trait he might have inherited from his Turko-Mongol ancestors. After peace had been restored, he was a kind, just and a considerate protector of his subjects, no matter who they happened to be by race or religion.

Although Babar had deep regard for his religion, Muslim divines, Shaikhs and Jurists, he never allowed his political outlook to be warped by the influence or parochial advice. In his court and company, theological or sectarian differences and angularities were hardly noticed. Himself a Sunni Muslim, he refused to be lured into the popular surge of fanaticism which disgraced the annals of contemporary Iran and Turan. True that he called the Hindus *kafirs* and the Afghans unreliable, yet his behaviour towards their nobles and people was courteous, gentle and friendly. At least twice he had raised the standard of *Jihad* for reasons which have been discussed previously, but the way they were directed was quite in keeping with the normal rules of warfare. It is equally true that on one such occasion he formally exempted the Muslims from paying *Baj-o-Tamgha*, but it is by no means clear if that order was ever enforced. In all probability, he could not enforce it even if he would. Here and there some enthusiastic individuals damaged a temple or two, but even such cases were surprisingly few at a time of great political upheaval. There is nothing to show that religious persecution was a part of state policy, or had any moral support of Babar. As compared to what happened in the Near and Middle East between the Shias and Sunnis and in the Western countries these cases are simply insignificant.

Babar tore the old map of India by destroying the so-called "Balance of Power" between its numerous states, and laid the foundation of an empire based on

new traditions. In the sixteenth century, when monarchy was the only form of government known to the world, a united India could only exist under an imperial regime. By destroying the hegemony of the Lodis and the Rajputs, he cleared the way for building an empire with a new outlook, which his illustrious Mongol anceestors had entertained. It was essentially practical and political. The theory on which he organized his central government did not seek to centralize all powers and departments of State in the hands of the Emperor, or to reduce the ministers to the position of mere puppets. No less an authority than Sher Shah pointed out that the Mughal Emperor left everything in the hands of his ministers. According to the theory on which Babar worked, the duty of the Emperor was to see that the ministers exercised the functions entrusted to them with energy, responsibility, honesty and tact. So long as they did not act in a way prejudical to the interests of the State and the people or to the general policy of the Emperor, they were allowed to have their way and take credit or discredit for their actions. When a minister seemed to falter or fail, the Emperor stepped in just to set things right by pulling him up or removing him from office or by adding strength to his elbow. He acted as a supreme judge of the state, a function which he could exercise only by keeping himself aloof from the executive, revenue and judicial departments of the state. It was not his duty to govern, but to see that the government was carried on well. People could look up to him for sympathy and justice even against the government. This was precisely the theory which even his illustrious grandson Akbar followed.

Babar was a good diplomat. He used force when diplomacy failed. His handling of the Hindustani and Afghan nobles, and also of the rulers of Bengal and Bihar, shows clearly that he possessed considerable patience, tolerance, tact and even cunningness. But for these qualities, it would not have been possible to handle such a divergent and militant, racial and sectarian elements as formed his court.

Babar's influence on the history of India was enormous. Besides changing the entire political situation of northern India, he linked India once more directly with western and central Asia. Since the time of the Kushans, Afghanistan had ceased to form a part of India, Throughout the early Turkish period the frontiers of India remained very vulnerable, for the conqueror of Afghanistan was always tempted to cross the Indus and at least threaten the province of the Punjab. Now that Babar had joined Afghanistan and India and established his capital at Agra, the policy towards, and defence of the north-west frontier of India assumed a new character. Besides its military importance, its commercial and cultural significance cannot be over-rated.

The technique that Babar brought with him changed the system of warfare in India. Some sort of fire-arms were used in India in the early Turkish period and even before the Europeans had introduced guns in India, and yet it was not till the battle of Panipat that the importance of artillery as one of the decisive factors in war, was understood by the rulers of India in general and of northern India in particular. That a skilful combination of cavalry and artillery could smash armies of great numerical strength was impressed upon the Indian rulers once for all. The importance of forts gradually began to decline and with it, at least on the plains, the feudal system of the older type began to wither. Such forts as Chitor, Ranthambore, Mandu, Kalinjar and Chunar, which were imagined as impregnable, failed to hold out for long before a strong and well-directed artillery. The introduction of new firearms, therefore, was as important from the military as from the socio-economic point of view.

The glory of the Mughal empire rested not only on its military power but also on its policy of religious toleration towards the non-Muslim subjects, particularly the Rajputs, and its emphasis on culture. Without depriving Akbar of his well-deserved greatness, it can be maintained that the seeds of his policy were sown by his illustrious grandfather. The conception

of a new empire, based on a political outlook as distinct from the religious or sectarian, of the place of the Crown in the state, of settling the Rajput problems by alliances and matrimonial contacts, and of emphasising the cultural character of the court, could be traced back to Babar. Thus Babar had not only shown the way to found a new empire, but had also indicated the character and policy which should govern it. He established a dynasty and a tradition in India, which have few parallels in the history of any other country.

CHRONOLOGY OF BABAR :—

1.	Babar's birth.	February	1483
2.	Babar succeeds his father.		1494
3.	Babar captures Samarqand.		1497
4.	Samarqand taken by Shaibani Khan.		1501
5.	Farghana lost.		1503
6.	Babar captures Kabul.	October	1504
7.	Babar marches on Multan.		1504
8.	Babar assumes the title of Padshah.		1507-8
9.	Birth of Humayun.		1508
10.	Battle of Merv.	December	1510
11.	Kamran born.		1510
12.	Babar's last attempt to retain Samarqand.		1511
13.	Battle of Ghazdwan.	November	1512
14.	Battle of Khaldiran.		1514
15.	Birth of Askari.		1516
16.	Birth of Hindal.		1519
17.	Babar enters India.		1519
18.	Babar's attack on Bhera and Sialkot.		1520
19.	Babar captures Qandahar		1522
20.	Babar attacks Lahore and Sarhind.		1523
21.	Battle of Panipat.	April	1526
22.	Battle of Kanua.	March	1527
23.	Babar captures Chanderi.		1528
24.	Battle of Jam.	Sepetember	1528
25.	Battle of Kanauj.		1529
26.	Battle of Ghagra.		1529
27.	Humayun's return from Badakhshan.	June	1529
28.	Humayun falls ill.	March	1530
29.	Babar falls ill.	April	1530
30.	Babar's illness takes a serious turn.	July	1530
31.	Babar's death.	26 December	1530

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CHAPTER III

HUMAYUN (1531-1556)

Babar left four sons and three daughters. Humayun, the eldest son, was born on March 6, 1508 to Maham Sultana of the house of Huṣain Baiqara of Herat ; Kamran and Askari were from one Gulrukh Begam and Hindal, the youngest, was from Dildar Aghachi. In the lifetime of his father Humayun was given several opportunities to gain military and administrative experience. He had fought in the battles of Panipat and Kanua, and had led a successful expedition against the recalcitrant Afghan nobles in the east. In these engagement he had shown judgment, promptitude and firmness, which seem to have impressed his father who was pleased to entrust to him twice the government of Badakhshan (1520-25 and 1527-29), a bulwark against the warlike and indomitable Uzbeks. During his period of office no serious complications arose, and the fact that the Badakhshanis implored him not to leave them at the mercy of the Uzbeks by going away to India, clearly shows that he was regarded a competent leader. In India too, he held for sometime the government of one of the most turbulent parts of the country—the province of Sambhal.

Humayun was well educated in Arabic, Persian and Turki. He was cultured and thoughtful, sober, amiable, brave, magnanimous, and charitable. His chief drawbacks, if one may call them so, were that he was deficient in political trickery, aggressiveness and unscrupulousness. He loved peace more than war, and had a mystic bent of mind. But he commanded the affection and confidence of his father who, it may be remembered, was by no means a poor judge of men.

Humayun ascended the throne at Agra on December 29, 1530 at the age of twenty-three amidst general rejoicing. The occasion was celebrated by the distribution

of a boatful of gold. The officers and nobles offered their ungrudging allegiance, an in return they were confirmed in their appointments, irrespective of their antecedents.

Babar left to the care of Humayun a vast empire which extended from the river Amu to Bihar. Kunduz, Badakhshan, Kabul, Ghazni and Qandahar were his western possessions. In India, Multan and the Punjab, the United Provinces and portion of Bihar, formed parts of his empire. Biyana, Ranthambore, Gwalior, Alwar and Chanderi formed the irregular boundary-line between the empire and the kingdoms of Rajputana and Malwa.

The empire of Babar rested on a weak foundation. Babar had neither the time nor probably the inclination to establish a new system of administration, except in certain tracts. The empire was divided among nobles and *jagirdars*, who were made responsible for the maintenance of law and order within their jurisdiction and were required, when called upon, to do military service and pay a specified tribute to the Imperial treasury. The officers, it may be presumed, did not interfere much with the local customs and the sytem which prevailed during the last days of the Lodis. It can also be imagined that at least the people of Hindustan must have been passing through a period of great political confusion and economic unrest, owing to the constant military movements of hostile Mughal and Afghan armies.

The composition of the Mughal army also was far from satisfactory. It consisted of the Uzbeks, Mughals, Turks, Persians, Afghans and Indians. These were usually led by their own tribal leaders. The tribal and personal jealousies must have prevented the growth of a sense of unity, which is essential in a well-knit army, and were hardly calculated to make it a reliable engine of war. On the other hand, they perpetuate tension in the army, which could prove dangerous to the State at any time. The most glaring examples are the attitude of the Mirzas and their followers, as also the conflicting opinions offered to Humayun by the Mughal and Afghan nobles at Chunar.

Far more dangerous than the turbulent nobles were

the princes of the blood. Humayun had three brother of whom Kamran was the most ambitious, and undoubtedly had some capacity for adinistration and war. It is, however, doubtful if his hot temper would have allowed him to make a successful ruler. Round these princes moved a body of interested self-seeking nobles, ever ready to insinuate against one another, and to serve their own ends even at the cost of the state.

Besides his three brothers, there were the Mirza brothers, grandsons of Sultan Husain Baiqra, who were pure Timurids and considered their claims almost as good as those of the sons of Babar. Chief of them was Muhammad Zamman Mirza, the husband of Babar's daughter Masuma Begam. He had been offered the government of Bihar with a royal insignia, but later was confirmed as the governor of Jaunpur, a frontier province. The other Mirza was Muhammad Sultan Mirza, the son of a daughter of Sultan Husain. These Mirzas had no land of their own. Inevitably, therefore, India alone could be the field for their political and territorial ambitions.

These internal difficulties could acquire serious dimensions on account of the external dangers which beset Humayun. Even after two brilliant victories at Panipat and on the Ghagra, Babar could not claim to have crushed completely the Afghan power in India. Broken and demoralized though the Afghans were, the bulk of them had refused to submit to the Mughal domination. They had proclaimed Mahmud Khan Lodi their king. They were up in arms under capable and warlike leaders, like Biban, Bayazid and Maruf Farmuli, and were yet looking forward to a time when they could retrieve their honour and recover their lost sovereignty. These Afghans, when pressed hard, could find a refuge in Bihar and Bengal, and enjoy the sympathy of the rulers of Bengal and Gujrat. It was also known that the rulers of Bengal and Gujrat were negotiating with a view to driving out the Mughals.

The ruler of Gujrat, Bahadur Shah, was a young ambitious and warlike prince. Ruler of an extremely

rich kingdom as he was, he had plenty of resources at his command. He could boast of the finest park of artillery in India, and was served by some of the best officers of the time. The opportunity was also favourable to him. True, his relations with the Portuguese were unfriendly but he had no fear from them on the land. Nor was his position very weak on the coast. His power had grown to be very dangerous, for the two chief rivals of Gujrat, Malwa and Mewar, had become hopelessly weak and were not even quite able to defend themselves against his aggression. The rulers of Khandesh and Berar sought his favour. He had marched victoriously to Ahmadnagar, and had compelled the ruler of Bidar and Ahmadnagar to have *Khutba* read, and coins struck, in his name (1529.) Indeed, he had no serious rival left in the field and was feared by the rulers of the Deccan, as much as by those of Malwa and Rajputana.

Such an ambitious, warlike and resourceful ruler was bound to attract under his shelter a number of Afghan chiefs who had been driven out from the north by Mughal invaders. To his court repaired Fateh Khan, Qutb Khan, Umar Khan, Alam Khan and other Lodis, who were most graciously received by Bahadur Shah and were given *jagirs* and offices. He welcomed them and promised to do all he could. Indeed, he was the most formidable rival of Humayun for the throne of Delhi. He had virtually become a great arbiter in the politics of northern India, and was a sort of emperor *de facto* if not *de jure*.

Humayun, thus, found himself in a fix. According to the ancient Turko-Mongol custom, the empire had to be divided among the sons of Babar. Fearing the dire consequences of ignoring the well-established custom, Babar had advised Humayun, in a polite form, to respect it and treat his brothers with generosity. In case Humayun had tried to keep the whole of the empire to himself he would have met a challenge from his brothers, and the nobles could have appealed to time-honoured custom. The empire had to be

equitably divided to avert a civil war which would have smothered the infant Mughal empire before it had taken a chance against its external foes. It was, therefore, not so much an act of generosity or of obedience to the words of his father, but one of imperative necessity and absolute expediency. There was no other way out for him. It was in his own interest to win the goodwill of his brothers, and with their help to make a united effort to save the empire. It would have been wise for Humayun to have settled the share of his brothers, particularly of Kamran. After coming to the throne he remained undecided in his mind for some time.

Much against his will, Humayun ultimately decided to share the empire with his brothers. Theoretically he was the successor of Babar to the Imperial throne and enjoyed undivided sovereignty, but in fact the empire was divided up. Kamran had already got Kabul and Badakhshan; Askari, a lad of fifteen, received the province of Sambhal; and Alwar fell to the share of Hindal, a boy of thirteen. This arrangement could hardly satisfy Kamran, a young man of twenty-one who was supported by the nobles of Afghanistan and was quite conscious of his strength. The old uniform rule of Babar to give to Kamran five, if Humayun got six of anything, must have suggested to the ambitious Kamran to claim a larger share in the empire. Humayun for the time being did nothing more.

The historic fort of Kalinjar (Distt. Banda, U. P.) stands on an isolated rock of the Vindhyas, several hundred feet high, and difficult of access. It was a bone of contention between the Rajputs and the Turks ever since the beginning of the Turkish regime. It was conquered and reconquered. As a prince, Humayun had been sent to conquer it, but a settlement was arrived at with the Raja. Seven or eight months after his accession he had to attack Raja Pratap Rudra (Aug. 1531) who was threatening Kalpi. The importance of Kalpi as a link between Malwa and the Jamuna valley had always been appreciated. Now that Bahadur Shah had conquered Malwa (March 1531), Kalpi became

a bulwark against the possible advance of Bahadur Shah in Hindustan. Humayun became suspicious of the attitude and intentions of the Raja, and so he declared war on him. He laid siege to Kalinjar, and his artillery began bombarding the ramparts of the fort. Hardly had the siege continued for a month, when came the most disquieting news that Mahmud Lodi, brother of Ibrahim Lodi, had captured Jaunpur, and the Mughal officers had been complelled to retreat. Humayun, therefore, came to some ambiguous terms with Raja Pratap Rudra and hurried up towards Chunar.

Taj Khan Sarang Khani, an Afghan noble, was one of the chief Omra of Sultan Sikandar Lodi who had made him the commander and governor of the fort of Chunar. As the fort was regarded impregnable, Taj Khan refused to offer allegiance to Ibrahim Lodi, and assumed independence. When Mahmud Lodi wanted to take it, he offered a stout resistance, allied himself with Babar and offered him personal homage along with his sons (March 1529). In June, Babar asked him to transfer the fort to Junaid Barlas with a view to make it a second line of defence, or to complete his chain of fortifications. The actual transfer probably never took place. In 1530 Taj Khan was killed, or he died. Through intrigue, bribery, and even treachery, Sher Khan got possession of the fort, as well as the wife of Taj Khan. Since Sher Khan was recognized as a vassal of the Mughal Emperor, and Babar had already expressed his wish to take the fort, Humayun also thought it advisable to recover it. The importance of the fort was unquestionable. It commanded the land and the river routes between Agra and the east. It was known as the gateway to eastern India. He laid a demonstrative siege, which produced no appreciable effect on the fort or the morale of the Afghan garrison. As the Afghan menace was getting more and more serious, Humayun did not consider it proper to waste more time. He raised the siege and marched on.

Mahmud Lodi and his supporters first made

themselves masters of Bihar, where they collected a large army. Then they invaded the Mughal territory, drove out the Mughals from Jaunpur, and began to establish their authroity in Oudh. Humayun was anxious to hurl them back, but owing to the advent of rains, and the news of Kamran's activities in the Punjab, he postponed the conflict and hurried back to Agra to deal with his brother and to reinforce his army.

Taking advantage of Humayun's preoccupations in the east, Kamran left the charge of Afghanistan to his brother Askari, marched into the Punjab, captured Multan and Lahore, and replaced Humayun's officers with his own. To Humayun, however, he wrote very polite and respectful letters professing his loyalty and coaxing him to confer on him the provinces of Multan and the Punjab. Facing the established fact, Humayun acceded to the request of his brother. There was no other course open to him. He made the best of a bad job and earned the gratitude of his brother. Thus Humayun maintained his dignity and sovereignty, and won the goodwill of an energetic and warlike brother, who could deal with the western provinces of the empire while Humayun was left free to deal with the eastern and southern (1532).

Having settled the claims of Kamran to his satisfaction, Humayun returned to engage the Afghans. He came to grips with them at Daurah (Dadra or Daurua), near Lucknow, on the right bank of the Sai river. In spite of the neutrality—rather treachery—of Sher Khan, which caused great confusion in their army, the Afghans fought bravely, but lost the battle. Two of their best leaders, Ibrahim Khan Yusuf Khail and Bayazid Farmuli were killed. Mahmud Lodi fled to Bihar and retired once for all into private life. Jaunpur was recovered and again placed in charge of Junaid Barlas (Oct. 1532).

For having deserted Mahmud Lodi and his supporters at a critical moment in their career, Sher Khan hoped to be confirmed in his possession of Chunar

by Humayun. His expectations, however, proved false for shortly after his victory over the Afghans, Humayun asked Sher Khan to surrender the fort of Chunar and sent Hindu Beg to take possession of it. Sher Khan declined to give up the fort. Consequently, Humayun marched against him and besieged the fort. It was a mistake on the part of Humayun to have conducted the siege personally. He should have stayed at Agra and sent some one else to capture the fort.

Sher Khan was an experienced and wary Afghan. He entrusted the fort of Chunar to Jalal Khan, his second son, himself withdrew into the hilly tract of Bihar. His object was to leave his family at a safe place and then return to harass the besieger from outside, and to keep a continuous flow of supplies into the fort.

The siege was protracted for about four months. The fort was gallantly defended. Humayun had neither good siege-guns, nor was it possible to run mines owing to the nature of the land, nor could the supplies be effectively cut off on account of the Ganges. On the other hand, the guns on the ramparts of the fort were handled by the Afghans most skilfully and produced a deadly effect. The fall of the fort was still not in sight. Sher Khan did not think it advisable to let things drift indefinitely, for, the ruler of Bengal, Nusrat Shah, would have hardly liked the growth of a powerful kingdom of Bihar under the supreme control of an ambitious and astute upstart like Sher Khan. Sher Khan was, therefore, anxious to get a respite and disentangle himself from the Mughals.

Luckily for Sher Khan came a very favourable opportunity. Bahadur Shah of Gujrat had already annexed the whole kingdom of Malwa (March 1531), and thereby extended his empire to the confines of Gondwana. Encouraged by his successes, and taking advantage of Humayun's absence from Agra, Bahadur Shah planned the extension of his authority in Mewar which stood as a buffer state between his empire and that of the Mughals. Accordingly, in Nov.-Dec. 1532 he besieged

Chitor. This move of Bahadur Shah was fraught with serious consequences not only for Rajputana but also for the empire of Humayun. The conquest of Chunar paled into insignificance before the new danger. Humayun became anxious to get away from Chunar and, therefore, was inclined to listen to any reasonable terms from Sher Khan.

Both parties being anxious to come to terms, peace could not possibly be delayed. Sher Khan, who had been watching these developments with keen and most intelligent interest, took time by the forelock. In a most respectful and humble tone, he requested the Emperor to be good enough to leave the fort to him, and as a proof of his devotion and loyalty promised to send his third son Abdur Rashid, commonly known as Qutb Khan, for service under the Emperor with a strong force. Humayun was pleased to accede to the request, raised the siege, and returned to the capital. Both the parties seemed apparently quite satisfied. But the whole transaction was a relief and an encouragement to Sher Khan in the pursuit of his plans, while it brought some discredit to Humayun.

From Chunar, Humayun went towards Gwalior to watch the movements of Bahadur Shah. The ambitious, young ruler of Gujrat appeared to be planning his moves on a large scale. He had entered into an alliance with Sher Khan, and had subsidized his activities heavily. He had established contacts with the ruler of Bengal. His court was an open asylum to the enemies of the Mughal empire. His invasion of Mewar, if successful, would have destroyed a buffer state and brought him to the boundary of the Mughal empire, besides placing at his disposal the resources of Rajputana. Humayun's anxiety was but natural. At this juncture he received a pressing request from Rani Padmawati mother of Vikramaditya, the Rana of Chitor, to help Mewar against the Sultan of Gujrat.

Taking all factors into consideration, Humayun mobilised his army and encamped at Gwalior. Since he had to keep an eye on the Afghans in the east, and

his fighting strength was not definitely up to the mark, he was not keen to enter forthwith into a war with Bahadur Shah. He, therefore, resorted to diplomacy, and backed it up with a threat of war.

Bahadur Shah, on his part, was also not quite prepared to precipitate a war with the Mughal Emperor. He was not prepared to meet a combined opposition of the Rajputs and the Mughals. He, therefore, readily listened to the proposal of Vikramaditya to surrender the insignia of royalty which had been captured from the ruler of Malwa by Rana Sanga, together with the territory of Malwa annexed to Mewar. Besides these, the Rana promised to give substantial presents or indemnity to the Sultan. A treaty was patched up in March 1533 and Bahadur Shah retraced his steps.

The treaty with Chitor saved the kingdom of Mewar from falling into the hands of the Sultan. To that extent it gave satisfaction to the Rajputs and the Mughal Emperor. Bahadur Shah, on his part, was happy to get recognized as the sovereign of the entire kingdom of Malwa. For the time being Humayun seemed to have been satisfied. He broke his camp at Gwalior and returned to Agra.

After his return from Gwalior, Humayun spent most of his time in building a well-fortified town which was protected by the spurs of Arawali hills and the Jamuna river (1533-34). The need for building such a place was obvious. The advent of Kamran Mirza in the Punjab, and the extension of his *jagir* to Hissar Firoza, needed precautionary measures. The new fortified town served as a bulwark and a strong outpost against any aggression from his brother's side, while it also revived the cultural dignity of the old, but deserted, capital. Moreover, it could serve as a suitable place to fall back upon should Bahadur Shah threaten Agra seriously. The keen interest which Humayun took in the new town and the generous policy of toleration which he followed, attracted people from different parts of India, as also from the Muslim countries

of Central and Western Asia. Within an incredibly short time it came to be recognized as the most important centres of culture in the Muslim world. Incidentally, Humayun's diversion in building a new town was likely to suggest that he was not seriously perturbed by the activities of Bahadur Shah in Malwa and Rajputana.

The treatment which the Mirzas received at the hands of Humayun was quite different. Muhammad Zaman, and Muhammad Sultan Mirza with his two sons, felt themselves coldly treated by the Emperor and took up arms against him. Their rebellions were, however, nipped in the bud, and they were defeated and made prisoners by Yadgar Nasir Mirza (1534).

The tact with which Humayun kept the forces of disorder and confusion under his control, made an impression upon Bahadur Shah who sent an ambassador to Humayun with valuable presents and a friendly message. The Emperor received the ambassador with kindness and sent a friendly reply. But these professions of friendship were not earnest and sincere. Quite in keeping with his policy, Bahadur Shah offered a right royal welcome to Muhammad Zaman Mirza, who had contrived to escape from the prison of Biyana by means of a forged letter (1534). When Humayun asked him to send the Mirza over to him, he entered into a discussion of the law and custom relating to political fugitives.

Bahadur Shah must have now felt that a conflict with Humayun was inevitable and not far-off. His head was turned by the Afghan nobles and the Mirza, who were constantly dinning into his ears that Humayun was a worthless king, his army was ineffective, and that it would be easy to knock him on the head and conquer the throne of Delhi. The youthful imagination of Bahadur Shah was fired up and he threw himself wholeheartedly into organizing a grand military operation. Meanwhile, he captured Ranthambore and Ajmer. Moreover, he secured the promise of the Portuguese for military assistance by granting them concessions.

The plan of Bahadur Shah was to cripple the Mughal empire by attacking it at different points. It was arranged that Sultan Alauddin Lodi, uncle of Ibrahim Lodi, was to proceed with an army to Kalinjar with a view to strengthening the hands of the rebels in Hindustan and the eastern provinces. His son Tatar Khan, a young man of considerable military ability, was sent to raise a large army at Ranthambore and then lead a vigorious invasion upon Agra and Delhi. A sum of several crores was forwarded to Burhan-ul-mulk, the officer at Ranthambore, with instructions to help Tatar Khan. Burhan-ul-mulk was further ordered to march upon the Punjab *via* Nagor and create a powerful diversion near Delhi or in the Punjab. Bahadur Shah himself decided to lead the main army of Gujrat against Chitor.

Opinion was sharply divided on the feasibility of this plan. It was urged by some that the plan was calculated to break the strength of the army, fritter away all its energy and resources, and make it possible for Humayun to smash each army piecemeal. On the other hand, it was argued that powerful diversions in different quarters would put maximum pressure upon Humayun's ill-organized army and slender resources, foment rebellion, create commotion in the various parts of the empire by encouraging hostile elements, prevent Humayun from concentrating all his strength for the defence of Chitor and thus enable Bahadur Shah to conquer it with comparative cease in a short time. Bahadur Shah approved of the plan because he thought that his Lodi collaborators would find greater, support in the north, and, that in case of a reverse, he would be able to explain it away to Humayun by throwing the entire responsibility of the various invasions on the other people. The opportunity was favourable, for, while Kamran was obliged to leave the Punjab because of the hostile movements of the governor of Khorasan against Qandahar, trouble was brewing up for Humayun in the eastern provinces. Muhammad Sultan Mirza had also escaped from Gwalior and was

creating trouble near Kanauj. Much more dangerous were the activities of Sher Khan who seemed to be keen on the conquest of Bengal. Humayun therefore, left Agra for the east.

Chitor had hardly recovered from the shock of the previous invasion of Bahadur Shah when a second and more dangerous one followed. The gallant Rajputs offered a powerful and desperate resistance but it was not likely to last long, for Bahadur Shah was bombarding the defences of the fort with the finest siege-guns available in India, which were deftly handled by the Portuguese under the direction of Rumi Khan, the Turkish master-gunner.

Near Kalpi Humayun came to know of the plans of Bahadur Shah and of the siege of Chitor. He found himself between the devil and the deep sea. He gave up the idea of going to the east because Sher Khan seemed less dangerous when compared to Bahadur Shah. True, that the victory of Surajgarh (1534) had immensely raised the prestige and power of Sher Khan and had made him the undisputed master of Bihar, but he had yet to deal with the hostile ruler of Bengal and, therefore, had not apparently disclaimed his loyalty towards Humayun, or declared himself the ruler of Bihar. In fact, his prestige and power, wealth and resources, or military strength, could not even the be considered in any way equal to that of Bahadur Shah. It was, therefore, clear whither Humayun should first direct his attention.

From Kanar (Distt. Kalpi) Humayun hastened back to Agra. Meanwhile, Tatar Khan marched with 40,000 cavalry against Biyana and captured it. Mirza Askari, Yadgar Nasir Mirza and Hindal were sent with 18,000 horse against Tatar. At the approach of the Mughals, the army of Tatar Khan melted away. In his desperation he fell furiously upon the Mughals at Mandrail only to be cut down along with his 300 devoted comrades (1534).

On Nov. 8, 1534 Humayun left Agra to fight Bahadur Shah. Taking advantage of the initial victory at Mandrail. Humayun entered Malwa without any obstruction,

and passing by Raisen reached Sarangpur with little difficulty. His movement through eastern Rajputana, was a wise one, for he could go freely in any direction wherever his presence was urgently needed. It was not till Humayun had reached Sarangpur that Bahadur Shah learnt of his exact whereabouts. Bahadur Shah now requested the Emperor not to attack him while he was engaged in a holy war (*jihad*) against an infidel. Humayun is supposed to have been impressed by this appeal to the *Shariat*, and yet continued to push on towards Chitor, though in a circumspective manner. Probably he hoped that his movement towards Chitor might force Bahadur to raise the siege.

There were, however, other and more solid reasons for Humayun's cautious move. He had come to Malwa in a hurry, hence he was anxious to get time to organize his army properly before engaging Bahadur. Though there was discontent in Malwa among the Rajputs and the old displaced nobility against the aggression of Bahadur Shah, yet to exploit it to his best advantage Humayun required proper information and time. More over, he probably felt that he should act with caution for, besides a section of the people of Malwa supposed to be friendly to Bahadur, the northern states of the Deccan were also in alliance with him. He was eager to be at a vantage-point in Malwa from where he could intercept any reinforcements to Bahadur Shah, either from Mandu or Ahmadabad. He could also cut off his retreat to the two capitals if Bahadur attempted to fall back on them. Humayun was also not quite certain of the movements of Alauddin Lodi who had been sent towards Kalinjar. In case of his return from that side, a possibility that could not be ruled out after the debacle of Tatar Khan, he could threaten the rear of Humayun. All these considerations must have weighed with the Mughal Emperor when he decided to accept the request of Bahadur Shah and cheaply earn in return a reputation for piety and magnanimity among the Muslims. Humayun had no doubt gained a distinct strategical advantage which might be of indirect help to Mewar if alone the Rajputs

could hold longer. Probably he had no clear idea of the striking power of Bahadur's artillery, which broke Rajput resistance within ten days after his arrival at Sarangpur. On March 8, 1535 Chitor fell in spite of the gallant resistance and sanguinary fighting of its defenders. Lack of fire-arms with the Rajputs was the main cause of their early collapse.

Humayun set his army in motion as soon as he received the news of the fall of Chitor, and occupied a strategic position at Mandasor. Bahadur was advised by Sadr Khan and Taj Khan to attack the Mughals before the enthusiasm of the Gujrat army had cooled down. But he chose to follow the advice of Rumi Khan, and entrenching himself behind the guns, gun carriages and carts, tried to allure the Mughal army within the firing range. The Mughals saw through the plan and kept themselves at a safe distance. They hovered around, cutting off the supplies and plying the Gujratis with arrows. This voluntary siege brought the men of Bahadur Shah to the verge of starvation. The scarcity of fodder and provision, and their continued helplessness broke their morale. Disgusted with this state of affairs, Bahadur Shah blew up the guns, ground to dust or burnt all the valuable jewels and precious stores, broke up his camp and fled to Mandu leaving to Humayun an enormous booty. Muhammad Zaman Mirza fled to Lahore, from where he was driven out by Kamran, who had returned in time to drive back the invaders. Rumi Khan's artillery was destroyed and as he lost the confidence of Bahadur Shah, he went over to the Mughal Emperor who took him into his service. The Gujratis threw the blame for this misforture on Rumi Khan and brought a charge of treachery against him, which is not borne out by facts.

The Mughal army was soon in hot pursuit. At Mandu, negotiations were begun regarding the cession of Malwa and other possessions outside Gujrat and Chitor to the Mughals. The Gujratis were thrown off their guard. Taking advantage of it, some Mughals broke into the

town, and created tremendous confusion. Barely did Bahadur Shah find time enough to escape into the fort. Thinking it unsafe to prolong his stay there he fled incognito with only five followers to Champanir, leaving Mandu at the mercy of the Mughals (1535) who ordered a general massacre, thereby forcing the garrison to surrender the fort.

The first care of Bahadur Shah on reaching Champanir was to send to Diu his women and as much treasure as he could carry from that place. This done, he left the fort in the charge of Ikhtiyar Khan, set the town on fire, and fled to Cambay. He was, however, pursued further by Humayun with 1000 horses. At Cambay Bahadur ordered to be burnt down a squadron of 100 ships, which he had fitted up to fight the Portuguese. He then sailed for Diu. Humayun reached Cambay a few hours later. Although Bahadur Shah was not captured, Humayun could boast of having driven him out of Gujrat. Two days after his arrival at Cambay his camp was attacked by the Kolis and Gawars who were roused to fury by anti-Mughal propaganda. Most of the mob was killed, but the exasperated Emperor ordered the town of Cambay to be plundered and burnt. Humayun stayed there till November to persuade the Portuguese to enter into a treaty with him. But the Portuguese decided to sign a defensive and offensive alliance with Bahadur Shah.

Returning to Champanir, Humayun set himself vigorously to the task of capturing the fort which was regarded as invulnerable. The fort of Champanir, doubly fortified and served by Portuguese gunners, was well provided with stores and ammunition. Necessary supplies reached it through a secret passage. Accidentally Humayun discovered the passage which ended at a place where the rampart was only 60 or 70 yards high. To create diversion, he ordered a night attack on the fort, while he himself scaled the wall with forty men by means of iron spikes, drew up 300 more men, and made a surprise attack. The presence of the Emperor frightened the defenders and the fort fell

into the hands of the Mughals (Juiy 19-26, 1536). An enormous quantity of gold and treasure piled up by the rulers of Gujrat was discovered in the fort. But with a recklessness, probably inherited from his faher, Humayun gave away a large portion of it to his followers, in spite of the advice of some men to the contrary.

The country beyond the Mahendri river had not been conquered yet. Either because the people hoped that restoration would follow when the Mughal clouds had dispersed, or because of their natural sympathy for the house of Muzaffar Shah, they invited Bahadur Shah to collect revenues. Imad-ul-Mulk undertook to realize the revenues. He came with a handful of soldiers, but by the time he reached Ahmadabad he commanded 10,000 cavalry, and soon raised his force to 30,000. Mujahid Khan, the zamindar of Junagadh, also joined him.

Hearing of Imad-ul-Mulk's arrival at Ahmadabad Humayun marched out of Champanir to drive him out. He crossed the Mahendri and gave battle to Imad-ul-Mulk. The advance guard under Askari was defeated, but in the long run the Gujratis sustained very heavy casualties, were defeated, and dispersed after a very sanguinary fight. Ahmadabad was occupied by the Mughals.

It was now high time to make a settlement of Gujrat. Hindu Beg advised the Emperor to reinstate Bahadur Shah, as he was very popular in Gujrat, and return to Agra. It is believed that this advice was sound, and Humayun committed a blunder in not having accepted it. For, such an act would have enhanced the reputation of Humayun for generosity, and bound Bahadur Shah to him by a strong sense of gratitude. The resources of the Emperor were not quite sufficient to undertake the government of a distant province, the people of which had a pronounced liking for the old ruling dynasty. Bahadur Shah would have heartily welcomed such an arrangement, gladly become a vassal of the Emperor, and left the forts in his hands. But all this is a bold hypothesis. It should not be forgotten that Bahadur Shah was very ambitious; and a young, energetic

and self-conscious ruler like him would have hardly failed to take full advantage of the coming struggle between Humayun and the Afghans in the northeast. To leave the richest and most resourceful province of northern India in the hands of such a man would have been, after all, an act of doubtful wisdom. Humayun could, indeed, with difficulty be persuaded to place his reliance on the friendly professions of Bahadur Shah or Sher Khan.

It was, therefore, finally decided to annex the province to the Empire. Askari Mirza, who was one of the best commanders among the Mughals, was made the viceroy of Gujrat with his head-quarters at Ahmadabad. A considerable force under the command of Hindu Beg was quartered there and placed at his disposal. The division of Patan was given to Yadagar Nasir Mirza; Broach and Surat were placed in the charge of Qasim Husain Sultan; Cambay and Baroda were entrusted to the care of Dost Beg; and Mahmudabad and Champanir were to be held by Mir Buchka and Tardi Beg respectively.

When these arrangements were completed, Humayun set out in pursuit of Bahadur Shah towards Diu. He had reached only 30 *kos* from Ahmadabad when he learnt that rebellion had broken out in Hindustan, in Malwa, and that Handia and Ujjain had actually been occupied by Sikandar Khan and Mallu Khan who were besieging Chitor. Shortly after, came a despatch from Agra announcing the rebellion of Muhammad Sultan Mirza and his son in Hindustan and the eastern provinces. Consequently, the Emperor changed his mind and set off for Malwa by way of Baroda, Broach, Surat, Asir and Burhanpur. The news of his return produced its effect. The Malwa rebellion broke down, and there was a lull in the activities of Sher Khan in Bihar. As the climate of Mandu proved quite agreeable to Humayun, he thought it desirable to take some rest there and watch from that central place the development of affairs in the Deccan states as well as the eastern and western quarters of the Empire, and also to co-ordinate the activities of his

officers. He stayed for four or five months in Malwa.

The rapid extension of Humayun's empire outstripped the process of consolidation. Bahadur Shah was free; the rebels of Malwa had effected their escape; Ranthambore, Chitor and Ajmer were held by the officers of Bahadur Shah who had to be displaced. Rumi Khan Safar still defended the fort of Surat with the aid of Gujrat fleet; and the people of Kathiawar recognized none but Bahadur Shah as their ruler. Bahadur Shah was communicating with Sher Khan with a view to inducing him to create some diversion, and it was alleged that he had actually sent him a subsidy for that purpose. Humayun's decision to stay at Mandu for the time being was not unwise.

For three months, apparently all was quiet, but beneath the surface was brewing enormous discontent. Moreover, Bahadur Shah and his supporters were busy working out a co-ordinated plan for driving the Mughals out of Gujrat. Khan-i-Jahan Shirazi who had deserted Bahadur Shah and joined the Mughal Emperor, who was pleased to place him in charge of Surat, was the first to set the spark to the powder of insurrection. Nausari, Surat, Broach, and Baroda were captured from the Mughal officers. The fire of rebellion spread wildly and widely. Cambay and Patan also were lost.

Never before was so evident the necessity of a complete unity of purpose among the Mughal nobles. It was felt impossible for small garrisons to hold the out-posts, hence they were withdrawn to Ahmadabad. Obviously enough, Askari and his advisers had decided to pool all the fighting resources and then meet the insurgents. In the circumstances, that was the only rational course. The total strength of the Mughal army was estimated at twenty thousand cavalry.

In connection with the general policy to be adopted in Gujrat, it was suggested by no less a person than Hindu Beg that a declaration constituting Gujrat into an independent principality under Mirza Askari might assuage the feelings and allay the fears of the people and wean them away from Bahadur Shah. The idea

underlying the suggestion was to assure the nobility and the people of Gujrat that their interests and the integrity of their old kingdom would be safeguarded if they accepted a Mughal prince as their sovereign. To substantiate the earnestness of such a policy it was desirable that the *Khutba* should be read, and coins issued, in the name of Askari. Besides being a very risky measure, which was likely to be misunderstood by the Emperor and other princes, it looked like a desperate gamble. There was no guarantee whatsoever that it would have necessarily led the people of Gujrat to jettison the popular Muzaffari dynasty in favour of the Mughal strangers. It was, therefore, turned down by Askari himself and abandoned.

The upshot of all this long and serious deliberation was a policy of resistance, although the ratio between the Mughal and Gujrat army was two to five. That in itself was not so alarming, for the Mughal army was used to fighting against odds. But the utter lack of moral support, or rather the active hostility of the people of Gujrat was a very disquieting factor. Originally, they had planned to give an open battle, for which they encamped at Ghiyaspur, but growing popular hostility and the rapid increase of the army of Imad-ul-Mulk led them to change their plan. Under the circumstances, Ahmadabad appeared like an unsafe island menaced by a surging tide of hostility. To make it the base of operation was very unwise. It was, therefore, decided to take the Mughal army to Champanir, which from all points of view was an excellent base. This step appeared like a retreat from, and an evacuation of, Gujrat; but it could not be helped. It could be reconquered if the Mughal resistance succeeded. Should it fail, it had at least the virtue of saving the Mughal army from annihilation. The policy of Askari and his advisers might have erred on the side of caution and prudence. It is, however, difficult to pronounce it as an outcome of sheer demoralization or a counsel of despair for, both Askari and Yadgar Nasir Mirza were brave commanders and had by their side experienced and well-tried advisers.

It required the courage, dash and resourcefulness of Babar and the authority of a sovereign power ot take the risk of the magnitude with which the prince was faced. But Askari was neither Babar nor a sovereign authority. A strategic retreat at times is better than a reckless advance. As a commander of the Mughal forces, he had the right to choose the time and place for defence or offence.

Champanir could serve as a base for operations if Tardi Beg, who was in charge of it, were willing to extend his whole-hearted co-operation and place at the disposal of the prince the resources at his command. Askari and others had taken them for granted because there was apparently no reason to think otherwise, and Tardi Beg was expected to carry out the instructions of the prince who was his superior officer. While retreating, the Mughal army had to fight a sharp rearguard action with heavy casualties on both sides.

Tardi Beg welcomed the prince but refused to give him any financial support until the permission of the Emperor had been obtained. However important the formality might have been, it would have taken at least ten days or more. The exigency of the situation could not brook such a delay. The army of Bahadur Shah was dangerously near, and the keenness of the Mughal army to seek revenge and retrieve its honour could not be allowed to cool down. Tardi Beg's pigheaded obstinacy, and his refusal to aid the prince in the face of obvious danger, not only embarrassed but also exasperated the young Viceroy. In sheer desperation, Askari agreed with his advisers and planned to arrest Tardi Beg, who got a timely inkling of it. It increased the suspicions of Tardi Beg, who refused to see the prince, asked him to leave Champanir, and even threatened to open fire from the fort. Askari was filled with dismay and felt thoroughly humiliated.

Since a battle against Bahadur Shah was out of question with his denuded resources, there were only two courses open to Askari. He could have tried to go to Humayun or anywhere else. With the failure of

all his plans, Askari fought shy of presenting himself before the Emperor. Moreover, Tardi Beg, who was holding the key to the road of Malwa, might have obstructed his passage, for he suspected evil intention in the movements of Askari. The prince, therefore, decided to go to the wilderness, marching tardily through Rajputana without any definite plan.

Meanwhile, Tardi Beg reported to the Emperor that Askari had hatched a plot to usurp the throne and was marching towards Agra. This news upset Humayun and he decided immediately to march on with a view to block Askari's passage to Agra. At Ghat Kharji (in Palanpur state) he overtook Askari. The behaviour of Askari disarmed the suspicion of Humayun and, therefore, their meeting was cordial. Humayun must have understood the whole affair clearly ; hence he neither punished nor rebuked the Mirza or any of his followers. Both the brothers then marched towards Agra (March 1537).

The debacle in Gujrat was bound to react on Malwa which was yet in an unsettled condition. It was calculated to change the attitude of the Deccan states also. The army quartered in Gujrat instead of joining Humayun at Mandu had gone northwards, and the attitude of Askari as reported by Tardi Beg was alarming The resources at the disposal of Humayun in Malwa were totally inadequate to meet the danger. He could not allow himself to be cut off and get overwhelmed in Malwa. Therefore, he thought it advisable to leave Malwa and hurry back to Agra. If, however, Askari had joined Humayun at Mandu it might have been possible for him to organize resistance with some hope of success.

It has been observed that Humayun's failure to send reinforcements to Askari was the direct cause of the loss of Gujrat and indirectly of Malwa. This view presumes that Humayun had a large army with him while the Mughal army in Gujrat was small. There is no justification whatsoever for such a hypothesis. In all probability his army at Malwa was not much bigger than

that at Gujrat, while the need of holding that province was obviously greater than that of saving Gujrat. Moreover, no request for reinforcement had come from the Mughal commanders in Gujrat. It can be reasonably concluded that neither Humayun nor Askari and his advisers felt it necessary to throw additional reinforcements in Gujrat, and from the military point of view the strength of the Mughal army there was not considered to be very unsatisfactory. The unfortunate decision of Mirza Askari to march off to the north made the position of Humayun almost untenable in Malwa, and led to the loss of that province as well. If Tardi Beg had given the necessary support to Askari the misfortune might have been averted and the Beg saved the humiliation of surrendering a fort like Champanir so meekly. No one in particular could be held directly repsponsible for the failure of the Mughals to hold the two kingdoms. It was due to suspicions rife in the Mughal camp and a combination of fortuitous circumstances.

The news of Humayun's departure from Malwa was the signal for a general upheaval there. Bhupat Rai and Mullu Khan lost no time in occupying Mandu. They were joined by Muhammad Shah of Khandesh. Malwa also declared for Bahadur Shah. But he was not destined to enjoy his good luck for long. He had gone to Diu to persuade Nunho da Cunha, the Portuguese Viceroy, to let him erect a wall between the fortress built by them and the town. This was to avoid frequent conflicts between them and the residents of the town. The governor who had come with men-of-war feigned illness, and expressed his inability to come and interview the Sultan. He was probably afraid of some foul play. The Sultan, then, went to see him on board the ship. As he found the governor hale and hearty his suspicion was aroused and he wanted to return at once. An attempt to detain him led to a scuffle in which Manoel de Sausa, the commander of the fort, fell into the sea and was drowned ; and Bahadur who tried to swim across was also wounded and drowned (Feb. 1537).

CHAPTER IV

THE SECOND AFGHAN EMPIRE

During the period of Humayun's absence from Agra (Feb. 1535 to Feb. 1537) some important events shaped themselves in the north. The Shamlu nobles, one of whom was the Prime Minister of Persia, rebelled against Shah Tahmasp and wanted to place the Shah's brother Sam Mirza on the throne. Having failed in their design and fearing revenge, they fled. In conjunction with the Afshar governor of Farh they laid siege to Qandahar which was gallantly defended by Khawaja Kalan. Receiving a call for reinforcement Kamran rushed up with twenty thousand horse and inflicted a defeat on the Persians (Feb. 1536).

During Kamran's absence Lahore was attacked by Muhammed Zaman Mirza. But Kamran returned by forced marches to Lahore and complelled the Mirza to raise the siege and flee eastwards. In April 1537 came the distressing news that Shah Tahmasp himself had invaded Qandahar and captured it. But before the year was out Kamran Mirza again defeated the Persians and recovered the fort from its governor. Thus the credit of maintaining the integrity of the western provinces of the empire goes to Kamran.

The situation in the east was handled fairly well by Hindal. In July-August 1536 Muhammad Sultan Mirza had raised the standard of rebellion but was overtaken and defeated by Hindal at Bilgram. But the Mirza fled and joined his son Ulugh Beg, who held his *jagir* in the valley of the river Sarju. Before Hindal could secure reinforcements they launched a counter-attack. The news of the return of Humayun to Agra had encouraged Hindal, and he succeded in defeating and driving them out.

The greatest danger in the east was Sher Khan, whose activities in Bihar were fraught with far-reaching

consequences. His position in Bihar improved rapidly and he became the leader of all the Afghans in the east. He began to organize them methodically and inspire them with the hope of recovering the lost Afghan empire from the Mughals. The Afghans from far and near rallied round him. He was in contact with Bahadur Shah who even subsidized him. Besides, he contrived to relieve Fateh Malika, a daughter of Kala Pahar, of her immense wealth. These resources, combined with his sound financial policy, enabled him to maintain a large and efficient army, which included fifteen hundred elephants.

Although, by the terms of the treaty of Chunar, Sher Khan had undertaken to send an Afghan contingent under his son Qutb Khan to serve in the Mughal Army, yet he connived at his stealthy flight from Mandasor. Freed from all anxiety, by the return of his son and his troops, he adopted a decidedly aggressive and hostile policy and imposed his authority along the Ganges as far as Chunar. He declared war on Bengal, which was suffering from grave political unrest owing to the instability of government, and appeared with a large and powerful army at the gates of Gaur. Mahmud Shah, the incompetent ruler of Bengal, sought safety by paying a huge indemnity of thirteen lacs of 'Dinars'. This was construed by Sher Khan as a recognition of his sovereignty by Mahmud (1535-36).

On his return to Agra Humayun was advised to declare war on Sher Khan for his aggression, arrogance and defiance. That was not quite practicable, for the need of raising a fresh and strong army for the eastern campaign was obvious. Meanwhile, he sent Hindu Beg as governor of Jaunpur with instructions to send a report on the situation in the east.

Sher Khan had withdrawn his control from the eastern districts except Chunar and probably Banaras. He sent handsome presents to Hindu Beg and professed loyalty to the Emperor. He might have explained away his activities in the eastern districts as necessitated by the rebellion of the Mirza and not due to any defiance on his part, for he had had neither the *Khutba* read nor coins

issued in his name. Hindu Beg saw no such danger from Sher Khan as would require a precipitate and immediate action. He did not dilate upon the consequences of Sher Khan's policy in Bengal; rather he left it to Humayun to form his own opinion. The report relieved Humayun of his immediate anxiety and he continued the reorganization of his army.

Hardly a month or two had elapsed when the news came that Sher Khan had again invaded Bengal on the ostensible pretext of realising the annual tribute which Mahmud had not paid (June 1537). It is extremely doubtful if Sher Khan's claim was at all valid for Mahmud does not appear to have admitted it. This claim on the part of Sher Khan involved important issues and Humayun could not look upon it with equanimity. Sher Khan had accepted the position of a vassal by the treaty of Chunar, and had been professing his loyalty. As such, he was not entitled to declare war on any state without the permission of the Emperor, or claim any tribute. A conquered prince paid tribute to the sovereign and not to a noble of the state. But Sher Khan's policy clearly indicated that without confessing it openly, he had assumed an air of independence and behaved as a sovereign. Apart from the constitutional implications, the successes of Sher Khan in Bengal, the large army that he commanded, the resources which he possessed, the influence and prestige that he had built up in the east from Chunar to Gaur, and the ambition of Afghan restoration which he entertained and inspired in his followers, were sufficient reasons for Humayun not only to show vigilance but also to take some action, diplomatic or military.

In July 1537 Humayun started from Agra in spite of the rains. After spending a couple of months at Kara Manikpur he moved on and encamped a few miles before Chunar (Nov. 1537). Since Sher Khan's son Qutb Khan did not come to pay his respects to him, the suspicions of Humayun were confirmed. He consulted his nobles regarding his next move. The Afghan nobles advised him to march on to Gaur and frustrate the designs of Sher Khan to conquer Bengal. But the

Mughal nobles, headed by Hindu Beg, were of opinion that it was not wise to leave a fort like Chunar, which commanded the routes to Bengal, in the hands of the enemy. Its conquest would provide huge resources, keep the line of communication with Agra safe and could be used as a base for operations against the Afghans in the east, for it was the gate to Bihar and Bengal.

It appears that Humayun either overestimated the power of resistance of the ruler of Bengal or underestimated the power and resourcefulness of Sher Khan and, therefore, did not expect the fall of Gaur in a short time. He took the advice of the Mughal officers. He was assured by Rumi Khan that the fort could be captured in in a short time.

The capture of the fort, however, proved a formidable task. Besides its invulnerability and impregnability, it was bravely defended by the Afghans. The Afghan gunners and matchlock men used their weapons with the most deadly effect, caused havoc among the Mughals, and frustrated the repeated efforts of Rumi Khan to carry the fort by storm. At last Rumi Khan managed to get a good deal of information regarding the defences of the fort through his spies, and with the help of a most ingeniously and skilfully constructed floating-battery, commenced such a vigorous bombardment that the garrison was compelled to surrender. The capture of Chunar took not less than six months (June 1538). The time spent in capturing the fort of Chunar is generally believed to be "a tremendous mistake" and supposed to have "cost Humayun his empire". This pronouncement may not be, and probably is not, true in its entirety, but there can be no doubt that the failure of Humayun to despatch an adequate force to create a powerful diversion in Bihar or Bengal, if not to relieve Gaur, till the surrender of Chunar, was a deplorable mistake. To leave a fort like Chunar in the hands of the Afghans was inexpedient and unwise, but it was equally wrong to have detained the whole army there and let Sher Khan have his own way. And

if the fort had been taken at such a risk it ought to have been either entirely dismantled, or better still, so strongly fortified as to make its easy recapture by the Afghans impracticable.

During the time the Mughals were busy at Chunar, Sher Khan not only carried away his family to Rohtasgarh, but by a treacherous stratagem contrived to capture it from Raja Chintamani.

From Chunar Humayun went to Banaras, where he learnt that Gaur had either fallen or was about to fall. Without wasting much time there he pushed on with the intention of attacking the fort of Rohtasgarh. The attack was calculated to create a powerful diversion, which could be an indirect relief to Gaur. Before reaching Patna he came to know definitely that Gaur had fallen (April 1538). The news seems to have changed his plans.

Humayun decided to come to a settlement with Sher Khan, if possible without a war, particularly because the rains had set in. He sent a message to Sher Khan to the effect that he would allow him to keep Chunar and Jaunpur provided he delivered the insignia of royalty captured by him from the ruler of Gaur, transferred to him the kingdom of Bengal and the fort of Rohtasgarh, and personally attended on him. These were indeed hard terms which show clearly that the Emperor was confident of his strength, and was not prepared to accord to Sher Khan any status higher than that of a Mughal noble. Professing, as usual, his loyalty to the Mughal Emperor, Sher Khan submitted his own proposals which virtually negatived those sent by Humayun. He offered to surrender Bihar and the insignia of royalty of Bengal, provided the Emperor allowed him to keep Bengal, for which he offered to pay an annual tribute of ten lacs, and return to Agra. Since both of them wanted Bengal, the negotiations were not likely to bear fruit. Dilatory negotiations would have given more time to Sher Khan to consolidate his power, and would have been disadvantageous to the Emperor. Humayun , therefore, decided to

continue his march. Nevertheless, he sent another message, probably warning Sher Khan of the dire consequences of refusing the imperial offer and asking him to reconsider it. There was no reason why Humayun should have dropped his original proposals, which were definitely advantageous to him, and accepted those of Sher Khan.

During the negotiations between the Emperor and Sher Khan came the messengers of Mahmud, the ruler of Bengal, and informed Humayun that though Sher Khan had captured Gaur he had not conquered Bengal which yet recognized Mahmud as its ruler. He requested Humayun not to repose trust in the words of Sher Khan. Without committing himself the Emperor waited for a few days for further information. His messenger to Sher Khan returned and informed him of the decision of the Afghan leader to stick to his own proposals. About this time Mahmud, the ruler of Bengal, came, badly wounded and in utter distress. He confirmed the statements of his messengers and urged upon the Emperor the desirability of rescuing Bengal without further delay. The Emperor, then, finally decided to march on to Gaur promising to reinstate Mahmud on the throne of Bengal.

Humayun had come from Agra to deal with Sher Khan and curb his rising power. But he had apparently no intention of directly involving himself in the affairs of Bengal. The ruler of that kingdom had made no request to him for help. It was the conquest of Bengal by Sher Khan, which led Humayun to open the question of Bengal. The failure of negotiations with Sher Khan and the personal appeal of Mahmud Shah for help took him a step further. He found himself supporting the ruler of Bengal against the Afghans. But the news of the execution of the sons of Mahmud followed by the death of the latter, before the Emperor had stepped into Bengal, drove him to the conquest of that kingdom as much in its interest as in his own. Thus, step by step Humayun was drawn into the vortex of Bengal politics. The progress of the Mughal army was interrupted by

the Afghans, who under prince Jalal Khan were holding the passes of Teliagadhi and Sakarigalli. Sher Khan had instructed them to prevent the advance of the Mughals and not to come to grips with them. Although the prince was provoked by insults to fight a successful action with them, yet on the whole he followed the instructions of his father. Having completed his plans, Sher Khan called his son back, thus leaving the passes open to the Mughals. There was no obstacle now; and Humayun reached Gaur in September 1538.

Luckily for Sher Khan , a variety of circumstances detained Humayun in Bengal for three or four months. The fall of the Husaini dynasty must have brought chaos and confusion in Bengal. To establish law and order in a newly conquered kingdom is a task that requires experience, time and organization. It was creditable to the Emperor that he succeeded in doing so within an incredibly short time. Besides, he had to reorganize his weary army and secure the necessary supplies before he could start on his return journey. He had sent Hindal Mirza to his *jagir* in Tirhut and Purnea for collecting supplies. But the Mirza had proceeded to Agra without permission and contact with him was lost. The Emperor sent Shaikh Bahlol to find out the actual state of affairs, an bring the prince round to his sense of duty. Thus the worry caused by the shortage of provision became doubly serious owing to the inexplicable behaviour of Hindal. Sher Khan's vigilance and control over the routes to Agra had made communications difficult. There was no other alternative for Humayun but to wait till he was properly informed, and his preparations were complete.

After a long suspense the spell was broken. The Emperor was informed that Hindal had assumed sovereign authority, Shaikh Bahlul was killed, that no pressure from the west was likely to be exerted on Sher Khan, and that the country between Banaras and Kanauj was conquered by Sher Khan.

The news was alarming enough to compel Humayun to return as quickly as possible. He recalled the various

detachments spread over the province, tried to replace the losses in men and cattle and militarily re-equip himself as best as he could under the circumstances. One of the most ticklish problems before him was to persuade some able man to hold the province for the Empire after he had left Bengal. The Mughal officers were unwilling to undertake that onerous duty in a distant and unhealthy province. At last one Jahangir Quli Khan agreed to stay at Gaur though only five thousand soldiers could be left at his disposal.

Since the capture of Monghyr by the Afghans had made the southern bank of the Ganges more risky, Humayun chose to go by the northern route, which was believed to be comparatively open. Mirza Askari was sent in advance. The Mirza informed the Emperor that the northern route was equally unsafe as it was blocked by the Afghans. On a second thought, Humayun decided to adopt the southern route and crossed the Ganges near Monghyr. It was thought advisable to return by the same route, which the Mughals had followed at the time of invasion, because the terrain was known to them, while the northern route passed through *terra incognita*. Besides, the southern route would have take him to Chunar, which was yet under siege but had not been captured by the Afghans. Chunar was comparably better from every point of view than Jaunpur which also was then holding out against the Afghans. It was commodious and strong, commanded the country between Manikpur and Kanauj, and formed an invaluable link between the Jamuna valley and the east. The real resasons for the change of route were camouflaged by the ostentatious statement that the Emperor refused to avoid the route for fear of Sher Khan, determined to cut his way through. The change of the route upset, to a considerable measure, the aggressive plans of Sher Khan who had to organize them again on a defensive basis. It also made the progress of the Mughal army comparatively easy and rapid. The Emperor reached Chausa and crossed the Karmnasa in March 1539, and encamped on the western side of the river.

At this stage Humayun had to decide whether he should go to Chunar, which was within easy reach, or remain encamped, till the affair of Sher Khan had been settled, in Bihar. He might have hoped that his return from Bengal might suggest to his brothers the advisability of coming forward to help him. Since Chunar was yet in the hands of his men, his rear was, in a way, safe and he could fall back upon it when necessary. Nor did he worry about the predominance of the Afghans on the northern side of the Ganges as that river protected his flank. That his position was on the whole satisfactory is suggested by the fact of Sher Khan's opening the proposals for peace.

Sher Khan offered to have the *Khutba* read and coins struck in the name of the Emperor provided he was allowed to keep Bengal and the fort of Chunar. Humayun expressed his willingness to accept the proposal on condition that Sher Khan left the eastern bank free and withdrew his army. Moreover, Humayun suggested, that the Mughal army should be allowed to recross to the eastern bank and make a token display of chasing the retreating Afghan Army. This latter proposal was curious but Sher Khan accepted it. By crossing over the Emperor exposed himself to unnecessary risk

Sher Khan was in no mood to allow the chance to be lost, particularly because he was informed on good authority that the Mughal army suffered from shortage of equipment and means of transport. He threw the Emperor off his guard by pretending to fulfil the conditions imposed by the terms he had accepted. The Emperor seemed to be so satisfied that he decided to return . Just before the day fixed for return, Sher Khan fell upon the Mughal army about early dawn and surrounded it on three sides. The Mughals were taken by surprise and panic-stricken. They rushed pell-mell towards the bank of the Karmnasa. Since the bridge was destroyed, the Mughals had to swim across. They were slaughtered mercilessly by the Afghans. Seven thousand persons, among whom were some very distinguished officers and men, were killed. Women

and children, however, were spared as far as possible. The women were later on sent to their homes unmolested.

Humayun and Askari Mirza managed to reach the other side of the river. With those who could join them, they made for Chunar along the southern bank of the Ganges. One Afghan detachment pursued them while another obstructed their way in the front. At this juncture, Raja Virbhan, the ruler of Gahora, who was at Arail, near Allahabad, came to their rescue, drove back the Afghan troops, entertained the Emperor and his party at Arail for a few days, supplied them with the necessary provisions and escorted them to Kara Manikpur. By way of Kalpi, Humayun reached Agra in July 1539.

Humayun was welcomed by Kamran, who had come down from Lahore at the request of the Governor of Delhi to save that place from Mirza Hindal, who had fallen under evil influences and rebelled against the Emperor, while the latter was in Bengal. Hindal, a brave young-man, was weak-minded. He had been persuaded by the governors of Delhi and Agra to raise troops and gather whatever money and material he could and rush to the aid of the Emperor. Yadgar Nasir Mirza also promised to join him. He actually started from Agra with the above object. But Zahid Beg, a brother-in-law of Humayun, and Nuruddin contrived the murder of Shaikh Bahlol, whom the Emperor had sent from Bengal to bring the Mirza back to his sense of duty, and involved Hindal in it. They then persuaded Hindal to assume sovereignty and get the *Khutba* read and coins struck in his name. Thus he found himself in open rebellion and went to besiege the fort of Delhi, which its governor and Yadgar Nasir Mirza was holding for Humayun.

The arrival of Kamran (June, 1539) not only relieved the fort but dispelled the illusion and half-hearted ambition of Hindal. He fled to Alwar, but was recalled by Kamran to Agra. The brothers then wanted to go to the aid of Humayun who was at Chausa, but

Kamran's followers opposed and the proposal fell through. This was very unfortunate, for their timely help would have saved Humayun and the Mughal empire in India. They simply sat idle and watched the development of affairs in the east.

When Humayun returned to Agra with only five hundred horses, Kamran gave him a cordial welcome, and after a few days presented Hindal before him. Humayun received him kindly and thus did not disturb the atmosphere of goodwill. In spite of the disaster of Chausa the nobles of the empire remained quiet and loyal. Even those who had misbehaved come to offer their submission. It appeared as if Humayun had taken a page out of the life of Babar.

Humayun's military machine had completely broken down. He had no army and, therefore, the first task before him was to raise one as quickly as possible. The victory of Sher Khan at Chausa was bound to encourage him to push forward sooner or later. The Mughals seem to have realized the impending danger and, therefore, responded to the call of the Emperor for a united stand. Kamran even offered to march with his cavalry of ten thousand against Sher Khan.

Humayun had an experience of the strength and resourcefulness of Sher Khan. He did not, therefore, encourage Kamran to invite a conflict with him until full preparations were completed. Moreover, it was not wise to stake the troops of Kamran which appeared to be the only effective force then available. In case Kamran lost, there would have been nothing left to fall back upon. If, however, he succeeded, of which there were few chances, the credit of defeating Sher Khan would have gone to Kamran and might have swelled his head. He was told that Humayun, who had lost the first round, would rather like to have a second one himself, for it was a personal duel between him and Sher Khan and, therefore, a point of honour with him.

The climate of Agra did not suit Kamran. He fell ill, remained confined to bed for about three months, and grew so weak that his limbs seemed to refuse to

function, and his speech was affected. Some mischief-mongers suggested that he was being poisoned slowly by Humayun and, therefore, it was desirable to get away from Agra as soon as possible. Since in the politics of the day such a possibility could not be ruled out, his suspicion was easily aroused in the weak state of his health. Besides, he felt highly offended when he was asked, in spite of his illness, to attend the court of Nizam, the water-carrier, who was seated on the throne for half a day, for having saved the life of the Emperor at Chausa. Kamran must have felt that the Emperor was getting soft in the brain and ridiculously eccentric. Whatever enthusiasm he might have felt for the Emperor was shaken.

Kamran's mind turned to his own affairs. He had been absent from the Punjab for more than a year. During this period considerable changes had taken place in the mid-Asian politics. The Uzbek chief Ubaidullah was dead and Shah Tahmasp was, therefore freed from anxiety. It was quite conceivable that in view of the confusion in the affairs of the Mughals in Hindustan, the Shah might make one more effort to capture Qandahar. For this reason, Kamran did not accede to the wish of Humayun to leave his entire force behind. He, however, agreed to leave three thousand troops to serve the Emperor, and left for Lahore. It seems that the seeds of misunderstanding between him and the Emperor were sown on this occasion. A number of people sent their families to Lahore with the Mirza, probably because they feet that the Afghan advance might make Agra unsafe in no distant future.

The apprehension of the people were not without foundation. Sher Khan celebrated his victory of Chausa by declaring himself, at Banaras, an independent king with the title of Sher Shah Sultan-i-Adil. The Afghan army reconquered Bengal and killed the Mughal governor. Sher Shah next planned a big offensive against Hindustan. While he himself proposed to lead an army to Kanauj, he sent his son Qutb Khan to proceed along the Jamuna towards Agra. He even invited the rulers

of Gujrat and Malwa, and other chieftains, to proceed against Agra and thus co-operate with his son.

Sher Shah found it easy to capture Kanauj, but his son Qutb Khan failed to make headway owing to the energetic counteraction of the Emperor. He despatched Askari and Hindal to watch the movement, if any, of the chieftains of Malwa, while Yadgar Nasir Mirza was sent to stop the progress of Qutb Khan. Since Sher Shah's request did not find any response in Malwa, the Mughals found it easy to deal with the Afghan prince. Near Kalpi a battle was fought, in which Qutb Khan was killed and the Afghan army routed. The plan of Sher Shah was defeated.

Taking advantage of the initial success Humayun marched out of Agra to meet Sher Shah (March 16, 1540) with a large but not very well organized and trained army. Humayun crossed the Ganges and encamped, waiting for the move of Sher Shah. The ground which the Mughals occupied happened to be on a lower level than that occupied by the Afghans. Sher Shah also waited for the arrival of Khawas Khan from the east. On his return Sher Shah felt ready to open the battle.

Unluckily for Humayun, the rains flooded the ground which he had occupied. He organized his army in a battle array and tried to move up to a better ground. Sher Shah rightly felt that the opportunity for striking had offered itself. He, therefore, launched attacks on both the flanks of the Mughal army. Mirza Hindal, who commanded the left centre, smashed the attack of prince Jalal Khan and drove it back in confusion. But Askari who commanded the right was not so lucky. His wing was routed by Prince Adil Khan and Khawas Khan, and his soldiers ran towards the Mughal centre which was also thrown in disorder. At this juncture the camp followers of the Mughals, who were in the rear, were attacked by an Afghan detachment. Panic-stricken, they also threw themselves on the Mughal centre. This coincidence caused so much pressure on the centre that the gunners were borne over, thus completely paralysing the Mughal artillery. Sher Shah took full advantage

of the confusion. He hurled his army on the Mughal centre, which was simultaneously attacked from the left. These vigorous onslaughts broke the Mughal army. The battle was lost by the Mughals, who fled for life towards the river (May 17, 1540). Humayun was outwitted and his generalship failed him on the occasion, with the consequence that the Afghans had the satisfaction of retrieving the honour they had lost at Panipat.

Humayun, Haider Mirza, Askari, Hindal and Yadgar succeeded in crossing the Ganges. They made for Agra, being hotly pursued by the Afghans. Sher Shah had sent two detachments, one towards Agra and the other towards Sambhal. In spite of numerous obstacles, harrassments, starvation, and exhaustion Humayun managed to reach Agra. There he spent a night. Next day he left for Delhi with his family and some treasure. At Rohtak, Hindal joined him, and both fled to Lahore *via* Sirhind. There they were joined by Aksari Mirza (July 1540).

Humayun and his brothers, along with Haider Doghlat and Yadgar Mirza, discussed the ways and means to deal with the Afghan menace. Humayun wanted them to pool all the available resources and make a determined effort to recover the lost territory. Kamran was anxious to save the Punjab from going out of his hands. Since the military resources of the Mughals were limited, he preferred negotiations with Sher Shah. The difference between Humayun and Kamran was on one point only. Should the Emperor conduct negotiations on behalf of all, in the capacity of the sovereign, or should Kamran do it as the *de facto* master of the Punjab? Haider Doghlat advised the Emperor to go to Kashmir, which was then passing through factional anarchy, conquer it, and bide his time there to defeat the Afghans. Hindal and Yadgar Nasir wanted him to conquer Sindh and go to Gujrat where, after the death of Bahadur Shah, no suitable person was to be found to rule as an efficient sovereign.

One thing was, however, clear that except Humayun, no one considered it practicable to fight Sher Shah. Every one of these proposals had some defect

or the other. Humayun also came to see that under the circumstances the proposal of negotiating with Sher Shah ought to be given a chance, even though there was little hope of success.

Accordingly, he sent an envoy to Sher Shah with a proposal to treat Sirhind as a boundry between the Afghan and the Mughal kingdoms. Since it was apprehended that Sher Shah would not come to terms with Humayun, Kamran had secretly instructed Qazi Abdullah to make an attempt to offer the same proposal on his behalf. Since Kamran had not come into conflict with Sher Shah so far, his proposal might receive better consideration. Both the proposals implied that the Mughals would feel satisfied if they were allowed to hold the territory which was in the possession of Babar before the battle of Panipat.

Sher Shah was shrewd enough to realize that the Mughals were in no position to fight, and that a settlement of that nature would not last long, since there was no good natural boundary in the Punjab to seperate the two kingdoms. He also concluded that the Mughal princes were either disunited or were trying to outwit him. He, therefore, made a straight, and the only workable, proposal that he would sheathe his sword should the Mughals agree to recognize the Indus as a boundary line between the two kingdoms. In other words, he was not prepared to divide India either with Humayun or Kamran or, for the matter of that, with anybody else.

Negotiations having failed, it was clear that Sher Shah would advance against them in no distant future. It was also evident that the Punjab could not be retained either by Humayun or Kamran. The latter felt that he had lost the Punjab for no fault of his own, but through the incompetence of his brother. Therefore, he became all the more anxious to save Kabul and Qandahar for himself. Like his father he felt that the resources of Afghanistan were not adequate to sustain the extravagance of the entire Mughal nobility. He saw no reason why he should go to the wilderness while he had Afghanistan to fall back upon. Hence he showed no

interest in the diverse proposals mooted.

Humayun would have preferred to go to Badakhshan where he was well known ; but he could not get it without a war with Sulaiman Mirza, whose hereditary claim to it was confirmed by Babar. None could say what complications might arise should a war break out in Badakhshan, which was a bone of contention between the Uzbeks and the Mughals. As the *de facto* ruler of Afghanistan, Kamran would not like trouble on its border. Apart from it, what guarantee was there that after consolidating his position in Badakhshan Humayun would not feel tempted to conquer Kabul? History had demonstrated times without number that kingship knows no kinship. For all these reasons, Kamran opposed the idea of Humayun's going to Badakhshan. For a good-hearted and unsuspecting man like Humayun the attitude of Kamran seemed too selfish and disappointing. He was simply incapable of appreciating his brother's reasoning which, of course, was not unsound politically. In fairness to Kamran it may be added that he offered to take with him all those people from Lahore who wanted to seek asylum in Afghanistan, and settle them there. He offered to take care of the families of his brothers and cousins so that their hands be free for any enterprise they might venture upon.

Humayun now had to choose between Kashmir and Sindh. He objected to go to Kashmir because he thought he would get confined in a country which was economically poor and politically unreliable. At this juncture came the news of Sher Shah's advance.

Mirza Haider Doghlat parted company with Humayun. Kamran and Askari Mirza went to Afghanistan. Hindal and Yadgar Nasir Mirza decided to sail in the same boat with Humayun (Oct. 1540). Accordingly they moved towards Sindh. The field was now open to Sher Shah, who moved forward quickly and made himself master of the whole of the Punjab as far as the Indus.

A few days after Humayun's departure from Agra Sher Shah entered the capital. He spent sometime

there in settling preliminary affairs and nominating officers to take charge of Alwar and Sambhal. Then he set his army in motion and by slow marches reached Sirhind to watch there the activities of the Mughal princes.

Sindh in those days was ruled by the Arghunians, who had been driven out by Babar from Qandahar and had carved out a kingdom for themselves in Sindh. The arrival of Humayun in Sindh frightened Shah Husain Arghun. For six months he kept Humayun in good humour, meanwhile trying to seduce Yadgar Nasir Mirza. The efforts of Shah Husain were crowned with unexpected success owing to a misunderstanding between Hindal and Humayun. The reason for Hindal's dissatisfaction was that Humayun was lost in love of Hamida Banu, a young daughter of Hindal's spiritual preceptor, whom he eventually married (Aug. 21 1541). Displeased at this, Hin al listened to the insinuations of Yadgar and accepted the invitation of Qaracha Beg, the governor of Qandahar, on behalf of Kamran, and marched off to Qandahar. Humayun, however, did not lose heart. Leaving Yadgar Nasir Mirza to capture Bhakkar, he proceeded to take the fort of Sihwan. Owing to the dearth of sufficient men and means the fort could not be taken, while the activities of the Sindhis, who cut off all the supplies, brought terrible scarcity in Humayun's camp. The fort stood a siege of seven months and yet its fall was not within sight. Meanwhile Mirza Yadgar was won over by Shah Husain, who gave him his only daughter in marriage and promised his help in the conquest of Gujrat. These developments encouraged further desertions among Humayun's followers till he was left with a handful of men. The Mirza went further and even attacked Humayun. In his dispair Humayun thought of renouncing the world and taking to the life of a recluse at Macca. He was, however, dissuaded from doing so by his most devoted friends. As further stay in Sindh was useless and even dangerous, Humayun left Sindh and proceeded towards Rajputana at the invitation of Raja Maldeo, the ruler

of Marwar.

With the decline of the prestige and power of Mewar after the death of Rana Sanga, the house of Marwar began to rise in importance. But it was not till the death of Bahadur Shah of Gujrat that Maldeo found the field open for his ambition. Within four years he established his domination form Nagor and Jalor across Merta and Ajmer to Hindaun and Biyana. Bijan Deva, the Raja of Merta, is said to have fled to Sher Shah. Maldeo then turned his arms against Bikaner. Jaitsi, Raja of Bikaner, sent his son Kalyan Mal or Kalyan Singh and his minister Nagraj to seek help from Sher Shah.

To counteract the move of the Raja of Bikaner, Maldeo not only invaded and conquered his kingdom but sought alliance with Humayun. He sent an invitation to Humayun promising to give him Bikaner, and offering him his support in the conquest of Gujrat and Hindustan. So long as Humayun hoped to conquer Sindh he paid little attention to these proposals. After losing that hope, he decided to avail himself of Maldeo's offer. He reached Phalodi in July 1542. Here he was welcomed by the representatives of Maldeo with presents and cash.

Sher Shah was aware of the dealings of Maldeo with Humayun. He, therefore, sent an envoy to the former requesting him either to hand over Humayun to him or to drive him out of his dominion. If the Raja acted on these suggestions, Sher Shah promised to give him Alwar or any other place, and recognize his conquest of Nagor. The envoy was at Jodhpur when Humayun was encamped near it.

Humayun had expected personal attendance of the Raja on him, adequate military preparations, and concentration of the army at Jodhpur, but he was disappointed in all these respects. Instead, he found there the envoy of Sher Shah and heard alarming rumours and allegations suggesting treacherous intentions on the part of the Raja. What precisely was the reply of the Raja to Sher Shah, or what his intentions really were, could not be ascertained definitely. None the

less the general atmosphere and the movements of some persons, suspected to be the spies of the Raja, alarmed Humayun so much that he abruptly broke his camp and fled as fast as he could. True, that Maldeo had made no effort to capture Humayun, but the latter did not get any help from him, nor could he stay in his kingdom. Although one condition of Sher Shah was satisfied yet subsequent events show that there was no love lost between him and Maldeo. That Maldeo was capable of treachery and even meanness may be probable, but the charge of his treachery to Humayun stands unsubstantiated. All that can be said is that he could not fulfil his promise given to Humayun. This might have been due to the advance of Sher Shah on Malwa and its rapid conquest without any opposition whatsoever. The presence of Sher Shah with a powerful army in Malwa might have prevented Maldeo from taking any action which could have forced a premature conflict. There is no reason to believe that his proposals to Humayun were insincere, but circumstances prevented him from acting on them further, at least for the time being. Opinions, however, will differ about his motives.

Passing through Jaisalmer, Humayun reached Amarkot on August 22, 1542, in a most pitiable condition. He was kindly received by Rana Birsal, who gave him every facility he could afford. He stayed there for over a month and a half. The Rana was anxious that Humayun should help him in taking revenge upon Shah Husain Arghun, who had killed his father ; hence he insisted on Humayun's taking the field as early as possible. The Rana had collected seven thousand horse to follow him. The Emperor tried to postpone the matter because Hamida was advanced in pregnancy and was expected to be delivered within a few days. The insistence of the Rana, however, obliged him to leave the Begam in the palace and start on the expedition on 11 October. A few day later Hamida Banu gave birth to a child (Oct. 15, 1542) who later on made his mark in Indian history and exacted vengeance upon the Afghans for the miseries of his father.

For several months Humayun continued to beat the air in Sindh. He was opposed by Arghunians at Jun and could make no headway against them. Here he was joined by his wife with the infant son, and Bairam Khan, who managed to reach him after an adventurous flight from the grips of the Afghans.

From Jun he issued an appeal to the Rajas and other chieftains to join him in driving out the Arghun usurpers. It received a wide response and brought under his standard about sixteen thousand cavalry. Upset by the remarks of a Mughal officer, the Rana left Humayun and so did the other chieftains.

Finding Sindh quite inhospitable, Humayun left Jun on July 11, 1543 for Qandahar *via* Sivi. Shah Husain apprised Kamran and Askari, who had been apparently reconciled, of Humayun's march towards Qandahar. At Shalmastan (Mashtung) Humayun learnt that Askari under Kamran's instruction was coming to arrest him and was not far from the place. Leaving his belongings and baggage and the infant son to the care of reliable men, Humayun set off with his wife and twenty-two loyal followers for Persia by way of Ghazni (Dec. 1543). Askari probably connived at it, since he did not order a vigorous pursuit.

Humayun was received well by the governor of Seistan. On learning about his arrival through a letter of Humayun, the Shah instructed all the officers of the provinces through which he was to pass to give him right royal reception with all facilities and comforts. Passing through Herat and Mashhad, he reached Qazwin, the capital of Persia. The Shah was at Surliq, the summer capital. Humayun was escorted there and led to the presence of Tahmasp (July 1544). He felt diffident and humiliated in his heart, but had to keep up appearances. The difference of creed, as also the view which the Persian held about Babar's responsiblity for the defeat of the Persian army at Ghazdawan, stood as a barrier between the two sovereign and made free, frank and cordial behaviour somewhat difficult. Reluctantly Humayun had to dress like a Persian and

Tahmasp suggested Humayun to adopt the Shia creed. Humayun was hesitant. So the Shah concluded [illegible]

conform at least externally to the forms and formalities of the Shia community.

It was unfortunate that Humayun unwittingly excited the jealously and displeasure of the Shah's brother, Bahram Mirza, and some other influential people. They tried to provoke the Shah against Humayun and succeeded to such an extent that even the life of the royal guest was exposed to risk. But the sister of the Shah, Sultanam, interceded for Humayun and pursuaded the Shah to give him his support. At last it was settled that the Shah would place about thirteen thousand horse under the nominal command of Prince Murad, who would conquer Qandahar for Humayun. In lieu of this favour, Humayun was asked to marry a daughter of the Shah's sister, and to promise that after the Persian army had recovered Quandahar, Ghazni and Kabul for him, he would surrender Qandahar to the Persian monarch. It may be pointed out here that no religious or sectarian condition or any sort of political allegiance was imposed on him. The Shah also gave letters to Humayun to be sent to Kamran and Sulaiman Mirza in which he advised them to come to some amicable settlement with Humayun without forcing a war. But Humayun did not send them.

Qandahar was besieged. Since it was found difficult to capture it, Humayun sent Bairam Khan with the letter of the Shah to Kamran. Kamran gave serious thought to the proposals, relaxed control over Sulaiman, Hindal, and other nobles, but did not go further than that. Meanwhile, Humayun succeeded in occupying a hill which overlooked the fort and made bombardment effective. This led to the desertion of some influential persons in the fort, and at Kabul as well. Since no reinforcements came, Askari surrendered the fort. He was placed in rigorous confinement (Sept. 1545).

The Persian general Budagh Khan asked Humayun to surrender to Prince Murad the fort of Qandahar with all its assets, men and material, including Mirza Askari. Humayun allowed them to take the fort, but wanted to divide the property equally. He refused to surrender

his brother. Suspicion and unpleasantness grew between him and the Persians who were not liked by the people of Qandahar owing to their haughty and arrogant behaviour and extortions. It became obvious that the Shia soldiers and the Sunni populace could not get on well. The people of Qandahar naturally looked to Humayun for help. Moreover, the Persians seemed to have been quite contented with the possession of Qa dahar, and did not seem to be in a mood to help Humayun in the conquest of Ghazni and Kabul which formed part of the settlement between him and the Shah. Humayun's attitude was perfectly natural although its legality is doubtful. The Persians on the other hand cannot be absolved of the charge of selfishness an unwillingness to carry out their undertaking in full.

Wit the collaboration of the people of Qa dahar, Humayun captured the fort by a stratagem. T respect the susceptibilities of the Shah, Humayun appointe Bairam Khan as governor of Qandahar. The recovery of Qandahar encouraged Hindal, Yadgar Nasir Mirza, and many other nobles to go back to Humayun, and add strength to of his influence, prestige and power. Being deserted by a large number of officers and soldiers Kamran lost courage. Hefled from Kabul which was occupied by Humayun about six months after the death of Sher Shah.

In discussing the causes of the failure of Humayun against Sher Shah, much has been made of the hostility of his brothers and the weakness of his character—such as opium habit, soft nature and laziness. Modern scholars not only consider such explanations as overdrawn and shallow but to a considerable measure unfair and unjust. The reasons for his stay in Malwa and Bengal have been discussed in their proper context. Among them laziness aud love for ease hardly find a place

It has been established that the behaviour of Kamran during the first ten years of Humayun's reign was far from hostile. In fact, he had acted with due

deference and loyalty towards him. After his defeat at Kanauj, Kamran seems to have completely lost his confidence in the capacity and ability of his brother and, therefore, he refused to sail in the same boat with him. He could not see eye to eye with him and, therefore, decided to follow an independent line of action which, he believed, would save at least Kabul, Ghazni, Badakhshan, and Qandahar from passing out of his control. In indentifying his interests with those of Humayun he saw grave danger to his own possessions. He, therefore, dissociated himself from the exiled Emperor, and left him to look after his own affairs. Askari had never rebelled. He served his Emperor as best as he could and was present in almost all the major battles which Humayun fought in the east or the west. When Kamran separated from the Emperor, Askari also went away with the former, who was his uterine brother. Kamran gave him the charge of Qandahar. He seems to have a soft corner for Humayun for he connived at the flight of Humayun to Persia, and treated Akbar with tenderness and love.

Humayun's youngest brother Hindal was at best only a half-hearted rebel. He was of a weak mind and therefore, reluctantly drawn into an unfortunate situation by some rebellious nobles. His inaction at a critical juncture proved undoubtedly disastrous to Humayun at Chausa. The reason for it was not so much personal ambition as fear of punishment for his running away from Bihar to Agra. Later on he parted company with Humayun for a purely sentimental reason and not because of the hardships in Sindh or any political ambition. He was not happy in the company of Kamran and rejoined Humayun as soon as he found it possible. The relations between him and the Emperor were always tender and affectionate. But for the solitary dereliction of duty and stupid action stated before, he served Humayun energetically and loyally, and ultimately died fighting for him.

It is true that the disaster at Chausa could have been averted if Hindal and Kamran had taken prompt and

energetic action. Their inaction was ill-advised, short-sighted and most unfortunate, but it was not motivated by any desire to deprive Humayun of his sovereignty or end his life. They did not take any advantage of the utter helplessness of the Emperor after the debacle at Chausa. Taking all factors into consideration it can be safely concluded that the brothers of Humayun contributed very little, if at all, to his ultimate failure. It was not the defeat at Chausa but that at Kanauj which was the main cause of the exile of Humayun. None of the brothers, not even Kamran, can be held responsible for the collapse of the Mughal power at Kanauj.

The character of Humayun also cannot be responsible for his failures. He was brave, cool, calm, and dignified, and quite capable of extraordinary exertion and activity when required. He was kind, generous, large-hearted, intelligent, cultured, refined and noble. He was also an able military commander and an experienced general. All these qualities would have gone to make him a popular and successful ruler. As to his love for opium, it was nothing as compared with the devotion of Babar to all kinds of drugs and intoxicants. In fact it was very much regulated, and was never allowed to paralyze his spirit or befog his understanding.

The record of Babar's success would have been worse than that of his successor, had he not won against Ibrahim Lodi. And if, instead of Ibrahim Lodi, Babar had to deal with Sher Shah, it is doubtful whether his success could be assured. But Babar was a greater personality than Humayun, and probably had a better army to command. He had, moreover, the advantage of possessing fire-arms which his adversaries did not.

Humayun had none of the latter two advantages while he had to face a co-ordinated attack of two rulers like Sher Shah and Bahadur Shah. He was no match to Sher Shah who excelled him in experience, organizing ability, dissimulation, craft and political opportunism. The Afghan leader was his equal if not superior as a strategist and tactician, and commanded an army which was inspired by national enthusiasm

to recover their lost dominion. The Afghans by then were quite familiar with the *Tulughma*. Although Bahadur Shah was much inferior in generalship to Humayun, yet he was served by the entire moral and material resources of Gujrat.

The second reason for the weakness of Humayun was his extravagance and lack of financial ability. This weakness he had probably inherited from his father. The consequence was that the central government found itself unable to raise or finance an army to help Humayun when he was in Bengal. That was a critical moment; lack of funds killed the enthusiasm of even his well-wishers and supporters.

Humayun was of an unsuspecting nature, and took a man at his word. The tragedy of Chausa might have been averted had he refused to place trust in Sher Shah, and acted with caution. This weakness of his was exploited more than once by the Afghan leader and the Arghun ruler of Sindh.

Humayun was also the victim of an inexorable fate. The failure of Askari to persuade Tardi Beg to extend him his support, and the unfortunate decision of the prince to go to the north, led to the collapse of the Mughals both in Gujrat and Malwa. The failure of Mahmud Shah of Bengal to hold out for a few months more changed the entire complexion of eastern politics and landed Humayun in unexpected difficulties. The unanticipated and usually heavy downpour of rain in the middle of May flooded his camp at Kanauj, which placed him at a great disadvantage and contributed largely to his defeat. Humayun was neither favoured by luck, nor so gifted by nature as to be able to sustain the weight of the great problems which he was called upon to tackle. His chief opponent Sher Shah had the advantage of both. Humayun seems to have possessed a one track mind and, therefore, failed to provide for such situations as might arise at the failure of his original plan. He allowed himself to be drawn easily into new problems and situations without realizing their full implications probably because he was not aware

of his limitations. For example, there was no necessity for his operations in such distant provinces as Gujrat and Bengal. Their conquest could have been undertaken after he had consolidated his position in Malwa and Bihar. But he allowed himself to be tempted into attempting, at a stretch, what should have been done step by step. His political calculations were defective. They suggest clearly that he was neither a good judge of men and their motives, nor of political situations and administrative problems. As a diplomat and politician he was no match to Babar or Sher Shah. He also lacked the ability to weave into a compact fabric his rapid territorial acquisition which he made in a fit of complaisance or absent-mindedness. He failed to retain his grip over them and their loss had disastrous reactions on his fortune and empire.

CHRONOLOGY

Accession of Humayun	30 Dec. 1530.
Bahadur Shah annexes Malwa	March 1531.
Humayun besieges Kalinjar	Sept. 1531.
Bahadur conquers Ujjain	Dec. 1531.
Humayun's first siege of Chunar	Feb. 1532.
Bahadur conquers Raisen, Chanderi Mandsur	May-June 1532.
Battle of Daura	Oct. 1532.
Bahadur's first attack on Chitor	Nov.-Dec. 1532
Humayun raises the 2nd siege of Chunar	Jan. 1533.
Humayun at Gwalior	Feb. 1533.
Bahadur raises the Ist siege of Chitor	Mar. 1533.
Humayun returns from Gwalior	Mar. 1533.
Bahadur captures Ranthambore and Ajmer	1533.
Foundation of Din Panah	Aug. 1533.
Mohammad Zaman's 2nd rebellion	1533-34.
Humayun leaves Agra for Kalpi	Nov. 1534.
Defeat of Tatar Khan	Jan.-Feb. 1535.
Fall of Chitor to Bahadur	March 1535.
Bahadur flees from Mandasur	April 1535.
Bahadur flees from Champanir	June 1535.
Humayun returns from Cambay	Oct.-Nov. 1535.
Kamran recovers Qandahar from the Persians	Jan. 1536.
Humayun captures Champanir	Aug. 1536.
Muhammad Sultan Mirza's Rebellion in Hindustan	July-Aug. 1536.
Askari appointed Viceroy of Gujrat	Aug. 1536.
Anti-Mughal revolt in Gujrat	Nov. 1536.
Askari's retreat to Champanir	Dec. 1536.
Humayun at Agra	Feb. 1537.
Muhammad Sultan Mirza defeated	Feb. 1537.
Siege and fall of Chunar	Jan-June 1538.
Humayun at Patna	Aug. 1538.
Humayun at Gaur	Oct. 1538.
Shaikh Bahlul murdered	Dec. 1538.
Humayun leaves Gaur	Jan. 1539.
Humayun at Chausa	March-June 1539.
Sher Khan takes Kanauj	Feb.-March 1540.
Battle of Kanauj	17 May 1540.
Humayun at Lahore	July.-Oct. 1540.
Humayun marries Hamida Banu	21 Aug. 1541.
Humayun at Jodhpur	May 1542.
Humayun at Amarkot	Aug. 1542.
Birth of Akbar	15 Oct. 1542.
Humayun leaves Sindh	July 1543.
Humayun meets Tahmasp	July 1544.
Humayun conquers Qandahar	Sept. 1545.

Humayun conquers Kabul Nov. 1545.

Humayun : For advanced study :—

PERSIAN :

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Abdul Qadir Badaoni : Muntakhab-ut-Tawarikh, English translation by Rankin.
Nizamuddin : Tabqat-i-Akbari, English translation by B. De.
Abul Qasim Ferishta : Gulshan-i-Ibrahimi, English translation by Briggs.
Abbas Khan : Tarikh-i-Sher Shahi, English translation by Elliot.
Gulbadan : Humayun Nama, English Translation by Beveridge.
Jauhar : Tazkirat-ul-Waqayat, English translation by Stewart, C.
Haider Doghlat: Tarikh-i-Rashidi, English translation by Elias and Ross.
Also those mentioned in connection with Babar and Sher Shah, particularly the Memoirs.

ENGLISH :

Elliot and Dowson : History of India, Vol V.
Erskine : History of India under Babar and Humayun, Vol II.
Banerji , S. K. : Humayun Badshah.
Qanungo K. R. : Sher Shah.

CHAPTER V

SHER SHAH

Sher Shah is one of those great men of history who blossomed out of dust into glory and rose to the highest pinnacle of distinction by dint of their courage, ability and resourcefulness, as also by the strength of their sword. He was neither born in purple, nor could he boast of his origin from any high family of religious or military leaders. His grandfather Ibrahim was probably a horse-dealer and did not apparently derive much profit from that humble trade. He, therefore, welcomed the general invitation of Sultan Bahlul Lodi to the Afghans, and migrated with his son Hasan from the rugged country of Roh to Hindustan. He was finally taken in employment by Jamal Khan, an Afghan officer at Hissar Firoza, who bestowed some villages on him as *jagir* to maintain fifty horses. Gradually he rose to the command of five hundred horse with a *jagir* at Hissar. It was at Hissar Firoza or Narnol that Hasan's Afghan wife gave birth to Farid. The exact date of his birth is not known, though 1472 and 1486 have been suggested. After Ibrahim's death, his son Hasan was confirmed in his father's place. Hasan had four wives and four sons besides Farid and his uterine brother Nizam. Hasan seems to have been more attached to his youngest wife and her two children Sulaiman and Ahmad.

Some years after, Jamal Khan was transferred to the eastern provinces. Consequently, Hasan and his family migrated with Jamal Khan and established themselves at Sassaram which was given with Khawaspur Tanda to him as *jagir*. Here the relations of Farid with his father became very much strained over his favouring his step-brothers. In utter disgust he left the paternal roof and went away to Jaunpur, which was the headquarters of the provincial government and a seat of learning.

Farid is believed to have lived at Jaunpur for a few

years and spent his time very profitably. He picked up some knowledge of Arabic, studied Persian well, and paid special attention to history and biography. Here he acquainted himself with the working of the civil and military administration of a province. Above all, he made friends with some of the saints and scholars of his time, who exercised great influence over the masses. By his intelligence, good manners, assiduity, amiability and manly virtues he made his mark at Jaunpur.

The pressure of his friends and the reports of Farid's accomplishments at last persuaded Hasan to recall his son promising to place him in charge of his *parganas*. With some reluctance, Farid accepted the invitation.

The *paraganas* of Hasan were never so well administered as under the regime of Farid. Lawlessness and anarchy were sternly put down; official tyranny was rigorously stamped out; peace and prosperity began to smile upon the *jagir* lands of Hasan. Two features in his administration require special notice. Firstly, he organized the peasantry into a kind of local militia, and with their help subdued the most recalcitrant and marauding landlords. Secondly, he extended all possible and reasonable concessions to the cultivators in assessing revenues but showed little mercy in realizing them. He did not introduce any radical reforms but gave option to the tenants of an area to choose and stick to one of the various systems of revenue assessment and payment then prevailing in the *jagir*. Most probably they would have preferred to follow the one to which they were used.

Hasan was highly pleased with the administrative efficiency of Farid and the prosperity of his *jagir*. But Farid's step-mother urged upon his father the desirability of giving her sons also a chance to administer the *jagir*. Farid had held it for well-nigh two decades and had come to imagine it as his monopoly. The request of his step mother was neither unfair nor unreasonable. Hasan decided to accede to it finally when his righteous indignation was aroused at the news of the self-immolation of a girl who was reported to have been driven to it by the impetuous

and passionate love of Farid. The tragic end of his love-affair, and the decision of his father to transfer the administration of the *jagir* from him to his step-brothers upset his mind. His first impulse was to resist what he considered was an act of favouritism and high-handedness of his father. But he was well advised when he gave up that idea and decided to seek his fortune else where. He threw up his office and left for Agra (1519).

At Agra he took service under Daulat Khan, who was so much pleased with his work that he spoke to Sultan Ibrahim Lodi about him and requested the transfer of the *jagirs* of Hasan to Farid. But the Sultan refused to take kindly to his request on behalf of Farid because the latter had the meanness to speak ill of his own father (1520).

Fortunately Hasan died the same year. Farid ran post-haste to Sassaram and driving off his step-brothers made himself master of his father's entire *jagir*. The disappointed youths sought the protection of the most influential leader of the Sur clan, Muhammad Khan, *jagirdar* of Chaund, who espoused their cause. Fearing serious developments, Farid entered the service of Bahadur Khan Nuhani of Bihar, whose influence was expected to avert any possible trouble (1526). Bahadur Khan was highly impressed with the ability and industry of Farid. For having slain a tiger, Farid got from him the title of Sher Khan. Sometime later, he was appointed the deputy and tutor to the crown prince Jalal Khan.

Once Sher Khan went on leave to his *jagir*, but without any good reason he overstayed there. Muhammad Khan Sur insinuated to the Sultan of Bihar against Sher Khan till he got displeased. Taking it as a fine opportunity Muhammad Khan opened the question of the partition of Sher Khan's *jagir* with his step-brothers, but Sher Khan flatly refused to do so. He then attacked Sher in his *jagir*. Finding it impossible to cope with Muhammad Khan, Sher Khan fled from Bihar and entered the service of Junaid Barlas, the governor of the eastern province on behalf of Babar (1527). With his help he recovered his *jagir*, and drove out Muhammad Sur. Junaid took Sher Khan

to Agra and spoke well about him to his brother Khalifa, the Prime Minister. Sher Khan then remained in the Mughal army for fifteen months. This gave him a splendid opportunity to watch and study closely the ways, habits, and administrative methods of the Mughals. He was lucky enough to accompany Babar in his Chanderi expedition (1528) and watch his operations in the eastern provinces (1529), and thus learn at first hand the Mughal system of military organization and warfare. Babar was also pleased to restore to Sher Khan his lost *jagir* (1528-29).

Sher Khan now devoted his energies to consolidating his power and reorganizing his *jagir*. But the arrival of Sultan Muhammad Lodi, brother of Ibrahim Lodi, with high Lodi and Farmuli nobles compelled him to join them. He, however, took the earliest opportunity of apologizing for his helplessness to Babar when he went to the east (1529).

A few months later he was recalled by Dudu, mother of Jalal Khan, the minor ruler of Bihar, and was appointed to be her deputy. In this capacity Sher Khan learnt the intrigues of diplomacy and details of administration which fitted him for the great task that lay before him.

The grip which Sher Khan acquired over civil and military administration was bound to excite resentment and jealousy among Nuhanis. At this, he asked them to choose one of the two branches of government —Finance and Military. They chose the military without realizing that there was hardly any field left for profitable campaigning, and that they had to be tied to the purse-strings of the *Diwan*. Finding themselves in a desperate position, they went to Bengal and sought the help of Nusrat Shah to restore them to real power. But Sher Khan defeated their combined armies at Surajgarh, which struck the death-knell of the Nuhani power, exposed the weakness of the ruler of Bengal, and helped the rising Sur leader in the realization of his higher ambitions. (Sept.-Oct. 1530).

Sher Khan had hardly settled down to the task of

consolidating his new gains when the arrival of Mahmud Lodi with Biban, Bayzid and other big nobles in Bihar put him in the shade. He was compelled to become one of their camp-followers and accompany them in their march against Humayun. He negotiated with the Mughal ruler, and his neutrality is believed to have contributed to the defeat of the Afghans at Daura (1532). It, however, made him quite a conspicuous leader of the Afghans.

Sher Khan's conflicts with Humayun have been discussed in connection with the reign of the latter. But his progress in the eastern provinces of the Mughal empire, Bihar and Bengal has been only touched upon there, and requires specific treatment here.

Humayun's occupation elsewhere gave Sher Khan an opportunity to organize and strengthen his power. He ordered every adult Afghan to join the army, and trained them morally and militarily to be useful in an organized bid for the revival of the Afghan power. He raised a large army, which included a flotilla of fifteen hundred boats and an equal number of elephants. His infantry was efficient, but his cavalry was yet weak. Still the army was powerful enough to conquer the whole of Bihar and to dictate terms to the ruler of Bengal at the very gate of Gaur (1536).

Next year he laid siege to Gaur, it was alleged , to realize the balance of tribute supposed to have been left unpaid, but with the intention of conquering it. After a vigorous siege of six months Gaur was captured. During the time Sher Khan was busy in Bengal, Humayun had captured Chunar. But Sher Khan balanced the loss of Chunar by treacherously capturing Rohtas where he could safely lodge his treasure and family.

The two victories he scored over Humayun, one at Chausa and the other at Kanauj, made him not only Sher Shah but also helped him in ascending the imperial throne of Delhi (1540). On coming to the throne, the first duty of Sher Shah was to subdue the Ghakkars and to prevent the possiblity of the return of the Mughals. The former were a semi-barbarous tribe of warlike marauders

inhabiting "the mountainous tract between the upper courses of the river Indus and Jhelum", comprising the modern districts of Hazara, Rawalpindi, and Jhelum. When asked by Sher Shah to acknowledge his suzerainty they replied, "We are tigers and soldiers. From us you cannot demand anything except tigers and arrows." Sher Shah flew into a rage at this blunt reply and said that "he would throw such a wedge into the breasts of all the Kakars (Ghakkars), that it should stick there till the day of resurrection". War was declared ; but it became protracted on account of the physical feature of their country. Inspired by their natural love of independence and confident of the power of their sword, they also offered a stout and prolonged resistance. Sher Shah wreaked vengence upon them by laying waste their country, and carried away as captives as many of them as he could. To keep these recalcitrants in check and also to guard the frontiers, he ordered a fort to be built at Rohtas. The Ghakkars offered all possible obstacles but the fort was completed under the supervision of Todar Mal Khattri.

During his stay in the Punjab, Sher Shah gave military assistance to a fugitive Kashmiri prince to dislodge Haider Mirza from Kashmir. But the expedition did not succeed.

The work of pacification and consolidation of the Punjab had not made much progress when Sher Shah was called away to Bengal. The governor of the province, Khizr Khan, had married the daughter of Mahmud Shah, the late ruler of Bengal, and had begun to assume an air of independence (1541). Though the governor came to welcome Sher Shah he was dismissed and put in chains. As Bengal was a large and resourceful province it was likely to swell the head of a governor. Sher Shah, therefore, reduced the size of the province and partitioned it into several divisions. Over each of these divisions he placed a Commissioner directly appointed by him ; but for co-ordinating their work Qazi Fazilat was appointed as "*Amin-i-Bangala*" or "*Amir-i-Bangala.*"

After the death of Bahadur Shah the affairs of Gujrat fell into confusion. Taking advantage of it Mallu Khan, whom we have noticed before, declared himself an independent ruler at Mandu and assumed the title of Qadir Shah. His usurpation was recognized by the Vazir of Gujrat, Imad-ul-mulk, in the name of Muzaffar III, the minor ruler of that kingdom. Besides Qadir Shah who ruled over Mandu, Ujjain, Sarangpur and Ranthambore, there were other chiefs who had made themselves independent in one or the other part of Malwa. Sikandar Khan Miana ruled over Sewas and Hindia ; Raja Pratap Shah held the divisions of Raisen, and Chanderi-Bhopal, and brought under his possession Bijagadh and Tamta.

On his return from Bengal, Sher Shah decided to march against Qadir Shah. There were several reasons for it. Qadir Shah had offended Sher Shah by questioning his right to affix his seal at the top of his *farman* which he had sent him announcing his assumption of the royal title after his victory at Chausa. Such a seal, Qadir said, could be placed by a sovereign on his *farman* to his vassal and not to an independent ruler like him. Secondly, the defeat and death of Qutb Khan at the battle of Kalpi was ascribed to the failure of Qadir Shah to help him. Thirdly, Humayun was roaming about in Sindh with a view to securing place for himself. A weak country like Malwa was, therefore, a point of danger. Fourthly, Maldeo had seriously embarked on a career of conquest and was, in fact, anxious to bring Malwa under his sway. Should Maldeo succeed in his object, his power would have become exceedingly dangerous.

Sher Shah, therefore, led an army personally. On his way he received the surrender of the strong fort of Gwalior from Abdul Qasim who had held it in the name of Humayun. At Gagron, Puran Mal, the powerful deputy of Raja Pratap Shah of Raisen, came and offered homage. Qadir Shah lost his courage. He came to offer homage to Sher Shah at Sarangpur. Sher Shah did not think it proper to leave Mandu in the hands of

Qadir Shah; so he offered him the government of Kalpi or a fief in Bengal. Qadir Shah could not naturally like this offer. He, therefore, fled one night with his family to Gujrat leaving his new kingdom to Sher Shah. At Ujjain Sikandar presented himself to offer homage. Sher Shah, who had learnt a lesson from the flight of Qadir Shah, suspected his sincerity, ordered him to be arrested and confiscated his territory. Having appointed his own officers to govern Malwa, Sher Shah marched on Ranthambore. Usman Khan, the governor of the place, surrendered the fort without any opposition. Thus, within a short time the whole of Malwa and Ranthambore came under the sway of Sher Shah. Leaving the work of consolidation in the hands of reliable officers, he returned to Agra. Sometime after his departure, Qadir Shah made an attempt to reconquer his territory but failed miserably (1542).

Sher Shah paid a short visit to Bihar, during which he reorganized the province by carefully fixing its boundaries, a task that had been necessistated by the partition of the kingdom of Bengal. Moreover, he laid the foundation of Patna on the confluence of the Ganges and the Gandak, and constructed a strong fort there which might serve the same strategical and commercial purpose as the fort of Chunar. The headquarters of the provincial government were removed from the town of Bihar to this new city which since them steadily grew in importance (1542-43).

The continuance of strong and vigorous Rajput principalites of Raisen and Chanderi, which were backed up by the Rana of Chitor, was never liked by the rulers of Malwa, Gujrat, or Delhi. Chanderi was conquered by Babar and Raisen by Bahadur Shah. During the confusion following the death of Bahadur Shah, Raisen and Chanderi were captured by Puran Mal, son of the well-known Silahdi (Silhari?), who ruled as a deputy in the name of Raja Pratap, son of his elder brother.

On the occasion of his first invasion of Malwa, Sher Shah had invited Puran Mal, though Ram Sah of Gwalior, to offer allegiance. Puran Mal was presented

by Shujaat Khan before Sher Shah, who was pleased to confer on him one hundred robes of honour with hundred horses. Leaving his younger brother to serve the Afghan king, he was allowed to return to Raisen. It appears that at that stage Sher Shah had no intention to pick up trouble with Rajputs. He remained quite contented with the establishment of his authority over Malwa.

After settling the affairs of Bengal and Bihar, Sher Shah's attitude changed. It is alleged that during his illness in Bihar he had taken a vow to punish Puran Mal for the same charge which Bahadur had brought against Silahdi, *viz.* of tyrannising over the Muslims, enslaving their families, and keeping their daughters as dancing girls. Although in those days scant regard was shown by either the Hindu or the Muslim conquerors towards the vanquished, and prisoners of war who were reduced to slavery, yet the charge was specific and serious and, therefore, called for a thorough enquiry and explanation. However, Sher Shah's mind was made up and action was decided upon.

Raisen was besieged by Sher Shah (1543). On behalf of the Raja, Puran Mal offered submission and sent a present of six hundred elephants. But he did not come to offer personal allegiance. The siege continued for six months. At last Puran Mal came. Sher Shah asked him to release the Muslims whom he had enslaved and take charge of the governorship of Banaras. Puran Mal denied all allegation of enslaving Muslims, and expressed his desire to consult the Raja about the surrender of the fort and acceptance of the governorship of Banaras.

After consultations he sent a message to Sher Shah accepting the terms, provided Prince Adil Khan and Qutb Khan Banet bound themselves by oath to guarantee the lives and honour of the besieged. Qutb Khan Banet was sent into the fort. "Binding himself by solemn oaths" he brought Puran Mal with his family which was assigned to a camp in the midst of Sher Shah's encampment.

Although Sher Shah was aware of the charges levelled against Puran Mal and of the Islamic

law and practice on the point, he had entered into a negotiation with, and given promise of safety to Puran Mal and his family. In spite of all that, he ordered a general slaughter of the Rajputs. His breach of faith has been condoned by some and condemned by others. But breach of faith was not a new technique of Sher Shah as he had committed it before more than once with perfect equanimity. It is quite likely that from the very beginning he had intended to "take the fort by the exercise of his skill" (Abbas) or rather treachery. The widows and the *mullas* were brought in later to justify the slaughter. Firishta says that Puran Mal and his comrades fought "so gallantly as to surpass the achievements of Rustam and Asfandyar". After the Rajput camp had been turned to shambles, and most of the women had saved their honour by performing *jauhar*, some unlucky children were taken prisoners. The boys were castrated and the girls distributed. Among the girls was a little daughter of Puran Mal who was given to acrobats to make her dance in the bazars. The Raisen episode undoubtedly "left the deepest blot on Sher Shah's memory". For this breach of faith Qutb Khan felt such anguish that he committed suicide.

During the years 1542-43 Haibat Khan Niyazi, the governor of the Punjab, made great progress in subjugating the province. Fateh Khan Jat, the robber-chief of Kabulah (near the modern Montagomery district), who was a terror to the country between Lahore and Delhi, was captured and put to death. Hindu Baloch, his comrade in arms, suffered the same fate. The province of Multan was subjugated and pacified. It is possible that some portions of Sindh might have also been conquered for Sher Shah in 1543 ; but the evidence is too weak to permit a definite statement.

Maldeo had ascended the throne at Jodhpur in July 1532. He had taken the fullest advantage of the political confusion in Rajputana and had extended his kingdom in the north to Sambhar, Nagore, Bikaner ; to Ajmer and Bednor in the east ; and in the south, it abutted on the State of Gujrat. He strongly fortified

the old forts—such as those of Ajmer, Merta and Jodhpur proper—and constructed new ones at strategic points. Indeed Maldeo was the most powerful ruler of Rajputana. He ruled over a vast territory and was believed to have an army 50,000 strong .

The conquest of Malwa and the Punjab being over, sher Shah could find time to organize an invasion upon the state of Marwar. The opportunity seemed ripe when Rao Kalyan Mal of Bikaner and Biram Deo of Merta, who were dispossessed of their land by their brother Maldeo, invited him to invade Marwar. With an army of 80,000 he marched against Maldeo in 1544. This was, in fact, the biggest army that Sher Shah ever led into the field. He marched with extraordinary caution, throwing up defences and digging entrenchments almost at every place his army halted.

For a month the armies lay within sight of each other. Neither was prepared to take an offensive ; both the leaders were very cautious. At last Sher Shah hit upon a clever stratagem. He forged a letter and had it dropped near the tent of Maldeo's minister in such a way as to attract his notice. The contents of the letter alarmed Maldeo. His suspicion gained strength from the fact that he had shown much severity in resuming the *jagirs* of his vassals. In his alarm Maldeo ordered a retreat. A few nobles headed by Jeta and Kumpa were much vexed at this unjustifiable reflection upon their loyalty. To prove their loyalty they fell with four thousand horse upon the Afghans and carried every thing before them. Unfortunately, when they came at close quarters with the main Afghan Army, they dismounted for a hand to hand fight, as was the custom of the Rajput cavaliers. This was a mistake and Sher Shah was clever enough to detect it. On penalty of death he forbade the Afghans to fight with the sword. He ordered an elephant charge backed up by the artillery and archers. The Rajputs fought hard and were killed to the last man. Sher Shah fully appreciated the danger which he was lucky enough to tide over, and gave expression to his feelings that "for a handful of

bajra I had almost lost the Empire of Hindustan."

It was too late when Maldeo saw through the trick and repented his folly. Before he could do anything Sher Shah pushed on, compelling him to retreat. Sher Shah despatched one of his divisions under Khawas Khan to capture Jodhpur, while he himself marched with the other against Ajmer. Maldeo was compelled to evacuate Jodhpur and seek shelter at Siwana.

After taking Ajmer, Sher Shah plundered Pali and captured Mount Abu where he established a strong military post. Leaving his camp at Amjer, Sher Shah went back to Agra for a few months. After his return he attacked Chitor which was torn by civil dissensions and had grown weak under the imbecile administration of Vikramaditya and Banbir the bastard. With out any serious resistance the ministers of Udai Singh sent the keys of Chitor to Sher Shah. From there Sher Shah returned victorious through Dhundar (Jaipur) territory probably receiving homage from the Kachwaha chiefs who were in no position of to offer any resistance. Thus Sher Shah could claim to have conquered Rajputana.

From Jaipur Sher Shah marched against Kalinjar which was then ruler over by Kirat Singh (Bharati Chand?). There were many reasons for his attack on Kalinjar. Kalinjar was considerd to be an impregnable fort which commanded the Jamuna Valley. After the conquest of eastern Rajputana and Malwa it was found expedient for military and administrative reasons to capture the fort and complete the chain of fortifications from Delhi and Malwa to the eastern provinces. Sher Shah also felt offended since the Raja had not come to offer his homage to him at Sehonda, where he was encamped and which was only thirty miles north-west of Kalinjar. The Raja of Kalinjar had offered submission to Humayun and was likely to be considered his well-wisher until he had definitely offered loyalty and homage to Sher Shah. His failure to present himself before Sher Shah was considered an act of defiance. Besides, Sher Shah wanted to get possession of a dancing girl whose fame

had aroused his keen interest. Last, but not the least, the Raja had given shelter to Vir Singh Baghela, the ruler of Gahora who was an ally of Babar, and whose mother Kalyandevi was the daughter of Puran Mal of Raisen. Some also said that his son Virbhanu had escorted Humayun to Kara when the latter fled for life from Chausa.

Sher Shah exerted his utmost to capture the fort. For seven months everyone, whether a soldier or a camp-follower, laboured day and night to supplement the work of the professional workmen. Mines were run, high platforms overlooking the fort were constructed for mounting batteries, and no effort was spared to ensure success. On May 22, 1545 the final assault was launched. Unfortunately one of the bombs struck the wall and rebounding unexploded, fell in a heap of bombs causing a tremendous explosion. Sher Shah, who was standing close by directing the operation, was caught in it and was mortally burnt. The tragedy stimulated the officers and soldiers who exerted their best and were able to convey to their dying master the news of the fall of the fort. Sher Shah thanked God for crowning his efforts with success and calmly passed away (Saturday May 22, 1545). According to his desire he was buried in the splendid mausoleum at Sassaram, which he had built for the purpose.


Sher Shah was one of the greatest rulers of Delhi. He was a prince of destiny. By his will he succeeded in creating an empire. A gallant soldier, a consummate general, a wonderful man of resources, a master of statecraft, Sher Shah stands as a great personality in Indian history.

In the dark days of the Afghans, he had a clear vision of the future. No misfortune or failure could confound him ; no task, however insuperable, could deter him from approaching it with admirable optimism. He laid his plans most carefully and worked out every detail with extraordinary precision. No work, however small, did he regard below his dignity. He toiled like a common soldier when occasion required it and at the same moment looked most

dignified. He was never carried away by success, but took every victory as a matter of course, and always looked to the future. In a period of trial he exercised remarkable self-control. He never attempted a thing which was impossible, and there was nothing impossible which he laid his heart upon. The most remarkable traits of his character were caution and thoroughness. He was never satisfied with half-measures, and never left a work half-done. Though a man of character he felt no scruples when the interests of the State required it. He had none of the petty notions of morality that usually convulse or throw a man in a fog. But with all his greatness, he was neither an original thinker nor a man of lofty visions, and this might be due to his being essentially a realist and a practical man of action. Havell has admirably summed up his genius thus: "Sher Shah was a good and plodding state-manager."

The personality which comes nearest to Sher Shah is that of Shivaji, the Master Builder of the Maratha Nation. "In the condition of the homes of their boyhood, their early life and training, and the development of their character—even as in the steps by which they mounted to thrones—the forsaken son of Shahji Bhonsla was the exact parallel of the son of Hasan Sur. Shivaji and Sher Shah were not only alike in character and genius, but also grew up amidst like circumstances." (Sarkar).

Of all the Muslim rulers of Delhi, Sher Shah was the only one who possessed first-hand experience of the details of administration at all levels. As a manager of his father's *jagir*, he had mastered all the details of village and *pargana* administration. As an intelligent observer, he must have availed himself at Jaunpur of the opportunity of acquainting himself with the political and administrative problems, and techniques of provincial administration. As a tutor of the crown prince and then as a deputy to the dowager queen of the Nuhani ruler of Bihar, he acquired such a grip over the different branches of administration in that provincial kingdom that he aroused the jealousy of other ministers. There, he established his complete domination and acted as the



EMPIRE OF SHERSHAH
50 0 50 100 150 200 250 300
English Statute Miles
KASHMIR
Kabul
Ghazni
Qandahar
Rohtas
Mankot
Lahore
Multan
Sirhind
Uch
Panipat
Delhi
Bhakkar
Sukkar
Bikaner
Phalodi
Nagaur
Jaisalmer
Alwar
Sambhar
Jodhpur
Ajmer
Agra
Kanauj
Bilgram
Gwalior
Kalpi
Manikpur
Jaunpur
Chausa
Banaras
Patna
Monghyr
Jalor
Chitor
Kalinjar
Chunar
Sasaram
Rohtasgarh
Gaur
Mandsaur
Sarangpur
Ujjain
Raisen
Mandu
Ahmadabad
Baroach
Surat
Deogarh
Daulatabad
Ahmadnagar
Bidar
Golconda
Gulbarga
Bijapur
R. Amu
R. Helmand
R. Jhelum
R. Chenab
R. Ravi
R. Sutlej
R. Indus
R. Jamuna
R. Ganges
R. Gandak
R. Brahmaputra
R. Son
R. Mahanadi
R. Godavari
R. Krishna
R. Tungabhadra
R. Pennar
R. Palar
R. Cauvery

de facto ruler. Besides mastering the methods and technique of the Afghan system of administration he had acquired general familiarity with the Mughal system of central and local administration. His understanding and experience of military organisation and finance were also varied and thorough. Born and bred in India he understood her peoples and problems most intimately and could handle them with confidence.

Armed with such a wide and deep knowledge of Indian affairs and trained in the school of experience and discipline, Sher Shah took the reins of administration of the second and larger Afghan empire in his own hands. Energetic, laborious, indefatigable, vigilant and conscientious, Sher Shah worked from three in the morning to late in the night with brief pauses for prayers or rest. Accounts, official reports, levies and recruitment of soldiers, inspection of the various departmental works, in fact, everything connected with the government he could find time to attend to. There is no wonder that within a short span of five years he succeeded in accomplishing much more than any other ruler before or after him could have done in fifteen or twenty years.

Although Sher Shah showed great deference to Afghan sentiments, socio-political customs and practices, he was quite aware of the fact that India was not Aghanistan and, therefore, it was not possible to enforce them in this country without necessary modifications. The Afghans had to be gradually weaned away from their tribal and parochial outlook and trained to think in terms of an empire. As a keen student of the history of Muslim rulers of India, he must have learnt that the early Turkish Sultans of Delhi also had to modify the Turkish and Islamic laws to suit the conditions of the country. In the court of Babar he could observe in action a policy which was not tethered tightly to the *fiqh* but was broad-based and liberal. He, therefore, chose to adopt a policy of moderation and tried to avoid extremes as best as he could. He did not relish the enormous influence which the *Ulama* had acquired in the state, and wished

to keep them within reasonable bounds , at least till he was strong enough to deal drastically with them. He, however, did not know how to go about he matter.

Sher Shah did not like the Shias for sectarian, political as well as personal reasons. He is reported to have nursed a desire to conquer, after subduing the Rajput infidels, the Shia states of south India and, if possible even Persia. But this policy was directed towards foreign states. Towards his own non-Muslim subjects he was fairly liberal, generous and just. He did not go out of his way to placate any class or sect or religion. He allowed them to observe their festivals, fasts and feasts, and worship in their own way. There is no evidence of any kind of disability imposed by him upon his non-Muslim subjects. Himself he was a good Sunni Mussalman, but his plicy towards the non-Muslims may be described as that of non-interference. He seems to have followed the policy of some broad-minded Sultans and continued to realize the *jiziya*. With all that , the higher and military services were manned generally by the Afghans, or in some cases by the non-Afghan Muslims. There is hardly any evidence to show that he had opened all services to the non-Muslims, or had adopted a policy different from that of his predecessors.

If he did not fully share the view of the Afghan tribal lords regarding the position of the sovereign, he could not afford completely to disregard it. He seems to have struck a compromise between the Afghan and Turkish theories of sovereignty. Since he was their national hero and chosen leader who had retrieved their honour and recovered their lost empire, his prestige and popularity were high and his orders were generally obeyed. The Sultans of the first Afghan empire did not possess these advantages. Without, therefore, changing the outlook of the tribal leaders he found it easier to command respect and enforce obedience. Few could dare defy his authority for, besides his personality and prestige his own army was larger and more efficient than that of any of the Afghan lords.

The general structure of administrative divisions in

the time of Sher Shah remaind as before. A village was the smallest unit of administration. A number of villages constituted a *pargana* ; several *parganas* were united to form a larger *Shiq* or a division (*Sarkar*). In a few cases such as the Punjab, Malwa and Bengal, several *Shiqs* were placed under an officer who may be equated with a *Subedar*. In the absence of any precise term his jurisdiction may be called a province, except in the case of Bengal where Sher Shah had allowed the territorial divisions as he found them to exist. Bengal had been a thorn in the side of the Delhi Sultanate since the beginning of the Turkish rule. When Khizr Khan, the governor of Bengal, married a daughter of the late king Mahmud Shah without his permission, he was dismissed and imprisoned. Bengal was dismembered into a number of divisions, over each of which *jagirdars* officers where appointed. To prevent a conflict of jurisdiction and interests, as well as to co-ordinate the work of the *jargirdars* and exercise a general supervision, *Qazi Fazilat* was appointed as an *Amin* with loose and unspecified powers. It appears that Sher Shah had no clear plan or policy about the organization of provincial administration. In a vast empire the importance of a well organized provincial administration as a link between the central and local government can hardly be exaggerated. It is essential in the interest of both the government and the people. In this direction Sher Shah could or would not make any contribution.

The village (*deh*, in Persian) life and government had the least interference from Muslim rulers. In a way, they were tiny self-contained units, and although their old influence and prestige had suffered steadily with the rise of powerful monarchies and political upheavals, their core and general structure seems to have remained intact. In each village there was the headman (*Mukhiya* or *Muqaddam*) who was the main link between the government and the village. It was through him that the government dealt with the village peasants. In spite of the fact that his influence and powers underwent some changes from time to time, and there is no precise information as to how much power and responsibility was exer-

cised by him in the time of Sher Shah, it may be presumed that the headman was the most important individual in the general economy of the village. Since it was the general policy of Sher Shah to establish direct contact with the peasants it is probable that the authority of the headman in settling or collecting the village revenue might have suffered seriously. None the less he was in a way responsible for maintaining law and order in the village without being a government servant. Besides him there was the inevitable *patwari* or the village record-keeper who was also not a government servant, but an employee of the villagers.

Modern researches have revealed that Sher Shah did no interfere with the administrative machinery even of the *pargana*, except probably in regard to nomenclature. As before, in a *pargana* there was a *Shiqdar* or *Amil* who was the head of that unit. His chief function, however, was to collect the revenue. His was a lucrative job. Sher Shah changed the *Amil* every year or two.

Besides a *Shiqdar* there was the *Munsif* or the *Amin* (perhaps the old *Mushrif*) whose function was to measure the land for revenue purposes and settle disputes regarding the actual area or size of holdings. While the *Amin* was a government official who was appointed or transferred or dismissed by the government, the interests of the cultivators and the customs and practices obtaining in a *pargana* were preserved by a *Qanungo*, the *pargana* record-keeper, who was usually a hereditary semi-official.

The *Shiqdar* was assisted by two clerks known as *Karkuns*. While these officials handled all the records and papers the *Khazanadar* (or *Fotadar*) kept the treasure and the cash. He was counterpart of the old *Muhsil*. The accounts were kept both in Hindi and Persian by the *Karkuns*.

A number of *parganas* were combined to form a *Sarkar* (division). The Empire of Sher Shah was divided into sixty-six *Sarkars*. In each *Sarkar* there was a divisional officer who was called *Shiqdar-i-Shiqdaran*. He was the chief supervisor and executive

officer over the *Shiqdars* of the various *parganas* in his divisions. The work of the *Amins* of the *pargana* was supervised by the *Munsif-i-Munsifan*. He was the chief assessment officer of the division (*Sarkar*). It may be assumed, though there is no direct evidence, that there must have been *Karkuns* in the *Sarkar* office. There is, however, some doubt about the existence of a divisional treasurer, though is existence is not improbable.

Very little information his available about the organization of the Central Government in the time of Sher Shah. He was not impressed by the Mughal system of government which was based on the theory of ministerial responsibility. In his opinion the Mughal Emperor gave too much power to his ministers who were generally corrupt and negligent. In the first Afghan empire also the ministers were not entrusted with wide powers. Sher Shah believed in direct supervision and control of government, for he had no trust in high offlcers. His was a one man's rule or autocracy. It might be that the Afghan tribal lords did not like to take orders from anyone except Sher Shah whom they respected and obeyed as their elected hero and sovereign. That was probably one of the main reasons why Sher Shah chose to concentrate effectively all power in his own hands. He had great faith in his unbounded capacity for work. There is no doubt that with his great knowledge and experience of the governmental problems and administrative details, and his tireless energy and whole-hearted devotion to his duty, he must have cleared a large amount of work. Yet with all his Herculean energy and capacity for hardwork it was impossible for any one person to cope with the rising volume of work in his newly created vast empire. He was one of the most efficient rulers of his age, but it is extremely doubtful if one man's rule could bring high efficiency in all the daepartments of the government. A well-organized and competent machinery of govenment at the centre was indispensible for a vast empire for a variety of reasons. Unfortunately Sher Shah did not give any attention to it, and his contribution in that direction was almost

nil. The consequence of his policy was that the structures of the central and provincial governments remained woefully weak. The government depended entirely on the ability and efficiency of the monarch. In the absence of an able, efficent and dominating personality the entire government was bound to collapse.

The most striking contribution of Sher Shah was his revenue reform. There were three important features in it. Firstly, Sher Shah decided once for all that the best system of assessment must be based on actual measurement. Accordingly, the empire was surveyed under the supervision of Ahmad Khan, one of Sher Shah's personal friends and reliable officers. Sher Shah remained firm and forced the system of measurement almost on the whole empire, although, as in the time of Alauddin and Muhammad Tughluq, there was considerable opposition in some parts of the empire. The only known case of exception is that of Multan, for not only the country round it had suffered considerably from political unpheavals, but also because it was a region of great military importance. A discontented population there could prove a source of considerable anxiety and trouble. A record was kept of the settlement made between the government and the landholder or cultivator. The latter was also given a title deed (*Patta*) in which conditions of settlement were specifically stated.

The second feature of Sher Shah's revenue policy was the collection of the land revenue for staple crops in cash as far as possible. Revenue on perishable articles was collected in cash. For that purpose the land was divided into homogenous units according to its fertility. It was classified into three classes—good, middling and bad. The average produce of the three classes was added and one-third of the total was taken was the average produce of each *bigha* for revenue purposes. Of this average produce one-third was demanded as the share of the government. In case of cash payment the amount of the government demand was fixed according to the

prices obtaining in near markets. Schedules of crop rates (*Ray*) were preserved showing the method and rates of assessment.

The third feature of his revenue policy was the standardization of the measure employed for survey and fixation of the perquisites of the officials employed for local assessments and collection, and settling definitions of the cesses. It is interesting to note that landholders and cultivators were required to pay two and a half per cent of the tax towards a sort of reserve fund from which relief was to be given to the people in case of famine or other natural calamities.

Besides the land revenue, which was the main source of revenue in India, other sources of income included the *jiziya*, the *zakat*, cesses on a variety of articles, escheats, custom, duties, and war booty.

Sher Shah's rate of assessment, though quite high, was considered as the lowest and most reasonable by the various rulers of India of the sixteenth century. Whatever leniency he might have shown at the time of assessment it is admitted that he was very strict in realizing the revenue. No cases of leniency in revenue collection are found in the sources available to us. In case of the failure of crops, and distress due to natural calamities, he followed the old practice of lending money and materials to the cultivators. There is no doubt that the fear and awe which he inspired and the vigilance which he exercised even in administrative details, must have improved the tone of administration. Even his relentless critics had to admit that Sher Shah freed the country from the evils of arbitrary settlement by agreement between the government and the farmer or headman. He was successful in introducing considerable uniformity in the revenue administration. His policy tended to introduce a *ryatwari* system, though it is difficult to say how far he actually succeeded. It is clear that Sher Shah did not or could not abolish or even substantively reduce the *jagirdasi* system. It was deeply rooted in India and was definitely liked by the Afghan tribal leaders for its economic,

military, social and personal advantages. In those parts of the country which were under the direct administration of the crown Sher Shah might have pushed his reforms fairly successfully even within his short rule.

Sher Shah's system of revenue assessment and collection suffered from two defects. Firstly, the cultivators of the middling and bad lands had to pay a greater share of their actual produce, while those of good lands had to pay proportionately less, and thus enjoyed distinct advantage at the cost of their less fortunate brethren. True it is that the government policy indirectly encouraged the cultivators of lower grades of land to improve and bring them to the level of good quality; yet so long as it was not done they had to suffer. The second defect was that the settlement of the cash value of the government share depended on correct information, proper inquiry and prompt report to and instructions from the central government. Such a procedure was dilatory and not quite dependable. It was, therefore, likely to hold up the work of collection to the great inconvenience, annoyance and disadvantage both of the revenue collectors and the cultivators. It seems that Sher Shah was making an experiment on a large scale. If he had lived longer it is quite probable that he might have rectified the defects.

Like a true Muslim ruler Sher Shah laid great stress on the dispensation of justice. His conception of justice was high. "Justice," said he, "is the most excellent of religious rites, and it is approved both by the kings of the infidels and of the faithful". Again "Justice does not consist in abstaining from oppression, but in fair and honest dealings with men." In doing justice he made no difference between the high and the low, or the rich and the poor. The civil cases of the Muslims were decided, as of old, by the *Qazi* according to the canon law or custom. But criminal cases were probably tried by the Chief *Shiqdar*. A dubious reference to *Mir Adl* is found, but his jurisdiction and duties are not specified. It is doubtful if any officer of that designation existed in

the time of Sher Shah. The criminal law was unifrom and rigorous. Imprisonment, flogging, amputation of limbs, tortures, fines and execution were resorted to according to the gravity of the crimes. Sometime theft and bribery were capitally punished. Revenue cases were decided by the Chief *Munsif* according to the regulations framed by the Sultan. Sher Shah does not seem to have introduced any change either in the administration of justice or in judicial organization.

The *Shiqdar* and the Chief *Shiqdars* were responsible for the maintenance of law and order within their jurisdictions. Sher Shah largely acted on the theory of local responsibility for maintaining peace. All the officials were required to do their best in the matter but the largest responsibility for detecting crimes rested with the *Chaudharis* and *Muqaddams*. If the *Muqaddams* of the villages near which a theft, robbery or murder took place failed to find out the culprits and recover property, they were severely punished and sometimes even put to death. This system in a way, shifted the natural responsibility of the government to the *Muqaddams* for the detection of the criminals and punishing them only when the charge against them was proved. In spite of its obvious defects it was calculated to inspire the *Muqaddams* and the villagers to a new sense of civic responsibility and secure their forcible co-operation in maintaining law and order. It was bound to be unpopular and the element of force destroyed its moral value. It is, therefore, not surprising that it was given up after Sher Shah. It is quite probable that in large towns *Kotwals* might have been appointed to do police work. On the whole peace and safety of the highways existed in the reign of Sher Shah.

Sher Shah paid great attention to his army. The army seems to have rested on the tribal basis. It was difficult for the Afghans to shake off the tribal traditions ; and even a man like Sher Shah could not force them to disregard them. Soldiers of one tribe were usually led by their own tribal chief and probably recognized none

else except him. But Sher Shah knew well how to keep these tribal leaders under strong discipline and control. The army was distributed in different parts of the country according to local requirements. At least sixteen cantonments are recorded, but it is likely that their number was larger. Besides the tribal divisions, Sher Shah maintained a strong personal army consisting of 1.50,000 cavalry and 25,000 infantry as also a park of artillery and 5,000 war elephants. Apart from the imperial army there were the troops of the *jagirdars*. The total strength of the two sections could not have been less than four lacs.

Sher Shah paid personal attention to matters like recruitment, fixing of salaries, payments and promotions of soldiers. He looked after their comforts, was accessible to them, and tried to keep them well satisfied. The horses of the cavaliers were branded as in the times of Alauddin Khalji. *Munsifs* were appointed to see that his regulations were properly obeyed.

The standing danger from the west forced Sher Shah to attend seriously to the north-western frontier. He extended his authority as far as the Indus which could be considered the natural boundary of India. He subdued the recalcitrant tribes like the Jats, the Baloch, and particularly the Ghakkars. With a view to keep order in the western Punajb and guard the western frontier, Sher Shah constructed, in the teeth of opposition of the Ghakkars, the strong fort of Rohtas. Both Multan and Rohtas were well garrisoned.

A strong and peaceful administration was bound to encourage trade and commerce. This was not all. Other measures of Sher Shah were equally well calculated to improve the commerce of the country. He effected improvemnt in currency which had been debased during the later days of the Turkish and Afghan rule. Well-executed coins of gold, silver and copper of a uniform standard and value replaced the old debased ones of mixed metal. His silver rupee was so excellent as to be considered a standard coin for centuries after him. Besides the coins of smaller fractions of a

rupee, even the copper coin *dam* had fractions of half, quarter, eighth and sixteenth. Another measure was the building of roads and *serais*. Fine shady roads were constructed between such distant places as Dacca and Lahore, Mandu and Burhanpur, Agra and Burhanpur and Agra, Jodhpur and Chitor ; minor highways connected Jaunpur and Biyana, Agra and Delhi, Multan and Lahore. These roads were as useful for commercial as for military purposes, for which they were planned. Along these roads were sunk wells at convenient and short distances, and at intervals of four miles were built *serias* where arrangements were made for the comfort of both the Hindus and Muslims. In these places the state provided to the Hindu also hot or cold water, beds, food cooked or uncooked, grain and hay for horses and cattle. Sher Shah is credited with having repaired or constructed about 1,700 caravanserais. They were largely for the convenience of the royal post. Besides these indirect measures, direct steps were also taken to tone up commerce. The merchants and shopkeepers were ordered to maintain uniformity of weights, prices and quality of articles. The state officials were forbidden to buy things at a price lower than that prevailing in the market. Finally, he opened free trade between the provinces of his empire. He charged the transit duties only at two places in the empire, the places for entrance, which were Sikrigarli pass in the east and Rohtasgarh in the west, and at the place where commodities were sold. It is, however, not clear what means did he adopt to prevent the duties being demanded in case of resale of an article at different places.

Charity has been enjoined as a religious duty by Islam on every ruler ; and Sher Shah was by no means irreligious. He did not fail to make provisions for the upkeep of the *madrasas* and mosques which he built or which existed from old days. Liberal provisions were also made for the support of the blind, the old, the weak, widows, students and scholars. His policy was to give something to every deserving man and give no more than what was necessary for the requirements of each.

Houses for the poor and free kitchens were opened at several places and a huge amount of 18,25,000 rupees was annually spent on them.

The tolerant attitdue of Sher Shah is reflected in the religious, literary and architectural activities of his times. The Muslims took greater interest in the growth of Hindi literature and some of them produced works of great merit and originality. In this field the *Padmavat* of Malik Muhammad Jayasi stands pre-eminent. It was during the Sur period that Vaishnav teachers were zealously preaching their doctrines and the Mathura district had become the chief centre of neo-Vaishnavism in northern India. The architectural monuments left by Sher Shah show clearly that in art he made no distinction between the Hindus and Muslims, or Afghans, Turks and Persians. He patronized an eclectic art which assimilated in a striking manner both Indian and Persian artistic traditions. His buildings reflect solidity, virility, massive grandeur and glorious impressiveness. Nothing depicts the personality, character and lofty-mindedness of Sher Shah more vividly than his own tomb at Sassaram.

Had Sher Shah lived longer he might have taken the wind out of Akbar's sails. He was undoubtedly one of the greatest statesmen among the Sultans of Delhi. Indeed, he had paved the way for the highly enlightened policy of Akbar and was his true precursor. Mr. W. Crookes does him no more than bare justice when he observes, "That he (Sher Shah) introduced such extensive reforms in his short reign of five years is a wonderful proof of his executive ability", and quotes Keene, "No Government, not even the British, has shown so much wisdom as this Pathan". No historian can even question the title of Sher Shah to rank among the most prominent, enlightened and virile Muslim rulers before Akbar.

Sher Shah was undoubtedly the builder of the second Afghan empire. At least during his lifetime he united the Afghan tribes into a nation and recovered for them their lost empire. But he did not rule long enough

to establish a new tradition which could solidify the Afghans effectively and teach them to think and act imperially. Although he ruled well and justly he was primarily the ruler of the Afghans. His reforms were certainly calculated to bring greater uniformity in administration and unity in the empire, establish closer contacts between the provinces, and encourage tolerance to some extent. But he did nothing positive which could create enthusiasm among, or inspire his non-Muslim subjects to honour him as their ruler or consider him the symbol of national unity in the wider sense of the term.

CHAPTER VI

ISLAM SHAH

When Sher Shah died none of the two princes was present on the spot. The elder one Adil Khan, was at Ranthambore, and the younger Jalal Khan was somewhere near Rewa. A few big nobles present in the camp kept the news of Sher Shah's death a secret and sent letters to the two princes to return immediately to the camp. Jalal Khan, who was nearer, arrived on the 5th day and was hailed as the emperor by the powerful nobles present in the camp. The old nobles of the time of Sher Shah were lukewarm, but the partisans of Jalal Khan carried the day. The argument which counted most was that while Adil Khan was luxurious, lazy and indifferent Jalal Khan "resembled his father in his pomp and splendour, and in his desire of dominion and conquest. He possessed great power, ability and good fortune". The only defect which was attributed to him was his fierce and vindictive disposition, but it was expected that he would surely be toned down in course of time.

On coming to the throne (May 26, 1545) Jalal Khan assumed the title of Islam Shah. The first thing he did was to execute the Raja of Kalinjar and his seventy comrades who were taken prisoners. The soldiers and and officers were satisfied by cash presents equal to one month's salary. He raised his supporters to higher offices and dignity, but the old nobles of Sher Shah's time were left out in the cold. Islam Shah must have been aware that in spite of the great advantage he had gained over his brother, his throne was not quite secure, hence he decided to remain at Kalinjar and wait for further developments.

On hearing of his brother's accession to the throne, his elder brother Adil Khan made a dash upon the capital (Agra), but the governor of the place closed the gates

against him. Adil Khan was not prepared for this opposition, hence he returned to Ranthambore and opened negotiations with Khawas Khan and Isa Khan Niyazi. Khawas Khan, however, decided to pay homage to Islam Shah though his sympathies were with Adil Khan. The attitude of Khawas Khan encouraged Islam Shah to come to Agra and received his homage in a grand *Darbar*. On that occasion Islam Shah observed that "he was that day constituted Emperor, when Khawas Khan had joined him".

So long as Adil Khan was at large, Islam Shah could not consider his position quite secure. He, therefore, asked Adil Khan to come and pay personal homage. On the solemn assurances of Khawas Khan, Isa Khan and other grandees, that he would be allowed to depart soon after the first interview, and that Biyana and its dependencies would be bestowed upon him for his maintenance in lieu of Ranthambore, Adil Khan came to Singarpoor (near Agra) to pay homage. Islam would have done away with his brother had his plan not been frustrated by the above-named nobles who, when prevented by the gate-keepers, forced themselves into the royal pavilion with their retainers. After paying homage Adil returned safely to Biyana. Having failed in the first attempt Islam sent Ghazi Khan with a golden chain for Adil Khan, asking him to put it round his feet and come to Agra as a proof of his good faith and promising to free Adil Khan in a few days and allow him to go back. This preposterous proposal alarmed Adil who threw himself on the protection of Khawas Khan. This generous knight threw Ghazi Khan into prison and advised Adil to use sharp steel to vindicate his honour.

This was precisely what the discontented nobles of Sher Shah wanted. Indeed the Afghans were "supplicating God most fervently to excite the dust of discord between the two brothers." When sounded by Khawas Khan and Isa Khan, a number of powerful nobles promised to join Adil and his party should they reach the environs of Agra before dawn. With a view to elicit the attitude of his followers correctly Islam Shah

spoke about his intention of going to Chunar or the eastern Rohtas (Behar) and raise a strong army to fight. But Isa Khan Afghans, who was his greatest supporter, rightly pointed out that his departure from Agra would spell ruin, lead to wholesale desertions and make the rebels irresistible. He advised Islam Shah not to think too much of the enemy or too little of his own power for he argued that the Farmulis were loyal to him, his own army 6,000 strong was quite devoted to his cause and the Niyazis were on the whole not yet hostile to him. The nobles who were friendly to Khawas and Adil promised to desert Islam Shah provided Khawas arrived near their encampment before daybreak. But Khawas spent the night (*Shabi-Barat*) in prayers at the tomb of Salim Chishti of Fatehpur-Sikri. He could not reach near Islam's camp till noon. The plan of the deserters, therefore, could not be carried out. Islam Shah gave battle to Adil and Khawas at Marhakar, a small town west of Agra, and defeated them. Adil Khan fled via Chandwar towards Panna. Khawas Khan fled to Mewat, hotly pursued by the Islam Shahi nobles. Khawas, however, succeeded in defeating the pursuers at Firozpur (Jarka—near Mewat) and reached Sirhind.

Islam took full advantage of his success and did away with some of the Sher Shahi nobles on whom his suspicions fell. Jalal Khan and his brother Khudadad were executed and about thirteen nobles were sent to rot in the Gwalior prison. Said Khan Niyazi, brother of Azam Humayun, the powerful governor of the Punjab, made good his escape and joined his brother at Lahore. Dismay and consternation prevailed amongst the old nobility. At such a time the recall to the court of Azam Hyumayun from Lahore and Shujaat Khan from Malwa was naturally interpreted to mean their destruction. Shujaat Khan came to the court and was graciously received, owing to the influence and support of his adopted son Daulat Khan Oujala, who, for his accomplishments, generosity, tact and graceful features, had risen to be a favourite of Islam Shah.

But Azam Humayun Niyazi refused to come. He

had under his command thirty or forty thousand horses and his strength was further augmented by Khawas Khan who came down the hills with his men and joined him. He even read the *Khutba* in his name and unfurled the standard of rebellion. It appeared that the history of Ibrahim Lodi was going to repeat itself. Azam Humayun then marched towards the capital with his force. Islam Shah was not to be cowed down even by such a powerful combination, and he too mobilized his army. Both armies pitched their camps at Ambala. On the eve of the battle, Azam Humayun and Khawas Khan sat in a conference to discuss the future of the empire should they come out victorious from the inevitable war. Khawas Khan, who was a legitimist, proposed to raise Adil Khan to the throne. He was taken aback when the Niyazis unanimously ridiculed his suggestion and held that "No one obtains a kingdom by inheritance ; it belongs to whoever can gain it by the sword". Khawas Khan was attached to Adil and so without speaking a word made up his mind to desert the Niyazis. In the night it rained heavily and after a frightful thunderstorm lightning fell upon the elephant of Azam Humayun. This was taken as a bad omen and might have damped the spirit of the opponents of Islam Shah.

Islam Shah probably got a hint of the fatal division among the rebels, and came out to fight them early next morning. Just at the commencement of the battle Khawas Khan withdrew from the field to the great chagrin of the Niyazis, but they fought most stubbornly. At last victory declared in favour of Islam Shah and the Niyazis were routed. Those who escaped drowning in the swollen stream, to the west of Ambala, and the slaughter, fled precipitately. Islam Shah pursued them to Rohtas. Khwaja Vais Sharwani was sent in pursuit of the fugitives (1547).

From Gwalior, which Islam Shah had made the seat of his government for the time being, Shujaat Khan fled away towards Malwa. The cause of this sudden flight was an attempt on his life made by an Afghan named

Usman, whom he had punished some time back. It was alleged that the Afghan had been encouraged by Islam Shah to take revenge upon Shujaat. When Islam heard of his flight he sent Isa Khan against him and himself followed soon. Shujaat refused to take up arms against the son of Sher Shah and fled away to Gujrat (1547). He was, however, pardoned through the influence of Daulat Khan and was reinstated in the governorship of a portion of Malwa.

From Ambala Khawas Khan fled to Lahore and thence to Kumayun where the Raja took him under his protection. Islam Shah sent Taj Khan Karrani, who owed his high position to the preferment of Khawas Khan, with instructions to use every possible means to get hold of him. Several messages were sent to the Raja to hand him over but the Raja indignantly replied, "How can I throw into fetters a man who has sought my protection? As long as I have breath in my body I can never be guilty of such baseness". Failing in this attempt Islam himself wrote to Khawas Khan granting him unqualified amnesty, and appealed to his patriotism and religious instincts to come and lead a holy war against the Rana of Udaipur, who had successfully defied every Afghan general and was ravaging and enslaving the Muslims. Khawas Khan fell into the trap and in spite of the friendly warnings of the Raja's nobles came down the hills. Taj Khan Karrani got him treacherously assassinated and sent his head and body to Delhi. The relentless monarch ordered the copse to be thrown in the market of Delhi so that men might take lesson from his fate. The citizens of Delhi, however, knew too well the conqueror of Gaur, his generosity, magnanimity and saintly character. They honoured the dead by covering for three successive nights his body with flowers in spite of the guards placed to prevent them (1552).

Azam Humayun and other Niyazi leaders succeeded in driving Khwaja Vais Sharwani back to Lahore. Islam Shah lost no time in sending fresh reinforcements to Khwaja, who defeated the Niyazis at Sumbul near Dunkot, and compelled them to seek the protection of the

Ghakkars whom Sher Shah had failed to subdue. This combination was serious enough, particularly because Humayun's position in Afghanistan had grown strong. Islam Shah moved with a strong army to fight them. For two years (1548-1550), Islam Shah carried fire and sword into the Ghakkar country but the dogs of war failed to corner the indomitable Ghakkars. The Niyazis, however, felt it impossible to live indefinitely upon the hospitality of the Ghakkars who had become thoroughly tired, hence they tried to enter Kashmir but they were opposed by Mirza Haider Doghlat. A fierce battle was fought in which Bibi Rabia, the wife of Azam Humayun, distinguished herself by a heroic fight. The Niyazis were, however, outnumbered, overwhelmed and defeated. Azam Humayun, his wife and brother were killed and their heads sent to Islam Shah. The most repugnant and disgusting feature in the Niyazi war was the beastly treatment given to Niyazi women. Some were kept exposed for months in a state of nudity. Others were made over to harlots. Sher Shah's molestation of the Rajput women pales into insignificance before the cruel treatment given to Niyazi Afghan women by Islam Shah.

To keep the Ghakkars and the hill *Rajas* in check as also to erect a second line of defence, Islam Shah ordered the construction of a set of five forts. Among these forts the most well-known was that of Mankot.

In 1552 Mirza Kamran came to Islam Shah with the hope of receiving some substantial support from him, but he was received most coldly. For some time he remained in his camp as he could not get either any help or even permission to go. When Islam broke up his camp in the Punjab and proceeded to Delhi he took Mirza Kamran with him. From Machiwara Kamran secretly fled away and after knocking about for some time fell into the hands of Sultan Adam Ghakkar, who kept him in his custody and informed Humayun of it.

In 1553 Humayun crossed the Indus with a view to receive the surrender of Kamran from the Ghakkars. Islam Shah was undergoing a leech operation when the news of the arrival of Humayun at Nilab reached him.

Forthwith he tore off the leeches and the same day marched out of Delhi ordering his army to follow him immediately. Unfortunately there were no cattle to drag his artillery which consisted of sixty guns. So Islam Shah ordered his Afghan soldiers to drag the artillery. The orders were at once carried out and the whole park was carried at the rate of twelve miles a day. Not less than sixty thousand soldiers were employed in the task. At Ludhiana Islam heard that Humayun had returned and he, therefore, retraced his steps and went to Gwalior.

Islam Shah's cruelty towards the Niyazis and his rough treatment of Afghan soldiers led to two attempts on his life. One was in the Punjab and the other at Gwalior. The cause of the latter was the unpopularity of Islam Shah, who had exacted very hard work from the soldiers but had not paid them anything for two years. As no one dared take up arms against him openly they conspired to assassinate him while hunting. Islam, however, took the hint and ordered the soldiers to be paid their arrears within two days. His anger was, however, so much aroused that he would execute anyone on the slightest suspicion.

In the reign of Sikandar Lodi one Saiyid Muhammad, a saintly and eloquent scholar of Jaunpur, declared himself at Gujrat to be the promised Mahdi, who was expected to appear about the end of the first millenium of Islam to purify it of its accretions, to galvanise it, to propagate the true doctrine and to restore the right mode of Muslim living. Round him gathered a number of distinguished disciples who were able to attract a few zealous adherents to the new doctrines. Among them was one Mulla Abdullah, a Niyazi Afghan, who had acquired considerable reputation for his piety, humility, sympathy and service of the poor, and above all his spiritual attainment. He established his headquarters at Biyana and preached the Mahdawi doctrine. The fact that he was a Niyazi Afghan, and preached a doctrine that was dangerous to the established order of the *Ulama* and sovereign authority of the State, and advocated the arming of

the followers of Mahdawism aroused the suspicion of Islam Shah and also of *Makhdum-ul-Mulk* Shaikh Abdullah Sultanpuri one of the most influential divines at his court. The Shaikh was summoned by the Sultan and was, for his refusal to salute him in the court fashion, beaten almost to the point of death (1548). He was taken care of by his followers and after recovery left for Macca.

The Mahdawi movement was a revivalist and not a reform movement. The Muslims were asked to go back to the ideals and ways of life followed by the companions of Muhammad under his inspiration and guidance. The best way of life was that of perfect contentment based on absolute trust in God. Such people should keep away from worldly goods and pursuits and devote their time and energy to piety and prayers, to the propagation of the Islamic ideals and enforcing its moral code and injunctions. Those who belonged to this class should neither acquire property nor beg. They would gladly go without food for two or three days but would not beg. They could accept a voluntary gift of the bare necessities of life, but after meeting their essential requirements must distribute the remainder to the needy and poor. Nothing should be kept for the morrow, otherwise they would be guilty of distrusting God. Their main duty was not only to observe the rules of Islam but also to prevent their breach by others to the best of their ability and power. They kept themselves well armed and did not hesitate to use force to compel people to observe the *Shariat* strictly. All Muslims were treated as equals irrespective of wealth or acquired learning. Thus a king, a servant, a professional divine and an unlettered Muslim stood on the same level. The measure of greatness consisted in one's earnestness of faith, purity of life and loyal and honest obedience to the laws of Islam. Those who could not see eye to eye with them lived in a state of perpetual terror. Their earnestness and self-abnegation, however, impressed the minds of the people, and they received varying support from men of different grades and shades of society. Those who could not break away from the

normal worldly life or take to the life of poverty were required to pay one tenth of their income in charity and observe scrupulously the five duties.

Khwaja Husain, a very learned scholar and an earnest follower of Islam, settled down at Biyana after his return from Macca. There he came under the influence of Abdullah Niyazi and joined the Mahdawi Movement. After the departure of Abdullah he carried on the movement with greater enthusiasm, vigour and ability. The Khwaja came to be called Shaikh Alai. His colossal learning and infectious earnestness, combined with his extraordinary polemical and oratorical powers, created a sensation. Under his energetic and inspiring leadership Mahdawism rapidly tended to become a mass movement. Scholars and students, civilians and soldiers, nobles and common people all seemed to have been affected by it. There was a great searching of heart amongst the Muslims. The placidity of domestic life was disturbed owing to sharp differences of opinion even between father and son, brother and brother, and husband and wife.

The Mahdawi movement had not merely a theological or religious significance. Its social, political and economic implications were also far-reaching. It condemned property ; refused to recognise the prevalent social and political stratification and stratocracy ; and transferred, as if it were, the duty of maintaining law and order from the *Ulama* and the State to the common man. It was a great challenge and could hardly go unnoticed by the custodians of law and order as well as by those who would not like the interference of outsiders in their private life, pleasures and amusements.

Shaikh Alai was summoned to the court. Like his teacher Abdullah Niyazi, he also offended Islam Shah by refusing to salute or address him according to the formal court etiquette. He wished him in the manner prevalent among the common Muslims. The *Makhdum-ul-Mulk*, Shaikh Abdullah Sultanpuri, denounced him as a heretic and a revolutionary innovater. The Sultan referred the case of Shaikh Alai to an ecclesiastical council of eminent *Ulama*, who were invited from different parts

of the empire. Like Luther before the Diet of Worms, about a quarter of a century earlier, Shaikh Alai stood to support his thesis before a large body of *Ulama.* His persuasive eloquence, trenchant logic, and deep and ready learning struck the *Ulama* dumb. In sombre silence they heard the biting denunciation by the Shaikh—"you are a thief of religion— who have made kings and emperors the object of your ambitions and gad from door to door."

Islam Shah was highly impressed by the earnestness, courage of conviction, arguments and scholarship of the Shaikh. He congratulated him and promised to appoint him the chief censor of the empire provided he could make a declaration renouncing Mahdawism. In case he refused to accept the suggestion he would be most reluctantly driven to implement the decision of the *Ulama,* which imposed capital punishment. The Shaikh expressed his inability to give up his creed irrespective of consequences. In spite of the *fatwa* of capital punishment pronounced by Shaikh Abdullah Sultanpuri, Islam Shah did not do anything more than exiling Shaikh Alai to Handiya on the southern frontier of the empire.

In his exile also the Shaikh continued his propaganda. It was reported that Bahar Khan and the soldiers serving under him had joined the movement. The spread of Mahdawism in the army was fraught with serious consequences and was, therefore, bound to cause great concern and apprehensions to the state authorities. Abdullah Sultanpuri utilised this information to play upon the fears and suspicions of Islam Shah.

Consequently, the Shaikh was ordered to go to Shaikh Budha of Bihar, whom Sher Shah held in great esteem, to bring his *fatwa.* Shaikh Budha was in favour of absolving Alai of the charge of heresy. His sons, it is alleged, forged a letter in his name supporting the verdict of Abdullah Sultanpuri. On his way back Shaikh Alai was seized by *Taoon* (Plague?) and was operated upon. When he reached the court he was quite exhausted by the long journey and so weak that he could not speak but with great exertion.

Islam whispered into his ears to renounce Mahdawism or else he would be forced to execute the *fatwa*. But the Shaikh turned a deaf ear to his advice. Islam Shah, therefore, ordered him to be flogged. At the third stroke Shaikh Alai "rendered his soul to the angel of death" (1549-50). His body was left in the open ; and although people were forbidden to show any respect for the dead, they managed to cover his body with flowers every night.

In 1553 Islam Shah developed fistula. In spite of the best medical treatment the trouble went on increasing and he was confiend to bed. Nevertheless he took care to put to death all those who could possibly stand in the way of his son's accession to the throne. The one man whom he could not execute was Mubariz Khan, son of Sher Shah's brother Nizam Khan and brother of Islam Shah's wife Bibi Bai. It was, however, due to her own negligence ; for, when Islam Shah's trouble grew most serious by an attack of strangury and he was on his death-bed, he called Bibi Bai and tried to persuade her to allow to put Mubariz to death if she desired her son to rule after him. But she would not agree to it. In 1553 Islam Shah died at Gwalior after a reign of eight years, nine months and nine days.

Islam Shah was a worthy successor to his father. A good student of literature and a patron of men of letters, he distinguished himself in literary circles by his wit, humour, apt quotations from classics, and appreciation of fine composition. At times he composed extempore verses of no mean order. He had studied canon law and theology and could take an intelligent part in discussions on those subjects. His private life was well regulated. He did not take any intoxicants, nor did he like the company of buffoons, jesters, dancing girls or women of questionable character. His manners were pleasant, polished and refined. He had distinguished himself as a good soldier and an able commander while yet a prince. When he became a king he added substantially to his reputation as a leader of inspiring courage, bravery, and sound judgment. As a ruler he was god-fearing, a protector of his subjects,

a hard taskmaster, and a vigilant, energetic and firm administrator. With all these qualities he had some defects also. He was haughty, suspicious, revengful, ruthless and at times ferocious and cruel. His treatment of Niyazi women was outrageous, shameful and barbarous. He was, therefore, feared but not loved.

In handling the Afghans Islam Shah showed great firmness verging on truculence. Apparently, he was bent on knocking out of their heads arrogance, pride and tribal chauvinism. He persecuted relentlessly, and punished or destroyed anyone who dared defy him. He broke their power, prevented them from encroaching on royal prerogatives and deprived the troops of dancing girls and buffoons by whom they were usually surrounded. By stopping the payment of their salaries for two years he reduced them to such a desperate condition that they could be slogged like cattle. Once Shah Muhammad Farmuli put the whole situation to Islam Shah in a clever manner—"O, my liege! two nights I dreamt that three bags descended from heaven, one containing ashes, another gold and the third papers. The ashes fell upon the head of the troops, the gold upon the houses of the Hindus, and the papers fell to the lot of the treasury!" The policy of Islam Shah might have worked well by clearing the ground for organizing the Afghan nobility on a new basis and creating a new bond between the sovereign and the nobility. But its success depended on the continuity of a constructive policy for a fairly long time as was the case in Tudor Britain. Unfortunately Islam Shah died prematurely and his successors were worthless. His task was, therefore, not only left half-finished but produced undesirable results by destroying the morale and weakening the sense of honour of the Afghans, which the successful leadership of Sher Shah had revived. However, during the life time of Islam Shah, discipline was maintained at a high level. His orders were implicity obeyed. In his inimitable manner Badauni tells us that the officers of the state quailed before the king came out of their headquarters for miles to receive his orders which they carried on their heads and paid respects

even to his slippers in a formal gathering !

Islam Shah was endowed with high imagination. He tried to give uniformity to the law and legal procedure in the empire. The canon law was no doubt there, but its sanction was religious and quite independent of the state. Although on major questions there was a general agreement among the legists of the *Sunnat*, yet the differences of opinion in many matters were quite substantial. It gave considerable latitude to the judges to exercise their own choice in adjudication. The object of Islam Shah seems to have been to secure the sanction of the state as the basis of law. In this respect his policy was progressive and tended to modernise the legal outlook. With that end in view he issued laws and regulations touching almost every branch of administration ; military, revenue, trade, commerce and so on, irrespective of "whether they were in accordance with the Mohamedan law or not. It was a measure which obviated the necessity of referring any of these matters to the *Qazis* and *Muftis*." (Badauni). The idea of unification, codification and simplification of the laws, and putting them on the basis of state sanction was characterised by originality, far-sightedness and courage. Even Alauddin Khalji, Muhammad bin Tughluq and his own father did not show that clarity of vision, definiteness of purpose and capacity for implementing ideas which one finds in Islam Shah.

Islam Shah followed broadly the administrative and agrarian policies of his father. He tried to improved upon and make them more effective. For example, he built more *serais* and added to their amenities ; decentralized arrangements for free kitchens ; distributed *Madad-i-Maash* (maintenance grants) and stipends on a wider and larger scale, and tried to discourage the *jagir* system as far as could be possible under the circumstances. The Afghans seem to have been divided broadly into two classes. One possessed *jagirs* and the other did not. The latter were also anxious to enjoy the advantages of *jagirs*. For a change Islam Shah took away the *jagirs* from the old *jagir* holders and gave them to men of the other class. This juxtaposition

did not apparently change the general situation, as it simply amounted to robbing Peter to pay Paul. But it had two advantages. Firstly, it gave Islam Shah an opportunity to weaken the old and well-entrenched nobility and create a class of new nobles who depended on his favours. The second advantage consisted in demonstrating that the element of security and stability associated with the *jagir* was more imaginary than real. The measure was likely to prepare the Afghans psychologically to acquiesce in the polciy of eventual abolition of the *jagir* system. While planning for the removal of that system Islam Shah "made strenuous efforts to improve the lot of the ryots." Even Abul Fazl gives him credit for his anxiety to deal equitably with the peasantry.

The police arrangement of Sher Shah was open to serious criticism. He had made the *Muqaddams* or of the villages responsible for the crimes committed within their jurisdiction, but the officials of the government appointed to maintain law and order there were not required to take their share in making good the losses or damages. Islam Shah removed the grievance of the *Muqaddams* and made the officials share responsibility and penalty with them.

Islam Shah maintained the efficiency of the army not only by continuing the policy of his father, but also by introducing some new reforms. He remodelled the cavalry by fixing regular grades in service. The troops were divided into units of fifty, two hundred, two hundred and fifty, and five hundred. It seems that Islam Shah wanted to add new grades to the old decimal system for the sake of efficiency and for accommodating a larger number of men in the officers' grade. This policy was accepted by Akbar who extended it to higher grades also. For each unit of fifty troopers two clerks were appointed to keep accounts and records.

The army was organised into larger divisions of five, ten and twenty thousand soldiers. For each of such division a staff was appointed consisting of one Sardar, one Afghan and one Hindustani judge and two other officials. Besides remodelling the cavalry Islam Shah

strengthened the artillery of the army.

Regarding the defence of the empire he added a second line to that of Sher Shah. Sher Shah had built the fort of Rohtas to defend the Upper Indus frontier. Islam buttressed it strongly by building on the hills a chain of five fortresses : Shergarh, Islamgarh, Rashidgarh, Firozgarh and Mankot. They were collectively known as the fortress of Mankot. This line of fortifications was effectively used by the Afghans when Humayun came to reconquer his lost empire.

Islam Shah not only kept the empire of Sher Shah intact and crushed all attempts at rebellion, but even extended it slightly to the eastern Bengal. But for the Mughal menace, he might have extended further the boundaries of his empire. Had he been alive it is doubtful if Humayun could have ventured to reconquer his lost empire.

CHAPTER VII

BREAK-UP OF THE SECOND AFGHAN EMPIRE

The noble sentiment of patriotism with which Sher Shah had been able to inspire and unite the Afghan nobles received such a shock at the hands of Islam Shah that it was practically destroyed. As soon as his commanding personality was removed, the pent-up feelings and ambitions of the Afghan nobles were let loose. Islam had left a son named Firoz whom the Salim Shahi nobles raised to the throne. Only a few days had elapsed when Mubariz Khan brutally murdered him in the very presence of his expostulating sister, the mother of Firoz. Although Mubariz Khan was dissolute and ignorant and possessed no other qualities except that of being a great musician, he was placed upon the throne by a set of nobles, chief among whom was Shams Khan, the younger brother of the late Khawas Khan. A hopeless wretch and an libertine, totally indifferent to public affairs and wholly unfit to be the head of the state, he contrived to seek popularity with the low and the vulgar by his reckless extravagance and distribution of largesses. He took the title of Adil Shah but the Afghans called him *Andhli* "the blind" and the Hindus *Adili* "the Fool".

The news of the murder of Firoz was received by the nobles in distant provinces with a feeling of horror and indignation. "From country to country, town to town all was put in a state of sedition". The opportunity was welcomed by them to assert their own independence.

The first to take up arms was Salim Khan Sur. Hardly had his rebellion been brought under control when Junaid Khan *Foujdar* of Ajmer revolted. He was, however, defeated by Hemu, a Hindu officer who was destined to distinguish himself in the service of his master. The lineage of this talented military leader, Hemu or Hemraj, is in the dark, but it is clear that he

belonged to the Dhusar clan which is supposed to be a sub-division of Gaur Brahmins, and followed the profession of a saltpetre-dealer at Rewaree. He attracted the notice of Islam Shah who made him the superintendent of markets. Steadily by his talents he worked his way up. For sometime he acted as a surveyor of the imperial kitchen and was finally enlisted among the military nobles of the empire. After the death of Islam Shah he threw his lot with Adil Shah. His success against Junaid Khan raised him so much in the estimation of his master that he practically appointed him his Chief Minister and general supervisor of the state. The fact that he possessed remarkable military and administrative genius was of no consequence with the Afghan nobility which grew jealous of him.

Adil Shah had seen enough of the turbulent Afghan leaders and had, therefore, taken a leaf out of Islam Shah's book. His policy was two-fold. He wanted to replace the remnants of the Sher Shahi and Islam Shahi nobility by that of his own creation, and secondly, to crush the power and pride of the turbulent tribal leaders. Once in the *Darbar-i-Am* while he was reshuffling the *jagirs* it was announced that Shah Muhammad Farmuli's *jagir* of Kanauj was transferred to Sarmast Khan Sharwani. The son of the former, Sikandar Khan, a hot-headed youth lost his temper at this and ejaculated indignantly, "Have things come to this pass that they are taking our *jagirs* away from us and are giving them to this set of Sarwani dog-sellers?" This remark was followed by an uproar. Swords were drawn ; Sarmast Khan was killed then and there. Indeed Sikandar had run amuck and might have killed Adil Shah as well, had the latter not fled in time to the inner apartments and bolted the door. At last Sikandar and his aged father were killed by Ibrahim Khan and Daulat Khan respectively.

From what had taken place in the council-hall, Taj Khan Karrani, a highly insolent grandee of Islam Shah and the captor of Khawas Khan, rightly concluded that the affairs of the empire were changing fast. He,

therefore, decided to flee with his followers from Gwalior towards the east. Adil Shah pursued the rebel. He was overtaken by Hemu at Chibramau and was defeated, but made good his escape to Chunar, plundering and robbing on his way. At Chunar he fought another engagement but Hemu routed his forces again. Still he managed to escape and reach his brother Ahmad Khan, the governor of Jaunpur. Hemu now requested Adil Shah to remain at Chunar and leave the Karranis at his disposal. Hemu then pressed forward. The Karranis fleeing before him did not rest till they reached Khawaspur Tanda, on the confines of Bengal, where Taj Khan's brothers held *jagirs*.

The execution of such Afghan leaders as Daulat Khan Jilwani and Firoz Khan Kakar led other nobles to think seriously of their own future. In removing those two nobles Adil Shah was said to have "pulled up the root of his chief empire with his own hands". Ibrahim Khan Sur, husband of the elder sister of Adil Shah and one of his chief supporters, broke away from him. While Adil Shah was at Chunar he fled from Gwalior to Delhi, proclaimed himself an independent ruler under the title of Ibrahim Shah, seized Agra and got the *Khutba* read in his name. He was readily joined by several nobles and became quite powerful.

The conduct of Ibrahim encouraged Ahmad Khan, husband of the younger sister and a cousin of Adil Shah, to follow suit. He requested Ibrahim Shah to confer the Punjab on him promising his loyal support to his cause. On receiving a flat refusal, he decided to put the matter to the arbitration of the sword. At Farah, eighteen miles north-west of Agra in the district of Mathura, a battle was fought in which Ibrahim Khan was defeated. Ibrahim fled to Sambhal and Ahmad Shah lost no time in declaring himself a sovereign ruler under the title of Sikandar. Piece by piece the empire of Sher Shah crumbled. Bengal and Malwa also constituted themselves as independent kingdoms under Muhammad Khan Sur and Baz Bahadur respectively.

The empire was thus dismembered into five king-

doms. Ahmad Khan Sur or Sikandar Shah was supreme in the Punjab ; Ibrahim Shah held Sambhal and the Doabs ; Adil Shah exercised sovereignty from Chunar to Bihar ; Malwa was under Baz Bahadur and Bengal under Muhammad Khan. Each of these aspired to rule over the whole empire. Sikandar had captured Delhi and Agra and Muhammad Khan Sur was on the point of crossing his border and attacking Adil. Chaos prevailed over the entire Afghan empire and this was the opportunity for Humayun.

After his flight from Ghazni, Humayun reluctantly threw himself under the protection of Shah Tahmasp of Persia. The Persian monarch welcomed him and took care to provide him with every comfort. Humayun met the Shah at Surliq in July 1544. The rift in the lute came when the Shah tried in vain to convert Humayun to the Shia faith. Humayun, however, maintained a broad, liberal and dignified attitude and studiously avoided giving offence to his susceptibility. However, he made the best of the situation by wearing Shia dress and signing some papers containing Shia beliefs. Humayun had to face an intrigue of Bahram Mirza, younger brother of the Shah, who felt himself unnecessarily offended on a trifling incident. These intrigues were reinforced by the supporters of Kamran who were also active at the Persian Court. But the tact of Humayun, the support of Sultanam Begam, the Shah's Sister, and Qazi Jahan, the *Diwan*, saved him from ruin. At last the Shah consented to give him military support on condition that Humayun should marry a daughter of the Shah's sister, and that after the conquest of Qandahar, Kabul and Ghazni he would hand over Qandahar to Persia. A force of thirteen thousand cavalry under the nominal command of Mirza Murad, the infant son of the Shah, was sent to support Humayun .

Humayun launched an attack on Qandahar which was held by Askari for Kamran. After a siege of over five months Askari surrendered the fort on September 3, 1545. The Persians now made three demands : the surrender of the town, delivery of the treasure found

there and the handing over of Askari Mirza, whom they wanted to send as a captive to the Shah. Humayun accepted the first two, but firmly refused to make over his brother, which amounted to an insult to the family of Babar. The relations grew so strained that the Persians not only refused to give shelter to the family of Humayun in the fort as long as he was engaged on the Kabul expedition but also showed such intolerable arrogance that the Mughal Emperor was compelled to deal with them in a summary fashion. The death of Mirza Murad, the son of the Shah, gave Humayun the opportunity to take over the charge of the town himself. The Persians were taken by surprise and were compelled, after some desperate street-fighting, to evacuate the town and eventually to surrender the fort (Oct. 1545). So terrible were the stories told of the fanaticism and cruelty of the Persians that the Shah of Persia had to keep silence over the matter. To humour the susceptibilities of the Shah , Humayun appointed Bairam Khan, who was a Shia, as the governor of Qandahar.

Some writers have charged Humayun of treachery in regard to his transaction over Qandahar, but the arguments they advance are weak and far from being decisive. On the other hand there are sound reasons in defence of Humayun. The failure of the Persians to fulfil their obligation of helping him in the conquest of Kabul, Ghazni and Badakhshan absolved him of the responsibility of handing over Qandahar to them. Moreover, by their arrogance and oppression the Persians had become extremely odious to the people of Qandahar who were Sunnis. Humayun's helplessness in seeking Persian aid suggested his inability to protect his subjects and this deprived him of their confidence and sympathies which he could not afford to lose permanently. The blatant refusal of the Persians even to allow his family to remain in the fort so long as he was engaged in the conquest of Afghanistan, extremely distressed him. Then the need of the hour for Humayun was a strong base of operation and the one absolutely safe at the rear was Qandahar which, left under Persians, could obviously

not serve the purpose. At the very outset the Persians had annoyed Humayun by taking exclusive possession of the fort although there was no valid reason for such a step. Their claim over Qandahar could be considered unquestionable only when Humayun with their aid had succeeded in conquering Afghanistan and Badakhshan, In the light of these arguments the charge of treachery on his part does not stand.

Making Qandahar as the base of his operations, Humayun turned his eyes on Kabul. Hindal Mirza had escaped from Kabul and joined Humayun, while the people of Badakhshan had declared their independence of Kabul. Humayun started with about four to five thousand men to fight Kamran who was belived to hold four times as large an army under his command. But Humayun had powerful moral support at his back even of the men of Kamran, who by now had become disgusted with his hard and selfish rule. When Humayun reached Kabul, people came in lots to join him and Kamran being alarmed at these desertions shut himself up in the citadel of Kabul. Finding his position untenable even there, Kamran fled to Ghazni, but the officers there refused to admit him. So he fled to his father-in-law, Shah Husain, in Sindh. In November 1545 Humayun made his state-entry into Kabul amid great rejoicing of its inhabitants. Here he met his son Akbar, who was now three years old. Gradually the whole country offered submission to Humayun.

The hardships that Humayun had experienced had hardened him and brought a wholesome change in his temperament. For, as soon as he found Yadgar Nasir Mirza intriguing he threw him into prison and later on put him to death. Again in the spring of 1546 he marched out of Kabul to punish Sulaiman Mirza who had not only declared himself independent but had ventured to lay hands upon some dependencies of Kabul. In spite of the heavy odds against them , Humayun's men fought so resolutely and gallantly that Badakhshan was almost completely subjugated and Sulaiman fled to Khost.

Unfortunately Humayun fell seriously ill in

Badakhshan. It was rumoured abroad that he was dead. Unrest reared its head everywhere ; much of the work done by Humayun was nullified. It was at this juncture that Kamran returned from Sindh well supplied with money and troops, fell upon Kabul and captured it without any opposition. As soon as Humayun was fit to work he made peace with Sulaiman, restoring Badakhshan to him, and in spite of winter and deep snow marched back to Kabul. He was challenged near the Dihafghanan pass by Kamran's general Sher Afgan, who had come with a large army. A battle was fought in which Sher Afgan was defeated and captured. Humayun then pushed forward and laid siege to the citadel of Kabul. Failing in his attempts to compel Humayun to retire, Kamran gave vent to his wrath by treating the wives and children of Humayun's followers most savagely. Infant were hung from the walls exposed to the fire of the besiegers. Among these unfortunate children was also prince Akbar, but he was noticed in time and the direction of the fire was quickly diverted. At last Kamran slipped out of the fort to the hills. Humayun was once more master of Kabul (April 1547).

Kamran was not the man to sit idle. He went to Sulaiman of Badakhshan, but on being refused any help he pushed on and sought the help of the Uzbeks. These hereditary enemies of the Timurids were glad to help Kamran much the same way as Humayun was helped by their rivals, the Persians. With a powerful Uzbek force Kamran returned carrying everything before him. Sulaiman Mirza and Hindal, who were reinforced from Kabul, were heavily defeated and forced back. In July 1548 Humayun came into conflict with Kamran. It was the gallantry of Hindal Mirza that averted a calamity and compelled Kamran to retire to Taliqan. The siege was so vigorously conducted that Kamran surrendered (Aug. 17, 1548) on condition to be allowed to go to Macca. Humayun accepted the terms and granted general amnesty. A great feast was held to celebrate the meeting of the brothers. Humayun now pushed on to punish the Uzbeks. Indeed they had gained an enormous

advantage over the Uzbeks, but overtaken by a stupid panic the Mughal army broke up in utter ruin. With a small following Humayun returned to Kabul.

Kamran would have been the last man to fail to take advantage of the loss of prestige and position of Humayun. He collected as many of his old followers as he could and called to his aid the Uzbeks. His attempts to capture Qila Zafar and Qunduz failed. The Uzbeks, becoming suspicious owing to the forged letters of Hindal, deserted him. Everything seemed hopeless when he received an invitation from Kabul. Forthwith he marched to Kabul. Humayun tried to intercept him at Derakip but was hopelessly outnumbered and defeated. He was himself badly wounded on the head, but managed to escape. His coat was so much drenched in blood that he had to cast it off. It was picked up by Kamran, who exhibited it to Humayun's supporters at Kabul and persuaded them to believe that the Emperor was dead. The town and the fort of Kabul once more came under Kamran.

Humayun did not sit idle. He called all his followers together and asked them to take an oath of allegiance individually in a way as to preclude the possibility of frequent desertions of which he had become sick. The nobles promised to do that on condition that the Emperor should also take an oath to submit to the advice given by his well-wishers. Humayun accepted the suggestion. Recognition of this reciprocity in obligation is a unique phenomenon and deserves fullest consideration, for it "may well lead us to doubt whether the traditional absolutism of an oriental despot is not in practice an illusion, at least in matters of real moment." This incident is a turning point in the career of Humayun.

Armed with this compact of loyalty, Humayun moved on. At Ushturgaram he came into touch with Kamran who had proceeded there to oppose his march on Kabul. Humayun sent an ultimatum to Kamran asking him to surrender Kabul and accompany the coming expedition against India. This being unacceptable to Kamran, the Emperor showed his willingness

to place Kabul in the charge of Akbar in such a way a to accommodate both the parties. Kamran was somewhat inclined to accept the latter proposal, but Qarach Beg and others would not let him do that. Consequently the negotiations were broken off. A desperate battle was fought in which Kamran was totally defeated and Qarach Beg was captured only to be immediately executed. Kamran fled away and the road to Kabul lay open. Humayun proceeded to Kabul and captured it without any resistance.

With his charactreristic energy, Kamran raised an army from the wild Afghan tribes and emerged to lay siege to Jalalabad. When Humayun marched out to relieve Jalalabad, Kamran made for Kabul by a circuitous route. Fortunately Bairam Khan had come from Qandahar to Kabul. His presence and opposition broke the spirit of Kamran, who had to abandon the siege and flee away. Bairam was sent to deal with Kamran. The pursuit was conducted so vigorously that Kamran had to cross the Indus. Bairam returned to Qandahar. In 1551 Kamran again appeared near Kabul. For several months, he kept up a sort of guerrilla warfare. In one of the night-raids, Mirza Hindal, the gallant prince, was killed. Humayun moved out to come to a final settlement. The supporters of Mirza Kamran were frightened and deserted him. He sustained a crushing defeat and fled away to the court of Islam Shah.

Islam Shah turned the cold shoulder upon the fugitive prince. To his chagrin, Kamran realized that the astute Afghan was in no mood to give any help, and was detaining him only to make a pageant of him. He, therefore, slipped away from the camp and in disguise travelled through the hills to the Ghakkar country. Sultan Adam found him out and kept him in confinement. At the request of the Ghakkar chief, Humayun came to take delivery of the dangerous foe. There was a unanimous cry among the nobles and the lawyers to put Kamran to death. But Humayun could not agree to it. It was, therefore, decided to blind him. This

was done (Nov-Dec. 1553). At his own request he was, with his devoted wife and Calma Kuka, a loyal servant, allowed to go to Macca where he died on October 5, 1557.

From the Ghakkar country, Humayun wanted to go to Kashmir. But his nobles opposed the project and he was obliged to drop it and return to Kabul. On his way, he ordered the fort of Peshawar to be repaired, fortified and garrisoned. Humayun had now no brother to quarrel with, his army was strong and well equipped, and his nobles were obedient. The great task which lay before him was the recovery of his Indian empire and to that end he was working hard. The opportunity was quite favourable, for the Afghan empire was fast crumbling to pieces in the hands of Adil Shah. At his own request, Bairam Khan was allowed to join the expedition. About November 12, 1554 Humayun left Kabul and reached the banks of the Indus on 31 December, where he was joined by Bairam Khan.

Sultan Sikandar Shah had not yet been able to consolidate his kingdom, when the news of Humayun's invasion of India reached him. The fort of Rohtas, which Sher Shah had built as a bulwark against the return of the Mughals was held by Tatar Khan Kashi. He seems to have been frightened by a probable combination of the Ghakkars and the Mughals, and as the confusion in the Afghan empire precluded the possibility of substantial reinforcements, he left the fort to its fate and fell back. This made the task of Humayun still easier . A detachment was sent to take possession of the fort and the main army marched on without meeting any serious opposition ; the Ghakkars remained almost neutral. Humayun reached Lahore on February 24, 1555. Making Lahore his headquarters, the Emperor sent a detachment under Shah Abulma-ali towards Dipalpur which was held by Shahbaz Khan. After a short engagement the Afghan army got panic-stricken and fled. The main army moved towards Hariana, where Nasib Khan Afghan made some resistance only to fall back.

The Mughal army concentrated near Jullundhur. At Machhiwara it crossed the Sutlaj to meet the Afghan general Tatar Khan Kashi, who had been sent by Sikandar Sur with 50,000 horse. Tatar Khan gained some preliminary advantage, for the Mughal commander evacuated Sirhind and fell back on the main army. Consequently the Afgans were in high spirits. Numerically superior, they were keen to come to grips with the Mughal army. But they were kept at bay by the Mughal archers till night-fall. Unfortunately a fire broke out in a large village of thatched houses and exposed the Afghan army completely. The Mughal archers took full advantage of it and plied them with showers of arrows till they broke and fled leaving their elephants and property to the Mughals. The Mughals then pushed on to Sirhind under Bairam Khan.

Sikandar Sur also was not inactive. He came to Sirhind with a large army estimated at 80,000 horse. Bairam Khan fortified his position and sent a request to Humayun to send reinforcements. Prince Akbar was immediately ordered to go and the Emperor followed. On 29, May he joined the army at Sirhind. The Mughals tried to harass the Afghans and cut off their supplies. In one of the raids, Tardi Beg got the better of the Afghans, captured an important supply train and killed the brother of Sikandar Sur. In their rage, the Afghans opened an attack. On June 22, the decisive battle was fought. At first the Afghans gained some advantage. After a well-contested fight, Bairam Khan was compelled to retire to a fortified position. But the attempts of the Afghans to carry the place were successfully repulsed. It was raining heavily and the wind was violent; still the battle was hotly contested. The main struggle centred round an engagement in which Kala Pahar, brother of Sikandar Sur, led the Afghans and the troops of the Prince. Regent were commanded by his maternal uncle Khwaja Muazzam and Atka Khan. But the last blow was given by a well-arranged ambush which developed into a vigorous attack on the rear of the Afghan army led by

Tardi Beg and Shah Abul Maali. The Afghans broke and fled. Sikandar Sur narrowly escaped with his life into the Siwalik hills. Two hundred and fifty elephants, three hundred horses, treasure, gold and silver vessels, and all the palace furniture were captured by the Mughals. The victory was complete. The most remarkable thing in this battle was that "on both sides humanity and gentleness were practised, so that the bodies of those who had sacrificed their lives were reverently made over to their friends."

Sirhind opened the gates of Delhi. The Mughals found no other obstacle. By way of Samana, Humayun marched on to Delhi. On July 20, 1555 he entered the fort of Salimgarh, which had been built round the *Din Panah* of Humayun.

The comparatively easy march of Humayun to Delhi was quite in keeping with his former marches to Ahmadabad and Gaur. His arrival at Delhi was by no means a *sine qua non* of the conquest of India. Even the province of the Pinjab, through which he had marched victoriously, was far from being pacified, and was threatened by Sikandar Sur, who was moving about in the Siwalik hills and was in possession of the mighty fortifications of Mankot. In other provinces the Afghans were supreme and were not likely to lay down their arms without a full trial of strength. The work of conquering India was yet to be done. The Mughal generals were active in the Punjab and Meerut and Rohilkhand divisions, and were making slow but sure progress.

This time, however, there was no fear of a debacle. Humayun was no longer beset with difficulties which he was called upon to face in his early career in India. There was no Bahadur Shah, no Sher Shah or Islam Shah and, above all, no envious brothers to make matters worse confounded. Moreover, he had come out chastened and well-steeled through the long test of adversity. He had, besides, brought some definite ideas with him and was prepared to fully utilize the administrative traditions left behind by Sher Shah. He had nothing to add, for the time being, to the

working of district and village administration of Sher Shah, but he had conceived a definite plan to organize and control the provincial governments. He had fully realized that efficiency in government of a vast empire could not be possible without strong provincial administration under the vigilant care and control of the central government. In a nutshell, his plan was something as follows : The country from the Punjab to Jaunpur and Malwa was to be divided into six provinces having fixed capitals respectively at Lahore, Delhi, Agra, Kanauj, Jaunpur and Mandu. At these provincial capitals he wished directly to appoint a governor with not more than sufficient military force to enable him to carry on his duties without being dangerous to the state. The governor was to be assisted by a board of influential men drawn from the province. The Emperor himself was to tour regularly from province to province to see with his eyes, rectify, and improve the working of the provincial administration. In pursuance of this plan, he had appointed Shah Abul Maali to the governorship of Lahore and Tardi Beg to that of Delhi.

But fate had decreed otherwise. He was not destined to see his plan laid out. On January 24, 1556 he went up to the roof of the library, which he was fitting up in *Sher Mandal*, to enjoy the cool breeze and observe the appearance of Venus when he intended to hold a grand assembly. At evening, he wished to descend and as he was on the second flight of stairs, the Miskin cried out the *Azan*. In his devotion he wanted to sit where he was, when his foot was caught in his gown and his staff slipped, so that he fell upon his head. A few drops of blood came out of his right ear. He was, however, conscious enough to order a despatch to be sent immediately to the Crown prince. But the injury was serious. He "relapsed into a state of coma", and in that condition passed away quietly to the other world on Sunday, January 26, 1556.

CHRONOLOGY OF SHER SHAH AND ISLAM SHAH :—

1.	Birth of Sher Shah	1472 or 1486.
2.	Sher Shah at Jaunpur	1494.
3.	Sher Shah as manager of his father's *jagir*	1497-1518.
4.	At the court of Sultan Ibrahim for employment.	1518.
5.	Enters the service of Bahadur Khan Nuhani	1526.
6.	Enters the service of Junaid Barlas	1527.
7.	Accompanies Babar on his Chander expedition	1528.
8.	Restoration of his *jagir* by Babar	1528-29.
9.	His appointment as Deputy Governor of Bihar	1529.
10.	Offers submission to Humayun.	Jan, 1533.
11.	The battle of Surajgarh	1534.
12.	Sher Shah at the gates of Gaur.	1536.
13.	Second invasion of Bengal	June, 1537.
14.	Humayun's march against Sher Shah	1537.
15.	Siege of Chunar	Oct, 1537-March, 1538.
16.	Sher Shah's capture of the fort of Rohtasgarh	1538.
17.	The battle of Chausa	26 June, 1539.
18.	Sher Shah as King of Bengal and Bihar	1539-40.
19.	The battle of Kanauj.	17 May, 1540.
20.	Sher Shah as King of Hindustan	1540-1545.
21.	Dismissal of the Governor of Bengal	1541.
22.	Conquest of Malwa and Ranthambore	1542.
23.	Foundation of Patna.	1542.
24.	Capture of Raisen.	1543.
25.	Subjugation of the Punjab	1542-43.
26.	Conquest of Rajasthan	1544.
27.	Attack on Kalinjar	Nov, 1544.
28.	Death of Sher Shah	22 May. 1545.
29.	Accession of Islam Shah.	26 May. 1545.
30.	Battle of Ambala.	1547.
31.	Conquest of the Ghakkar country	1548-1550.
32.	Execution of Shaikh Alai	1549-1550.
33.	Kamran in the Punjab	1552.
34.	Death of Islam Shah	30 Oct., 1553.

CHRONOLOGY OF HUMAYUN

Death of Hindal			1551
Kamran blinded	November-December		1553
Humayun captures Lahore	February	24	1555
Humayun defeats the Afghans			1555
Battle of Sarhind	June	22	1555
Humayun enters Delhi	July	20	1555
Humayun falls	January	20	1556
Death of Humayun	January	24	1556
Kamran died at Macca			1557

SHER SHAH AND HIS SUCCESSORS.

For advanced study :—

Consult books mentioned on Humayun and Akbar also.

PERSIAN :—

Abbas Khan : Tarikh-i-Sher Shahi, Portions of English translation by Elliot and Dowson, History, Vol. IV.

Niyamat Ullah : Tarikh-i-Afaghina, Portions of English translation by Dorn.

Abdullah : Tarikh-i-Daudi, Portions of English translation by Elliot and Dowson, History, Vol. IV and V.

Ahmad Yadgar : Tarikh-i-Salatin-i-Afaghinah.

ENGLISH :—

No up-to-date work is available but consult the following :

Erskine, W. : History of India Vol. I and II.

Campos : The Portuguese in Bengal.

History of Bengal vol. II

Qanungo, K. R. : Sher Shah.

Zulfiqar Ali : Sher Shah Suri.

Tripathi, R. P. : Some aspects of Muslim Administration.

P. Saran : The Provincial Administration of the Mughals.

Roy, N. B. : The Successors of Sher Shah.

CHAPTER VIII

AKBAR THE GREAT : THE REGENCY

The death of Humayun came as a bolt from the blue to the Mughals. Most of the high officials were away fighting the Afghans in the Punjab or the U. P. The officers at Delhi were fully conscious of the confusion that was likely to arise should the news be given publicity without making proper arrangements for declaring his successor and carrying on the normal business of government. They, therefore, kept the news of his death concealed for seventeen days during which one Mulla Bekasi, who had a striking resemblance to Humayun, was dressed in royal robes and shown to the people from the terrace of the palace. Meanwhile, information was sent to the Prince Regent and the principal officers. On February 14, 1556 the officers of Delhi assembled together and read the *Khutba* in the name of Jalaluddin Muhammad Akbar. (Later on, when Akbar introduced the Solar Era, March 11, 1556 was officially fixed as the date of accession.) In the camp of the Prince Regent at Kalanur (district Gurdaspur) Akbar was formally seated on the throne to receive the homage of the officers present there. Akbar's age at this time was about thirteen years and four months.

Bairam Khan, the tutor of the Prince and a loyal and favourite officer of Humayun, became the *Khan-i-Khana* and the *Vakil* of the empire. The opportunity was indeed most favourable for him, for he was not only the guardian of the prince but the most powerful noble in the camp. As to his fitness for the high office, there could be no doubt. His loyalty to the house of Humayun was beyond question ; through thick and thin he had stood by his master. His superior culture, literary gifts, wit and shrewdness , combined with a virile character, high diplomatic skill, administrative experience, fine generalship and striking gallantry marked him out as

one of the fittest nobles for the high office of the Regent. At that time, he enjoyed full confidence of the young Emperor. But he was a Persian and a Shia and was junior to a number of older nobles who were Sunnis and claimed pure Turkish blood in their veins. It was for time to prove how they would get on with the astute Regent.

From the very beginning, Bairam Khan acted with vigilance and promptness. Of his possible rivals, there was one Shah Abul Maali, who was present in the camp. This young man traced his descent to the Saiyids of Tirmiz who were held in great veneration all over Central Asia. His most attractive and handsome physique, graceful manners, dashing courage and straightforwardness had made him a favourite of Humayun, who used to address him by the exalted title of *Farzand* (son) and always gave him a seat of honour in the councils and banquets. From this vain, restless hater of Shias, Bairam Khan smelt danger. He, therefore, took an oppotunity of summarily arresting him in the grand banquet which was given to celebrate the accession of Akbar. The removal of Shah Abul Maali averted for the time being every possibility of immediate trouble in the imperial camp.

Three or four days after the accession of Akbar, when the army was encamped at Jullundhar, information reached from Kabul that Sulaiman Mirza had besieged Kabul with a large army, and that effective resistance would not be possible without adequate reinforcements. The Mughal army was not very large and could not be conveniently thinned without endangering the Indian conquests. The imperial government was still in great anxiety about Kabul when a despatch came from Tardi Beg, governor of Delhi, that Hemu had marched through Gwalior, taken possession of Agra and intended to attack Delhi, which could not be well defended unless sufficient reinforcements were rushed in time. The government was in a fix, for it was almost certain that a movement of the main army either towards Kabul or Delhi would let loose Sikandar Sur who was threatening

to overrun the Punjab from his Siwalik retreat. To make matters worse, terrible famine and pestilence were raging in the provinces of Agra and Delhi, which made the question of supplies a very difficult problem.

In response to the request from Delhi, Bairam Khan sent his ablest lieutenant Pir Muhammad Sharwani with some others to Tardi Beg to hearten him and advise him as to the best course for the time being. Tardi Beg on his part was not inactive. He had sent urgent orders to all the nobles of the provinces of Agra and Delhi to muster at Delhi without losing a single moment. Accordingly, a large number of the nobles had come and some more were expected to arrive soon. The arrival of Ali Quli Khan Shaibani was very eagerly awaited, but before he could arrive Hemu had actually reached the environs of Delhi. A council of war was called ; the question of retreat or fight was fully discussed ; and it was unanimously resolved to give an open battle to Hemu.

In spite of their smaller number the Mughals made a gallant stand. The Afghan vanguard was beaten back and Hemu's right wing was smashed. A further energetic push might have given victory to the Mughals but, for two reasons, they lost the battle. The Mughal left which had defeated the Afghan forces facing them, committed a common blunder of pursuing the enemy to such a long distance as to get completely out of touch with the main army and the field of battle. This mistake was not quite irreparable. Hemu, who was standing with a strong reserve of cavalry and elephants, launched a furious attack on the Mughal centre. His hands were strengthened by the timely arrival of Haji Khan from Alwar with fresh reinforcements. At this critical moment, some Mughal commanders, including Pir Muhammad Khan, fled away to the great surprise and chagrin of Tardi Beg. Their flight made further resistance out of the question, and Tardi Beg had also to save himself by taking to his heels (Oct. 7, 1556). When the pursuing Mughal troops returned, they found the tables turned. Ali Quli Khan reached next day after the battle, only to learn of the disaster.

Tardi Beg and other nobles joined the imperial army. The disaster of Delhi was a very serious event. So it was decided to leave a competent officer to look after Sikandar Sur and move the main army to Delhi But Bairam Khan meditated the ruin of Tardi Beg and to throw him off his guard he treated him with punctilious courtesy. One evening he invited him to his tent and got him murdered. The murder of one of the oldest Turkish nobles sent a thrill of horror among the Turks and confirmed their worst suspicions regarding the ulterior motives of Bairam Khan. True, that Tardi Beg's loyalty was not so consistent and unswerving as that of Bairam Khan, but his services to the Empire were far greater than his delinquencies. The charge of having abandoned Delhi to the enemies seemed plausible, but was not proved. Nor could it be fairly argued that the punishment was intended to set an example to other nobles and to terrify them into complete obedience, for although some nobles might have considered themselves "equal to Kaiqubad and Kaikaus", there were hardly any signs of disruption or insubordination in the camp or the army. The interest of the nobles of Akbar was to hold together in the face of common danger.

The imperial army now moved rapidly towards Delhi. Ali Quli Khan Uzbek, a gallant soldier and a great commander, was sent in advance with ten thousand cavalry. He was lucky enough to come upon Hemu's artillery which was not so well guarded as to fight successfully Ali Quli's strong force. The whole train of artillery thus easily fell into the hands of the Mughals. It was indeed a fatal mistake of Hemu to have sent his park of artillery in advance under a weak guard. Undeterred by this calamity, Hemu hastened to the field of Panipat in battle array. Next day (November 5, 1556) he came to grips with the Mughal army. The battle was desperately contested. Success gradually began to incline towards Hemu. The Mughal archers and cavaliers gave a fine show of their skill and valour, but Hemu drove back the wings right and left and brought a tremendous pressure on the centre which was all but

broken. To smash the centre, Hemu moved his war-elephants and reserve cavalry. He was riding an elephant and was vociferously cheering up his spirited soldiers. The Mughal army seemed to be on their last legs when suddenly a random arrow pierced the eye of Hemu and made him unconscious. As he sank in the *hauda*, a rumour spread that Hemu was dead. Such a situation and such a rumour have more than once caused ruin of many a winning army, especially where people fought for men and not for a cause. Hemu's army did not fare better. It was thrown in a hopeless panic, of which the Mughals took immediate advantage. Hemu's army broke and fled. As usual, a large number of his soldiers fell a prey to the sword of the victors. The elephant-driver of Hemu wanted to carry away his master, but was challenged and compelled to lead the elephant to the presence of the Emperor. Bairam Khan asked the Emperor to chop off the head of Hemu, but he refused to flash his sword on the dying man. He was, however, persuaded to touch his head with his sword, while Bairam Khan smote it off. Hemu's head was sent to Kabul and his trunk was gibbeted on a gate of Delhi.

Thus ended the career of one of the most remarkable persons of the sixteenth century. Hem Raj had risen from an insignificant position in life ; beginning as a small revenue officer, he became a minor military officer and finally rose to the position of the Commander of the army of Adil Shah. He had thrown into the shade all the Afghan commanders, and won everyone of the twenty-two battles he had fought from Chunar to Delhi for his master. He was exceedingly popular with the Afghan soldiers who fought most loyally under his command. Numerous reasons have been assigned for his ultimate defeat but they are either fanciful or speculative, if not malicious. The causes of his defeat were the capture of his artillery and the random arrow which made him unconsicous and caused panic in his army. His defeat was accidental and the victory of Akbar providential.

The Mughals did not rest on their oars after the occupation of Delhi. Military expeditions were sent to

different quarters. Ali Quli Khan was sent towards Sambhal, Abdullah Khan to Kalpi, Qiya Khan to Agra, and Pir Muhammad to Alwar. Haji Khan, the Afghan governor, fled from Alwar leaving it to the Mughals. The family of Hemu which lived at Macari fell into the hands of Pir Muhammad. The old father of Hemu was called upon to accept Islam if he cared for his life. But he replied : "For eighty years I have worshipped my God, according to my religion. Why should I change it now at the sunset of my life and that too merely for fear of life, and without understanding how it disturbs you in your worship." This sensible reply could hardly carry any weight with the hardened *Ulama* who had him executed forthwith. But the wife of Hemu made good her escape to hilly woodland leaving behind all property, which was plundered.

The defeat of Hemu sealed the fate of Adil Shah. The absence of Hemu was taken advantage of by Khizr Khan, son of Muhammad Shah of Bengal who had been killed in a battle with Adil Shah. He attacked Adil Shah, defeated and killed him, and to satisfy his hatred, had him dragged about tied to the foot of an elephant (April 1557). Adil Shah's death opened the field for the operations of the Mughal troops which were active under the energetic leadership of Ali Quli Khan, now honoured with the title of *Khan-i-Zaman.*

Nor were the affairs of Sikandar Sur anyway bright. Shortly after the occupation of Delhi and Agra, Bairam Khan marched along with the Emperor to deal with Sikandar Sur, who had ventured to come down the hills and collect revenues in the Punjab. Hearing of the march of the imperial army against him, he fortified himself in Mankot. The Mughals laid siege to the fort, for it was not easy to take it by storm. For six months Sikandar continued to defy the besiegers. When the news of the defeat of two big Afghan generals Rukn Khan Nohani and Hasan Khan Bachgoti at the hands of Ali Quli Khan came, followed by the still more disquieting information of the death of Adil

Shah, Sikandar lost all hopes of relief and sued for peace on condition of being allowed a *jagir* in Bihar. His terms were accepted and the fort of Mankot was surrendered to the Mughals (May 24, 1557). Sikandar was allowed to go to Bihar, where he died after a few years.

The imperial affairs at Kabul also took a favourable turn. After besieging Kabul in vain for several months, Sulaiman Mirza thought it prudent to come to some settlement with Munim Khan. The movements of the Uzbeks in Central Asia, the approaching winter, which would have blocked with snow his return, and the rumour of the coming reinforcements from India combined to persuade him to raise the siege and go back on condition of his name being read even just for a day in the *Khutba.* This was done and he went away. Kabul was freed. After hearing the news of the defeat of Hemu, the royal ladies left Kabul for India escorted by Munim Khan himself. At Jalalabad, Munim came to know of the murder of Tardi Beg and the supremacy of Bairam Khan. So he gave up the idea of going further and returned to Kabul.

The Mughal government thus passed through a very severe test, but practically remained intact owing to the energetic efforts of the Mughal officers and the good fortune of the Emperor. Nevertheless, there was one substantial loss. Qandahar was surrendered to the Persians by Shah Muhammad, the governor of the place, who was obliged to take that course owing to the rebellion of Bahadur Khan, brother of Ali Quli Khan-i-Zaman.

During the four years of Bairam Khan's regime not only the most formidable dangers were overcome, but the Mughal armies showed a very satisfactory progress. From Kabul to Jaunpur and from the out-skirts of the northern Punjab hills to Ajmer, the sovereignty of Akbar was recognized. Gwalior was conquered, and vigorous attempts were also made to conquer Ranthambore and Malwa. The Ghakkars were also persuaded to recognize the suzerainty of the Mughal Emperor.

While outwardly Bairam's power and prestige were

supreme, numerous forces were active in undermining his influence, which was eventually destroyed by 1560. His most formidable opponents were the Turkish nobles in general and foster-parents of Akbar in particular. Their chief grievances were that they had been treated in a most clumsy way by the Shia Prime Minister, who had reduced the old nobility and the servants of the royal household to poverty ; that he eiter favoured the men of his own creed or created a nobility entirely subservient to his will ; and that they were living under a state of perpetual suspicion and fear. Further, they believed that Bairam was using his influence to subvert the Sunni creed of the empire and give greater prominence to Shiism. These charges though not true in their entirety, were not without foundation. The murder of Tardi Beg, the execution of Musahib Beg, and the frequent explanations called from Shamsuddin Atka, were the most glaring instances of Bairam's hostility towards the Turks. The appointment of Shaikh Gadai, to the post of the *Sadr* of the empire and the insults heaped upon Shaikh Muhammad Ghaus, who was widely respected by the Sunnis for his spirituality lent colour to the charge of undermining Sunnism. A short time after Akbar took an opportunity of visiting Shaikh Ghaus at Gwalior, and enlisted himself as one of his disciples.

These nobles would have fumed and fretted in vain had the mind of Akbar not gradually turned away from Bairam. As Akbar grew in age, he wanted to assert his position, but in some matters his wishes were entirely disregarded by Bairam. Akbar resented very much the taking over of the command of the imperial elephant-stud from him. Moreover, he was not allowed any privy purse. It was enough that he had remained in a state of tutelage for four years. The policy of being kept engaged in hunts and amusements indefinitely could no longer satisfy the Emperor, who was getting more and more anxious to take the helm of the empire in his own hand. But he knew very well that an open rupture with the Prime Minister might jeopardize his

position as in the case of his grand-father Babar. He, therefore, waited for a favourable opportunity.

The opportunity came when Bairam dismissed Pir Muhammad Khan Ghaznawi and sent him into exile. Though a creature of Bairam, Pir Muhammad possessed a fair amount of independence of character and was a bigotted Sunni. He had on more than one occasion ventured to protest against certain actions of Bairam and was for these reasons believed to be a friend of the Sunni Turkish party. A man of revengeful temper, tenacious character, impetuosity, courage and relentlessness, Pir Muhammad could undoubtedly be used as a weapon against Bairam.

The dismissal of Pir Muhammad and the appointment of a Persian in his place frightened the satellites of the Emperor. Akbar resented this exercise of royal prerogative by Bairam. On the pretext of going on a hunting expedition, the Emperor fled away from Agra (March 19, 1560) to Delhi with some of his most confidential men. Shihabuddin, the governor of Delhi, who knew of the plot welcomed him (27 March).

CHAPTER IX

STRUGGLE WITH THE NOBILITY

From Delhi Akbar issued *farmans* suspending Bairam Khan and calling upon the nobles of the empire to come to Delhi to pay homage to him as a proof of their loyalty to him. Pir Muhammad, who was hanging about in western Rajputana, was also invited to join. Those who were unhappy with Bairam rallied at Delhi.

Bairam Khan was not prepared for this *coup*. He lay under the delusion that Akbar had thorough canfidence in him and would not hoodwink him so unceremoniously. His surprise was great and he could not persuade himself to believe that the Emperor himself was the pivot of the whole plot. He believed that if he could once see the Emperor he would win him back to his side, but his request for an interview was politely refused. Bairam threatened the Emperor with resignation, but to his surprise it was also accepted. He, therefore, felt that there was no hope of regaining the confidence of the Emperor unless he destroyed the power and influence of the conspirators who, he thought, were responsible for the mischief. His determination was definitely strengthened when Pir Muhammad was deputed to watch his movements. Bairam did not remember that any military demonstration on his part against the party which had indentified itself with the Emperor could be nothing short of a rebellion. It was no use drawing a sharp distinction between the Emperor and the party which was now pledged to the imperial cause. If on the other hand, he thought that the Emperor was only a tool in the hands of a set of conspirators, he egregiously failed to comprehend the situation or understand the character of Akbar.

After some fatal hesitation, due to his feeling of loyalty, he at last decided to vindicate himself by taking up arms to punish his enemies. From Bikaner he went

to the Punjab probably relying on the support of those who had basked in the sunshine of his favours. But they failed him in his adversity. The Emperor too was closely watching his movements. He had sent Shamsuddin Muhammad Atka in advance to check Bairam's progress, while he himself marched out of the capital to support him (August, 1560). Shamsuddin overtook Bairam at Gunacur and defeated him. But Bairam managed to flee to the Siwalik. Here he was pressed hard by Akbar, who had been joined by Munasm Khan from Kabul.

Half-hearted rebel as Bairam Khan was, he was driven to despair and dismay at the death of his friend Husain Jalair and at his own untenable position. He, therefore, threw himself on the mercy of the Emperor (Oct. 1560). Akbar was not oblivious of the great services which Bairam had rendered to the empire and his family. He, therefore, rose from his seat, accosted him well, embraced him, and seated him at his own right hand. Bairam burst into tears at this unexpected reception which intensified all the more his feeling of humiliation. The Emperor consoled him with kind words and presented him his own robe. Akbar offered him three alternatives. "If Bairam loves a military life, the government of Kalpi and Chanderi offer a field for his ambition. If he chooses to remain at the Court, our favour shall not be denied to the benefactor of our family ; but should he be disposed to seek devotion in retirement, let him perform a pilgrimage to Macca, wither he shall be escorted in a manner suitable to his rank." The first two of these proposals he could hardly like, for although precedents of the appointment of Prime Ministers to provincial governments were not wanting, he could not reconcile himself to a subordinate appointment after having been all in all in the empire for four years. Moreover, he seemed to have still entertained apprehensions from his enemies. Hence he was unwilling to remain in a hostile atmosphere. If he had been offered the *Vikalat*, he might have accepted it but that was not possible for the time being. In sheer chagrin he decided to go to Macca. Akbar gave

an escort see him safely off.

Bairam was, however, not destined to reach Macca. At Pattan, in Gujrat, he had gone to enjoy the sight of its famous old tank when a band of Afghan ruffians led by the semi-lunatic Mubarak Khan Nohani attacked him. Mubarak Khan had two reasons for his hostility towards Bairam. First, that Bairam had killed his father at the battle of Machiwara ; second, that he had taken with him a Kashmiri wife of Islam Shah and intended to marry his son to her daughter, and had thereby scandalized the Afghans. Mubarak stabbed Bairam from behind and another Afghan chopped off his head (January 31, 1561). Some pious *faqirs* and poor men carried away his corpse and gave it a lowly burial in the precincts of the tomb of the holy Saint Shaikh Hisam.

Though his friends could not carry away the corpse of Bairam, they managed to convey safely his wife Salima Begam and son Abdur Rahim to Ahmadabad fighting all the way. After a few months they were carried to Akbar, who welcomed them most graciously. The Emperor took the widow Salima Begam in marriage and brought up Abdur Rahim as his son.

Akbar had freed himself from the control of Bairam Khan not to fall under the influence of any other power. Some of those people who had stood by him in his struggle with Bairam naturally began to assume an air of importance and entertain high expectations. But Akbar had his own plans and favourites. With a view to disperse the nobles who had gathered round him, and also to extend the limits of the empire and strengthen its weak points, the emperor sent several expeditions. One was sent to support the government of Kabul where, owing to the mismanagement of officials, unrest and sedition had grown up. Another was despatched for the conquest of Malwa under the commands of Adham Khan, Pir Muhammad Khan and Qiya Khan. Freed from these dangerous friends, the Emperor, began to reorganize the central government. Maham Anaga was allowed to retire from political affairs,

The expedition sent to Malwa proved successful. Here Baz Bahadur, son of Shujaat Khan, after defeating all his rivals had established himself as an independent ruler. A young energetic man, he began very well, but he had lately given himself up to the pleasures of wine and women. A handsome man with fine aesthetic taste and a master of the art of music, he found the society of the fair sex most congenial. It was evident that such a man could not resist for long the swelling tide of the Mughal conquest. He offered some resistance, but was defeated and obliged to fly towards Burhanpur.

The easy conquest of Malwa and his presumptuousness led Adham Khan to act in a most high-handed manner. He perpetrated cruelties on the prisoners of war, and did not spare even the women and children of the Shaikhs and Saiyids. Besides, he offended the Emperor by appropriating to himself all the war-booty and women of Baz Bahadur, and tried to console the Emperor with a present of a few elephants. To nip his ambition in the bud, Akbar, left Agra with a small escort, pretending to go for a hunt (April 27, 1561), and proceeding by forced marches suddenly surprised Adham Khan near Gagrun. Adham offered homage. Akbar went to Sarangpur where Adham exhibited all that he had captured including the beauties of the harem of Baz Bahadur. The Emperor took whatever he liked and set out on his return journey. Adham, however, contrived to steal two women. Akbar came to know of it and ordered him to produce them. Maham, the mother of Adham Khan, who had already arrived in the camp, feared that if presented before Akbar, those women would disclose the wickedness of her son. So she got them secretly murdered. The Emperor, for the time being, connived at this atrocity and returned to Agra on June 4, 1561 after an absence of thirty-eight days.

The removal of Bairam Khan from his office encouraged the Afghans in Bihar to try their luck again. They declared Sher Khan, the son of Adil Shah, as their ruler and in 1561 marched with 20,000 cavalry, 50,000 infantry and 500 elephants upon Jaunpur. The

Mughals had been practically beaten when the impetuous Khan-i-Zaman fell upon them in the rear and routed the Afghans. Like Adham Khan , he too appropriated to himself the enormous booty which fell into his hands. Rumours were also afloat that he intended to rebel against the imperial authority and establish an independent kingdom of his own with the help of his relatives.

On July 17, 1561, Akbar started with Munim Khan for the east. At Kara, Khan-i-Zaman and his brother Bahadur Khan came to offer homage and presented some of their best elephants and other valuable *peshkash.* Akbar received them with kindness and returned to Agra on August 29, 1561.

On January 14 1562 Akbar set out on his first pilgrimage to the shrine of Khwaja Muinuddin Chisti at Ajmer, about whose glories he had heard some enchanting ditties from Indian minstrels. At Sanganir, a few miles from Ambar , Raja Bhara Mal Kachwaha was introduced by Chaghtai Khan to the Emperor. The Raja had come not only to pay homage but also to seek protection from Muhammad Sharafuddin Husain, governor of Mewat, who was helping the Raja's nephew Suja to drive him off from his ancestral town of Amber, and if possible to ruin his family. Living under the evil shadows of the Raja of Marwar and Sharafuddin, and torn by internecine feuds, the Kachwaha family was steadily but surely sinking into insignificance and ruin. The small state of Kachwahas was shared by numerous petty princelings who were no better than ordinary *jagirdars* of other states. They had meekly submitted to Babar, Humayun, Sher Shah and to Sharafuddin Husain simply because they had neither the prestige nor the strength to face any serious military power. The nearness of their homeland to Delhi, Agra and the flat plains kept them always exposed to the attacks of the rulers of Delhi and Agra. Hence, in spite of their being good warriors, they could not, like the rulers of hills and deserts, defy so well the power of Akbar. Akbar received the Raja with kindness and promised to bring

his troubles to an end. Either of his own accord or in compliance with a suggestion of someone else, Raja Bhara Mal gave his eldest daughter in marriage to Akbar. History has left us in the dark as to how and from whom this idea originated. It may be safely surmised that self-interest, gratitude and probably some pressure from the side of the Emperor brought about this marriage. Marriages between Rajput women and Muslim rulers there had been earlier, but it is doubtful if they were ever backed up by such a good faith and goodwill as in the present case. As a price of this marriage, Jagannath, the son of the Raja, and his two nephews, who were taken by Sharafuddin Husain as hostages, were restored to the Raja, and his other son Raja Bhagwantdas and grandson Man Singh were taken into the imperial service. This was the first marriage of a Rajput princess to Akbar and was the beginning of a policy which had a enormous influence on the Mughal rule in India.

The journey of Akbar to Ajmer was not simply a pilgrimage, but it was closely connected with his future plans in Rajputana, as is evident from his alliance with the house of Amber and the conquest of Merta, the outpost of and the the key to Marwar, then the biggest state of Rajputana. Merta was besieged by Sharafuddin and, in spite of the gallant defence of Jaimal and Deodas, was carried by storm. According to Rajput traditions, Chandrasen was sent by Raja Maldeo of Marwar to have an interview with Akbar at Ajmer, offer him present and enter into some sort of a treaty. But Akbar insisted on the personal submission of Maldeo, and was annoyed at the "disdainful bearing of the desert king". hence the negotiations ended in nothing (1562).

With his usual caution, Akbar did not invade Marwar at that time. Moreover, his attention was diverted towards Malwa. The governor of Malwa, Pir Muhammad Khan, had invaded Burhanpur and Bijagarh, without the permission of the Emperor, only to satisfy his old grudge against Khandesh. Inadequate as his force was, he had to retreat before a combined attack of the ruler of Khandesh and Baz

Bahadur, the exiled ruler of Malwa. In an attempt to cross the Narbada, Pir Muhammad was thrown off his horse and drowned. Baz Bahadur was not slow to take advantage of his death. He entered Malwa and was hailed by the people who had been smarting under the cruelty and tyranny of Pir Muhammad. Before Baz Bahadur could consolidate his power and gather enough strength, he was attacked by Abdullah Khan whom Akbar had sent as the governor of Malwa (1562). Dislodged again from Malwa, Baz Bahadur had to leave his kingdom for good and seek shelter in the hills of Mewar. Abdullah Khan occupied Mandu.

Since his recall from Malwa, Adham Khan had entertained inimical feelings towards Shamsuddin Muhammad Atka who was believed to be *de jure vakil.* He was supported in his evil designs by Munim Khan, to create room for Shamsuddin. Shihabuddin Ahmad, one of the relatives of Maham Anaga, and at one time the *vakil* of Akbar, also fanned the hatred of Adham. Relying on such supports and on the influence of his mother, he wounded Shamsuddin and had him killed in his own presence. With his blood-stained sword, Adham proceeded towards Akbar's apartment but was checked by a eunuch. A tumult followed. Hearing of the murder of the Prime Minister, Akbar came out of his bedroom with sword in hand, but on his way met Adham Khan. Adham now began to offer lame excuses and caught the sword of the Emperor. Enraged at his audacity, Akbar dealt such a powerful blow with his fist that Adham fell down senseless. By the order of the Emperor he was immediately thrown down the terrace (May 16, 1562). Akbar himself went to Maham to break the sad news of her son's death and to console her at her sick bed. She received the news with outward composure, but was so much shocked inwardly that she pined away and joined her son forty days later.

The swift punishment of Adham Khan averted serious bloodshed, for the eldest son of Shamsuddin, Mirza Yusuf Muhammad Khan, had come with a force of his kinsmen burning for revenge and demand-

ing the surrender of Adham Khan and his associates. On being apprised of the fate of Adham Khan, they cooled down and dispersed. Adham Khan and his mother were, however, given a decent burial by the Emperor near Qutb Minar at Delhi. Munim Khan and Shihabuddin were captured in the Punjab and brought to the court. As their complicity in the murder was not well established they were pardoned. This incident shows that even the highest officers in the empire feared the emperor.

Since the coming of Munim Khan, the affairs of Kabul had fallen into disorder. The unpopularity, wickedness and inefficiency of Munim Khan's son. Ghani Khan, and other officers was exploited by the restless and intriguing Mah Chuchak Begam, the mother of Akbar's younger brother Mirza Hakim. Ghani Khan was eventually driven out of Kabul. Akbar sent Munim Khan to Kabul to set its affairs in order. He was, however, opposed by Mah Chuchak Begam, who had come to Jalalabad. A battle was fought in which Munim Khan was defeated and forced to fly leaving all his baggage to be plundered. Defeated and disconcerted, he returned to Akbar's court and, in spite of his failure, was received graciously. Since then Kabul became practically independent of Delhi under the rule of Mirza Muhammad Hakim. This was good in one sense as it relieved the imperial government of a great deal of anxiety caused by the complex politics of Kabul, Central Asia and the western frontier, and Akbar could now devote his full attention to Indian affairs.

Kamal Khan, son of Sultan Sarang Ghakkar, had taken service under the Mughals and had fought gallantly against the Afghans. He represented to the Emperor that his uncle Sultan Adam and his son Lashkari had made themselves masters of the Ghakkar country and had completely ignored his claims. He requested that he should be given some share of his paternal dominion. Consequently, Akbar ordered the governor of the Punjab, Khan-i-Kalan, to ask Sultan Adam to leave half of his kingdom for Kamal Khan. Sultan Adam refused to

comply. The Mughal governor then invaded the Ghakkar country and defeated Adam at the battle of Hitan. Adam Khan and his son-Lashkari Khan were taken prisoners and the entire country was given over to Kamal Khan.

Sharafuddin Husain, the conqueror of Merta, was much perturbed at the kindness which Akbar showed to his father Khwaja Muinuddin, who had just arrived from Macca, because his relations with his father were highly strained. Suspecting some danger to himself, he fled from the court to his *jagir* in Ajmer and Nagor, (October, 1562). The Emperor sent Husain Quli Khan in his pursuit. Sharafuddin Husain fled from the imperial territory and his *jagirs* were captured by Husain Quli Khan. Husain Quli soon after invaded Jodhpur, which was ruled by Chandrasen, the younger son of the late Raja Maldeo. The elder son of Maldeo, Ram Rai, joined the Mughals. After sometime Jodhpur was conquered by Husain Quli Khan. Chandrasen fled towards Siwanah, determined to fight for the independence of Marwar.

On January 11, 1564 Akbar was returning to the city from the tomb of Nizamuddin Auliya when, near the College of Maham Anaga, one Qutlug Faulad, a servant of a slave of Mirza Sharafuddin, shot an arrow from the building and wounded Akbar in the shoulder. The culprit was at once cut into pieces. The wound was not serious and healed up in a week. The motive of the culprit was obvious, yet rumour tried to connect it with the alleged passion of Akbar for and keeness to discover and marry the beautiful women of noble families.

The northern portion of the modern Madhya Pradesh comprising the districts of Sagar, Damoh, Mandla, Seoni, the Narbada valley, and possibly some portions of Bhopal was welded together into a state by one Aman Das, flourished in the last quarter of the fifteenth century. This state came to be known by the name of Garha-Katanga, after the two towns Garha and Katangi in the district of Jabalpur. To its north was the country of Panna ; to the east Ratanpur ; to the west Malwa. Its area was 48,300 square miles. Chau-

ragarh (in district Narsinhapur) was its capital. Its natural strength was enormously increased by a fort which commended the Narbada Valley. besides that fort, there were fifty-two other fortresses in the state.

Aman Das had helped Bahadur Shah of Gujrat in the conquest of Raisen and was, therefore, honoured by that monarch with the title of Sangram Shah. His son Dalpat Shah was a strikingly handsome prince and possessed remarkable courage. He gained the hand of Durgavati, the daughter of Shalibahan, the Chandel Raja of Mahoba. This marriage was one of the most charming of Indian romances. He changed the capital from Chauragarh to Singaurgarh, which is situated on the brow of a hill that commands the Jabera pass leading through the hills between Jabalpur, Damoh and Sagar. Four years after his marriage, Dalpat Shah died leaving behind the widow Durgavati and a three or five-year old son Vir Narayan. The queen placed her son on the throne of his father and began to rule in his name. Durgavati was as brave and courageous as she was beautiful. She was a good shot with gun and arrow and was fond of outdoor games. "It was her custom that whenever she heard that a tiger had appeared she did not drink water till she had shot it." The stories of her feats and frays were current throughout Hindustan. Under her benign rule the kingdom rose in wealth and power. Baz Bahadur of Malwa and the Mianas of Raisen had suffered more than one defeat at her hands, and held her in fear. Her army consisted of twenty thousand cavalry, numerous infantry and about a thousand good elephants. How much of it was regular and dependable, it is difficult to say.

The kingdom of Garha-Katanga touched directly the boundaries of the Mughal empire in Malwa and came into indirect touch with it when Bhatha was conquered by Abdul Majid Asaf Khan, the governor of Kara (or Allahabad). Sooner or later this state was bound to bear the pressure of the growing Mughal empire, but the cupidity of Asaf Khan hastened the occasion. Asaf Khan had heard a good deal about the wealth of

the queen, was anxious to conquer it and occasionally ravaged the border-land. The Rani sent her minister Adhar Kayath to the Emperor, but negotations did not prove successful. Akbar probably wanted submission and cession of some territories. The Rani seems to have retaliated for the ravages of Asaf Khan by making frays against Bhilsa in Malwa. Asaf Khan, who was pressing the imperial government for permission to invade Garha-Katanga, decided to carry out his designs. He had already defeated Ram Chand, the Baghel Raja of Bhatha in Rewa, and was itching to attack Garha. He launched an attack with ten thousand cavalry and a large body of infantry and appeared at Damoh. It seems that discontent and treason were active in the kingdom of the Rani, for while the cavalry of Asaf Khan is alleged to have swelled to fifty thousand by the defection of the petty chiefs of the Garha kingdom, Adhar could not collect more than a few thousand for the queen. Adhar now tried to dissuade her from fighting with such slender resources, but she replied that the mismanagement was due to his stupidity, for which she was not going to compromise her dignity, or make proposal of surrender to an upstart Mughal officer who could hardly appreciate her position. If the Emperor had come personally it would have been a different matter. With only 2, 000 men, she took quarter at Narhi, a place difficult for ingress or egress, protected as it was by hills on three sides, and the Gaur and the Narbada rivers. Asaf Khan on learning her whereabouts moved towards the place. The Rani refused to avoid battle indefinitely till the army mustered. "How long", she said, "was she to shelter herself among trees? " She, therefore, came out with five thousand men to dislodge the Mughals who had taken possession of the head of the ravine. She was victorious. The Mughals fled, pursued by the Rani. She advised an attack the same night to finish off the detachment before Asaf Khan could himself arrive with reinforcement. Her officers, however, did not agree with her and the plan was dropped. Next morning, Asaf Khan did arrive and gave a battle. The

battle was obstinately fought. Bir Narayan, Shams Khan and Mubarak Khan fought most gallantly and the Mughals were thrice rolled back. Unfortunately, in the third encounter Bir Narayan was wounded and carried away to a safe place. His removal from the field created a panic, which was followed by a stampede. Only 300 men remained with the Rani. Undaunted by the cowardly desertions, the Rani continued to fight desperately. An arrow pierced her right temple, but she pulled it and threw it aside. The point of the arrow, however, remained in the wound. Soon after, another arrow was lodged in her neck, and although she drew it out, she fainted. On coming to her senses she realised that the battle was lost. Fearing an outrage on her honour, she asked Adhar to kill her, but his heart trembled; he refused to obey but promised to carry her away safely from the field. This the gallant Rajput lady could not brook. She, therefore, drew her dagger, plunged it in her breast and dies a glorious death. She was buried in a narrow defile some twelve miles from Jabalpur. The tragedy of her suicide, for which Akbar was not responsible, has prompted some writers to make unnecessary and unjustifiable reflections on him. He was not fighting an individual woman but a powerful state which was friendly with the Afghans. It was an accident that the state was ruled at that time by an amazon. Moreover, Akbar had not consolidated his power so much as to compel Asaf Khan to desist from his plans. He could do nothing even if he had wished otherwise. He could not also foresee the development of circumstances which obliged the Rani to commit suicide. If history is forced to pronounce a verdict, all shame must lie on those cowards who deserted their gallant and popular queen in her most critical hour. Asaf Khan now marched upon Chauragarh, which was captured, but not before Bir Narayan had fallen fighting bravely and *jauhar* had been performed. Kamlavati, the sister of the Rani and an immaculate queen, was captured and sent to the Court with 200 elephants. Asaf Khan got the object of his ambition,

viz. the incalculable amount of gold and silver and jewels and about 800 elephants. This he appropriated to himself, leaving the Emperor in the lurch (1564). After crushing the Uzbek rebellion, Akbar felt his position strong enough to recall Asaf Khan (1567). He restored the kingdom of Garha-Katanga to Chandra Shah, a brother of Dalpat Shah, after taking ten forts to round off the province of Malwa.

The connivance of Akbar at Asaf Khan's audacity was probably due to the clouds of sedition rising up in Malwa and the east. The Emperor had no doubt broken the back of the powerful nobility, but he had yet to reckon with the tribe of the Sistani Uzbeks, who were playing fast and loose with the empire. In spite of the fact that the Uzbek leaders had done very valuable services to the empire, their attitude was not beyond suspicion. It was Bahadur Khan, the brother of Khan-i-Zaman, who chopped off the head of the imperial servant who had been sent to show him the head of the arch-rebel Wali Beg, a brother-in-law of Bairam. It was misappropriation of the war-booty which had compelled the Emperor (1562) to go to Kara, but the brothers came to offer homage and thus averted immediate troubles. Nevertheless, it was rumoured about that Khan-i-Zaman was developing friendly relations with Sulaiman Karrani, the Afghan ruler of Bengal. Akbar felt that he would have to deal effectively with them sooner or later, but he was not in a hurry as he had many more important things to look after.

The crisis, however, came when Abdullah Khan Uzbek, the imperial governor of Malwa, began to assume an air of independence. Like some other nobles he kept to himself the war-booty and had his own way. In July 1564 Akbar went to Malwa on pretext of hunting at Narwar but in reality to bring Abdullah back to his sense. Hearing of the arrival of the Emperor, Abdullah fled away from Malwa and refused to come even though all promises of pardon and favours were made by the Emperor.

The Emperor rightly surmised that the incident of

Abdullah Khan might cause some trouble in the east where all the chiefs of the Uzbek tribe, such as Iskandar Khan, Khan-i-Alam Bahadur Khan and Ibrahim Khan, were posted. He therefore, decided to disperse them. Ashraf Khan, the chief secretary of the Emperor, was accordingly sent to Khan-i-Alam Iskandar Khan, *Jagirdar* of Oudh, to bring him to the court. Iskandar went with Ashraf to Ibrahim Khan to consult him on the point and finally they all proceeded to Jaunpur to take the advice of the Khan-i-Zaman. The Uzbeks were not prepared to leave their posts in the east, for they feared lest their solidarity and position should be weakened. Not only did they refuse to go to the court, but threw Ashraf Khan into prison and took over the government of the eastern districts from Akbar's officers posted in those quarters. Accordingly Iskandar Khan and Ibrahim Khan were sent towards Kanauj via Lucknow while Ali Quli and Bahadur went to Kara Manikpur, which was then held by Majnun Khan Qaqshal.

Near Nimkhar (in Sitapur district) a battle was fought between Iskandar Khan's troops and the loyalists. The latter were driven back to seek shelter in the fort of Nimkhar, from where they requested the Emperor to send reinforcements. Similarly Majnun Khan was obliged by Bahadur Khan to shut himself up in the fort of Manikpur and request Asaf Khan of Garha-Katanga to come to his aid. Asaf Khan did come with men and money but found that he would not be able to cope with the valiant Uzbek brothers.

When the Emperor came to know that the Uzbek tribe was up in arms and was backed up by the Afghan leader Awas Khan, son of Islam Shah, he sent Munim Khan in advance and himself joined him at Kanauj (June 1565). As soon as the Ganges was fordable the Emperor crossed it and by forced marches surprised Iskandar at Lucknow. As the troops of the Emperor were knocked up Ibrahim Khan and Iskander Khan made good their flight to Khan-i-Zaman and Bahadur. Thinking that successful resistance might be difficult, the Uzbek leaders fled to Jaunpur and thence beyond the Gandak to Haji-

pur, opposite Patna, and asked for help from Sulaiman Karrani. On July 11 the Emperor took the fort of Jaunpur. Here he was joined by Asaf Khan. At this time Asaf Khan took alarm at the rumour that the Emepror intended to call for an account of the plunder of Chauragarh, and fled back to Garha. His flight weakened the imperial force and encouraged the Khan-i-Zaman to despatch Iskandar Khan and Bahadur Khan to Sarwar (Gorakhpur and Fyzabad divisions) to stir up insurrection. The Emperor at once sent a detachment to suppress them. Meanwhile, Ali Quli opened negotiations with Munim Khan and sought for pardon. At the insistence of Munim Khan, Akbar pardoned the rebels, though not without expressing doubt as to their good faith, on condition that Khan-i-Zaman should not come on this side of the Ganges so long as he (Akbar) was in the eastern quarters. According to Khan-i-Zaman's instructions, Bahadur Khan, who had gained a victory over the imperialists at Khairabad, also submitted.

Akbar now broke up his camp at Jaunpur and proceeded towards the capital. On his way he stopped to spend some time in hunting elephants in the forests of Chunar. While engaged in this pastime, news was brought to him that Khan-i-Zaman had changed his mind on hearing of the victory of Bahadur Khan at Khairabad, and in contravention of his promise had crossed the Ganges and sent men to capture Ghazipur and Jaunpur. The Emperor made up his mind quietly and on Feb. 2, 1566 jumped upon the saddle and rode fast to chastise the rebels, leaving behind orders for the army to follow him. Khan-i-Zaman fled towards Gorakhpur, hotly pursued by the Emperor's troops and disappeared in the forests. Akbar returned to Mau, in the district of Azamgarh, where he learnt that Jaunpur had fallen into the hands of Bahadur Khan and Banaras had been plundered by him. The Emperor, therefore, marched back and recaptured Jaunpur. At Zamaniya, Bahadur heard of the Emperor's return and fled to Hajipur again. The Emperor now announced his intention to

remain at Jaunpur until he had crushed the Uzbek rebels. This determination of Akbar weakened the morale of Ali Quli Khan , who again requested for mercy. Munim Khan again interceded and persuaded the Emperor to forgive him once more. The Emperor now fully realised that Munim Khan and some of the imperial officials had dormant sympathies for the rebels and that his force was not sufficient to crush the hostile elements. He, therefore, made the best of the situation and granted amnesty. On March 3, 1566, he started for Nagarchain or the Town of Peace, a country-palace which had been tastefully constructed at Kakrali, near Agra.

Mirza Hakim, Akbar's brother , being driven out of Kabul by an invasion of Sulaiman Mirza of Badakhshan, had come to India to seek Akbar's help. Akbar was pleased to order the Punjab officers to do their best to help the Mirza in his distress. Meanwhile, the Mirza changed his mind. Encouraged by the Uzbek rebellion and instigated by his maternal uncle Faridun, Mirza Hakim invaded the Punjab. As his invasion came as a surprise, he found no serious opposition. Plundering Bhera on his way, he came to besiege Lahore. Akbar was beside himself with anger and on November 17, 1566 marched from Agra to repel his brother. He had hardly reached the Satlaj when news was brought that the Mirza had raised the siege of Lahore and returned to Kabul. The Mirza was not prepared to fight Sulaiman and Akbar simultaneously. His hope was based on the supposition that he would find universal support from the nobility, which was believed to be quite discontented. But the opposition which he met at Lahore and the celerity with which Akbar marched out to meet him disillusioned him and he fled back precipitately. Akbar, however, pushed on to Lahore and sent an army to hound the Mirza out. The Mughal army halted on the bank of the Indus as Akbar had no intention of taking an offensive against Kabul.

The hurried retreat of Mirza Hakim was extremely fortunate. If he had managed to hold on in India for

some time more, he would have found his cause more hopeful. For, while the Emperor's attention was engrossed in the Punjab, rebellions broke out in the U. P., from Sambhal to Jaunpur. The Mirzas of Sambhal were in open rebellion ; the Uzbeks were again up in arms and had been joined by Asaf Khan of the Garha-Katanga fame. The Uzbeks had already read the *Khutba* in the name of Mirza Hakim. Taken between two fires, Akbar would have found his affairs most desperate. Indeed, since the days of Hemu, Akbar had to face no crisis more serious than this. But stars were fighting for Akbar. The rebels had no definite plans and could not unite for action.

Muhammad Sultan Mirza was a direct descendant of Umar Shaikh, son of Timur on his father's side, and his mother was the daughter of Sultan Husain Baiqara. He had served under Ulugh Beg Mirza and Shah Mirza. They had given some trouble to Humayun by their rebellious activities but were forgiven. Ulugh Mirza was killed by Hazara Afghans but he left behind two sons Sikandar Mirza and Muhammad Sultan Mirza. Humayun was pleased to confer on these two boys the titles of Ulugh Mirza and Shah Mirza. When Akbar came to the throne he gave the old Muhammad Sultan Mirza the *jagir* of Azampur in Sambhal. But the old man married again and from his new wife had several children ; Ibrahim Husain Mirza, Muhammad Husain Mirza, Masud Husain and Aquil Husain. The Emperor was pleased to grant fiefs to everyone of them. As they were princes of the royal blood they could not meet their growing expenditure from the income of their small *jagirs*, hence they decided to build their fortune with the help of the sword. The invasion of Mirza Hakim, the state of unrest in the U. P., and the absence of Akbar from the capital gave them the opportunity to rise up in arms. Ulugh Mirza, Shah Mirza, Ibrahim Husain Mirza and Muhammad Husain laid their hands on some of the imperial territory but were driven out by the fief-holders. They then went to Khan-i-Zaman, who received them so coldly that they bade him

good-bye and plundering on their way and defeating the *jagirdar* of Nimkhar, proceeded towards Delhi. As Delhi was very well fortified and well garrisoned they descended upon Malwa, the governor of which region was absent on a visit to the Emperor at Lahore. After some fight they made themselves masters of Malwa.

The Uzbeks were in open rebellion. They had read the *Khutba* in the name of Mirza Hakim and had planned extensive operations. It was a mistake on their part to have failed to utilize the unbounded energy of the Mirzas and the abilities and resources of Asaf Khan who had been deprived of the governorship of Garha-Katanga and had, therefore, gone over to the Uzbeks. The Mirzas went to Malwa and Asaf Khan also effected his escape and was graciously received by the Emperor. The turbulent Uzbek brothers now mainly relied on their own steel. At Lucknow all the Uzbek leaders met in a conference and settled a definite plan of campaign Their operations were eminently successful, for the whole country from Jaunpur to Kanauj and Oudh up to Kara lay at their mercy. The governor of Kanauj was besieged by the Khan-i-Zaman himself.

Akbar was not very much perturbed by the news. His anxiety was quite relieved by the departure of Mirza Hakim and he could now give his full attention to internal dangers. In March 1567 he left Lahore and came to Agra, where he learnt the full details of the Uzbek movements. On 6 May he started from Agra with full determination to crush the rebels. This time, however, he left Munim Khan at the capital as his sympathies for the Uzbek brothers had proved to be a source of weakness in his previous campaigns. Hearing of the march of the Emperor, the Khan-i-Zaman raised the siege of Kanauj and joined his brother Bahadur Khan who was besieging Asaf Khan, and Majnun Khan at Manikpur. Having sent on 2 June a force of 6,000 cavalry under Muhammad Quli and Raja Todar Mal against Iskandar Khan in Oudh, the Emperor himself proceeded to hunt out the Khan-i-Zaman. At Rai Bareilly he learnt from a despatch of Asaf Khan, that the

Uzbek brothers had marched off and intended to capture Gwalior on their way to Malwa. The Emperor turned his reins and marching the whole night and half of the day reached Manikpur. Here he learnt that the Uzbek brothers had crossed over the Ganges. With about 1,500 tried soldiers the Emperor immediately hastened in pursuit of the enemy. The Ganges was in flood, but the Emperor drove his elephant into the river and safely crossed it. The Uzbeks had no information of the arrival of the Emperor so very near their camp and passed the night in dissolute carousal. Before the day broke the Emperor's troops were in full battle array and the drums were beaten. The Uzbek brothers then came to know who they were going to fight with. Hence they prepared themselves for the worst and came out to fight to the bitter end. On June 9, 1567, a desperate battle was fought at Fathpur Parsoki (7 miles S. E. of Kara). While the battle was raging furiously, Bahadur Khan accidentally fell from his horse and was taken prisoner. The Khan-i-Zaman received two fatal wounds, was unhorsed and crushed incognito by an elephant, Nain Sukh, which was driven by Somnath. Bahadur Khan was brought before the Emperor, but he showed no sign of repentance and spoke in a defiant manner. He was, therefore, ordered to be executed.

The division that had been sent under Todar Mal to Oudh continued to press upon Iskandar Khan. The news of the death of the Khan-i-Zaman and Bahadur Khan broke the courage of the rebels and encouraged the imperialists. At last, Iskandar fled away in the darkness of night. He was, however, pursued but managed to escape through Gorakhpur to Bihar. As the royal troops had not received any order to cross the boundary they turned back. Finding his life in danger in Bengal, Iskandar came to Munim Khan, at whose request the Emperor pardoned him and gave him the fief of Lucknow (1571). Next year he died.

From Allahabad the Emperor proceeded via Banaras to Jaunpur. The *jagirs* of the Khan-i-Zaman were given to Munim Khan who was called from the capital to take

over the charge. The eastern districts were now tranquil ; the Emperor, therefore, returned to the capital on 18 July.

With the collapse of the Uzbek rebellion came to a close a long struggle between the Emperor and the turbulent nobility. It began in 1560 when Bairam was dismissed and continued for full seven years. The Emperor was called upon to vindicate his power and prestige. By his diplomatic skill, patience, perseverance, unbounded energy and undaunted courage, he triumphed over all the forces of opposition. The last two years of this struggle (1565-67) were to him a period of intense anxiety and severe trial. Indeed, since Panipat, the Empire had not seen such troublesome days. If Akbar had succumbed, the history of India would have been entirely different, but he was destined to live long to put the Mughal empire on a strong footing.

CHAPTER X

CONQUESTS OF AKBAR

MEWAR AND MALWA

Free from anxiety and internal dangers, and the undisputed master of a large empire, extending from the Indus to Jaunpur, including within its bosom large portions of Bundelkhand, Gondwana and eastern Rajputana, Akbar could now turn his attention to a methodical expansion of his dominion. His progresss in Rajputana, which was arrested by Uzbek rebellion and other internal dangers, would now go on uninterrupted,

The Kachwahas had already offered their sumbmission. Jodhpur and Bikaner were quite submissive and other petty princes could be subdued any time. But Akbar could not expect to keep Rajputana thoroughly under his control, so long as the rule of Mewar continued to defy the imperial power. Situated in the heart of Rajputana, the state could act as a perrenial source of inspiration for freedom to all the Rajput princes. Indeed, Mewar was, by its glorious traditions, past history, grand achievements and high social status, the premier state of Rajputana. People were yet alive who had seen and fought under the banner of Rana Sangram Singh who was acknowledged as the leader of the great Rajput hegemony before which the throne of Agra shook to its very foundation. And although evil days had fallen on Mewar, who could say they were not like temporary clouds which had gathered to unveil a brighter sunshine. Did not Mewar quickly recover from the shocks of Alauddin, Bahadur Shah and Sher Shah?

The attitude of the rulers of Mewar towards the Mughals was at least not friendly. Rana Sanga, the most formidable opponent of Babar, was dead but none of his descendants ever bowed his head to Babar or to his

successors. It was Mewar that had given shelter to Mahmud Lodi, son of Ibrahim Lodi, so long as he chose to remain there. It was probably for all these reasons that Humayun had allowed Chitor to be humiliated, battered and plundered by Bahadur Shah, and even in his days of adversity he did not dream of going to Mewar, whose wooded hills would have given him a more hospitable protection than the burning sands of Marwar.

Shortly after his return from the eastern campaign, Akbar began to make preparations for a campaign in Rajputana. Asaf Khan, the conqueror of Bhath and Garha-Katanga, was appointed the governor of Biyana with instructions to collect provisions and materials for the army. On August 30, 1567 Akbar left Agra on the pretext of hunting but with an intention to capture Chitor and expel the Mirzas from Malwa. It was not till he had reached Dholpur, that Sakat Singh, alleged to be a son of Rana Udai Singh of Mewar, who had voluntarily exiled himself and taken service under Akbar, could know of the Emperor's intentions, and that too when he was asked what services he could render should Chitor be invaded. Sakat Singh was indeed not so much demoralized as to contemplate with equanimity a sudden invasion of Mewar and earn the notoriety of having brought the Mughals against his father. He, therefore, fled from the Mughal camp.

The flight of Sakat Singh strengthened the determination of Akbar. Fearing lest the Rana should find enough time to organize an elaborate defence, he marched on rapidly. The forts of Sivi Supur and Kota were evacuated by the Rajputs and taken easy possession of by the Mughals. At Gagraun, 100 miles west of Chitor, the Emperor divided his army into several parts. A strong detachment under Shihabuddin Ahmad Khan was sent to drive the Mirzas from Malwa. Asaf Khan was sent to attack the fort of Mandalgarh, situated to the north of Chitor, while the main army led by Akbar moved against Chitor. Rana Udai Singh called a council of his chiefs who unanimously advised him to go out of the fort to a safer place with women and

princes. The Rana agreed to the proposal. Leaving five thousand Rajputs under the able leadership of Jaimal of Merta fame, he went away towards Raj Pipli, which was situated in the heart of the southern hills of Mewar. It did not probably occur to him that he could harass the Mughals and thereby indirectly help the besieged from outside.

On the eastern bank of the winding Banas river is the rock of Chitor which rises steeply from the plain. Its elevation is about 500 feet and its width in the centre is some three miles and a quarter. On the summit of this rock stands the historic fort of Chitor with its double ramparts. It had plenty of good water and fair fields and gardens. Its principal approach was by a sloping zigzag road, hewn in the rock, which passed through seven gates.

To keep Rana Udai Singh shut up in the hills and to devastate the country, a detachment was sent under Husain Quli Khan. In the last week of October, Akbar commenced the blockade of Chitor. Desultory attempts having failed to make any impression, a most methodical and systematic siege was laid, but three points were chiefly selected for specific concentration. The Emperor himself took his stand opposite the Lakhala Bari, the northern gate of which was defended from inside by Jaimal Rathore. A large mortar was cast on the spot to batter the walls. As the siege was vigorously pushed, the defenders were somewhat alarmed and sent two messengers Sanda and Sahib Khan offering to send annual presents and tender their homage. Several officers of the Emperor advised him to accept the offer but he refused to consider any proposal unless the Rana himself came in person. The Rana was not in the fort. Obviously, therefore, the defenders could not produce him. On his part the Emperor thought it entirely useless to patch up some arrangement not with the ruler himself but his servants and accept a proposal which made no mention of the surrender of the fort. The Emperor was in right earnest, for he felt that his failure before a fort which he surrendered to Bahadur Shah and Sher Shah would

take away much of his prestige and may even jeopardize his success in Rajputana and Gujrat. Indeed, he had made it a point of honour to capture the fort at any cost. The defenders too now felt their position desperate and decided to exert to their best.

Then began a life-and-death struggle. The besieged had in their service a band of expert Afghan match-lock men and a few artillery men, who poured deadly fire upon the besiegers. The workmen who were employed by the Mughals to dig trenches and construct *sabats* suffered terribly at the rate of two hundred a day, but they were kept going by lavish gifts and extravagant wages. The *sabat* was a zigzag passage covered on both the sides by mud-walls impervious to shots. Simultaneous with them the miners were busy in driving mines to the foot of the fort. Two mines connected by the same train were at last charged respectively with 120 and 180 maunds of gunpowder. On 17 December they were ignited and the troops were ordered to follow the explosion by storm. One mine exploded pulling down a bastion and killing 40 men. The Mughal soldiers, in their impetuousity, rushed on only to be blown up by second mine which exploded later. Among the casualities were a hundred distinguished officers. The mining operations having failed, Akbar concentrated his attention on completing the *sabats* which were being worked under the expert supervision of Todarmal and Qasim Khan. The *sabat* which was conducted from the royal battery was so extensive that ten horsemen abreast could ride along it and it was so high that an elephant rider with his spear in hand could pass under it. One day, as Akbar was standing behind a wall in front of the northern gate, his attention was drawn to the most accurate shooting of a musketeer in the fort. He took his gun and shot at the point from where the deadly shots were coming. Accidently it went so accurately that the expert musketeer was killed. This victim was Ismail Khan, chief of the musketeers. At last the *sabats* were completed. For two days and two nights a ceaseless conflict raged. Several breaches in the walls were made ; one

of them was wider and the Mughals wanted to rush in through it. But the Rajputs defended the breach most gallantly and filled it with muslin, cotton, wood and oil to be set on fire should the Mughals reach it. These operations were being directed by Jaimal, who was clothed in an officer's curiass. Akbar, who was watching him from the roof of the *sabat*, shot at him with his famous gun Sangram. The shot proved accurate and Jaimal was seriously wounded. The death of Ismail Khan and the disabling of Jaimal weakened the spirit of the garrison which was already very much hard-pressed and distressed for want of supplies. Being driven to despair, the Rajputs performed *jauhar* and eight thousand souls prepared to lay down their lives. The gates were flung open ; a deadly hand-to - hand conflict followed ; prodigies of valour were shown. The most stirring was the gallant charge led by the mother and the wife of Patta, who descended the rock and fell fighting. Akbar himself was wonder-struck at the heroic deeds which he witnessed and never forgot them throughout his life. Terrific slaughter was caused by three hundred war-elephants who were let loose on the Rajputs. Besides the eight thousand soldiers, thirty thousand peasants were killed for defending their hearth and home (Feb. 23, 1568). The enormous sacrifices sustained by the Mughals had made them and Akbar so wild as to exact a heavy toll of life. Such an act of heartlessness was the first and the last of its kind in the life of Akbar and remains a blot upon his otherwise generous character. This act of terrorism instead of breaking the spirit of the sons of Mewar only stiffened them against the Timurides. How much wise it would have been if blind fury had not got the better of Akbar's wisdom ! Chitor was dismantled once for all, but the pride of Mewar shones still brighter for the catastrophe.

Akbar gained a bloody victory. Chitor was constituted into a *sarkar* and was placed in the charge of Asaf Khan. Akbar had vowed to make a pilgrimage on foot to the shrine of Muinuddin Chishti. After paying a visit to the tomb, Akbar proceeded to Agra. In

memory of his great exploits he ordered to be placed at either side of the principal gate of the Agra fort two stone elephants on which were seated the statues of Patta and Jaimal. That was an indirect tribute to the valour of those gallant Rajputs who, if alive, would have probably resented such an insult.

Chitor having fallen, it was not difficult to capture the equally famous fort of Ranthambore. It was besieged on February 10, 1569 and surrendered to Akbar's mortars after one month of defence by Surjan Hada on March 22.

The expedition which had been sent to Malwa also proved successful. The Mirzas realized their inability to cope with the imperialists and hastily fled to Chingiz Khan in Gujrat. Chingiz Khan treated them kindly and with their help defeated Etmad Khan and captured Ahmadabad. For having rendered valuable services Chingiz Khan gave fiefs to the Mirza near Broach. But their cupidity and restlessness brought them into conflict with Chingiz Khan, who defeated them and compelled them to quit Gujrat. Again they came back to Malwa and after an ineffectual attempt to capture Mandu fled back to Gujrat. By this time Chingiz Khan was dead and civil strife had broken out in his state. The Mirzas were not slow to utilize the opportunity and they brought under their possession Champanir Surat, Baroda and Broach.

As was expected, the capture of Chitor made good impression on all, rulers and subjects alike. Sulaiman Karrani, the ruler of Bengal, offered his homage and read the *Khutba* and struck coins in the name of Akbar. Raja Ram Chandra of Kalinjar hastened to surrender the fort of Majnun Khan (1569). Chandrasen of Marwar and Rai Kalyan Mal of Bikaner offered their personal homage in 1570. Even Baz Bahadur, the ex-king of Malwa, after knocking about in the Deccan, Gujrat and Mewar, chose to surrender himself (1570).

The star of Akbar was in the ascendant and fortune favoured him on all sides. As in his political life so also in his domestic life he was blessed. His first son Salim

was born at Sikri on August 30, 1569 of Maryam-uz-Zamani, the Kachwaha princess ; a daughter was born on November 21 of the same year ; and on June 7, 1570 another son Murad was born to Salima Begum.

An empire-builder himself and the descendant of proud empire-builders, Akbar was not the man to sit idle for long. The conquest of Rajputana was practically complete, although the exiled king of Mewar continued to defy the Mughal arms and worship at the shrine of freedom in the Girwo valley of the Arawali hills. After touring in Rajputana and the Punjab to organize defence and shape internal administration, the Emperor turned his attention to Gujrat.

GUJRAT AND BENGAL

Since the death of Bahadur Shah, the affairs of Gujrat had fallen into a state of progressive deterioration. A boy of eleven years, the nephew of Bahadur, was raised to the throne with the title of Mahmud Shah III. He ruled for seventeen years, but only in name, while real power was wielded by a few nobles. Flung in licence and debauchery and fond of the society of the low-born, he is remembered for his revelries with the "deer-eyed spouses" in the "Deer (*Ahukhana*) Park", of which even the trunks of trees were dressed in cloth of gold. He spent the short span of freedom from surveillance in idle thoughts of invasion of Malwa and persecution of the Hindus. The only redeeming feature in his contemptible character was his patronage of learned and religious Muslim divines and the building of a *serai* at Macca. In 1553 he was poisoned by Burhan, one of his worthless favourites. The nobles were exasperated and killed Burhan. Abdul Karim, who had been made Etmad Khan in 1540, was a powerful noble of Mahmud III. He caught hold of a boy, who was returning with some grain in his skirt for his pigeons, declared him a relation of the king and raised him to the throne with the title of Ahmad Shah III, in spite of

his wails and protests. This unfortunate boy was kept under such a rigorous watch that he began to smart and fret and, later on, even gave vent to his anger by striking off plantain trees calling them Etmad Khan! During his nominal rule of seven years, the kingdom of Gujrat was divided between powerful nobles such as Imad-ul-mulk Rumi (Turk), Ikhtiyar-ul-mulk and other *Habshi* (African) leaders, the Saiyids of Bokhara, Shaikh Musa Khan and other Afghan newcomers. Even the outsiders began to cast their greedy on the kingdom. Mubarak Shah of Khandesh twice threatened to invade Gujrat ; the Portuguese laid their hands on Daman and Saujan. In 1560 Ahmad III was mysteriously murdered by Etmad Khan's order, and thrown into a ditch. Etmad Khan then produced a boy of twelve, originally called Nathu or Habib, but of obscure extraction ; swore to his genuineness and installed him as Muzaffar Shah III. This high-handedness led to intrigues, counter-intrigues, revolutions and assassinations. Besides the local parties and turbulent nobles, the Mirzas, driven from Malwa, also stepped in to make matters worse. There was no central authority. The kingdom of Gujrat lay broken and dismembered, and the nominal ruler was merely the shuttlecock of selfish nobles.

The utterly distracted affairs of Gujrat and the presence of the Mirzas, who had sought shelter in Gujrat, attracted the attention of Akbar shortly after the settlement of the Punjab and Rajputana. Since Gujrat had been conquered once by Humayun, Akbar visualized some claim of his family over it. The political and commercial importance of Gujrat for northern India and the Deccan was so obvious that an empire-builder could not afford to allow its dissolution into small, ineffectual and warring principalities ruled largely by foreign adventurers. Then came an invitation from Etmad Khan, a grandee of Gujrat, requesting the Emperor to put down the anarchy which had become the bane of Gujrat.

On 20 November the Emperor reached Ahmadabad. Akbar's march to Ahmadabad was easier than

even that his father's, but troubles were yet to come, for some of the nobles particularly the Mirzas were in the southern Gujrat. Moreover, some of the Gujrati nobles repented having offered their submission to Akbar. Acting upon a rumour that Akbar had ordered the arrest of the Gujrati nobles, the Mughal soldiers plundered their camp. Although the criminals were given exemplary punishement, the confidence of the Gujratis was shaken. The Gujratis also resented the air of superiority assumed by the Mughal nobles, so much so that Ikhtiyar-ui-mulk fled away from Ahmadabad towards the hills of Idur.

From Ahmadabad Akbar reached Cambay on 12 December and soon after turned to the task of crushing the Mirzas. With a view to launching a simultaneous attack on Champanir and Surat, he sent two strong detachments. They had not gone far when news was brought that Ibrahim Husain Mirza was running away with a thousand men and was likely to pass within eight miles of the imperial camp. At 4 a. m., the same night, the Emperor set off with forty men in pursuit of the Mirza. After ceaseless search lasting twelve hours the Mirza was located at Sarnal. With barely two hundred men, Akbar crossed the Mahi and, scrambling up the steep bank, fell upon the enemy. There was some hand-to-hand fighting. At one time Akbar was tightly cornered but he saved himself by jumping his horse over a thorn bush. But his efforts proved fruitless for, in spite of a considerable loss of men on his side, the Mirza managed to make good his escape. Darkness prevented pursuit. Disappointed, Akbar returned to his camp.

The Emperor laid siege to the fort of Surat on January 11, 1573. The fort was very strong, for it had been built as a bulwark against the inroads of the Portuguese. It was certain it could not be quickly captured. A long stay at one place could, however, encourage the enemies to foment trouble in northern Gujrat. So, the Emperor ordered the Malwa officers to join Aziz Koka, the governor of Ahmadabad, and despatched officers to guard the routes to the north lest the Mirzas should try

to go to Hindustan and create disturbance there.

The siege of Surat dragged on, while the guns from the ramparts of the fort poured deadly fire. During these operations news arrived that the Mirzas, together with Sher Khan Fauladi, had besieged Patan vigorously and, that the Afghans of Bengal were getting restive and might even break through the defences of the eastern provinces. It seemed as if the history of Humayun's reign would repeat itself. Undaunted, however, Akbar pushed on the siege in spite of the advice of the nobles to hurry back to the north. He stuck to his position and would listen to no argument but the capture of the fort. Meanwhile, Aziz Koka scored a brilliant victory in the third week of January over the Mirzas and the Afghans at Patan, and it was rumoured about that he was coming to reinforce the besiegers. At last, after a siege of one month and seventeen days, the fort of Surat surrendered on February 26, 1573. The fall of the fort made a strong impression on the princes. The Raja of Baglana and Raja Ali Khan of Khandesh came and offered their homage to the Emperor. The Portuguese too who had come while the siege was going on offered presents and entered into an understanding with Akbar.

On April 13 Akbar returned to Ahmadabad. For the purpose of administration, Gujrat was constituted into a province. Khan-i-Azam Aziz Koka, a young man, was made the governor of the province, and different officers were appointed for the divisions of Patan, Dhulqa, Broach and Baroda. This plan of government was just like that of Humayun ; the difference, however, was that in the latter's time Bahadur Shah was allowed to remain at large, while Akbar took Muzaffar Shah into custody. Moreover, Malwa and Rajputana were controlled better by Akbar than by his father. The Emperor was, however, far from satisfied with the state of Gujrat, for the Mirzas, the sons of Chingiz Khan, the princes of Kathiawar, and the Hindu Rajas, such as those of Sirohi and Idur, had not yet recognized his supremacy and were ready to act against him. But he did not think it advisable to stay any

longer in Gujrat, particularly as the affairs in the north were disquieting. Having impressed upon the Khan-i-Azam the need to keep himself ready to face the enemies but not to risk any clash without due caution, and, if possible, without first informing him, he left for the capital, where he was welcomed on June 3. Here was presented to him the head of Ibrahim Husain Mirza who, after his defeat at Patan, fled to Sambhal and thence to the Punjab. He was, however, vigorously pursued by the Mughal officers, defeated and killed.

No sooner did Akbar go out of Gujrat than all the enemies of the Mughals came out of their retreats. Muhammad Husain Mirza laid siege to Surat immediately and captured Broach and Cambay. The Khan-i-Azam, who was encamped near, Idur sent reinforcements to Surat, which weakened his own army. As soon as Ikhtiyar-ul-mulk heard of it, he came out with superior numbers to fight him. Following Akbar's advice, Aziz Koka entrenched himself at a strong place and refused to be lured into an open fight. Ikhtiyar-ul-mulk then marched upon Ahmadabad, but Aziz Koka outstripped him, entered the capital and placed it in a position of defence. However, Ikhtiyar-ul-mulk besieged it and was soon joined by Muhammad Husain Mirza. Soon the flame of revolt blazed up all over Gujrat.

The distressing news from Gujrat reached the Emperor at Fatehpur while he was preparing for an expedition against the Afghans of Bengal. As soon as the Khan-i-Azam frankly recognized his inability to ride the storm, Akbar made up his mind to hurry immediately to Gujrat. Urgent orders were sent to *Amirs* and *jagirdars* of Malwa to march immediately to Gujrat. Man Singh was commissioned to collect his Kachwaha levies quickly and join him wherever he could on the way to Gujrat. On Sunday, 23 August, Akbar left Fatehpur on fast dromedaries with 500 men. On the 25th morning he reached Ajmer , and after circumambulating the shrine of the Khwaja, he pushed on. At Balisana he reviewed his troops, which came to 3,000 in all. On the eleventh day he pitched his camp

six miles from Ahmadabad. From here he sent word to the Khan-i-Azam to make a bold sally out of the fort and join him. But Khan-i-Azam could not believe it and hesitated.

The enemies too were absolutely ignorant of the arrival of the Emperor. It was not till the Emperor was about to ford the Sabarmati and the drums of war were beaten, that they came to know of his arrival. Immediately after, Muhammad Hussain Mirza came out to fight but was attacked with a tremendous impetuousity which compelled him to flee so precipitately that his horse tumbled. He was thrown down and taken prisoner and later on executed. In this fight Akbar just escaped narrowly with his life on account of his presence of mind and the timely help of Chela Gujar. Hardly an hour had passed when Ikhtiyar-ul-mulk, hearing of the defeat of the Mirza, came rushing to the battlefield. His van was rolled back by the imperialists, and this created confusion in the ranks which were pressing on from behind. Taking advantage of their weak moment, Akbar made a cavalry charge with so much success that the enemy broke and fled to the surprise and amusement of the imperialists. Ikhtiyar-ul-mulk fell from his horse and his head was immediately chopped off. This was indeed a great victory. With three thousand men Akbar crushed an army twenty thousand strong. Ahmadabad was cleared of the enemies in a few hours. Bulletins of victory were sent all over, and the Malwa troops which had not yet arrived were ordered to return. The Emperor spent a few days at Ahmadabad to see order restored. On 16 September he left for Fatehpur Sikri, where he reached on 5 October.

On his return from Gujrat Akbar began to prepare for an expedition to Bengal. After the defeat of Muhammad Khan Sur by Adil Shah, his son Bahadur ascended the throne. He revenged the death of his father by defeating and killing Adil Shah at the battle of Surajgarh in 1556. Bahadur was succeeded by his brother Jalal Shah, who was followed by his son who was

murdered by one Ghiyasuddin III in 1563. The Karranis who held large *jagirs* in Bihar and had joined the rulers of Bengal espoused, not without selfish motive, the cause of the murdered prince. Taj Khan killed Ghiyasuddin III and began to govern in the name of his brother Sulaiman. After the death of Taj Khan in 1564 Sulaiman assumed the title of Hazrat Ali and established the capital at Tanda. He lived on friendly terms with Khan-i-Zaman Ali Quli Khan, the Uzbek. In 1565, when the Uzbek rebellion broke out he tried to capture Rohtas from Fath Khan with the help of the Uzbeks. The arrival of the Emperor towards Jaunpur and the despatch of Quli Khan to help the besieged frustrated Sulaiman's plans and he thought it advisable to retire. Sulaiman was, however, wise enough not to involve himsef in the-Uzbek rebellion. After the death of the Khan-i-Zaman, his servant Asadullah Khan, who held Zamaniya, proposed to Sulaiman to take over the charge of the fort. Sulaiman sent an army under Lodi Khan, a capable commander and a sagacious politician, but he was sorely disappointed as Munim Khan had, in the meantime, won over Asadullah Khan. Sulaiman now established friendly relations with Munim Khan, accepted the suzerainty of Akbar by reading the *Khutba* and striking coins in the Emperor's name. He never sat on the throne. The reasons for this change were that Akbar's successes had convinced him of the futility of inviting a conflict with him too soon, and he feared the interference of the Mughal government with his design of conquering Orissa, the ruler of which state was on friendly terms with the Emperor. His plan proved successful. Orissa was conquered and Raja Mukund Deva and Ibrahim Khan Sur, a rival of Adil Shah Sur, who was also there, were killed (1568). Akbar did not like the aggrandisement of the kingdom of Bengal on the ruins of a friendly state, but his hands were too full to welcome a fresh war.

In 1572 Sulaiman died. His eldest son and successor Bayazid was killed by the Afghan nobles, who placed his second son Daud on the throne. Just after

Sulaiman's death, his successors subverted his policy, stopped the *Khutba* to be read and coins struck in the name of Akbar, shook off allegiance and assumed sovereignty. As soon as the mattter was brought to the notice of Akbar, he ordered Munim Khan to invade Bengal. Munim opened negotiations with an Afghan general, Gujar Khan, who promised to help him, but the latter was reconciled by Lodi Khan. To keep the disappointed Munim in good humour, Lodi Khan sent him a present of three lacs. As soon as the affairs of Bengal were put in some order, Lodi Khan and Daud attacked Zamaniya and razed the fort to the ground. The Mughals would have fared better had Raja Gajpati of Bihar attacked successfully the Afghans, and thereby given Munim Khan time enough to rally his troops near Ghazipur. The Mughal and the Afghan armies were entrenched facing each other while Akbar was besieging the fort of Surat. Failing to secure the personal presence of Akbar, the old, jaded and weak Munim Khan did not think it proper to come into conflict with the ruler of Bengal, who was believed to possess a large army consisting of 40,000 well-mounted cavalry, 1,40,000 infantry, 3,600 elephants, 20,000 guns and thousands of war-boats. He, therefore, opened negotiations, which were treated lightly by the Afghans. Fortunately for him, there was a division in the Afghan camp on account of the murder of Yusuf, son of the late Taj Khan and son-in-law of Lodi Khan. This changed Lodi Khan's attitude, who at once came to terms with Munim Khan. Lodi Khan might have turned upon Daud had he not been deserted by his followers. Meanwhile, at the insistence of the Emperor, who had ordered some reinforcements, Munaim Khan equipped a large army and commenced some preliminary operations against the Afghans, which were successful. Daud appealed to the patriotism of Lodi Khan and by flattery and kind words induced him to kick off the Mughals and return to his former master. This was, however, a trick to get hold of Lodi Khan. At the instigation of Qutlu Khan and Shridhar, Daud got him executed. This dastardly act sent a thrill of

horror among the Afghan nobles. The removal of Lodi Khan encouraged Munim Khan to move out and invade Patna. But Daud soon entered Patna with his forces to defend it. Had he attacked the Mughals he might not have scored success, but fortunately he decided to shut himself up in the fort. Munim Khan tried all his ingenuity but in vain ; the prospects of taking Patna were far from sight. In his helplessness he requested the Emperor to come and "untie the knot".

On June 20, 1574, just when the monsoons unsually break in Hindustan, the Emperor started from Agra for Patna. He was not the man to be deterred by storms, winds or rains into postponing his plans when urgency required them to be put into immediate execution. As it was certain that the roads would be impassable during the rains, he started on boats, which were specially constructed to convey the imperial party with its numerous officers. Great ingenuity was exhibited in constructing these boats and no arrangements towards convenience and comforts were spared. Yet the voyage on the swollen Ganges was bound to be adventurous and mishaps were inevitable. Akbar, however, tided over all difficulties and reached Saiyidpur, on the confluence of the Ganges and the Gomti. Here he was joined by the army which had been ordered to march by land. Sending his family to Jaunpur, the Emperor marched on and reached Patna on 4 *August*.

From the reports of the officers and personal examination, the Emperor concluded that the capture of Patna would be difficult unless Hajipur was first taken; because from the latter place all supplies and victuals flowed into the fort. Akbar, therefore, promptly decided to send a strong detachment against Hajipur. Meanwhile, he sent a message to Daud either to surrender the fort or to settle the quarrel by means of a duel with him with any weapon he chose, or by a contest of two proxy champions one from each army, or even by a fight of two war elephants representing the two armies. This might have been a reply to the boast of Sher Shah that man to man the Mughal was inferior to the Afghan,

or it was intended to produce a psychological impression on or beguile the Afghan ruler. Before a reply to this communication could come, the Mughals captured Hajipur on 7 August. The capture was indeed brilliant, and was effected in spite of extremely bad weather, dark night, frightfully flooded rivers and resolute Afghan opposition. The head of Fath Khan, commander of Hajipur, and the heads of other Afghan leaders were sent to Akbar who forwarded them to Daud. The royal challenge and the fall of Hajipur told severely on the morale of Daud. Though he had at his service 20,000 cavalry, numerous elephants and a large part of artillery, he slipped out of the fort with Raja Vikramajit by the back gate in the darkness of night and sailed as fast as he could, while Gujar Khan escaped simultaneously by land with the army and elephants. There was a great commotion, which was noticed by the Mughals. Akbar wanted to pursue the enemy immediately but was prevailed upon by Munim Khan to give up the idea as the night was too dark; rivers and rivulets were in flood and the geographical condition of the country was not well known. Early next morning the Emperor entered Patna, and after a few hours during which he disposed of urgent affairs, he rode out in pursuit of the Afghans, instructing Munim Khan to follow (Aug. 8, 1574).

For sixty miles at a stretch Akbar went on in pursuit of the enemy without drawing his reins, but could not get a trace of Daud. At Dariyapur he halted. Here he was joined by the army of the Khan-i-Khana Munim Khan. A council of war was held to discuss the advisability of prosecuting the campaign during the rainy season. After prolonged consideration, it was decided to push forward. Munim Khan was given the supreme command and nominated as the governor of Bengal. The Emperor returned and Munim Khan marched on. The Khan-i-Khana was also helped by the Rajas of Kharagpur and Gidhor. Telia Garhi, the key to Bengal, was easily captured and the Mughal army found an easy entry into Tanda (near Gaur), the then capital of Bengal. From

Tanda, expeditions were sent to drive out the Afghans. Majnun Khan Qaqshal was sent to Ghoraghat (in district Dinajpur); Muhammad Quli Khan was sent in pursuit of Daud, who had fled towards Satgaon ; while Todar Mal was despatched to prevent Junaid Karrani from joining his cousin Daud. All these expeditions proved successful; the Mughal troops occupied Ghoraghat and Satgaon, but Daud evaded them and escaped to Orissa. Encouraged, however, by the death of Muhammad Quli Khan, Daud appeared again. Munim Khan hesitated to chase him through the inhospitable country of Orissa, but Todar Mal procured a *farman* from the Emperor for immediate action. At last Munim Khan also had to march into Orissa. On March 4, 1575 a well contested battle was fought at Tukaroi (Dist. Balasore) in which, at first, victory inclined towards the Afghans, but the death of the Afghan commander from an arrow at a critical moment turned the tables in favour of the Mughals. Todar Mal followed up the victory to Cuttack. Driven to despair, Daud sued for peace. Todar Mal was opposed to peace making and refused to sign the treaty, but Munaim Khan concluded it on his own responsibility (April 12). By this treaty, Daud promised to deliver his best elephants to the Emperor, pay tribute, send his nephew Shaikh Muhammad as hostage and later on to go himself to pay personal homage to the Emperor. Munim Khan returned to Tanda after the treaty was signed.

In October 1575 the octogenarian Khan-i-Khana died of malaria at Gaur, which had been chosen as his capital. As soon as he was dead, bickerings and quarrels followed in the Mughal army. There was no one on the spot to fill the place of the Khani-i-Khana. Daud was not slow to take advantage of the confusion. He tore off the treaty and murdered the Mughal governor of Bhadrak (Orissa). The Qaqshals were driven out from the Ghoraghat region. Daud reoccupied Tanda. Disgusted with the climate of Bengal, distracted by the want of a leader in whom they could confide, and pressed by the Afghans, the Mughal

officers beat a shameful retreat to Bihar. To their amazement they found that the flame of revolt had blazed up in Bihar also and even Raja Gajapati had become hostile. At Bhagalpur the retreating officers met Husain Quli Khan-i-Jahan, the new governor of Bengal, who cheered them up and with the help of Raja Todar Mal restored order and confidence among them. The Khan-i-Jahan took the field, soon captured Telia Garhi pass and fortified himself at Ak Mahal (Raj Mahal). Here he was pressed hard by the Afghans and found his position difficult. But the situation was relieved by the timely arrival of Muzaffar Khan from Bihar with 5,000 horses. On July 12, 1576 a battle was fought in which the Mughals gained a clear victory. Junaid, "the sword of the Afghans", was killed ; Kala Pahar, the renegade Hindu and cruel desecrator of Jagannath fled away wounded; and Daud took to his heels. Todar Mal pursued Daud closely and captured him. Khan-i-Jahan was unwilling to take the life of a handsome man like Daud, but the *Amirs* compelled him to chop off his head which was sent to the Emperor. With Daud's death ended the independent kingship of Bengal.

CHAPTER XI

RANA PRATAP OF MEWAR

The stability of the conquest of Gujrat was dependent on the consolidation of the Mughal power in Rajputana. The fall of Chitor had undoubtedly established the prestige of Akbar in that region, but the kingdom of Mewar was not pacified. In February 1572 Rana Udai Singh died leaving behind eighteen Ranis and twenty-four children. He had nominated his favourite son Jagmal to the throne of Mewar in preference to his edest son Pratap Singh. But the maternal uncle of Pratap, Rai Akhai, Raja of Jalore and the ex-Raja of Gwalior, in consultation with some leading chiefs of Mewar dethroned Jagmal and installed Pratap Singh on the throne by a *coup de main*. Jagmal then left Mewar and went to the court of Akbar, who received him with kindness and granted him a *jagir*.

The new ruler of Mewar naturally required time to reorganize and consolidate his resources before he could adopt any vigorous policy towards the Mughal Government. This gave an opportunity to Akbar to carry out without any serious interruption his plan of the conquest of Gujrat. He was, however, quite aware of the importance of some final settlement with the ruler of Mewar. Accordingly in 1573, he sent from Gujrat Raja Man Singh to Mewar to negotiate with Pratap Singh the terms of a settlement. The Rana received Raja Man Singh well and accepted the robe of honour sent to him by Akbar. It was evident, therefore, that Akbar had no intention of interfering with the succession in Mewar, in spite of Jagmal's presence at his court, nor was the Rana prepared to pick up a quarrel with him at least for the time being, in spite of the friendship of Rao Chandrasen of Jodhpur. The mission of Man Singh was, however, not quite successful and he returned disappointed. It seems that the Rana was not willing

to see eye to eye with Man Singh and go to the court to offer personal homage.

Akbar was too shrewd to involve himself in any avoidable trouble which, if courted prematurely, might endanger his new conquest of Gujrat. In September 1573 he, therefore, sent Raja Bhagwan Dass to Mewar for the same purpose for which Man Singh had gone. Raja Bhagwan Dass proved more successful. It is difficult to say precisely whether Rana Pratap felt some compunction for having offended Man Singh in an excited moment, or whether he was not prepared then to come into an immediate conflict with the resourceful Emperor of Delhi; or whether he was in a peaceful frame of mind and wished to be let alone in the enjoyment of his blessed freedom. Whatever might have been the reasons, he treated Bhagwan Dass with respect and kindness, and sent his son Amar Singh along with him to pay homage to the Emperor and enter his service. The Rana himself wished to be excused for his inability to attend. Bhagwan Dass returned with Amar Singh to Fatehpur in November 1573.

Not long after, Todar Mal also passed through the Rana's territory. He too was treated most hospitalbly and went back with the impression that the Rana did not mean quarrelling with the Emperor.

In spite of these professions of friendship, the attitude of the Rana grew stiffer steadily. He could hardly feel satisfied at the sluggish recognition of his friendly attitude towards the Emperor who continued to insist upon his going to the court to pay personal homage and showed no intention of restoring the conquered territory of Chitor. On his part, Akbar could not repose full confidence in Rana's friendliness so long as he continued an alliance with the discontented Raja of Gwalior and the recalcitrant Afghans. His alliance with Chadrasen of Jodhpur and Rao Surtan of Sirohi, who defied imperial authority, could hardly please Akbar. Unless he could fully satisfy himself of the continued friendship of the Rana, he could not relax his control over the conquered portions of Mewar from where alone he could command

the route to Gujrat and ensure the safety of pilgrims, caravans and commerce.

In 1574, Chandrasen of Jodhpur raised the standard of revolt. Akbar thought it to be an isolated event. He sent an expedition to put it down, while he himself departed for Patna. Soon after Dauda of Bundi, son of Surjan Hada, also revolted. While the fire of rebellion in these states was burning, Rana Pratap commanded his subjects living in the plains to retire into the hills. This order he carried out severely and enforced on pain of death. The result of this measure was that the "garden of Rajasthan (was rendered) of no value to the conqueror (Akbar) and the commerce already established between the Mughal court and overseas conveyed through Mewar from Surat and other ports of Gujrat was intercepted and plundered". These developments probably led Akbar to the conclusion that the mainspring of mischeif lay in the defiant attitude of the Rana which acted as an infection.

The Emperor came down to Ajmer in March 1576. He made a present of a robe of honour and a horse to Man Singh and sent him with 5,000 good cavalry against Rana Pratap. Akbar had little doubt of his success, hence he returned to the capital. By way of Mandalgarh, Man Singh arrived at the Haldighati pass, fourteen miles from the fort of Gogunda. Here he was challenged by Rana Pratap, who came down with 3,000 horses (June 18, 1576). The Mughal advance guard under Jagannath and Asaf Khan was driven back in great confusion by Hakim Sur Afghan. The Mughal left was also driven back and the right too did not fare better. All along the line the troops of Rana Pratap had the better of their enemies. The Mughal army was thrown into confusion but at this very time Mihtar Khan, commander of the rear guard, came up with the reserve and heartened it once more. The battle was fiercely contested. Raja Ram Sah, who was the leader of the Mewar right, was killed with his sons. Ram Das, son of the gallant Jaimal, was also killed by Jagannath. The chief interest in this engagement, however,

centred on the fight of elephants let loose from both the sides, but even in this the Rana's animals fought better. On the Mughal side, the Saiyids of Barha did immense service. Had it not been for their obstinate stand, the Mughal army would have been routed in the very first onslaught. Man Singh also showed "indescribable steadfastness". Rana Pratap made for Man Singh and both fought valiantly. Though the Rana was pierced with arows, he had almost overpowered Man Singh, when the Mughal vanguard that had been routed at first turned again for the fray, and simultaneously with it flew a rumour that Akbar himself had arrived on the field with reinforcements. This rumour relaxed the efforts of the Rana, who retreated into the hills towards Koliyari. The casualities on both sides were almost equal ; each side lost about 500. The Mughal army could not pursue the retreating Mewar troops owing to excessive heat and the fact that they had been roughly handled and were quite tired. Next day they pushed forward and occupied Gogunda, which the Rana under false alarm had unfortunately evacuated. If he had only ascertained the truth of the rumour and made a stand at Gogunda, it would not have passed on so easily to the Mughals. At Gogunda, the Mughal army lay stranded. The rains had set in ; the army lay idle only to suffer severely from want of supplies. The soldiers kept their body and soul together "upon the flesh of animals and the mango fruit". In spite of all these troubles Man Singh and Asaf Khan would not permit any indiscriminate plundering of the Rana's territory. For this reason, they were called back by the Emperor. Man Singh was refused permission to appear in the *Durbar*. He was, however, forgiven after some time and sent back with instructions "to ragage the Rana's country". During Man Singh's absence, Rana Pratap came back, harassed the Mughal troops, and cutting off all supplies forced them to retire from their posts and recovered Gogunda.


Rana Pratap's heroism, sturdy independence, love

for freedom, readiness to suffer and sacrifice have inspired a large number of modern writers to read in his struggle facts not quite justified by sober history. Some Persian writers including Abul Fazl have spoken lightly of the gallant Rana, while others have condemned Akbar and Man Singh. It was not a Hindu and Muhammadan question, nor a conflict between Hinduism and Islam. It was simply a conflict between the Mughal empire and the state of Mewar. Had it been otherwise, Rana Pratap would not have placed one of his divisions under Hakim Khan Sur, nor Akbar his whole army under Man Singh. The same spirit which had led Akbar to vanquish Baz Bahadur of Malwa, Muzaffar of Gujrat, Daud of Bengal, Mirza Jani Beg of Sindh and Yusuf of Kashmir had brought him into conflict with the Rana of Mewar. If Mewar were ruled over by a Muhammadan prince, Akbar would have dealt with him in the same manner. There is not a shred of evidence to suggest that in his war with Mewar, Akbar was actuated by any other but purely political motives. Imperialism may be good or bad, but it cannot be denied that both the Hindus and Muhammadans subscribed to it as freely as the Europeans.

However one may admire the courage, determination and indomitable will of Rana Pratap, it will have to be admitted that he stood for a principle quite different to that which inspired his contemporary princes of Rajputana. While he fought for the independence of Mewar and the supremacy of the Sisodias, the other princes could not feel enthusiastic about it, for, their past experiences of the policy of the great rulers of Mewar was not very happy. It would be absurd to maintain that the rest of the Rajputs had become cowards and were so thoroughly demoralized as to sell their freedom for a mess of pottage. Their record in history totally belies such a gratuitious presumption. As before, they would have fought against Akbar shoulder to shoulder with the Rana had they felt that their hearth, home, religion and freedom were in danger. By his dealings with other Rajput princes, Akbar had

clearly shown that he did not wish either to annex their states or interfere with their social, economic and religious life. He wanted nothing more than their allegiance to the new Imperial Confederation, which implied four things ; firstly, the princes were to pay some contribution to the empire in the form of tribute ; secondly, they had to surrender their foreign policies and their right to settle their disputes by mutual wars ; thirdly, they had to send a fixed military quota for the service of the Confederation whenever required ; fourthly, they should consider themselves an integral part of the empire and not merely individual units. These represented one side of the case. On the other side, all the posts and ranks of the empire were opened to them and they were entitled to claim equality with holders of similar posts and ranks irrespective of race and religion. It may be mentioned in this context that while Akbar annexed to the empire almost every Muslim kingdom and state in India, he did not annex any important Hindu state.

The reasonable and generous terms offered by Akbar, viz. freedom from interference with social and religious life, and internal administration knocked the bottom out of the case against joining the Mughal Confederation. Under the new dispensation, the Rajput princes who had become sick of wars and chaos in Rajputana, could visualize the establishment of peace, order and prosperity. The hegemony of the Mughals could offer what Mewar did not and could not. Nor was it the policy of the Confederation to deprive them of reasonable scope for the exercise of their warlike qualities or administrative ability. It was not possible to make much of the bogey of matrimonial relationship enforced by the Mughal Emperor, for their is very little evidence outside the propagandistic compositions of the bards of Mewar to show that matrimonial alliance was a general policy of the Mughal Emperor to be enforced ruthlessly on all the Rajput princes. Indeed, there was hardly any novelty in such relationships. Numerous cases of it are recorded in the histories of Gujrat, Malwa and the



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&
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KHOST
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Samarquand
Balkh
Chitral
Kabul
Qandahar
Ghazni
Srinagar
Lahore
Amritsar
Sirhind
Delhi
Panipat
Jaiselmer
Bikaner
Jodhpur
Agra
Kalinjar
Allahabad
Patna
Darbhanga
Dacca
Sonargaon
Ahmadabad
Cambay
Baroda
Surat
Broach
Ujjain
Mandu
Bandhogarh
Cuttack
Puri
Chanda
Ahmadnagar
Daulatabad
Golconda
Bidar
Bijapur
Raichur
Goa
Vijayanagar
Junagarh
Diu
Dwarka
Thatta
Sehwan
Bhakkar
Multan
Uch
Sibi
Dadar
R. Brahmaputra
R. Mahanadi
R. Krishna
R. Penner
R. Palar
R. Cauvery
R. Indus
R. Jhelum
R. Chinab
R. Ravi
R. Helmand

Deccan. There is no positive evidence to show that Akbar was bent upon enforcing it or there was any great social upsurge or upheaval against such an alliance among the Rajputs. They were free to enter or not to enter into such an alliance.

Taking the various circumstances into account, most of the Rajput princes honestly and by conviction preferred to join the Confederation under the hegemony of the Mughal Emperor, rather than cherish and promote the impossible dream of re-establishing the hegemony of the Sisodias, which had been tried more than once but had failed. Reason and realism were on the side of the pro-Confederation elements among the Rajputs while romance and sentimentalism on that of the Rana.

Although the rebellion of Jodhpur had been crushed and the fort of Siwanah, the stronghold of the insurgents was captured, the situation in Rajputana had not much changed. The fire of rebellion still blazed in the states of Sirohi, Dungarpur, Banswara, Idur and Bundi, which belonged to the group of Mewar. The battle of Haldighati had brought nothing to the Emperor except Gogunda. Mewar was as usual defiant. Even the Muslim chief, Taj Khan of the Jalor, had "turned his head away from obedience". Had there been a leader of genius, all these hostile forces would have been woven together into a formidable counterblast against the Mughal empire. But there was no political head greater than Akbar.

After the conquest of Bengal, the Emperor gave his full attention to the affairs of Rajputana. In September 1576 he went to Ajmer. Man Singh was rebuked for having allowed Rana Pratap to make good his escape, and was ordered to be more vigilant and energetic. Tarsoon Khan and Rai Singh were sent against Jalor and Sirohi, closing the roads of egress and ingress from Mewar. Akbar himself moved from Ajmer to Gogunda on October 1576. Of course, it was out of the question for Rana Pratap with his slender resources to cross sword in the open field with Akbar, who was backed up by the

resources of his vast empire. The Rana, therefore, retired into the most interior parts of the hills. Akbar sent two expeditions : one under Quli Khan against Rai Narayan Dass of Idur, father-in-law of the Rana ; and the other under Qutbuddin and Raja Bhagwan Dass to hunt out Rana Pratap. Idur feul in the hands of the Mughals, but, like Rana Pratap, the chief fled into the hills. Akbar himself went to Banswara and Udaipur, but had to return without finding anything. The expeditions of Qutbuddin and Bhagwan Dass also failed to achieve anything. Rawal Pratap Singh of Banswara and Rawal Ash Karan of Dungarpur, however, offered submission. Sirohi and Abugarh were conquered and the Rai of Sirohi also submitted. In 1577 Bundi was conquered. The rebellion in Rajputana was thus almost crushed although Mewar still continued to defy the Mughals.

In 1577, Shahbaz Khan, an officer who had distinguished himself in Bihar and in the capture of Sirohi and had experience of mountain warfare, was sent. He laid siege to Kumbhalmir (April 1578), a fort on the Jodhpur frontier and headquarters of the Rana, after sending away Raja Bhagwan Dass and Man Singh lest they should thwart his designs. Unfortunately, a great gun in the fort burst and did immense damage to war materials. Moreover, Shahbaz had captured the outlets of Kelwara and Nadol, cut off the supplies of the fort and had ascended the heights. Finding further resistance hopeless the Rana secretely left the place, but the fort did not surrender till 5 June after a desperate resistance. Next day, Gogunda was taken with Udaipur. Hearing that the Rana had moved towards Idur and Banswara, Shahbaz Khan followed him in pursuit. He, however, established a chain of 50 *thanas* in the hills and thirty-five in the plains to watch the country from Udaipur to Pur Mandal.

The resources of the Rana were put to so much strain that his future seemed to be entirely dark. He was literally chased from hill to hill and valley to valley, suffering untold hardships. But for his intense love of

independence and faith in the righteousness of his cause, he would have broken down. His opportunity at last came when Shahbaz Khan was removed from Mewar to Bihar to quell the rebellion that had broken out there and assumed serious dimensions. Although Mewar was not pacified, it could not be a source of serious anxiety to Akbar. Its importance as a decisive factor in the history of Rajputana had definitely declined. Its affairs could be dealt with on a local basis in view of serious developments in the empire.

From 1579 to 1585 Akbar's attention was engrossed in quelling the mutiny in eastern United Provinces(now Uttar Pradesh) Bihar, Bengal and Gujrat ; and in repelling the invasion of the Punjab by his brother Mirza Hakim. In 1585 Hakim died. His death made the problem of the north-western frontier so serious and complicated that Akbar had to shift his capital to Lahore in 1585 and stay there till 1598. Before Akbar could free himself from the affairs of the north-west, trouble in the Deccan started with the death of Burhan-ul-mulk in 1595. It was not till the death of Abdullah Khan Uzbek in 1598 that Akbar could think of turning his attention seriously from the Punjab. Thus from 1579 to 1598, Akbar was busy, with all his resources in solving problems of great moment before which the tiny affairs of Mewar dwindled into insignificance.

Rana Pratap was not slow to take advantage of the situation. Since his resources were very limited his progress was not spectacular. The punitive forces sent against him from time to time under the guidance of the governor of Ajmer made his task all the more difficult. Military operations went on in a ding-dong way. In October 1585 the Rana was all but captured. He had to bide his time till Raja Jagannath was ordered to leave Ajmer for Kashmir (1587). Thence-forward the Mughals decided to hold the important strategic places like Ajmer, Chitor and Mandalgarh and relax their efforts in other directions. The Rana, it is said, succeeded in recovering the major portion of his kingdom. He ruled for twenty-five years ; most of the time

he spent in ceaselless struggle to preserve the traditions of his great house and freedom. He died prematurely at the age of fifty-one due to a fatal strain. But he left behind a story and a record in history so glorious as to inspire freedom-loving people everywhere.

CHAPTER XII

AKBAR CONSOLIDATES

I. ARMY

Since the overthrow of Bairam Khan, Akbar had begun to show keen interest in the affairs of his subjects. But it was his habit to proceed in every matter cautiously till he had fully acquainted himself with problems and their solutions. So far back as the year 1561, he moved incognito in the streets of Agra among the people, ascetics and *faqirs*. It was of his own accord that in 1562 he took the momentous step of entering into systematic matrimonial alliances with the Rajputs. It was, however, doubtful if at that time he was very clear in his mind as to the policy itself, and its far-reaching consequences. Most likely he was then keen to forge the closest links with the Rajputs as a set-off against the Afghans and the faithless nobles of his Court. But when in 1563 he abolished the pilgrim taxes at Mathura (levied at the sacred places of the Hindus) and announced in 1564 the abolition of the *jizya* on the Hindus, it became clear that he was not acting without a definite purpose and plan. Further reforms might have followed but the outbreak of the Uzbek rebellion with all its manifold complications diverted his whole attention to wars and conquests. It was not till the conquest of Gujrat (1573) that Akbar could turn his attention seriously to the multifarious problems of government. The period between 1573 and 1580 or rather 1582 of his reign was the most important one, for it saw all kinds of reforms being attempted and the state policy in all its aspects fully matured. Akbar had travelled from Bihar to Gujrat and had acquired personal knowledge of the affairs of the various constitutents of his empire and of the condition of his army. He had chalked out by 1573 a definite policy to overhaul the revenue system and reorganize the army. The actual

execution was, however, delayed by two years on account of the developments in Bengal. In 1575, the first announcement was made by which payments to officers and government servants were to be made in cash instead of *jagirs* ; the military ranks were to be re-arranged, and the *Dagh*, viz. the system of branding military horses and cattle was revived and enforced. The operation of these orders was extended to Gujrat in 1578 and to Malwa in 1579. By these new regulations the officers were required to bring their horses with accoutrements to the *Bakhshis* and get them duly branded. They were to pass muster at least once a year or when ordered to go on active service. The number of personal retainers and equipments of each officer was to be fixed personally by the Emperor. It is obvious that these reforms were intended to create a well-organized standing army in the long run. But the greedy nobles cheated the *Bakhshis* by borrowing branded horses for the period of muster or their duty at the palace. It was, therefore, finally decided to fix separate marks for the regiments of each noble, and to punish with heavy fines any delay in getting the horses branded.

Akbar had inherited the institutions of the Arabs on one hand and of the Mongols on the other. The institutions of the Caliphs, Chingiz Khan and Timur offered him a rich material to draw upon in organizing the civil and military administration of his own empire. Moreover, as a practical man he was likely to make the best of the systems which prevailed in India. Thus, in fixing the grades of officers and the classification of soldiers he seems to have been inspired largely by the principles which were adopted by the Abbasids in the Roman-Byzantine fashion and recommended both by Chingiz Khan and Timur. Their army was organized on a decimal system. The lowest unit was of 10, then came 100, 1,000 and 1,00,000. Between 10 and 100 the Abbasids had a unit of fifty. Timur had introduced ranks of one thousand, two, three, four, up to twelve, but from seven to twelve thousand

usually the command was given to his own sons. His eldest son Jahangir Mirza held the rank of twelve thousand.

In India, as early as in the time of Balban, the decimal system was established by the Turks. From a *Sar-i-Khail* who had ten horsemen under him to officers commanding 100, 1,000, 10,000 and even 1,00,000 are mentioned. In between these were officers over fifty. In those days a commander of one thousand was called an *Amir* and of ten thousand a *Malik*. Islam Shah Sur had also somewhat similar organization, but he had further introduced some intermediary ranks like those of 150 and 500. Thus, the framework and the principle on which Akbar proposed to build his system were already in existence. Akbar, in his characteristic manner, wished to divide the *mansabs* into sixty-six "as the value of the letters in the name of Allah". The *mansabs* actually given in the *Ain* were only thirty-three, but a perusal of the list shows that many of the intermediary grades mentioned were dropped either because they were minute enough or not to be included in a general and manageable list. It is equally possible that the whole plan could not be implemented till the time the *Ain* was written or was modified for practical reasons. The *mansabs* ranged from ten to twelve thousand. *Mansabdars* from 500 to 2,500 were called *Amirs*, over 2,500 were styled *Amir-i-Azam*. The highest military title was first *Khan-i-Zaman* and later *Khan-i-Khanan* which was conferred on one individual at a time. *Mansabs* above five thousand were, with a few exceptions, reserved for the princes of the royal blood, and no officer ever rose to a rank of over seven thousand. The policy of Akbar was that all should begin from the lower rung of the ladder and rise by their merit or services to the state.

One of the most disputed points about the military organization of the Mughals is the word *sawar* as distinguished from *zat* . Blochman held that the word *zat* indicated the brevet rank, while *sawar* indicated the actual number of horses under the command of an officer. Thus, an officer of 1,000 *zat* and 500 *sawar* held a rank of 1,000 but actually commanded only 500 horse. Irvine on the other hand maintained that the '*sawar*' rank

had nothing to do with the actual number normally commanded by an officer, but that it was an honour and indicated the actual number of horse over and above those of the '*zat.*' Irvine's view is supported by good evidence, but it is doubful if it holds true for the reign of Akbar. A new suggestion was made in a paper read before the Historical Records Commission (in 1923) according to which it was not till 1603-4 that the *sawar's* rank came in view. Its scope was then very limited. Probably it did not mean anyhthing more than the indication of the allowance given to an officer over and above his ordinary salary. The scale of allowance was at the rate of Rs. 2/- per '*sawar*'. Thus 500 '*sawars*' would mean an allowance of Rs. 1,000/- per mensem, nothing more or less. According to this view '*zat*' indicates the rank for which an officer received his normal salary, and '*sawar*' will mean an extra allowance. A lot has been written since then, but nothing useful has been added or any new light thrown. As to the actual number under command of an officer it was at first determined by the Emperor himself, but later on was guided by the "*Dah-Bisti*" or the "ten-twenty rule" by which a *mansabdar* of 10 was required to keep 20 horses. *Do aspah* means a horseman having two horses and *yek aspah* means a horseman with a single horse. *Nim-aspah* or one horse for two men is also sometime mentioned.

The *mansabdars*, except in the case of Indian hereditary Rajas or *Zamindars*, depended for their existence on the sweet will of the sovereign. They were, therefore, as much capable of loyalty as of treachery. The absence of the hereditary factor in *Mansabdari* system has been construed, on the one hand, as an approach to socialism or even communism, and on the other, deplored for its ineffectiveness in restraining the autocracy of the Mughal Emperor. Both these views are fanciful and futile. The fact is that the system had evolved, in the course of a long history, from the nomadic life and the military requirements of the middle ages. It was inherited as a socio-political system which had to be taken as it was. Hence no credit or discredit can be attached to any ruler for its existence. The *man-*

sabdar were paid very well. For example, the monthly salary of a third class officer of 100 was 500 rupees ; of a 1,000 officer, Rs. 4,400 ; of a 5,000 officer, Rs. 28,000. Out of the salary about half was spent in maintaining the standard equipment of their rank. The other half was left as their own share. Thus an officer of 100 got Rs. 250 ; of 1,000 got Rs. 2,200 and of five thousand 14, 000 a month. The value of a rupee in those days, on the most conservative calculation, was not less than seven times that in 1914, and twenty-one times as much as 1951. Simple multiplication will show the incredibly high salaries which the officers and even the soldiers got in the Mughal regime. It appears that they shared in full the political, social and economic advantages with the sovereign, and formed an integral part of the total make-up of the ruling society. They shared, therefore, the strength and weakness of the social order as it then existed. For some time the system had worked fairly efficiently and then withered away as it was an exotic plant on the Indian soil. In Akbar's time it was at its best, for whatever it was worth. Akbar tried, with some measure of success, to weave the Turko-Mongol system with the hereditary Rajput organization into a common pattern.

Besides the *mansabdars* there was a separate class of soldiers known as the "*Ahdis*". The word '*Ahdi*' means 'single'. They are commonly known as "gentlemen-troopers". They were paid at a very high rate ; sometimes an '*ahdi*' got as much as Rs. 500 per month, while the salary of an ordinary horseman ranged from 12 to 25 rupees. At first an *Ahdi* kept up to 8 horses, but later on 5 was the maximum number of horses required to be maintained. The *Ahdis* were mustered every four months for review. The actual number of '*Ahdis*' varied from time to time. At one time their number was 12,000. The '*Ahdis*' had nothing to do with *mansabdars* except on the field under express orders of the Emperor. They were under the direct orders of the Emperor and had a separate *Diwan* and *Baskhi*. Thieir distinctive number was 9.

The Mughals, like the Turks, relied largely on

cavalry, which formed the main strength of their army. Especially in the plains, cavalry was most effective in warfare because it could mobilize fast and possessed better striking power. The use of guns in India had not become so common as to neutralize these advantages. The cavalry was the backbone of the military organization of the empire. The advantages of the infantry were, however, not quite unknown. In the rugged and hilly parts of the country the infantry often proved of greater advantage than the cavalry. Sher Shah also had infantry regiments in his service. Akbar seems to have laid greater emphasis on the infantry than Sher Shah. For fighting purpose the infantry was divided into two bands—the *Banduqchis.* and the *Shamsherbaz.* There were 12,000 *Banduqchis* or matchlockmen in Akbar's service. They were placed under the command of *Darogha Topchian.* The *Shamsher* troops consisted of several regiments, each distinguished from the other by the kind of weapon it used, such as swords, daggers, knives and even cudgels.

Besides the troops of the *Mansabdars* and the *Ahdis* which belonged to the regular army there were the irregular troops or militia. They were supplied by the Rajas whenever required. It was estimated that if all the Rajas sent their full quota the number would swell to about 44 lacs. These troops were organized according to the principles followed by individual princes and were commanded by their own Rajas. Ordinarily they received no stipends from the Imperial government and were, therefore, not required to submit to the military regulations which governed the regular army.

Akbar was very fond of elephants. They were used both for transport and war purposes . If handled carefully, they decided the fate of battles ; sometime, however, when scared away they proved a source of danger. Thousands of elephants were trained for war. The Emperor's own stud counted 1,000 elephants of superior class. Great care was taken in training and feeding them. It was believed that about 50,000 elephants were maintained in the empire. They were , of course, distributed in different parts of the empire. Of these

about 5,000 were trained for war.

Since the invasion of Babar, the use of artillery steadily came in fashion in northern India. Both Humayun and Sher Shah had parks of artillery, but Akbar bestowed more care and attention on it. Under his inspiration heavy cannons of brass and iron, capable of discharging balls weighing 666 lbs. each, were cast. These heavy guns were, however, not portable ; hence a large number of guns suitable for sieges and naval operations, but portable with comparative ease, were cast. But his great contribution to the artillery of the time was the introduction of light, detachable guns which could be carried on light carriages by a single elephant, camel or man, thereby increasing the mobility of the artillery. It is difficult to say what was the actual number of guns, but it must have been very large. Excepting the Turkish artillery, Akbar's was second to none in Asia, for in Akbar's time it had reached the highest point of efficiency possible.

Akbar's was a land-empire. It was not till the conquest of Gujrat that his empire touched the sea. By that time the Portuguese had made themselves masters of the seas and kept a jealous eye on the increase of fleet of any of the Indian powers. It was not possible to develop a strong fleet capable of commanding the seas without coming into collision with them and thereby injuring India's foreign trade. There was little chance of success until the Deccan came under the sway of the Emperor. The difficulties of Akbar and Bahadur Shah can be imagined if we recall the failure of Shivaji to build up a navy in spite of his best efforts. One of the highest ambitions of Akbar was to banish the Portuguese piracy from the Arabian seas, but before he could be in a position to take up the matter seriously, he died.

For river warfare, with which the empire was immediately concerned, there were quite efficient flotillas. They were specially maintained in Bengal, Bihar and Sindh. To increase their efficiency Akbar built monster-boats of 105 and 111 feet, capable of carrying a weight of over 368 tons. But boats of such a huge size were

not many, as the rivers were not suitable for their navigation. Shipyards built at Lahore and Allahabad turned out very satisfactory. Had Akbar lived longer he would have surely built up a navy at any cost. The fact, however, remains that in his time there was no navy worth the name.

One of the most noteworthy features of the Mughal military organization was the Camp. The Turks and the Mughals, being nomads, had developed the camp equipment to a remarkable pitch of efficiency. But for these camps , even rulers with the best of intentions would have failed to prevent the army from plundering, ravaging, and causing unnecessary acts of violence. The Mughal camp was a huge affair, specially when the Emperor was on the march. Set up in the form of a city the Imperial camp occupied a space of 5 to 20 miles or even more, and contained about one to two lacs of men. This moving camp was equal in size to any of the great cities of Europe of that time and was certainly bigger than London. It undoubtedly redounds to the administrative ability and efficiency of the Mughals that such a large mass of men was kept in perfect order and discipline. "We lay as secure", wrote Jourdain in the time of Jahangir, "as if we had been in our own houses. I never saw a better government than there was in the camp, and plenty of all things." So carefully and admirably was the camp laid out that men found little difficulty in moving from place to place as if one "continued still in fixed and standing habitations". The most remarkable thing was the quickness with which it was set up. It took no more than four hours !

The difficulties of transport and commissariat were many before the invention of mechanical locomotion. In the camps everything of common requirements could be had at very reasonable rates. The foodstuffs were supplied by the *banjaras* who followed military camps. The nobles and big officials usually carried with them food supplies capable of lasting for several days, but the common soldiers and followers had to purchase things from day to day in the *Urdu* (bazar). In his campaign

against Hakim, Akbar personally examined the quality of foodstuffs brought for sale in the camp-markets. The system of supplies was very natural and most economical and seems to have worked quite satisfactorily. The cases when supplies broke down were few and far between. In such an emergency the government sent supplies and when this could not be possible, recourse was had to foraging. But such occasions were surprisingly few at a time when they were the order of the day in Europe.

Most of the European writers, and following them some Indian also, have spoken of the Mughal army as "intrinsically weak" and a shade better than an "armed rabble". These observations have obviously been made in a hurry and certainly do not hold good in the case of Akbar's army. It was even superior to that of Babar which had been pronouced as "efficent and successful" and hardly inferior to the Ottoman army of Sulaiman the Magnificent, which was admittedly one of the best of its kind in Europe.

II. THE REVENUE AFFAIRS

Like the military reforms, revenue affairs also attracted the attention of the Emperor after the Gujrat conquest, and several experiments were made. The system of Sher Shah had gone to ruins in the confusion which followed the death of Islam Shah. On his return, Humayun reverted to the policy of dividing the country among the nobles and officials. There was no clear line of demarcation drawn between the crown-land and the *jagir*-lands, and the finances were in a state of utter confusion. No substantial improvements seem to have been made by the government of Bairam Khan. In his time the demand rates were fixed annually by the Central Government on the basis of the returns of yield and the prices current in a *pargana* or a group of *parganas*. This system was probably inherited from the Surs. Its defects were, that the demand varied with the yield and prices from year to year and the work of collection

remained in suspense till the headquarters could send the demand rates. For these reasons the realization of revenue was often unavoidably delayed to the great inconvenience of both the officials and the ryot, and the revenues remained fluctuating. Moreover, the system of collecting returns of prices and yield was expensive and unreliable.

In 1560 Abdul Majid Asaf Khan became the Finance Minister. His period coincided with that of Bairam Khan's rebellion and the subsequent unrest. To keep the officers in good humour, he wrote down imaginary figures so that they might feel that the *jagirs* given to them yielded substantial income. This was indeed a gigantic fraud, which might have served the political object for the time being, but proved, in the long run, clearly disadvantageous to the State, to *jagirdars* and above all to the ryot. In 1563 Etmad Khan (Bahlul Malik), who had served under Sher Shah and Islam Shah, was made the Finance Minister. His inquiries showed that besides the unreliable entries in the financial records, the absence of a clear line of demarcation between the crown-lands and the *jagir*-lands, and also the unsettled state of currency, gave rise to serious troubles. He, therefore, separated the crown-lands from the *jagir*-lands; ordered the coins to be accepted at their face value; and reorganized the finance and treasury offices. In 1564 Muzaffar Khan was made the Imperial *Diwan*. He got disgusted with Asaf Khan's fraud and appointed ten *Qanungos* to collect the actual figure of yield from the registers of local *Qanungos*. On the basis of these returns a fresh rent-roll known as *jamai hal hasil* was prepared. This roll too was not thoroughly reliable, based as it was on second-hand information supplied by local *Qanungos* whose probity was extremely questionable.

In 1568 Shihabuddin Ahmad Khan was made the *Diwan* of the crown-lands. He found that the method of collecting annually the figures of yield and prices, besides being expensive and defective, had become unmanageable with the growth of the empire, and that

so long as there was no proper machinery the system could not work satisfactorily. He, therefore, abolished the system of *Zabti-Harsala* or the fixing of demand rates annually and established the *Nasq* system, which involved a mutual settlement between the government and the *zamindars* or holders of lands. It was a sort of farming. This system was arbitrary and far from being satisfactory. In 1570-71 Muzaffar Khan was again called to the Finance Office, and he lost no time in reverting to his system of determining revenue rates by "calculation and appraisement."

After the conquest of Gujrat and Bengal, Akbar gave his personal attention to revenue matters. The policy of the abolition of *jagirs* forced the reorganization. In 1575 a set of officials was sent out to survey the land and collect other necessary information. For measurement, instead of using the *Tanab* or rope, Akbar introduced the use of bamboo rods linked together by iron rings, which could not expand or shrink like ropes. The survey operation did not extend to all parts of the empire. Only the Punjab, the United Provinces, Ajmer, Malwa, eastern and southern Gujrat were brought under survey. The hill-states of the Rajas, the Rajput principalities, Bihar, Bengal and parts of Multan seem to have been left out. In the crown-lands of the empire were appointed 182 *Karoris*. Each *Karori* was to have his jurisdiction over a territory yielding one *Kror* of *Tankas* or 2,500,00 rupees. He was required to settle the boundaries of land under his jurisdiction, to record the different sources of revenue, and the amount derived from each of them and each kind of crop. He was assisted by a *Karkun* and a *Fotadar* (treasurer). The demand in cash was determined by the local prices.

By the year 1580 a workable mass of data was collected in the office of the Central Government. Although Raja Todar Mal was the Chief Finance Minister, the actual execution of reforms was done by his colleague, Khwaja Shah Mansur. The first thing that was done was to group the *sarkars* into provinces. The empire was thus divided into 12 *Subas*—Multan

Lahore, Delhi, Agra, Allahabad, Oudh, Bihar, Bengal including the conquered parts of Orissa, Malwa, Ajmer, Gujrat and nominally Kabul. In each of these *subas*, a *Diwan* was appointed to look after the provincial revenue affairs.

But the most important reform, for which Akbar deserves especial credit, was the introduction of the *Dah-Salah* or the 'Ten-year' schedule of rates. Such *parganas* in each province as were homogeneous in productivity were grouped into assessment circles, and a schedule of rate was fixed for each of them. Although the basis of assessment was the usual one-third of the produce in kind, yet for commuting the demand in cash an average of prices was struck from the prices believed to have prevailed or recorded during the ten years preceding 1580. The demand in cash was fixed, that is to say, it was not left to the fluctuations of yields and prices as before. It will be utterly wrong to presume that the *Dah-Salah* system involved anything like the decennial settlement or settlement after every ten years. Nor can it be called a permanent settlement because the state gave no guarantee for its immutability. In practice, however, the arrangement was intended to prevail indefinitely. It was not disturbed at least till the end of Akbar's reign.

The advantages of the *Dah-Salah* settlement were obvious. It simplified the system of assessment so much that no difficulty was felt by the revenue collectors in applying them and starting collection without waiting for instructions from higher authorities. It was convenient to the state, for the officials were no longer bothered with sifting the enormous returns of yields and prices and calculating the demand. Besides, it enabled them to guess fairly approximately the revenue of the government in cash as soon as the returns of the land actually sown were available. The system was welcomed by the cultivator, for he knew well what revenue he would be required to pay for the crop sown, and thus was freed from the strain of uncertainty, and the fraud of revenue officials. Moreover, it appeared to him just and fair,

in as much as it tranferred "from the state to the peasantry the benefit and the burden of fluctuations in prices". It gave him additional confidence when the government promised to consider reduction in state demand should the crops suffer heavily from unforeseen or natural calamities. In fact, provision was made "for automatic remission in case of crop failure". The settlement finally fixed by the government applied to the whole country both to the crown-land and assignments.

Land was classified according to the continuity of cultivation. A piece of land which was cultivated continuously was styled as *Polaj* ; that which was left fallow for three or four years was termed *Chachar* ; and if it remained uncultivated for five years or more, it was classed as *Banjar.* The first two and the *Parati* lands were further subdivided into three classes ; good, bad and 'middling'. The average of these classes was declared as the share of the State. If the *Parati* land lay fallow for one year only, it was assessed at the rate of the *Polaj* when under actual cultivation ; if it lay fallow for two years it was charged at three-fourths of the demand rate in the first year and full in the second. The policy of Akbar was to encourage the cultivators to raise the lower quality of land to the higher, and extend cultivation of superior crops. Therefore, he taxed the *Chachar* and *Banjar* classes of land lightly and progressively till, in the course of a few years, it came to the *Polaj* standard when normal rates were charged. Consideration was also shown for those crops which required a larger outlay and greater care and for them the scales of taxes were different.

Owing to the use of technical terminology which has not yet been finally settled, it is just fair to state the views generally held on the subject. Broadly speaking, there were three systems of the collection of revenue: the *Ghallabakhsha*, the *Nasq* and the *Zabt.* The *Ghallabakhsha* was probably "the original Indian system under which a share of crop was taken by the ruler". Although it could be adopted, if people wanted it, in any part of the empire, it was ordinarily prevalent in lower Sindh, part of Kabul, and especially in Qandahar, and Kashmir. The

Nasq was also "a well-known and old established mode of assessement". It involved no measurement of land, no division of crops, but was a pure and simple agreement—probably based on a rough and ready estimate, in a summary fashion—between the government and the holders of land, either tenants or *zamindars*. In the former case it would be *ryotwari* and in the latter *zamindari*. It prevailed in Bengal, Kathiawar and portions of Gujrat. The *Zabti* "laid down that each plot of land sown should be charged with a fixed assessment determined according to the nature of the crop". It had obvious advantages to the state in as much as it was largely realized in cash and eliminated the uncertainties due to variations in the yield. It was, therefore, favoured more by the Government, but it was not forced upon the unwilling tenants. As a rule, it prevailed in Bihar, Allahabad, Malwa, Oudh, Agra, Lahore, Delhi and Multan. It should not, however, be presumed that the prevalence of one system in a province precluded the existence of others ; others might exist side by side in a province if the local conditions so required. Convenience of the peasants and regard for strong local traditions were not sacrificed for the sake of uniformity.

Akbar's assessment, though not severe, was also not light. But right through these centuries Akbar has been remembered as the father of the people. This is because he evolved a system which had an element of permanence and could be understood by the cultivators. His demand rates were fixed and thus saved the tenants as well as the state from the anxiety caused by uncertainty and suspense. Moreover, Akbar went further than the Surs in as much as he relieved the peasants of a number of petty and vexatious taxes and cesses. Besides the *jiziya* and the *zakat* and the pilgrim taxes, he abolished taxes on trees, sale of cattle, oxen, salt, markets, turbans, lodgings, hide, oils, blankets, weighing, purchase and sale of houses, permission to reap harvest, and strictly forbade fees charged for *Tahsildars*, *Daroghas*, treasurers and money-testers. Without taking the statement as literally true, it may be

presumed that these remissions must have brought a fair measure of relief to the poor people. The *Kotwals*, and the *Amalguzars* were instructed to see that these orders were properly carried out and cases of corruption, when discovered, were duly punished. Akbar made remissions of taxes in cases of famines, caused either by natural calamities or by serious dislocation of prices, and was always ready to make advances to the poor cultivators to enable them to purchase seed, implements and cattle ; and helped them to have a steady start in life. His policy of preserving useful cattle, such as, cows, buffaloes, camels and oxen, and maintaining free pastures must have been welcomed by the peasants. Above all, the establishment of the *ryotwari* system in the Royal and State demesne and a uniform agrarian policy in the empire would have come as a boon to the *ryots*, who must have heaved a sigh of relief on being freed from the caprices and whims of the *zamindars* and *jagirdars*.

III. SAYURGHAL

Since the foundation of the Muslim State, one of its recognized functions was to support the learned scholars, men engaged in spiritual pursuits, indigents, decrepits, widows, and respectable men without any employment. The state either gave them help in cash, or in land, or both. Help given in cash was called *Wazifa*, while land bestowed for such purposes was known as *Milk*, *Madadi-Maash* or *Sayurghal*.

Large areas of land were given away as *Madadi-Maash* by early rulers. For example, in Gujrat alone, one-sixth of the entire revenue of that kingdom was devoted to such purposes and still the demand was growing. The grateful recipients of such favours naturally prayed, and, if necessary, actively worked for the interest of the ruler or the dynasty from whom they got their grants. Mahmud Khalji of Malwa used to say that it was difficult to conquer Gujrat "because it had one army for day and another for night". Whenever, therefore, a new dynasty came to power, it had to confirm these

grants and make its own contribution, if it cared to do so. Sher Shah Sur himself had to cancel the old grants and issue them again in his own name. The Surs, on the whole, were as liberal as the Lodis in making such grants.

When the Mughals came to India they had also to make such grants. This work was entrusted to a separate department which was presided over by the *Sadr*. In the early days of Akbar, the *Sadr* department was a law unto itself and the *Sadr* enjoyed enormous power and prestige. The policy of Shaikh Gadai, during the period of Bairam's regency, was to deprive the Afghans of their grants and transfer them to his own favourites. In 1565 Shaikh Abdunnabi became the *Sadr*, on the recommendation of Muzaffar Khan, the Finance Minister. He was instructed to go into the question of *Sayurghals*, and, if necessary, to make a redistribution with the help of the Finance Minister. At first, he deprived many Afghans of their grants and annexed their lands to the crown-lands, but later on, when his influence with the Emperor was well established "he conferred whole worlds of *waqfs*, *inams* and *idrarat*", and threw into shade the extravagance or generosity of all his predecessors.

The *Sayurghal* affairs once more came into prominence when the *Karoris* were sent out to make inquiries (1575). They were instructed not to recognize any grant unless it had been countersigned by the *Sadr*. This measure compelled the grantees to go to the capital to have their grants signed by the *Sadr*. Of course, it must have put them to great inconveniences, involving long and tedious journeys. There was a rush on the Sadr department. The easy-going Abdunnabi unfortunately left too much in the hands of one Abdur Rasul who was a dishonest and corrupt man, and did not show sufficient respect to the Shaikhs and eminent scholars, either for the pride of his power or want of sufficient time. Abdunnabi did not show his usual generosity probably because he was instructed by the Finance Minister not to be too lavish in grants. He sometimes even curtailed the original grants, if very

large, but compensated for this strictness by bestowing grants upon new men, even though they were men of no renown. "Never in the time of any Emperor had such absolute power been given into the hand of any *Sadr*." In all likelihood he was following this policy under the instruction of the Emperor, who without meaning any insult to any holder wanted to make room for poor deserving men, with as little further burden on the exchequer as possible.

The volume of grievances against the *Sadr* department became so serious that Akbar ordered Farid Bukhari to institute an inquiry into the matter. It was found that the distribution had been very haphazard and while still there were large grant-holders there was a large number of deserving men who got nothing. Another evil was that owing to the mixing up the crown, *jagir* and *Sayurghal*-lands, there were constant quarrels between the *Sayurghal*-holders and officials. Lastly, some people held lands at different places by no good title but fraud. To remedy these evils, the Emperor ordered that lands for *Sayurghal* purposes should be set apart in every *pargana* and that no grantee should be allowed to hold lands at different places. Shaikh Abdunnabi was removed from the office of *Sadr Kul* which was given to Sultan Khwaja. To relieve the pressure of work at the central office which these changes involved and to save the inconveniences to the people, one *Sadr* was appointed for the Punjab and another for Gujrat. The Emperor, however, himself undertook to revise the grants of big *Sayurghal*-holders and ordered that the holders of over 500 *bighas* of land should appear personally before him. Akbar managed to find time to see these grant-holders individually, and fixed upon each a grant according to the impression created upon him of the ability, necessity and qualification of the grantee. The cases of old men were, however, treated with much consideration. Those who failed to appear were punished by being deprived of three-fifths of the excess over 100 *bighas*, but this rule was not to apply to Irani and Turani women.

In 1580, the empire was divided into *subas*, in each of which one *Sadr* was appointed. To keep control over these *Sadrs*, the empire was divided into six circles and one supervisor was appointed over each.

The critics of Akbar have criticised very much his *Sayurghal* policy. According to them, its objects were to destroy the power of the *Sadr*, who had grown very powerful, to wreak vengeance on the orthodox Muslims who were a serious obstacle in the way of his religious innovation, and to replenish the coffers of the exchequer. There is hardly any proof to show that any particular class of religious opinion was, as a whole, more severely treated than others, or that any special favour was shown to those who were less orthodox. It is entirely baseless to say that the exchequer gained anything out of the change except that it was hard-pressed to meet the growing demand of new men. However great the power of the *Sadr* might have been, he could be appointed or dismissed by the Emperor at his will and there could be no difficulty for Akbar to place a man in that office absolutely subservient to him. The decentralization of the work was intended to bring more efficiency and better supervision and to avoid the inconveniences of long travels and litigation to the small holders. The *Sayurghal* reforms were closely connected with revenue reforms. Both went almost side by side. Akbar's policy aimed at distributing charity more evenly and penalising frauds and idleness severely.

IV. RELIGION

Akbar possessed a complex personality, but a distinct individuality. He had inherited the daring and broadmindedness of Babar, the patience and mysticism of his father, and the religious-mindedness of his mother. Like all the Timurides, he was inspired by the glorious achievements of Chingiz Khan, who believed that it had fallen to his lot to establish armed peace and justice for all people and cultural units irrespective of their country, colour and creed. The mystic liberalism of Humayun,

his culture and generosity, were also present in the blood of Akbar. From his childhood, he had been mixing with Mughal, Turkish, Afghan and Persian nobles, and had thus escaped the contamination of a parochial outlook, which renders men incapable of understanding the views and ways of others. Among his tutors were the Turkish Sunnis like Bayazid and Munim Khan, and the Shias, Bairam Khan and Mir Abdul Latif Qazwini, who was considered a Sunni in Persia, and a Shia in India. Qazwini had imbued Akbar's mind with the Sufic view of life and enriched his memory with verses and odes from Maulana Rum and Hafiz. Even during the period of the regency, Akbar had begun meeting the Shaikhs and saints with a reverential attitude; and after shaking off Bairam, he mixed quite freely, often incognito, with Shaikhs, *Faqirs*, *Yogis* and *Sadhus*. As time rolled on, he grew more and more sedate, taciturn and contemplative. In his serious undertakings he used to seek the blessings not only of the living but the dead saints as well. Saint-worship was the main creed of the masses of Central Asia, and, to a considerable measure, of those of Persia. He was particularly attached to the Chishtian order and Shaikh Salim.

The spiritual movements both of the Hindus and Muslims from the 13th to the 16th century were attempting to direct the mind of the people from the formal aspect of religion to its underlying spiritualism, from the outer to the inner, from professions to actual living. With all their superstitions and obscurantism; jargons and antics, they laid emphasis on the psychical, psychological and ethical bases of religion, as distinguished from the purely formal, physical, ritualistic and social. Their approach to spiritual and religious questions brought to light a considerable measure of common experience, basic religious factors, beliefs and faiths which could be made the bases of a philosophy of common sense, catholicity and fraternity. Their influence on social life and the masses was fairly appreciable, but on politics only faintly perceptible. The necessity for a policy of

non-interference in religious matters of the non-Muslims was also being forced steadily upon the attention of the Sultans and Shahs, and had been adopted in a varying measure by many of them. A policy of enlightened and active sympathy for, and help to, all truly religious and spiritual movements had sometimes been attempted in provincial kingdoms, but never by the rulers of Delhi and Agra. It was Akbar, who, from the very beginning of his reign, gradually accepted a policy of dynamic toleration and active sympathy for religious and spiritual movements. His mental make-up, political experiences and social alignments and marriages, all combined to invite him towards it. In spite of his multifarious military and political engagements and activities, he managed to find time for introspection, contemplation and communion. However, he did not normally interfere with the religious policy followed by the *Ulama* under the leadership of Shaikh Abdunnabi and Abdullah Sultanpuri, which was anything but tolerant. They were left free to persecute persons whom they considered heretics, schismatics, Shia, or Mehdavi. But Akbar was critically observing the developments all round and evolving in his mind another policy and plan.

In 1573 when Akbar returned to Sikri from his Gujrat campaign, Shaikh Mubarak requested the Emperor to give a lead to his people in matters religious as he was doing in those of politics. It amounted to asking Akbar to assume the role of *Khalifa.* Akbar did not at once jump at the suggestion. He gave no reply but became pensive. As usual he would not take a decisive action till he had carefully prepared every detail and was quite ready to see it through. With a view to qualify himself fully for the delicate and difficult task, he took up seriously the study of the philosophy and thought of the chief religions represented in India. He began with the Muslim religion in the most methodical manner. Dogma ethics, philosophy and mysticism, traditions, law and institutions, history and biography were taken up so that he might get an all-comprehensive view in proper perspective as well as

in details. Standard works were read out and expounded to him by some of the most eminent scholars in India. Among them the names of Shaikh Abdunnabi, Abul Faiz, Abul Fath, Naqib Khan and Shaikh Tajuddin deserve notice.

In 1575 Akbar gave orders for the construction of a building to be called the Ibadat Khana, which was intended for the gatherings of selected representatives of theologians, lawyers and mystics. It was completed in a short time. It was divided into four quarters—the western was reserved for the Saiyids, the southern, for the *Ulama*, the northern, for the Shaikhs and mystics and the eastern, for those nobles and courtiers of Akbar who were reputed for their scholarship and intellectual accomplishments. For over two years, discourses in it seem to have been confined to persons of Islamic religion. Every Thursday night and sometimes in the morning of Friday, Akbar "listened to the discourses of scholars assembled there and conversed with them on religious and spiritual topics" Frequently he observed, "My sole object, oh wise *Mullas*, is to ascertain truth, to find out and disclose the principles of genuine religion and to trace its divine origin ; take care, therefore, that through the influence of your human passions, you are not induced to conceal the truth, say nothing contrary to the almighty decree." The proceedings of the Ibadat Khana were far from smooth and dignified. Stormy discussions leading to unpleasantness were kept under some restraint only by the presence of the Emperor. Instead of developing better understanding and appreciation, they led to bickerings and personal recriminations ; and Akbar was disappointed at the behaviour even of some of the well-known scholars ; and sober and elderly people began to drop out in disgust.

Akbar seems to have felt that the presence of scholars of non-Muslim religions might produce some sobering influence ; so he opened the Ibadat Khana to Christians, Zoroastrians, Hindus, Jains, Sabeans and the atheists also in 1578. Their arrival led to discussions even about questions on which there was no basic

difference among the Muslims. Questions like the finality of the Quranic revelations, the Prophethood of Muhammad, resurrection, the nature of Divinity, the conception of the Unity of God on which all the Muslim creeds and sects held almost common views, were subjected to criticism, to the horror of the pious or rather orthodox Mussalmans. The Ibadat Khana might have grown into a real Parliament of Religions, but unfortunately it degenerated into a debating hall and a cockpit of conflicting creeds and sects. At times the disputants flew into rage, threatened one another, and might have come to blows, but for the restraining presence of the Emperor. The Christian priests, particularly Monserrate, gave an ugly exhibition of bad taste when they attacked Islam in rude and offensive language and used foul words against it founder. They believed that in doing so they were displaying their courage and religious ardour. It, however, did not produce a good impression on the Emperor, who sent them a message to be more discreet and dignified in their expression, but gave them police protection. The proceedings of the Ibadat Khana led to all kinds of rumours and misapprehensions not only among the outsiders, but also amongst those who participated in them. The patience and open-mindedness of Akbar were construed in a variety of ways by persons of different faiths. Instead of bringing credit the Ibadat Khana brought growing discredit to Akbar.

Akbar, however, did not feel satisfied with what he could gather in the Ibadat Khana. His nightly meetings with scholars who read out original and standard works, and the patience and perseverance with which he listened to their expositions continued as usual. In four or five years he had enriched remarkably his mind and acquired a vast store of knowledge. "Among books of renown there are few that are not read in His Majesty's assembly hall, and there are no historical facts of the past ages or curiosities of science or interesting points of philosophy with which he is unacquainted." This statement of Abdul Fazl has been

fully confirmed by Akbar's most ruthless critic, Abdul Qadir Badauni, who says: "Learned men of various kinds and from every country and professors of many different religions and creeds assembled at his court and were admitted to converse with him. Night and day people did nothing but inquire and investigate."

The first public indication of Akbar's intention to assume the role of Imam-i-Adil was given when on June 26, 1579, the day of the birth of Muhammad, he himself read the *Khutba* from the pulpit of the mosque which was constructed by him a few years back. The practice of reading the *Khutba* by the sovereign himself was not new in the history of the Muslim world or that of the Timurides. Many a *Khalifa* and Timur and Ulugh Beg Mirza, the ancestors of Akbar, had done so. But it was considered a novelty, rather an innovation in India. Ascending the pulpit Akbar recited the verses composed for the occasion by Faizi:

> "In the name of Him who gave us sovereignty,
> Who gave us a wise heart and a strong arm,
> Who guided us in equity and justice,
> Who put away from our heart aught but equity,
> His praise is beyond the range of our thoughts.
> Exalted be His Majesty—God is Great."

The novelty of the situation, and the seriousness of the occasion appear to have made Akbar a bit nervous, but he finished the prayer, recited a few verses of the *Quran* and finished with the *fatiha*. He then came down from the pulpit and said the Friday prayers. Though there was no opposition, disturbance or commotion in the mosque or in the town, yet in certain quarters vague apprehensions were entertained and motives were attributed to the Emperor. When they were reported to the Emperor, he dismissed them as silly, puerile or mischievous.

As the knowledge and experience of Akbar grew, he felt confident to proceed with the idea suggested by Shaikh Mubarak some five years back. Accordingly, a decree was issued (September 2, 1579) under the signature of some of the most renowned scholars like

Shaikh Abdunnabi, Qazi Jalaluddin, Shaikh Mubarak, Abdullah Sultanpuri, Ghazi Khan Badakhshi, declaring Akbar as *Imam-i-Adil* in the following words : "We declare that the King of Islam , the Asylum of Mankind, the Commander of the Faithful, Shadow of God in the world, Abul Fath Jalaluddin Muhammad Akbar, Padshah Ghazi is a most just and wise king." Therefore, "we have agreed that the rank of a just king is higher in the eyes of God than that of the *Mujtahid*". In view of his legal status, he is entitled to adopt from among the conflicting views of the *mujtahids* that which is calculated to be of 'the benefit of the human being and in the interest of good order'......and 'issue a decree to that effect which shall be binding on all his people, and all his subjects". "Should his Majesty see fit to issue a new order in conformity with the *Quran* (and the *Hadis*) and calculated to benefit the nation all shall be bound by it." It is apparent that Akbar was not declared to be a *Mujtahid*, viz. one qualified to form his opinion independently on a question open to doubt. It is absolutely wrong to say that Akbar was declared either a *Mujtahid* or Infallible. He was entitled to exercise his right of selection from the views and opinions held by the *Mujtahids* in in case of difference and conflict of views. In case there there was unanimity of opinion among the Mujtahids, the question of selection simply did not arise. The authority in the interest of his subjects and law and order he chose to issue a new order, it could hold good only when it was in conformity with the *Quran* (and the *Hadis*). The authority vested in the sovereign was *intra vires* and had the sanction of the Muslim law and practice. There is no surprise, therefore that the decree was signed by the *Ulama* of different types and nationalities.

The need for such a declaration of policy was obvious so far as the Mussalmans of India were concerned. The Shias, Sunnis and Mahdawis had been frequently indulging in bloody conflicts among themselves and with the non-Muslims. The situation in Kashmir and Ahmadnagar was particularly serious. Religious outbreaks resulting in considerable loss of life and pro-

perty were not infrequent. Persecution of the followers of one creed by the other was the order of the day. There was no other appeal except to that of the sword. The international situation of the Muslim world also called for a clarification of the policy of the Mughal empire. The Shia kingdom of Persia and the Sunni states were at war more for religious than political reasons. The Shah of Persia claimed to be the leader of the Shias, while the Ottoman Sultan of Turkey claimed *Khalifat* over the Muslim states particularly of the Sunnis. These warring states were anxious to know what policy the Mughal empire proposed to follow. The declaration of Akbar, signed by some of the leading divines, announced his policy in unambiguous terms to all concerned, both in India and outside. The Mughal Emperor refused to identify himself with any creed and declared his determination to follow an independent policy of enlightened toleration within the ambit of the *Quran*, the *Hadis*, and common agreements between the accredited divines. The spirit of Akbar's policy, in essence, is not different from that of Chingiz Khan, the idol of the Mughals, though the former was a Muslim and the latter a non-Muslim. The declaration was meant for the Muslim in particular and its application to the Hindus could be only incidental and indirect. It is entirely baseless to suggest that by his decree Akbar sought to free himself from the domination, legal or moral, of the Shah of Persia, as it simply did not exist.

By temperament and education, Akbar was incapable of fanaticism and one-sidedness. He was equally keen to know and understand the faiths, laws and institutions of his non-Muslim subjects. His sympathy for the Hindus and their religious outlook had been growing steadily because of his social relations with the Hindu nobles. His Hindu wives, by their religious fervour, personal devotion and sweet simplicity, must have exercised unconscious influence on the mind of Akbar. The cumulative effect of such influences and his own inquisitive bent of mind prompted him to know more of Hinduism. He invited Purushottam and Devi to

expound the doctrine of Hinduism, while by direct contact with the *sadhus* and *yogis* he learnt its mystic side. He regarded *yoga* as a very essential branch of knowledge and direct experience.

In 1578 he invited Mahyarji Rana to explain to him the Zoroastrian religion. In 1577, at his request, came Father Giles Aves Pariera from Satgaon, but he failed to impress Akbar. Then he sent an envoy to the Viceroy of Goa requesting him to send two scholars. Great joy prevailed at Goa and wild hopes were entertained about the conversion of the Emperor. From among a large number of volunteers, Rodolfo Acquaviva, a keen student of Christian philosophy, and Father Antonio Monserrate were chosen by ballot. With them was sent Enriques, a Mohammedan convert to Christianity, who knew Persian. Father Monserrate was instructed to act as the historian of the mission. After intense prayers and penances for the success of the mission, they left Goa on 17 November and arrived at Sikri on February 18, 1580. Their polemics in the Ibadat Khana did not please Akbar, although he treated them with kindness and respect.

In 1580 Shaikh Abdullah Sultanpuri and Abdunnabi *Sadr-us-sudur* were sent to Macca. Akbar never liked Abdullah Sultanpuri as he was notoriously pro-Afghan in his sympathies. His blind opposition to whatever Abdunnabi said was ridiculous and must have irritated the Emperor. But Akbar lost patience with him, only when, in the words of Badauni, 'his villainy, sordid disposition and contemptible conduct were found out'. He was charged of avoiding the payment of the *Zakat* tax by transferring the surplus property to his wife at the time of collection and then taking it back again. Moreover, in his annoyance at the affairs in Ibadat Khana and the rise of his rival, Adbunnabi, he used to brand Akbar variously as Shia, Hindu, or Christian. He had gone to the extent of declaring India as a land of *Kafirs*, not fit for living in. Accordingly, he shifted himself to a mosque to reside there. Abdunnabi, the *Sadr-us-sudur*, who once basked in the royal

favour, lost his influence when the enquiry in the affairs of the *Sadr* department proved beyond doubt that his indifference, if not incompetence, was responsible for gross mismanagement and corruption. In expressing his views on legal questions, Akbar suspected him of shiftiness. In addition to that the Shaikh was fond of inflicting extreme punishment and death sentence not only on Hindus but on the Shias as well. The sentence of death awarded by him on a Brahman of Mathura for taking possession of the material collected for building a mosque and using it to build a temple, and for the alleged use of disrespectful language against the Prophet and the Mussalmans, caused considerable disappointment to Akbar, and he began seriously to doubt the sagacity and judgment of the *Sadr*. The vanity, arrogance, and temper of Abdunnabi were also almost as annoying as those of Shaikh Abdullah. Badauni remarks that "at no time had a *Sadr* exercised more tyrannical powers". He had made more enemies than friends. Like Shaikh Abdullah, he also charged Akbar of heresy. All these factors had combined to discredit both the Shaikhs in the estimation of Akbar. However, he did not take any violent measures against them, though he seems to have made up his mind to get rid of them. In 1579-80 rebellion broke out in Bengal and *fatwas* of heresy were given by some *Qazis* of the east. In such a charged atmosphere, their unfriendly attitude could do enormous mischief. Akbar thought it advisable to remove, in a gentle way; both Abdullah Sultanpuri and Shaikh Abdunnabi were sent with a pilgrim's party to Macca. They were entrusted with a large amount of money, which they were asked to distribute there according to instructions. They were advised to stay there till further instructions. Abdullah was positively against going to Macca, nor was Abdunnabi keen to go. They, however, could not afford to refuse the task entrusted to them by the Emperor.

In all monarchies there exist, besides the 'efficient parts' the 'dignified parts' to impress the imagination of the people and "excite and preserve the reverence of the population". Grand *darbars* and courts, rich and cere-

monious state functions, gorgeous paraphernalia of royalty, all are intended to serve no other purpose but to enhance the dignity of the ruler and the state. The early Turkish rulers of India felt such a need and had elaborately organized their court and ceremonials after the fashion of the Kianian rulers of Persia. The court of Balban was so gorgeous that men would travel over two or three hundred miles to have a sight of it, and it was talked about even outside India. The three state festivals of Id, Shabi-barat and Nauroz were celebrated on a grand scale and money flowed like water in feasts, festivities, gifts and rejoicings. The court glittered with gold and rich costumes, and was made as imposing as ingenuity could suggest and resources permit. In these grand courts sat the Sultan and before him high and low performed *sijdah*, while the theory that the king is 'the shadow of God' was sedulously pushed up in spite of the horror of the divines who, too, had eventually to reconcile themselves to it. The Hindu belief and the Persian practice were unconsciously acting upon the Delhi monarchy. But all this glory was swept away by the deluge of Timur's invasion. Sikandar Lodi and the Surs tried to revive it, but could have only a modicum of success.

It was left to the Mughals to revive the old glory of the Delhi monarchy and to raise the dignity of the Emperor and the empire in the eyes of the people and the nations of Asia. The Mughals, who believed in the Divine Right of kings were more conscious of their importance than the early Turks. The Islamic world in the 16th century witnessed changes in *Shariat* polity which forced a revision of the notion of sovereignty. The Ottoman Turk had declared himself the *Khalifa* of the Muslims but his claim was not respected by the Persians and Central Asians. The Persians had their own national King, the Shah, while the Central Asians had their equally independent Khan. Babar also threw aside the title of Mirza and assumed, for the first time in the history of the Timurids, the title of *Padshah*.

The Court of Akbar was organized on a scale

commensurate with the dignity of the Mughal empire. Gorgeous palaces and buildings were constructed, hunting expeditions on a gigantic scale were organized, a huge paraphernalia of royalty was evolved, and elaborate *darbar* ceremonials were laid down to enhance the dignity of the Imperial throne. Among these festivities and ceremonials was also the revival (in about 1580-81) of the Nauroz feast after the Persian model. Every year in March, when the Sun entered the Aries, the vernal new-year-feast was celebrated. It lasted day and night for full nineteen days, during which gaiety and merriment; music and dance, banquets and illuminations were the order of the day. All the wealth of the empire, jewels and pearls and gold and curios were displayed in the grand *darbars* held twice during the season and presided over by the Emperor in person. In these *darbars* stood the nobles in their best costumes to listen to the announcements of reforms and honours, mellifluous music of the best singers of age, and the odes or verses of the greatest poets of India and Persia. Here the King bestowed *jagirs* and promotions and rewarded the poets and the artists. The nobles, of course, held their own assemblies on a scale equal to their wealth and position, some of which were graced by the presence of the Emperor. Indeed, on such occasions the spirit of rivalry swayed the nobility and each tried to excel his equal in grandeur and show.

On the third day of the feast, a fancy bazar was held after the Central Asian model, in which the ladies of the Imperial harem and "the women of all other men were also invited" to make purchases from the stalls put up by the fair sex. Only married ladies were permitted and no male member, except probably the Emperor was allowed to go there. The fancy bazar being over, bazars were held for the courtiers. As the purchasers in these bazars were largely moneyed men and the aristocracy, merchants from distant parts of the empire and even other countries flocked there with their rarities and best stuff in the hope of finding enlightened patronage. The Emperor himself went round from stall to stall. "Bazar people on such

occasions may lay their grievances before His Majesty without being prevented by the mace-bearers, and may use the opportunity of laying out their stores in order to explain their circumstances." The merchants made huge profits. Besides what the nobles spent on their purchases, the Emperor spent large sums of money in organizing these bazars and in cash purchases. Such festivals served the purpose of exhibitions.

Although the grandest, Nauroz was not the only feast. One day in every month and three days in December, feasts were held. But next in show and importance to Nauroz were the celebrations held on the 5th of *Rajab*, and the 15th of October, the lunar and solar days of the birth of the Emperor. On those days too grand feasts were given, honours bestowed, royal mercy announced and donations made to men of all ranks. Prisoners and some animals were set at liberty. Pious men and and beggars received gifts, alms and bounties.

Not only at these *darbars* and festive occasions did the Emperor appear before the people but it was his practice, which he probably inherited from his father, to show himself every morning from the palace window or when in camp from the window of a double-storied tent. Multitudes gathered under the window just to have a glance of their ruler or to cry out their grievances to him. This was particularly welcomed by the Hindus, who believed that the monarch was a human reflection of Vishnu. Some Hindus attached so much importance to *darshan* that they would not breakfast until they had seen the Emperor.

CHAPTER XIII

AKBAR TRIUMPHS

In 1580, the empire was divided into twelve *Subas* (by 1595 three more were added) on historical and geographical bases. They were Kabul, Multan, Lahore, Delhi, Agra, Allahabad, Awadh, Bihar, Bengal, Ajmer, Malwa and Gujrat. In each of them there was a *Sipahsalar* (*Subedar*) or Viceroy, a *Diwan* (Chief Finance Officer), a *Bakshi* (Paymaster), a *Sadr* (Head of Charity and Religious Department), a *Qazi* or *Mir Adil* (Chief Judge), a *Kotwal* (Chief of Police), a *Waqanavis* (News Recorder) and a *Mir Bahr* (Chief Superintendent of Water ways). They were instructed to implement the reforms which were promulgated.

While Akbar was so engaged in administrative reforms and intellectual and religious discussions, the fire of rebellion blazed up in Bengal. The rebellion was provoked by the tactlessness of Muzaffar Khan, the newly appointed governor of Bengal (April 1579) and Rai Pitr Das, the *Diwan.* The nobles of Bengal, who were mostly Sunnis, did not like to be governed by the Shias and Hindus and resented their appointments. The Emperor was not prepared to change his policy for their unreasonable prejudices.

These officers had been sent with instructions to introduce the new military and civil reforms in that province. The military officers of Bengal, who uptil then had held good *jagirs* in the province, showed their unwillingness either to give an account of their illegal gains or to have their horses branded or to part with their *jagirs.* Unfortunately, at this time the imperial ministership of finance was held by Khwaja Shah Mansur, an able and expert officer, but strict and thorough in the execution of the reforms. Without fully realizing that the province of Bengal, with its large discontented Afghan population and unhealthy climate,

could not be properly governed without the loyal support of the local military officers, the new authorities began to force the reforms in a most ruthless and vigorous manner. Baba Khan used to say that he himself had spent 70,000 rupees but could not procure the branding of even 100 horses while the condition of other *jagirdars* was still worse. Dissatisfaction among the officers strengthened other forces of discontent. The *sayurghal-holders* were also dissatisfied with the new regulations to curtail their grants ; while Qazi Yaqub, who had been dismissed from the office of the Chief *Qazi* of the realm and was appointed as the Chief *Qazi* of Bengal, fomented the spirit of discontent among the Muslims by representing, that the Emperor was promulgating heretical opinions. To make matters worse, the agents of Mirza Muhammad Hakim were working in Bengal to excite the people to rebellion, under the guidance of Masum Khan Kabuli, Mirza's foster brother, and Roshan Beg.

The immediate cause of the mutiny was the reduction of military allowance from 100 p. c. for Bengal and 50 p. c. for Bihar to 50 and 20 p. c. respectively. It was made worse when the regulation was put into effect retrospectively and all excess payments were ordered to be refunded. To enforce these orders, the local officers used force. One Khaldin Khan, a fief-holder of Jallesore, was put in prison and severely bastinadoed. This caused dismay among the *jagirdars.* Close upon this came the orders of the Imperial government to capture Roshan Beg, who had taken shelter with the Qaqshals. Muzaffar Khan snatched him away from the Qaqshals and, addressing their old leader Baba Khan in harsh and rude language, asked him to cut the head of Roshan Beg with his own hands. This unnecessary exhibition of power caused great resentment among the Qaqshals, who shaved their heads, put on their high caps and broke out into mutiny. The rebels marched on to Gaur and plundered the property of Muzaffar Khan.

As soon as the news of mutiny reached the capital, the

Emperor sent orders to Muzaffar Khan to conciliate the Qaqshals, who were his most valiant and old servants. Consequently, the governor sent Rizvi Khan and Pitr Das to the Qaqshals. Some solution might have been found out, but Narain Das advised Rai Pitr Das to put to death the leaders who had come to the conference. Pitr Das told this to Rizvi who communicated it to the Qaqshals. This talk, even if not serious or true, was enough to frighten the rebel leaders, who threw Rizvi into prison and began to commit greater violence.

The rebellion of Bengal soon spread to Bihar, where Rai Purushottam and Maulana Taiyib were introducing the reforms with strictness. Masum Khan Kabuli, Hakim's foster brother, and Arab Bahadur became leaders of the insurrectionary force. Masum was an energetic man "renowned for his bravery and thoroughness", and Arab Bahadur was also a man of courage and experience. They got a religious sanction for their rebellion from Mulla Muhammad Yazdi, a Shia, who had been only lately appointed *Qazi* of Jaunpur. The Mulla issued a *fatwa* "insisting on the duty of taking the field and rebelling against the Emperor", because "the Emperor had in his dominion made encroachments on the grant-lands belonging to us and to God." The rebels then advanced upon Patna, plundered it, put Mulla Taiyib to flight and killed Rai Purshottam, while he was engaged in worship on the banks of the Ganges near *Baksar.* Leaving Arab Bahadur at Patna in charge of Bihar, Masum Khan advanced to Bengal to join hands with the rebels there, dislodged Khwaja Shamsuddin from Teliagarhi, the gate of Bengal, and joined the rebels in Bengal. The combined forces then besieged Muzaffar Khan who had shut himself in the indefensible mud fort of Tanda. The defence was vigorous for nineteen days, but it was hopelessly weakened when a few *Amirs*, headed by Vazir Khan Jamil Beg, went over to the rebels. Muzaffar Khan now offered to give up the fort, provided he was allowed to to go to Macca and the safety of his household, was vauchsafed. This proposal and the reports

of Mirza Sharafuddin, who had just fled from the fort, encouraged the rebels to attack, capture and plunder the fort. Muzaffer Khan was put to death with all sorts of torture. Bengal and Bihar now lay at the feet of the rebels. Mirza Sharafuddin Husain was elected by the rebels as their leader. They went even a step further for, on April 10, 1580 they read the *Khutba* in the name of Akbar's brother Mirza Muhammad Hakim and distributed offices and titles among themselves. The Mirza "was a drunkard, a poltroon and in no way comparable with Akbar."

When the Emperor came to know of the outbreak of rebellion in Bengal and Bihar, he despatched Raja Todar Mal and Shaikh Farid Bakshi against the rebels. He ordered the *jagirdars* of Oudh, Allahabad and Jaunpur to assist them. Sadiq Khan and others were likewise ordered to proceed from Chanderi to the eastern provinces. By the time the Imperial forces reached Bihar, Muhib Ali Khan had already captured Patna from Arab Bahadur. On arriving near Patna, Todar Mal discussed the plan of operations with his officers and then marched towards Bengal in battle-array. Masum Khan Farankhudi (not Kabuli) plotted to kill Todar Mal, but the latter got an inkling of it and without making much of it remained on his guard and tried to conciliate Farankhudi.

The Bengal rebels were not sitting idle. They had a cavalry of 30,000 at their command, besides 50 elephants, a flotilla and artillery. As Todar Mal suspected the loyalty of Farankhudi and some other nobles, he fortified his position at Monghyr. Here the rebels came and besieged him. The siege lasted for several months, during which the garrison was reduced by the desertion of a few nobles, and suffered for want of supplies and money. Akbar sent money and supplies and ordered Khan-i-Azam Aziz Koka to take charge of the government of Bengal. Shahbaz Khan was recalled from Mewar and sent to help the Khan-i-Azam.

No sooner did Shahbaz Khan leave, Mewar that Rana Pratap returned from his mountain retreat and began to

capture one by one the Mughal *Thanas* and drive their garrisons out. In a short time, he recovered a large portion of Mewar which the Mughals had conquered. In Mewar, Chandra Sen again raised the banner of independence and carried his ravages in the province of Ajmer.

Like the Mewar officers, those of Malwa also were called up. As the soldiers had not received their extra-allowance, some officers headed by Haji Shihabuddin mutinied and killed the governor, Shujaat Khan, and his son. Fortunately the disturbance did not spread and was, therefore, quickly brought under control.

The outbreak of mutiny and rebellions almost simultaneously put the Emperor under sever strain. Hardened in the school of adversity, he faced the situation with admirable composure. The officers of Monghyr sent representations to the Emperor to come in person, but he would not leave Agra, the heart of the empire for, from there he could watch the development in all quarters and keep an eye on the movements of his brother Hakim, in whose name the eastern rebels had read the *Khutba* and who could, therefore, be expected to adopt measures hostile to Akbar.

Moreover, from the reports received he could see that the rebels, instead of making any great progress, had lost appreciably. True, they had succeeded in closing the land route to Monghyr, but their attempt to close the water communications had not only failed but resulted in a loss of 300 boats laden with munitions. Abkar, therefore did not lose patience and believed that the arrival of Aziz Koka and Shahbaz Khan in Bihar would break the backbone of the rebellion. But he adopted the proposal of Raja Todar Mal to suspend from office Khwaja Shah Mansur, who was responsible for the rigour and severity that had brought the whole trouble. It was expected that his removal would soothe the feelings of the rebels and inspire hope of a change for the better.

The Emperor was not wrong in his calculations. The news of the march of Aziz Koka and Shahbaz Khan ;

the bold and frequently successful sallies from the besieged led by the gallant Sadiq Khan ; the successes of Qutlu, the Afghan leader in Orissa, against the Mughals there ; the death of Baba Khan, the leader of the Qaqshals, from cancer ; the scarcity of supplies in the rebel camp, caused by the hostility of the Hindu population which had suffered oppressions at their hands ; and the failure of the mutineers to achieve anything substantial taxed the patience of the rebels, who gradually dispersed even before the arrival of the Imperial reinforcements. Arab Bahadur went to Patna, but failing to captue it, fled to Hajipur. He was pursued and defeated by Muhib Ali Khan. Masum Kabuli retreated towards Bihar, but was pursued by Todar Mal and Sadiq Khan and was defeated on September 29, 1580, though he effected his escape.

By this time Aziz Koka and Shahbaz Khan also arrived and joined the army of Todar Mal. If Shahbaz Khan had fully cooperated with Aziz and Todar Mal, the rebellion would have been crushed in a shorter time, but he was an obstinate officer and decided to stick to his own plans. Another complication which prolonged the operation was the open rebellion of Masum Khan Farankhudi, who had gone towards Jaunpur, and of Niyabat Khan, nephew of the old Shihabuddin Ahmad Khan, who was a *jagirdar* of Arail in the district of Allahabad. Leaving Bihar in the hands of Shahbaz Khan, Aziz and Todar Mal moved towards Tirhut. The rebels too were not quite united. Mirza Sharafuddin was poisoned by Masum Kabuli. The range of rebellious activity had no doubt increased in the east, but the solidarity of the rebels was considerably weakened. Their only hope lay in the impending invasion of Mirza Hakim and the diversion of the attention and energy of the Emperor to the west.

Shahbaz Khan was busy in crushing the rebellion in Bihar when he heard of the rebellious activities of Farankhudi and Niyabat Khan. He therefore, hastened to Jaunpur to fight Farankhudi and Arab Bahadur. At Sultanpur, 50 miles from Ayodhya, an engagenent was

fought on January 22, 1581. The rebels had a large army and had almost gained the day when a rumour spread that Farankhudi was dead. This upset their plan and they lost the battle. The troops of Shahbaz were so severely handled that they could not venture to pursue the rebels who retreated towards Ayodhya. The army of Shahbaz Khan, however, recouped its strength and returned to the field. On 2 February, only seven miles away from Ayodhya he succeeded in defeating Farankhudi, plundering his camps and capturing his family. Farankhudi fled leaving Arab Bahadur and Niyabat Khan to save themselves as best as they could. Soon after Farankhudi returned to attack Baharaich, but failing there, fell upon Muhammadabad, plundered it and threatened Jaunpur ; but he was so closely pursued by the Imperialists that his followers abandoned him. After having knocked about, he requested Aziz Koka to intercede for him. At Koka's request he was pardoned by the Emperor, but a few days later he was killed by someone who bore some private grudge against him.

After their defeat near Ayodhya, Arab Bahadur and Niyabat Khan fled towards Sambhal. Failing to capture the fort of Bareilly, they set about plundering with the assisatance of Ram Shah, the Raja of Kumayun, and other Hindu Rajas. But Hakim Ain-ul-Mulk, by his diplomacy, won over the Hindu Rajas and even Niyabat Khan to his side. Still Arab Bahadur and his followers continued the struggle till they were defeated and driven to wilderness. Niyabat Khan was sent to the fort of Ranthambore. His attempt to escape from there failed and he was executed. Although Arab Bahadur was still at large, and Masum Kabuli and Qutlu Khan were supreme in Bengal and Orissa, the back of the rebellion was broken and now it was easy to crush the rebels piecemeal.

Masum Khan Kabuli joined Isa Khan, a powerful *zamindar* of south-eastern Bengal. They continued to defy the Imperial power and took offensive, whenever they found any weakening of administration in Bengal. But they could not seriously injure the Mughal power

nor loosen its control in the east. Both of them died in 1599 leaving the field clear for the Mughal power.

It was indeed the good fortune of Akbar that Hakim's project of invading India was postponed owing to a civil war in Badakhshan. Had he invaded earlier when the Bengal rebellion was at its height, and symptoms of disaffection were visible in other parts of the empire, the task of Akbar would have been made far more difficult, though by no means hopeless. When, however, the Kabul army marched upon India the political situation had somewhat eased, though the rebellion in the east was yet far from being brought under control. It was in December 1580, that the advance of the Kabul troops crossed the Indus. Yusuf, the governor of Rohtas, loyally supported by the brave Ghakkars showed energy in offering opposition. Nuruddin was killed and the Afghan troops driven back. Akbar ordered Kunwar Man Singh to march forward and take charge of the frontier. Man Singh moved up immediately and sent some troops to Rawalpindi as he expected another attack to revenge the failure of Nuruddin. He was right in his calculations. For , Shadman, "the sword of Afghan army", laid siege to the fort of Nilab, fifteen miles below Attock, on 18 December. Man Singh hurried up to Nilab with his Rajput troops. On the 24th, a battle was fought between the Afghans and the Rajputs in which the former were defeated. In a hand-to-hand combat Shadman was mortally wounded by Raja Suraj Singh, the brother of Man Singh, and the commander of the Mughal vanguard. Though taken away alive from the field, Shadman died shortly after. As soon as the death of Shadman was reported to him, Hakim pushed forward with 15,000 cavalry. Akbar had already anticipated him and sent instructions to the officers of the Indus region not to oppose the passage of the Mirza across the Indus, and to put off engagement till he himself had joined them. Consequently, Man Singh fell back upon Lahore to organize a strong defence there. The Mirza now crossed the Indus and invited Yusuf, governor of Rohtas, to join

him. But the invitation was rejected. Thinking it a sheer waste of time to attempt to capture Rohtas, Hakim pushed on to Lahore, which he laid under siege. But Lahore was bravely defended by Raja Bhagwan Dass, Man Singh and others, and the efforts of the Mirza to capture it came to nothing. His disappointment was great when he found that not a single officer, Hindu or Mussalman, nor even the *Mullas* of Lahore, joined him against Akbar.

The Emperor was quite prepared to meet an invasion from Kabul. He had collected an army of 50,000 cavalry, and 500 elephants besides numerous infantry and artillery. On February 6, 1581, he left the capital with an army which was probably the biggest that he had ever led in his life. With him were also his two sons, Salim and Murad. Father Monserrate says that the army was well disciplined and everything moved like clock-work. This was due to the personal attention which Akbar gave to almost all the details of organization, even including the stuff sold in the camp market.

When the Emperor was encamped at Shahabad he ordered the execution of Khwaja Shah Mansur, the Finance Minister on the charge of high treason. Man Singh had found in the portfolio of Shadman, the Afghan General, three letters written to Hakim-ul-Mulk, Qasim Khan *MirBahr* and Khwaja Shah Mansur respectively, purporting to be answers to the letters of invitation and encouragement written to Hakim by those officers. At first the Emperor kept silent over the matter, but his suspicion was aroused when Shah Mansur informed the Emperor that Malik Sami Kabuli, *Diwan* of the Mirza, being dissatisfied with him had deserted him and come to the Imperial camp in the hope of getting some service. The Emperor then showed the letters transmitted to him by Man Singh and called upon Mansur to explain the matter. Mansur pleaded his innocence but his explanation did not satisfy the Emperor, either because it was insufficient or because the rebellions of several high officials during the year had made him touchy and oversuspicious. Mansur was

dismissed from his office and was prohibited to communicate with any man. A few days later, the *Kotwal* of the camp brought another set of letters which he had intercepted from Sharaf Beg, Mansur's *Shiqdar* (Collector) at Firozpur. In one of the letters, it was mentioned that Hakim Mirza had appointed collectors in all the *parganas* of his conquered territory, but had exempted the *jagirs* of Khwaja Mansur. It is not quite known if there was any other information damaging to Mansur's loyalty, but whatever might have been the evidence it was enough to convince the Emperor of his guilt. Nor were the back-biters wanting, particularly because the uniform severity and rigorous administration of the Khwaja had alienated the sympathies of all and had made enemies all round. As the time were critical and half-measures would have been ineffective, the Emperor in an agitated mood, ordered the public execution of the Khwaja, if no responsible high official came forward to stand a security for him. Unluckily no one offered to stand security for him, either because he was very unpopular or because men feared lest they should also be suspected of complicity with him. At Shahabad, before a gathering of chief nobles and other officials, Abul Fazl read out the charges against Mansur, who was hanged on a '*babul*' tree on February 27, 1581. Thus ended the life of the greatest Finance Minister (except probably Todar Mal) for whom, long after his death, Akbar continued to express his grief. The Emperor's anguish must have become all the more acute when, on reaching Kabul, he learnt that the last set of letters which proved the last straw was a cowardly forgery, and he must have regretted his decision and deception. Circumstantial evidence and other proofs, although available against Mansur, were by no means so clear as to justify his execution. However, political considerations and the highly charged atmosphere necessitated immediate and drastic action even without meticulous justice. Mansur's execution came as a warning to some and relief to all.

Akbar had gone a stage beyond Sirhind when he received the delightful news of the retreat of Mirza Hakim

from Lahore. The Mirza found that all his calculations were wrong. He had expected that Akbar would be deserted by his officials, that rebellions would break out everywhere as soon as his army entered India, that people would join him in large numbers as he moved forward step by step and that Lahore at least would easily fall into his hands. But he was sorely disappointed. Not a single official of high rank deserted the Emperor, no local support could be forthcoming and his most determined assaults were energetically repulsed by the Rajput generals. When he came to know of the large army led by the Emperor personally marching towards Lahore, he lost his nerve, hurriedly decamped and fled precipitately from India.

It was unnecessary for Akbar to go to Lahore. He, therefore, decided to proceed to the frontier to organize the defences there and lay the foundation of a strong fort at Attock to act as a bulwark against an invasion from Kabul and to form the last link of the mighty defences erected by Sher Shah and Islam Shah at Rohtas and Mankot. By way of Rohtas Akbar reached the Indus in May. Here he laid the foundation of a strong fort, which he named Atak Benaras to rhyme with Cuttack Benaras, the farthest eastern limit of his empire in Orissa. A message was sent to Hakim to come in person and settle terms or failing that send one of his sons with his sister Bakhtunnissa Begam, or send at least Khwaja Hasan Naqshbandi. Hakim, however, did not think it worthwhile to reply to it.

Man Singh was ordered to cross the Indus and proceed to Peshawar. Prince Murad was also sent afterwards. The Emperor, however, sent another note to Hakim to come and offer allegiance so that his army might return from Peshawar. As no reply came, Akbar crossed the Indus (July 13, 1581) and ordered the main army to follow him. This step produced some impression on the Mirza who sent Haji Habibullah with a message of loyalty. The Emperor was not satisfied with words and expected some more substantial proof of Mirza's fidelity.

Akbar, however, expressed his intention of marching on to Kabul. This announcement caused a flutter among the officials and nobles, who were already tired of a long march during the hottest season of the year and were not at all prepared to undertake a hill journey. Even Abul Fazl was found to be lukewarm. Indian soldiers were afraid of snow and cold and showed their aversion to an arduous campaign in Afghanistan. Monserrate advised the Emperor to leave the matter there and not to push further the quarrel with his brother. A council of twenty big nobles was called to discuss the matter. They decided unanimously against the march. Nothing except the seriousness of the eastern rebellion could have deterred Akbar from his project, but the victories of Shahbaz Khan over Masum Farankhudi had set his mind at ease. He refused, therefore, to pay any heed to the unwillingness of his officials to cross the Indus. He told them that if they did not like to go, they might remain behind but he was himself determined to go forward with his personal troops. Without waiting for further developments, Akbar pushed on towards Kabul. His example had a salutary effect on the nobles, who also willy-nilly decided to follow him.

At Gandmak Akbar heard that a disaster had overtaken prince Murad's troops. On 30 July Faridun fell on the stragglers of the rearguard, plundered the baggage and disappeared. He again emerged from his retreat, fought an indecisive engagement and plundered the treasury which Mir Abdullah was conveying to Murad. On 1 August at Khurd-i-Kabul, Mirza Hakim came out to fight and had almost gained the better of the prince when, by fast marches, Man Singh arrived with a number of war-elephants, and made such a determined attack that the Kabulis broke up and fled. The imperialists were not in a position to pursue them because they were neither fully acquainted with the country nor did they know the strength of the Mirza.

Nevertheless, Akbar pushed on and reached Kabul on August 10, 1581. This was the first time in the history of India when one of her rulers made a triumphal entry

into Kabul. For several reasons it was not advisable to stay at Kabul. Firstly, Akbar's officials had grumbled at the suggestion of an invasion of Kabul and it was not, therefore, desirable to detain them in Afghanistan for long. Secondly, the Mirza was still at large and commanded the sympathies of the Afghans. There was also the danger that in despair he might throw himself under the protection of the Uzbeks of Central Asia. The Uzbeks most probably would have welcomed him and supported him against Akbar. Their interference would have given rise to serious political and military complications which Akbar was not then prepared to invite. Thirdly, he had been absent from the capital for over six months and was, therefore, anxious to return as soon as he could. Finally, the affairs of Bengal, Rajputana and Gujrat were not so bright as to leave him quite free to invite conflict with a mighty foreign power.

Mirza Hakim loudly protested his loyalty and sought for forgiveness but refused to appear personally before Akbar. The Emperor, therefore, left the charge of the government of Kabul to his sister Bakhtunnissa Begam, the wife of Khwaja Hasan. He told her that he would not repeat the kindness if Hakim misbehaved again, and that he would be free to take over the administration should he ever deem it necessary. Staying therefore a few days he started on his way back to India. After some time Hakim returned to Kabul but ruled in the name of his sister. Leaving Man Singh in charge of the Indus province, Akbar returned to the capital on December 1, 1581.

The years 1580-81 were the most critical in the life of Akbar. Rebellions in India, invasion from Kabul, and discontent in the camp taxed his energy and tested his capacity. Akbar, however, stood firm, fought the storm and tided over every difficulty. To celebrate the grand success, the annual *Darbar* of 1582 was organized on a most magnificent scale. All provincial governors were asked to attend the *Darbar*. It was on this occasion that he introduced the New Year feasts

which were held by the early Turkish Sultans of Delhi after the model of the ancient Persian kings. However obnoxious to the orthodox Muslims and expensive to the tax-payer, they must have been welcomed by the aristocratic society, which was too fond of show and eclat, and by the people at large who take pleasure in merry-making.

To commemorate the occasion, a series of announcements of far-reaching importance were made. The first came from the throne, that slavery was to be henceforth abolished for, said the Emperor, "what strength has this handful of weakness (man) to take upon itself the name of Mastery, and to make slaves of the sons of men?" It was also announced that war-prisoners should not be reduced to slavery. The *Kotwals* were instructed to put a stop to the practice of sale and purchase of slaves. Thousands of slaves were set free. Even the term 'slave' was abolished in favour of the word *chela*, which obviously has a better significance and means servant. This word has led some people to indulge in wild speculations and uncalled for gibes.

The Crown prince and the high dignitaries were then called upon to make one proposal each for the benefit of the people. Prince Salim moved that marriage should not be allowed to take place before the age of twelve. Aziz Koka requested that the governors should not be allowed to execute any one without taking permission, in each case, of the Emperor. Abdul Rahim Khan-i-Khana pleaded for preservation, as far as possible, of small birds. Raja Todar Mal wished that arrangements be made for distributing charities every day at the palace. Yusuf Khan made a wise proposal that a daily journal of events should be obtained from all the cities and towns. This proposal was supplemented by Birbal who moved for the appointment of reliable inspectors who should report the cases of the oppressed and the poor, and the general condition of the people. The Chief Engineer, Qasim Khan, requested that *serais* be established on all routes in the empire. Jamal suggested the appointement of special officials who should

bring to the Court men in distress and want. The Poet Laureate, Faizi, made a prosaic but useful proposal for the appointment of controllers of market who should fix the price of every article. Abul Fazal requested that the *daroghas* of every city and town be ordered to prepare detailed records of the house-holders "name by name, trade by trade", keep a close eye on the income and expenditure of men and expel bad characters and do-nothings. Hakim Abul Fath also came forward with a proposal for the establishment of hospitals. The Emperor accepted all these proposals and promised to see them carried out. It is indeed difficult to say how far each of these proposals was carried out, but there is no doubt that they were not allowed to remain only on paper and efforts were made to put them into practice.

The work of revenue reform which had been temporarily suspended owing to the grave political situation was again taken up. Todar Mal was raised to the office of the Prime Minister (1582). He introduced several reforms and compelled the Collectors and *Jagirdars* not to infringe the rules laid down in the *Dastur-ul-Amal*. Thus the regulations for the crown-lands were also extended to *jagir*-lands to promote equity and uniformity. The *Amils* were ordered to make the crop-statements most carefully by means of actual measurements, protect the rights of the cultivators as scrupulously as of the state, and make regular tours to see with their own eyes the condition of the people. Instead of two clerks (*bitikchis*), one responsible and more qualified man was appointed to do their work. All the cultivable land was measured and progressive rent was fixed to encourage the people to bring under plough the lower quality of land, improve it and bring it to the level of the *Polaj*. The scale of the allowances of the officials employed for measurement was definitely fixed. To encourage the improved currency, definite value was fixed of the obsolete coins according to their weight. The collectors were ordered to fix definite dates on which the ryots should pay their dues to the treasury, and the Treasurer was directed to give them receipts for every

payment made to him. Finally, he was required to send to the Head Office weekly abstracts and accounts, and despatch every month the daily journal of collections.

One of the most important of revenue reforms was the introduction of a new era which was based on the Persian Solar Calendar. For official reckoning it was supposed to have begun from March 11 1556, though it was introduced in 1584. The multiplicity of eras, along with the *Hijri*, must have caused considerable inconvenience particularly to the Central Government. Apart from the fact that the lunar year is shorter than the solar by ten or eleven days in a year and, therefore, is not in harmony with the timing of the harvests. Consequently, in a cycle of twenty-nine solar years there are thirty *Hijri* years. If revenues were collected according to the *Hijri* era, a cultivator would have to pay for thirty years while actually he would collect harvests for twenty-nine years. But harvests are governed by the sun and not by the moon. In the words of Khafi Khan : "Mathematicians, astronomers and historians know that...... recurrence of the four seasons of Hindustan, the autumn and spring harvests, the ripening of corn and fruit of each season, the *tankhwah* (pay and assignments) of *jagir* and the money of *mansabdars*, are all dependent upon the solar reckoning and cannot be regulated by the lunar." There were numerous calendars in Asia and Europe which were based on solar reckoning, but on critical examination it was found that the most satisfactory one from every point of view was the Gurgani one (associated with the name of Ulugh Beg) "with the Persian names of month and days unaltered". Akbar adopted it for all official purposes and in his characteristic manner called it the "*Ilahi*" era. This reform must have been welcomed by the cultivators, businessmen and officials, and proved most satisfactory to the government. Ill-informed persons attributed it to Persian influence on the Emperor, or to his desire to abolish the *Hijri* era which was Islamic in its significance. The fact is that the *Hijri* era could not be and was not abolished for socio-religious purposes. It was maintained along with

the "*Ilahi*" era even in official records. Incidentally, it must have pleased Akbar to institute an era to commemorate his own age and perpetuate his own name.

In 1575 Gulbadan Begam, an aunt, and Salima Begam, a wife of Akbar, went on a pilgrimage to Harmainush Sharifain. The Portuguese, who were then the masters of the Arabian Sea, would not permit them to sail until Bulsar (Butsar), a village near Daman, was ceded to them. Apparently Akbar did not like the behaviour of the Portuguese as also the transaction. Instead of adopting a violent course, he thought it safer and wiser to establish friendly relations with them and bring them round. It appears that the policy did not bear any fruitful results. By 1580 he seems to have decided upon some vigorous measures and communicated his intention to Qutubuddin Khan, the *jagirdar* of Broach. He also invited the cooperation of the states of the Deccan in the task of clearing the Arabian sea of the Portuguese pirates. Since an invasion from Kabul was then imminent, and the royal ladies had not returned, no action on a large scale was attempted. In 1581, the Begams returned, and the invasion of Hakim was repulsed ; so the question of Bulsar was opened and its return demanded with an impressive military demonstration. In 1582 Daman was attacked, but was energetically defended. About this time, Muzaffar Shah III, the dethroned ruler of Gujrat, led a widespread rebellion against the Mughal authority. The loyalty of the troops of even the governor was undermined. Qutubuddin's position was even worse. The political situation in the province might have slackened temporarily the pressure on Daman, but there was every likelihood of its resumption with greater vigour and on a large scale. Father Acquaviva was apprised of the situation and he made a representation to the Emperor on behalf of the Portuguese government. The Emperor, therefore, ordered Qutubuddin to leave them alone for the time being and divert his energy to quell the rebellion of Gujrat which seemed to be gaining strength. The Portuguese problem was far from being solved though

hostilities were suspended for the time being.

The Christian Fathers had come to the Emperor with full hope of converting him. They even sent sanguine reports to Goa of their progress and read their successes in the alleged innovations of Akbar. The regard which Akbar showed to these strangers and their sentiments, the reverence with which he admired the pictures of Christ and Mary, the attention he gave to the ritual of the Jesuits, the trying patience with which he heard their rude and bigoted atttacks on Islam and its founder, and the fact that he appointed Monserrate to teach Portuguese and Christian morals to Prince Murad had given rise to a rumour that the Emperor had taken a fancy for Christianity. All these, combined with the Emperor's appreciative remarks on Christian moral code and his tolerance of Christian propaganda, led the Fathers to entertain a fond hope of some day counting him in the Christian fold. But it was a wild and wishful expectation and shows how little the Fathers had understood the working of Akbar's mind, and how poor was their grasp of the course of his actions. By the end of 1580 or the beginning of 1581 they began to feel that the Emperor had become weary of their monotonous sermons and their anxiety to convert him, and did not pay as much attention to them as before. The outbreak of mutiny, rebellion and the invasion of Hakim made Akbar cautious and diverted his attention and energy to political and military matters. Early, in 1581, therefore, the Council of Goa came to realize fully that the accounts of the Fathers were not to be taken too literally and that there was no hope of converting Akbar ; so it asked them to return. Partly because Akbar wanted them to remain for some time more, partly because the simple-minded Acquaviva had not yet lost all hopes of success, and partly because they thought that the semi-barbarous tribes of the western Punjab and eastern Afghanistan would offer a new field for Christian propaganda, they continued to linger on. Monserrate accompanied Akbar to the west but Acquaviva remained at Sikri praying day and night and prac-

tising brutal austerities for the conversion of the Emperor. When, however, Akbar returned from Kabul, Acquaviva found to his great disappointment that he was incorrigible and his mind was working in a direction different from what he had expected. On September 27 1582 Acquaviva wrote to the Provincial of Goa:"............I cannot quite understand him (Akbar). He does not now inquire about Christian faith as he did before.........I can see in this Court that Allah is well obeyed." The Provincial requested him to return immediately. Acquaviva sought the permission of the Emperor to go and was allowed to do so with much kindness. Akbar had gained his object of getting first-hand information about Christian religion and practices from well-informed professors.

Akbar had expected that a discussion between scholars of different religions would lead to a better appreciation of the doctrines of one another and pave the way for good understanding between the followers of those religions, but to his great disappointment he found that his experiment did not fructify. On the contrary it created bad blood, multiplied misunderstanding, whetted fanaticism, bred misgivings and generated mischief. The idea of a Parliament of Religions was neither unreasonable nor bad. But the desired results could come only when the professors of different religions, faiths or creeds had met together with a genuine desire to understand and appreciate one another's points of view without passion or prejudice. Open mind, forbearance, tolerance, reverence and free play of reason are the main conditions for the success of such an enterprise. But these were wanting. The scholars in the Ibadat Khana unfortunately gathered not to discuss and deliberate but to dispute, debate and make impressions on the Emperor, if not the public. Each one of them tried to establish his superiority over others, to run down, jeer and mock at other and to cover himself with glory. No doubt Akbar and a few others possessed the right attitude of mind, but they could not infuse their spirit in the wranglers. Akbar wanted them to discover

the points of contact between different religions, to see if it could be possible to evolve some fundamental and common principles which might command the allegiance of all, act as forces of union, and minimize differences and disunion, but they were bent on emphasizing the divergences, accentuating the differences and picking holes in the faiths of others. The Emperor was at last convinced of the futility of such discussions and learnt with sad experience the extent to which his best intentions could be misunderstood. He was sorely disillusioned at their narrow-mindedness, parochialism and intolerance. His respect and regard for them suffered appreciably Consequently, he put a stop to the debates and closed the meetings of the Ibadat Khana practically in 1581 but finally in 1582.

The quest of Akbar for higher truth, however, did not come to an end. He reverted to the old practice of inviting a few selected men in the private apartments of the palace and inquiring from them on religious truths and social peculiarities. Usually the Emperor framed certain questions and requested replies to them from individuals. His fund of information had indeed become large while his depth of mind had synthesized out of it a good deal that was useful to him, but he could never say to himself that the riddle had been solved to his entire satisfaction. It is doubtful if any amount of vigilance could ever solve it for him or for anybody under the sun.

The mystic experiences of Akbar and his stupendous information regarding different religions and creeds, beliefs and practices of saints and *faqirs*, were bound to extend the horizon of his outlook and broaden his vision. It was impossible for him to identify himself with the dogmas and ceremonials of any one creed-Hindu, Muslim or Christian-just as it was impossible for him to reject any one of them in its totality. He seems to have come to the conclusion that religion was born with the first man (Adam) and the later prophets of all religions, according to their inspiration and experiences, had tried to keep the erring humanity on the right road. He had

also come to the conclusion that every religion had its mystic and popular sides, and in the final analysis the principles were not as irreconcilable as they apparently seemed. Shorn of their details, rituals, mythology and social customs, the essentials of different religions do not show irreconcilable divergence. Fanaticism, bigotry, exclusiveness and blind devotion to customs and ceremonials ceased to have any appeal to him.

For want of proper material, it is not possible to dilate with absolute accuracy on all the aspects of Akbar's beliefs and faith. A few outstanding features, however, can be clearly described. The crux of his faith was an uncompromising monotheism, the *Tawhid-i-Ilahi*. He had no attraction for the doctrines of incarnation propounded either by Hinduism or Christianity. His monotheism was certainly Islamic and is clearly distinguishable from that of any other religion of his time. Communion with God could be possible by turning oneself to Him through meditation. Another feature was that he believed that the outer world of matter is only a reflex of the inner reality, visible not to physical eyes, but to heart and reason. This idea had no novelty in it and was familiar to the mystics and metaphysicians of Islam. Further, he believed that though air, water, and earth were essential for man yet the greatest boon to all beings is light which manifests itself on one hand in the shape of intuition, reason and spiritual illumination and on the other in the form of the sun and fire and physical light and heat. This belief had great affinity to the doctrine of Al Ghazali as expounded in his famous work *Mishkatul-Anwar* and *Hikmat-ul-Ishraq*. Finally, he believed that man in a mystic way passed from being to being, summing up the past and opening up the future at every stage. It was this kind of metempsychosis which appealed to him. "If the idea were merely that souls were transformed into a few determinate shapes, this would be unworthy but if the strange workings of destiny joined them to mineral, vegetable, animal life in serial progression till they were exalted to a high dignity, where would be the wonder?"

This idea was also very familiar to the Muslim Sufis and could not claim any originality in the evolution of Islamic thought. Besides these, he had come to believe in the sacredness of life in all sentient beings. It was a gift from God since no one else could give life. It must be respected as much as was humanly possible. Finally, he thought it necessary for man to keep his mind and body clean and observe the broad principles of morality and good behaviour.

It has been declared by many modern historians that Akbar learnt the sun worship from the Zoroastrains, and they consider it along with Nauroz festivals as due to the influence of the Parsis. There is no doubt that the Parsis of Nausari and their most honoured leader Dastur Mahyarjee Rana were at the court of Akbar and that he had also come in contact with a learned Parsi, who had been invited from Persia to assist in the compilation of a lexicon known as *Farhang-i-Jahangiri*. That, therefore, it would not at all be surprising if they had familiarized Akbar with their beliefs and ideas, but it requires more solid proof to declare that he had learnt sun worship from them. The question of Nauroz has already been dealt with. The history of Persia as well as that of the early Turkish Sultanate of Delhi has left behind accounts showing how the great kings celebrated the New Year festival. These were quite enough to inspire Akbar to adopt it.

Worship of light or the *Sun*, as the Parsis understood it, could hardly have appealed to the strict monotheism of Akbar, for the Parsi doctrine is "essentially dualistic" More than once, both Akbar and his official historian have repudiated the charge of being regarded as fire-worshipper. Moreover, fire and sun worship were not the exclusive peculiarity of the Parsis ; it was widely prevalent among the Hindus. If Akbar had learnt it from others, there was more likelihood of his having been influenced by the teeming millions of Hinduism rather than by the handful of Parsis living in a remote corner of western India, or a few temporary sojourners at his court. Indeed, Badauni traces sun worship more to the influence of Birbal and the

Hindus than to the Zoroastrians, though he tells us that the worship of fire was due to the influence of the Zoroastrians of Nausari and the Hindu princesses of the harem. What Akbar actually believed was something like this : Men do require some external symbol to contemplate upon the incomprehensible Divinity. The greatest symbol of divine effulgence that is visible to all is the sun, the source of light and life. He never went out of his way to confure the sun with God. It was his firm belief, which he had inherited from the Mughals and his father, that the fortunes of kings have some mysterious connection with the sun. Humayun also believed that "Sunday belongs to the sun to whom, according to the will of God, are attached the fates of all rulers and kings." It was an old superstition of the Mughals, and Akbar could not shake it off. He was further led to believe that by means of incantations and magic, the solar force could be made to yield most favourable results. Akbar shared this astrological belief with most of the Asiatics and, lthough not countenanced by Islam, it continued to linger on and even find favour in many quarters. Akbar did not worship the sun as God but had a reverential attitude towards it and believed that it had the sanction of the *Quran*. "From ignorance," said Akbar, "men fail in reverence to the fountain of light, and reproach him who prays to it. If their understanding were not at fault, how could they forget the Sura beginning : 'By the sun.........?' "

Like his sun worship, his kindness towards animals and dislike for animal food have been treated as due to Jain influence. The Jains were at the court of Akbar, and he had the privilege of listening to the discourses of the great saint and scholar, Hira Vijaya Suri, and also Vijaysen Suri and Bhanu Chandra Upadhyaya. It was at Akbar's request that Hira Vijaya Suri had come from Gujrat (1582), and Jinchandra Suri from Cambay (1591). Akbar treated them most graciously, admired their renunciation, listened attentively to their illuminating discourses and conferred honours and titles on them. His contact with them probably strengthened his

growing regard for animal life. As early as 1578, when he had a fit of frenzy, his interest in hunting had begun to flag and sensitiveness for animal life had begun to develop. The influence of the Hindu ascetics, *faqirs* and certain types of Sufis would have most likely made him more sensitive. Even in his time there were some highly venerable Muslim *faqirs* and scholars who had entirely given up meat. Akbar had come to believe that "blood contains the principle of life. To avoid eating thereof is to honour life." According to Monserrate, the Kapuri ascetics were responsible for inducing the Emperor to refrain from meat. It was in May 1578 that Akbar had given clear evidence of his regard for faunistic life and 'ordered hunting to be abandoned'. True it is that the Jains claim the honour of converting him to vegetarianism, but it is difficult to give them the whole credit for it, as other internal and external influences of a similar nature were working on his mind. But unlike the Jains, Akbar had not totally given up the use of meat, nor did he put a stop to killing of all animals as such. He restricted the use of meat and discouraged it among the people by prohibiting the slaughter of animals on certain days. The prohibition of the slaughter of cows, according to Abul Fazl, was based primarily on economic and secondarily on political reasons. Such prohibitions were not contradictory to the *Quran* and were not enforced under the influence of the Jains alone in defiance of Islam. If the Jains exercised any influence, it was of a secondary or rather confirmatory nature.

The development of Akbar's ideas and opinions and the general course of his conduct presented him to the outer world as a difficult problem. As to his faith, there has existed ever since his day a great divergence of opinion among historians. His admirer Abul Fazl regarded him as a true Mussalman, while Badauni, his relentless critic, pronounced him to be a heretic who, in his ignorance, was led unwittingly to subvert Islam under the Satanic influences of Mubarak Nagori, his sons and other self-seeking flatterers. He has made serious

charges against Akbar to prove that not only did he repudiate Islam, but went to the extent of insulting it in an outrageous manner by persecuting the Muslims, and establishing his own new-fangled religion. According to him, Akbar claimed to be a prophet and was suspected of aiming at Godhood. Some of these charges have been repeated by some of the Jesuit Fathers. At one time the statements of Badauni and the Fathers were taken almost literally. But on closer examination most of them have been found gratuitous, exaggerated and even deliberately perverted. They have been critically examined and analysed in detail by many students of history. Almost all of them have come to the conclusion that for a correct understanding of the religious views and policy of Akbar, it is very unsafe to rely upon the statements of Badauni and the Jesuits since they lacked correct information, proper appreciation of facts and impartiality. The statements of Abul Fazl, though comparably more reliable, suffer from the exuberance and extravagance of his florid Persian style and are coloured by a feeling of personal gratitude and intense hero-worhsip. But Badauni's opinions have never been shared by any Persian historian of eminence from his time downwards. Similar divergence exists among modern scholars.

Blochmann and Smith say that Akbar totally rejected Islam while Beveridge says, "he never entirely divested himself of his early religious beliefs", but suspects him to be a sceptic. Count Noer calls his creed a sort of "Parsi-Sufi-Hinduism" and credits him with a desire to annihilate the supremacy of Islam. Muhammad Husain Azad, a Shia, says that whatever Akbar did was due to political considerations and, though he considers some of his innovations as contravening the law, he does not regard him as a heretic. Shibli Nomani too does not consider Akbar a hater of Islam or a heretic ; on the other hand he says that Akbar's conduct was in harmony with that of the pious *Khalifas*. Whatever might have been the impression of the Jesuit Fathers and the rumours current among some classes of people,

there is no doubt that Akbar lived and died a Mussalman. It is equally clear that he never indentified himself with any particular school of law and thought, and this was the chief reason why people doubted his religion. In those days an average Mussalman thought of Islam in terms of Shia, Sunni, Hanafi, Maliki, Shafai, Hambali or any other affiliation. Only a few enlightened men could rise above this sectarian interpretation of Islam and look at it from a wider and comprehensive viewpoint. Akbar heard the views of every one of them but chose to follow that which appealed to his reason. He might not have been a good Mussalman in the eyes of the orthodox and school-men, but he never rode roughshod over any of the vital and essential principles of Islam.

A few of his acts may be open to some sort of objection, but on the whole Akbar's beliefs cannot be dubbed anti-Islamic. The theory that he persecuted pious Muslims for their religious opinions is true only to the extent that he brought to book a few individuals who were found to foment rebellion in the eastern provinces and the Punjab, particularly at Lahore. In sheer malice, Badauni has exaggerated the matter and given it the colour of religious persecution, and the Jesuit accounts are similarly warped by their one-sidedness, ignorance of correct facts and the desire to advertise their work of dislodging him from Islam. The charge of repudiating Islam levelled against Akbar can hardely sustain critical examination.

Convinced as Akbar was that the usual division of human actions into secular and religious was philosophically unsound, he naturally came to lay stress on the indivisibility of life. He believed that for every act, however trivial, man is responsible to God. From the day consiousness dawns upon the individual, he stands face to face with the Omnipotent and the Omnipresent, and it is impossible to evade His ever-vigilant and all-penetrating eye. It was for this reason that he always tried to know, if he could, the will of God, and abide by it. He honestly believed that whatever he did was an act of dedication to God. Every act was, there-

fore, religious in the higher sense of the term.

Another conclusion, to which he was drawn after a long study and serious thought, was that absolute truth is by no means a monopoly of any particular religion. All religions appeal to righteousness and strive after the same goal. This idea was beautifully expressed in an inscription written by Abul Fazl for a temple in Kashmir :

> "O, God in temple I see people that seek Thee, and in every language I hear spoken, people praise Thee.
>
> Polytheism and Islam feel after Thee.
> Each religion says, Thou art one, without equal ;
>
> If it be a mosque, people murmur the holy prayer and if it be a temple people ring the bell from love to Thee.
>
> Sometimes I frequent, the Christian cloister, Hindu temple and sometimes the mosque,
> But it is Thou whom I search from temple to temple.
>
> Thy elect have no dealing with *Kufr* and orthodoxy for neither of them stands behind the curtain of Thy Islam (truth).
>
> Heresy to the heretic, and religion (*Din*) to
> the orthodox,
> But the dust of rose petal belongs to the
> heart of the perfume seller."

Akbar, therefore, felt himself worried at the obstinacy of men not to see the grand Truth and realize that it was possible to live in peace with all, go ahead in the quest of God and lead a life of cleanliness and piety. "Although I am the master of so vast a kingdom," he is reported to have said, "and all the happiness of government are to my hand, yet since true greatness consists in doing the will of God, my mind is not at ease in the diversity of sects and creeds."

Shrewd as Akbar was, he must have felt that it was neither possible to melt all religions down into one, nor to launch a new religion which would have only added one more to others. But he felt himself called upon to

propagate his ideas among those who cared to listen to them. With a view to considering the measures that could be adopted to gain his object, he broached the matter in a council of some of his confidants. They represented that it was not possible for any individual connected with the state to undertake such a task in the atmosphere which then prevailed, for "although some are enlightened, many would observe silence from fear of fanatics...and should any one muster sufficient courage and openly proclaim his enlightened thoughts, pious simpletons would call him a mad man and throw him aside as of no account; ill-starred wretches would at once think of heresy and atheism and go about with the intention of killing him". By his position, intellectual and spiritual attainments, they said, the Emperor himself was fit to undertake the task and he might take those men, who were willing and whom he approved, and initiate them into his principles of life and conduct. Consequently, those admirers of Akbar who believed him to be worthy of being their spiritual guide constituted themselves into an order or society and recognized him as their *Pir* or *Guru.*

On his new task Akbar entered with full sense of responsibility. "To make a disciple," said he, "is to instruct him in the service of God, not to make him a personal attendant." "The office of a spiritual director is to discern the state of the soul and to set about its reform and it lies not in growing the locks of an Ethiopian and patching a tattered robe and holding formal discourses." Wether he was fit for discerning souls or not is not the question with which we are concerned. He himself never claimed to have reached the final stage of spiritual attainment. But he felt himself far more qualified to undertake the task than most of the *gurus*, *pirs* and spiritual interpreters of whom there were, in India, enough and to spare.

The society began in all solemnity with a small number of men and in an unostentatious manner. It was not open to all; only those who were willing to join and whom the Emperor approved were allowed to

become members. Sunday was fixed for the initiation of new members. The novice with his turban in hands placed his head at the feet of the Emperor, who raised him up with his own hands and placed his turban on his head. Akbar then gave him his formula, technically called in Sufic language '*shast*', which the novice was to repeat and concentrate upon. This formula was engraved on a tablet which also contained Akbar's favourite motto '*Allah-o-Akbar*'. The novice also got Akbar's picture in miniature which was usually carried in the turban. Individual instruction as to the particular course of conduct a disciple should adopt was also imparted. The novice was expected to open out his heart and Akbar gave him his best advice. Besides the individual instructions, the members of the order were to adress '*Allah-o-Akbar*' (God is Great) for salute, the answer to which was '*Jall-Jalalahu*' (Resplendent is His Glory). They were advised to try to abstain from meat as far as possible, but to refrain from even touching it at least in the month of their birth. The disciples were also ordered to give sumptuous feast and bestow alms on the occasion of their birthday. They were ordained not to cohabit with girls below the age of puberty, and with barren, pregnant and old women.

It is not possible to say if anything else, besides what the official accounts tells us, was binding uponits members. The superstition regarding the sun and light and such other personal beliefs of the Emperor do not seem to have formed an essential part of the *Ilahi* Order. The sect had no sacred book or scripture, no priestly hierarchy, no sacred place of worship and no rituals or ceremonies except that of initation. Badauni, however, says that a member had to give a written promise of having renounced Islam and accepted the four grades of entire devotion, viz. sacrifice of property, life, honour and religion. Without questioning the doubtful validity of this statement, it can be safely presumed that these grades were essentially those which Imam Ghazali prescribed for an aspirant to spiritual perfection. Ghazali adds that a novice should cling "like a blind

man on the bank of a river to his guide". The word religion in this context corresponds with what Ghazali understood by mechanical conformity (*taqlid*). In all probability Akbar did not interfere with the religion or creed of individual members, but only tried to help individuals in their spiritual evolution and to impress upon them the higher synthesis of religions and their fundamental unity.

The *Din Ilahi* was not a religion and Akbar never intended to establish a church. He knew that his position might induce a large number of men to seek admission to satisfy their curiosity or to seek material advantages. Therefore, he was very strict in admitting men to the order. In spite of these restrictions, a number of men might have got themselves enlisted with no higher motives than those of 'hope and fear'. These selfish men must have been sorely disappointed to find Akbar too shrewd for them. Akbar often used to say that "the welfare of those who are privileged to confidential counsel at the court of a great monarch has been said to lie in rectitude and loyalty; no self-interest or mercenary motive should intervene". Badauni himself tells us that neither force nor money was employed to enlist disciples. There is not a single instance to show that refusal to join the order lowered, or admission into it raised, the official status of a person. Still the number of disciples of all classes had swollen to "many thousands." About twenty names of the members have come down to us. Excepting Birbal, all were Mussalmans some of them were man of high character, great ability and independence of mind. None of the great Hindu officials, Bhagwan Dass, Man Singh, or Todar Mal joined it; they rather looked upon it with suspicion.

The political significance of the *Ilahi* order does not seem to have been great, for the membership of the order remained confined to a few thousands only in a population of millions. It nevertheless brought into existence a group of men whose chief motto was "God and the King", who vowed allegiance and surrender to Akbar and were bound to him by personal

ties. The *Ilahi* order set an example of how, inspite of social, political and religious differences, it was possible for men to meet on a common platform and unite for God and the King. It must have strengthened the confidence of the subjects in the Emperor and cast a spiritual halo around the throne. There seems to be no justification for the suggestion that the order was used by Akbar to train officers in his school of thought and then send them as high officers in different provinces of the empire to enforce or propagate it.

The *Din Ilahi* had come into existence simply because of the desire of Akbar to bring together men who were willing to submit to his spiritual guidance and infuse into them his own catholic spirit and principles of action. This he expected to do by means of example and not by other crude means of cajoling or coercion. It seems that he had no intention to perpetuate an order by nominating his spiritual successor or requiring others to initiate men on his behalf and propagate it. With his ability for organization, it would not have been difficult for Akbar at least to try to evolve a machinery for the continuation of his order and the propagation of his principles, but that he did not deliberately do. It was entirely a personal matter, not between the Emperor and the subjects, but between Akbar and those who chose to regard him as their *Pir* or *Guru*. With his death disappeared that personal tie and the society also naturally. Jahangir tried for some time to follow the example of his father, initiate disciples and bestow *Shast* and his picture. He exhorted the disciple not to "confuse or darken his years with sectarian quarrels, but to follow the rule of universal peace with regard to religions, (and) not to kill any living creature with his own hand", except in battle and the chase. But he had neither the character not the glamour of his father, with the result that he could not do much. His unworthy pretensions soon faded away.

The forces Akbar had set in motion did not, however, go in vain. At least for two generations his ideas inspired his descendants. Prince Khusro and Prince

Dara were the outstanding representatives of his school of thought and if they had succeeded to the Imperial throne they would have, in all probability, carried his mission further and achieved striking results. Unfortunately none of them possessed the strong political insight, courage and vigour of Akbar; hence both were disappointed.

Having undertaken to be the protector of his subjects, Akbar did not hesitate to introduce reforms affecting the social life of the people. The first was to stop *sati*, the burning of a widow (1590-91), unless she herself, of her own free choice, had expressed her clear and persistent desire to immolate herself. Widows of tender age who had not shared the bed with their husbands were not to be burnt at all. As a corollary, he also legalized widow-remarriage (1587) and encouraged monogamy. He prohibited men to marry more than one wife, except in case of barrenness. The marriageable age of girls was raised to fourteen and that of boys to sixteen (1582). For achieving these objects, he introduced registration of marriages. Although Akbar himself did not like change from one religion to the other, he gave perfect freedom to everyone to determine his own religion (1601). No one was allowed to marry by use of force or immoral enticements or for sensual love. The sale and manufacture of liquor was prohibited, but licensed shops were allowed to supply wine only to those who required it for medical purposes (1582). The age of circumcision was raised to twelve (1590-91). Prostitutes and women of bad character were segregated in a quarter outside the town and police officers were instructed to keep an eye on those who frequented them, register their names and also of those who called them to their houses. High officials charged with prostitution were censured and even sometimes punished. Akbar was much worried at the growth of mendicancy in India. "It is my desire," he used to say, "that mendicancy should disappear from my dominions." It was obviously difficult to abolish this evil of centuries, but he ordered the police

officers to keep a strict eye on the movements of mendicants, enquire into the course of their conduct, procure employments for those who had taken to mendicancy on account of poverty, expel from towns and cities men of doubtful character and deal rigorously with the *Malangs* and *Qalandars*.

Akbar was, by nature, inquisitive and anxious to know more and more about religions, cultures, philosophies and sciences of peoples with whom he came into contact. Work in Arabic, Sanskrit, Persian and even Greek were translated for him according to his instructions. Among the early translations were the *Singhasan Battisi* (1574-75), called *Khirad Afza Nama*, *Hayatul Haivan* (1575-76), the *Atharva Veda* (1575-76) and the *Bible* (1578). In the eighties of the century were translated the *Mahabharata* ('82-83), the *Bhagvadgita* the *Ramayana* ('83-84), the *Harivansh Purana* (*Jama-i-Rashidi*) (1585), and the *Tuzuki-Babari*, ('89). In the nineties translations were done of *Majmaul Buldan*, a work on geography ('91), the *Quran* ('91-92), the *Panchtantra*, the *Katha Saritsagar* ('96). A work known as *Samratul Filasafa* was translated from some treatise on the history of Rome and the biographies of great men (1603). Among original works composed at Akbar's behest were *Tarikhi-Alafi* (1582-83), the *Akbarnama* and the *Ain-i-Akbari* ('95-98), a Sanskrit rendering of a part of which was done by Mahesh, but was not completed. The romantic episode of Nal and Damayanti formed the subject of a *masnavi* by Faizi (1594), which was pronounced by Badauni as the finest work of poetry produced in India during three centuries. Most of the translations were neither full nor literal. They were general since their purpose was specific and practical.

CHAPTER XIV

EXTENSION OF THE EMPIRE

The last king of Gujrat, Muzaffar Shah III, had been taken into custody by Akbar in 1572. He was placed in the charge of Munim Khan Khan-i-Khana, who took him to Bengal and gave him the hand of his daughter. After Munim's death, he was transferred to the charge of Khwaja Mansur, but he contrived to escape. He then took shelter in Kathiawar, but kept his movements so secret that the governor of the province, Shihabuddin Khan, could get no clue. In 1582 Shihabuddin was recalled and Etmad Khan was appointed in his place. A few hundred servants of Shihabuddin mutinied on the question of pay. Taking advantage of the confusion prevalent and the absence of Etmad Khan from Ahmadabad, Muzaffar emerged suddenly and captured it. This event fanned the ambition of the mutineers. Encouraged by his success, Muzaffar took offensive against the Mughals, defeated them and resumed the style of the King of Gujrat.

On hearing the report of the insurrection, Akbar sent Mirza Khan on 23 September by the Ajmer route, ordered Qulij Khan of Surat to hasten to Malwa, and taking the officers there with him proceed to Ahmadabad by the Malwa route. Before these troops could reach Gujrat, the fire of rebellion had begun to blaze with greater fury. All the discontented elements gathered under the banner of Muzaffar. Baroda was besieged. Qutubuddin, the governor of Baroda, surrendered, but he was treacherously executed and his property valued at serveral crores was plundered (Nov. 23, 1583). The Emperor was at Allahabad supervising the new fort he was constructing at the confluence of the Ganges and the Jamuna, when this melancholy news reached him. He returned to the capital to direct the officials operating in Gujrat.

While Muzaffar's arms were more successful in the south, the Imperialists in the north were gradually gaining the better of the rebels. On the last day of 1583 Mirza Khan also reached Gujrat. On January 16, 1584, a battle was fought at Sarkhij between Mirza Khan and Muzaffar in which the latter was completely defeated. Muzaffar, however, fled towards Cambay and again collected an army, ten or twelve thousand strong, and went into the Rajpipla hills. The Mughals pursued him from place to place and inflicted a signal defeat on him an Champanir in March. Although his army was completely smashed, Muzaffar made good his escape. Gujrat was now quite out of danger. Akbar rewarded the services of Mirza Khan by conferring on him the title of *Khan-i-Khana*.

In Kathiawar, Muzaffar carried on desultory warfare with the active help or the connivance of the Afghan and Hindu chiefs, and continued to cause troubles. He was, however, not allowed to find rest and was chased from place to place by the Mughals under the energetic Nizamuddin Ahmad. As the rebellion dragged on without any hope of success, his supporters grew weary and gradually deserted him. In 1590, he appeared once more followed by the chiefs of Nawanagar, Cutch, Kherdi and a prince of Junagadh. On July 17, 1591, the confederates were defeated by Aziz Koka in a well-contested battle at Patri, north-west of Vairamgam. For two years Muzaffar continued to elude the Mughal pursuit, but by the treachery of the Jam he was captured on December 25, 1592. On the way, at Dhorral, Muzaffar committed suicide by cutting his throat with a razor. With his death the hold of the Mughals on Gujrat became tight and they found it comparatively easy gradually to subdue the Afghans and some Hindu chiefs who still defied the Imperial power in Kathiawar. The attempt of Bahadur, son of the late Muzaffar Gujrati, to assert his claims and rally supporters did not succeed.

During this period Akbar was contemplating an invasion of the Deccan, but he had to turn his attention to

developments in the north of Afghanistan. In that sphere the hereditary enemies of the dynasty of Babar, the Uzbeks, were gaining power for some years past under the leadership of the ambitious, energetic and warlike Abdullah Khan. He had conquered Bukhara, Balkh, Tashkant and practically the whole of Turkistan, and had welded the Uzbek tribes into a united and powerful nation. In 1584 he conquered Badakhashan, which was weakened beyond redemption by a civil war between Sulaiman and his grandson Shahrukh. Sulaiman and Shahrukh fled to Kabul in great distress. Mirza Hakim now felt that his own kingdom was exposed to the Uzbek aggression. He, therefore, requested the Emperor for assistance and afterwards, according to Akbar's wishes, sent Shahrukh and Sulaiman to India. Akbar was yet thinking of what steps he should take to keep the Uzbek in check, when the news arrived that Mirza Hakim had died on July 30, 1585, leaving behind two young princes, Kaiqubad and Afrasiyab, and that disturbances had broken out in Kabul.

The Emperor at once realized the danger to which Afghanistan was exposed and sent immediate orders to Man Singh to march to Kabul, put down disorders and wait for further instructions. On August 24 the Emperor himself left Fatehpur for the north-west. On his way, he sent from Kalanur an embassy to Kashmir asking the ruler either to come in person or send back his son Yaqub who had fled away from the camp.

The Emperor must have been much pleased when on 11 November the sons of Mirza Hakim who had been sent from Kabul by Man Singh, arrived in the camp. Many Mughal officers now advised the Emperor not to go beyond Rohtas, but he pushed on and reached Rawalpindi on 7 December. Akbar was obviously very anxious to maintain the integrity of the empire by closing every possible route to India; hence on 20 December he sent expeditions to conquer Kashmir, Swat, Bijaur and Biluchistan. Man Singh was sent to Kabul as its governor. Attock was made the Imperial headquarters.

As his prolonged stay at Attock was causing anxiety to Abdullah Khan and was likely to complicate the negotiations he was conducting with the Uzbek court, Akbar decided to return. It was however, not proper to move the court back to Fatehpur so long as the frontier tribes had not been compelled to adopt a reasonable frame of mind, Kashmir was not subdued and the general situation had not improved. Moreover famine conditions in the provinces of Agra and Delhi deterred him from going there. He, therefore, returned to Lahore in May 1586, made it the capital of the empire, and sat down to watch the progress of his military and diplomatic movements.

The full control of the Khaibar pass and the submission of the Afghan tribes inhabiting the country along the Kabul river were the first requisties for a comprehensive and systematic opposition to the Uzbeks. So long as Afghanistan was not well under control and the Afghan tribes inhabiting the plains of Peshawar and the hilly country of Swat and Bijaur maintained a defiant attitude, there could be no possibility of unhindered operations in Kabul or Badakhshan. Unfortunately, the Yusufzais of Swat and Bijaur were, as usual, troublesome and infested the roads, plundered the caravans between India and Turan, and remained defiant.

Akbar sent Zain Khan Koka against the Yusufzais of the Bijaur country; and Said Khan Ghakkar was sent to sweep the plains of Peshawar and join Zain Khan. Sometime after, Raja Birbal was also sent to reinforce the Khan. In the plains the operations were quite successful; and Zain Khan also gained success in the hilly country of Bijaur. Zain Khan, however, reported to the Emperor that the Bijaur expedition would not succeed fully unless the Afghans of Tirah and Swat were subdued first, and asked for further reinforcements. Hakim Abdul Fath was, therefore, sent through the Malkand pass, which was the shortest cut, to reinforce Zain Khan. At the Malkand pass, Zain Khan joined them and the combined troops marched to Chakdara. Dissensions

now broke out among the commanders, particularly Birbal and Zain Khan, on the question of guarding Chakdara by one army while the other operated in the interior of the hills. Zain Khan was of that opinion; but Birbal, who could surely have possessed little knowledge of the conditions there, insisted that the Emperor wanted them all to enter the hills and march rapidly through the country and not to occupy it permanently. As soon as the advance guard ascended the top of the hills, the rear guards, which were commanded by Zain Khan in the valley, were attacked by the enemy who plundered the stores. It was with enormous difficulty and great loss that he could extricate himself from the danger. Zain now advised his colleagues either to give a battle where they were or to make peace by restoring the captives and wait for further orders from the Emperor. Some people informed Birbal that the Afghans intended a night attack and it was desirable for safety to cross the Malandarai pass which was only a few miles long. Birbal, therefore, pushed on in advance, Zain Khan following in the rear. Just when they reached the pass where the Afghans had mustered strong to dispute the passage, the sun set. In the darkness of night a battle was fought in which the Mughals were completely defeated and sustained enormous casualities. Several commanders, including Birbal, perished in that terrible valley of death (February 14 1586). It was untold difficulties that Zain Khan and Abul Fath returned to Attock with the wretched remnants of the shattered army. Akbar expressed his great grief at the death of Raja Birbal and dismissed Zain Khan and Abul Fath.

Akbar must have been sorely disappointed by this debacle. He wanted to make a successful military demonstration against the Yusufzais with a view to impress his power on them and also on his great rival Abdullah Khan Uzbek. But the results were quite contrary to his expectations. He was, however, not a man to be deterred by such misfortunes. He now despatched Raja Todar Mal not only to punish the Yusufzais but also to reduce them to complete obedience

and submission, with the least possible bloodshed and severity. To assist him Man Singh was also sent. This combination of an experienced and shrewd general like Todar Mal and a gallant commander like Man Singh was far better than the previous one. Subsequently Zain Khan and Abul Fath were also sent to help them. The Mughal commanders this time showed better judgment, great vigour and wise caution. The Raja established military posts and garrisoned numerous forts which he constructed at strategic points. From these forts the Mughals sallied out and harassed the Afghans and soon 'reduced them to great straits". In October 1588 Zain Khan surprised the Yusufzais who had collected together to celebrate the *Id Qurban* and gained a victory over them. The advantage thus gained by Zain Khan was utilized in establishing posts and opening communications with the plains. Although the Afghans continued to fight sporadic engagements, the Mughals considered their position so strong that both Asaf Khan and Zain Khan returned to the court. In 1589 Kalu Afghan, the mischievous leader of the Yusufzais, was arrested and thrown into prison. The Emperor himself went to Kabul in 1589 to pacify the country. He gave presents to Afghan hermits and distributed money among the poor. He was received well, for "on the whole way, Turks and Tajiks came forward on both sides with presents and offerings". The Emperor personally went to visit the houses of the *Aimaks* and received the leaders of the Hazara Afghans with great consideration. Akbar might have stayed there longer, but his presence excited the apprehension of Abdullah Khan Uzbek. Hence he returned leaving Qasim Khan as the governor of Kabul and Shahbaz Khan, the commander in Sawad.

But the Afghans had not learnt to be peaceful. In 1590 they again created disturbance and Zain Khan was sent to fight them. In 1592 Zain Khan was sent once more against Sawad and Bijaur where rebellion had broken out in sympathy with that of the *Raushaniyas*.

Ismail Quli Khan, who had been sent against

Biluchistan in December 1585, proved successful in his efforts. The people of that country submitted soon. Their chiefs Ghazi Khan and Ibrahim Khan came to the court to offer their allegiance and the Emperor was pleased to allow them to retain their country.

Since the death of Shadi Khan, known as Zainul-Abidin, the fair country of Kashmir had been a prey to intolerance, furious fanaticism, political intrigues and party strife. So far back as the time of Sikandar Lodi, the ruler of Kashmir, Muhammad, had come to take shelter with him and seek his help against his uncle Fateh Khan. Sikandar Lodi reinstated him on the throne and drove out Fateh Khan. The son of Fateh Khan, Sikandar, sought the help of Babar, but failed to gain any influence in Kashmir. In 1525 Muhammad was dethroned and his son Ibrahim was raised to the throne by Mullick Achy. But Achy's rival invoked the aid of Babar, drove Ibrahim out of Kashmir, and once more placed Muhammad on the throne.

The discontented party now requested Kamran to conquer Kashmir, but the cruelty of the soldiers of Kamran drove the different Kashmiri parties into a temporary defensive union, strong enough to beat the Mughals back. In 1535 an invasion from Kashghar took place and the ruler of Kashmir was compelled to give his daughter in marriage to the prince of Kashghar. No sooner did the danger pass away, that civil war blazed up. A party invited Humayun to conquer Kashmir, but he could not accept the proposal for reasons already discussed. But Haidar Doghlat, the cousin of Babar, welcomed the proposals, conquered Kashmir in 1540-41, read *Khutba* and struck coins in the name of Humayun. The other party then called in the aid of Sher Shah, but the Afghan expedition led by Husain Khan Sherwani ended in failure. Similarly, the attempt to bring in the Niyazis in the time of Islam Shah failed ignominously. Haidar Mirza established friendly relations with Islam Shah and continued to rule till 1551, when he was killed in a skirmish.

The death of Haidar was a signal for a far more

furious factious struggle. There were four parties—the Zainas, the Makris, the Kapooris and the Kamis. The country was hopelessly divided and the nominal rulers were made and unmade at their sweet will. In eight years five kings ruled Kashmir. The old dynasty lost the throne which was usurped by Ghazi Khan Chak in 1560 and shortly afterwards transferred to his brother, Husain Khan. It is thus clear why Babar, Humayun and Kamran : all had their eyes on Kashmir.

The relations of Akbar with Husain Shah and his brother and successor Ali Shah were not unsatisfactory. Although he had refused the hand of the daughter of Husain Shah, he was pleased to marry Salim to the niece of Ali Shah Chak in 1572. Ali Shah had gone to the extent of proclaiming Akbar sovereign of Kashmir in public prayers. In 1578-9 Ali Shah died and was succeeded by his son Yusuf. A civil war at once broke out and Yusuf was obliged to fly and throw himself under the protection of Akbar. In 1580 the Emperor despatched Man Singh for his assistance. The Imperial army marched as far as Pinjar when the Kashmiris sued for peace and requested Yusuf to come alone. Without informing the Mughal officers, Yusuf slipped off and seated himself on the throne. When in 1584 he was asked to come to the court and pay homage, he refused and instead sent first his younger son Haider and then the elder one Yaqub. This, however, did not satisfy Akbar, who was apprehensive of trouble from the ministerial party which had made Yusuf their tool. In 1585, when Akbar was marching towards the frontier, Yaqub, apprehending some personal danger to himself, fled from the camp. At this, Akbar sent an order to Yusuf either to come in person or send Yaqub to the court. Yusuf was probably willing to come, but his nobles would not allow; so the embassy ended in nothing. As the time were critical owing to the developments in the north-west, and the Uzbek menace was serious, Akbar would not leave Kashmir in a state of doubtful loyalty.

In December 1585 Akbar deputed Shahrukh and

Bhagwan Das to lead an invasion into Kashmir by way of the Pukhli pass. At Buliyas pass they found their path blocked by Yusuf Khan. A well contested battle was fought, but with no decisive results. The Mughal army was in a fix; it could neither move forward nor could it retreat as the bridge had been swept away by heavy floods and the passes were under water. Famine in the camp and severe cold took a heavy toll of life. To add to their dismay, news reached the camp that the Yusufzais expedition had ended in utter disaster. Bhagwan Das, however, sent a message to Yusuf that he should not fail to remember that the Rajputs cared little for their lives and that the might of the Mughal Emperor would not suffer appreciably even if his troops in Kashmir perished totally. This plain truth moved Yusuf, but he failed to convince his nobles. At last he secretly fled from his camp and came over to Bhagwan Das. The Kashmiris at once placed Yaqub on the throne of Kashmir and came out to fight. After killing several thousand famished Mughals soldiers, they compelled them to seek shelter behind the entrenchments. But the Mughals could not afford to stay there any longer as famine and cold grew so threatening that a meal even for an asharfi could hardly be had, and men had to cut the bellies of elephants and horses to shields themselves ! No alternative being left, the Mughals patched up a sort of peace with Yaqub, the terms of which were that the *Khutba* and coins will bear Akbar's name and the dues from safforn crop, the shawl duty and income from mint be reserved for the Emperor (1586). The shattered and broken army retraced its steps to tell the sad tale to the Emperor.

To Akbar the expedition against Kashmir appeared as having failed like the first expedition of Birbal and Zain Khan against the Yusufzais. Its so-called success was worse than a defeat. Akbar's disappointment must have been all the more bitter as the ambassador of his rival Abdullah Khan of Turan was then staying at the court to record these disasters. He, therefore, refused to recognize the treaty which had been imposed upon his

officers in the face of untold hardships. Moreover, Yaqub had thrown to the winds the fiction of Akbar's overlordship and in 1586 ordered the *Khutba* to be read and coin struck in his own name. In short, Kashmir was ruled now by a prince definitely unfriendly to the Emperor.

Akbar was not prepared to leave Yaqub to himself. At first he thought of placing Yusuf once more on the throne of Kashmir, but afterwards he changed his mind probably because Yusuf was a worthless man incapable of controlling either his sons or the party leaders who had made themselves very powerful. Finally, he decided to conquer Kashmir and sent Qasim Khan *Mir-Bahr* to deal with Yaqub who had now assumed the title of Shah Ismail. Qasim entered Kashmir at a time when Yaqub's short-sighted policy had revived the fanaticism of Shias and Sunnis, and alienated some *Amirs* who raised the standard of rebellion under the leadership of Shamsuddin Chak. Qasim Khan moved cautiously, strengthened the passes which came in his control, won the sympathy of many chiefs, and welcomed the services of some discontented Kashmiri nobles. On Oct. 2 1586 a battle was fought in which Shamsuddin Chak was defeated and the road to Srinagar opened. On the 7th the Mughal troops reached Srinagar and read the *Khutba* in Akbar's name. Yaqub fled from Srinagar and continued his opposition, but was pursued from place to place. The restlessness and energy shown by the rebels obliged Qasim Khan to follow a repressive policy which, however, he had soon to regret. Repression could not solve, rather it complicated problems and he got disguested with it and requested his recall. Mirza Yusuf, a mashhadi Saiyid, was sent with his Rohilla contingents to take charge of the operations. He followed a policy of firmness and reconciliation, gradually won over the people and the nobles to his side, gave a smashing defeat to Shamsuddin Chak and finally compelled Yaqub also to surrender in 1589. The Emperor, however, pardoned him, and bestowed on him a mansab of 500 and a small jagir in Bihar.

The conquest of Kashmir made a great impression on the half-subdued or recalcitrant Rajas of the hills of northern Punjab. The Rajas of Nagarkot, Jammu, Man, Jeswal and a dozen other chiefs hastened to offer their submission and presents to the Emperor (1509). In 1591 Ali Rai the ruler of Little Tibet also sent present and gave the hand of his daughter to Salim. Their collective strength was estimated at one lac infantry and ten thousand cavalry, while their recognition of the Imperial suzerainty contributed substantially to the safety of the Punjab and the frontiers.

The founder of the *Raushaniyya* sect, nicknamed by the Mughal historians as the Tariki, was one Bayazid an Afghan born at Jullundhar about 1525, but bred up in the hills of Afghanistan. From his childhood he showed his learning towards spiritualism, but it was not till he had come under the influence of Mulla Sulaiman, probably an Ismailian, who lived at Kalinjar in U. P., that his religious beliefs took a definite shape. On his return from Kalinjar, he devoted himself to spiritual exercises in a mountain cave near Kaniguram and thereby he believed to have passed through the several stages of spiritual edification of which man is capable. He then came to feel that he was inspired directly by God and, therefore, whatever he did or said was unquestionably the final authority. Accordingly, he assumed the title of *Pir Raushan*, from which his followers came to be called the *Raushaniyyas*. The most important article of his faith was the divinity and the inviolability of the *Pirs*, who were to be recognised as the final authority in all matters. Those who did not offer submission and obedience to Pir were animals and deserved extirpation without any compunction, and their property could be confiscated. The *Quran* and the *Hadis* should be interpreted in the mystic sense, which only a *Pir* possesses or communicates. Pirhood is attained by religious exercises and austerities or instruction from a *Pir*. The external laws and ordinances (*shara*) do not apply to a *Pir*. Resurrection, heaven and hell are to be understood in a metaphorical sense, and

are found in this very world. Human souls are subject to transmigration into other bodies. The orthodox Muslims considered the *Raushaniyyas* as *Mulhids*, and the government charged them of sedition and brigandage. But for the aggressive militarism they might have been regarded as one of the many sects which held more or less similar views current in those days.

Bayazid's faith brought him into conflict with the Sunnis but his fervour and profundity won for him the devotion of a number of Afghan tribes, chief of whom were the Mohmands, Gharihels, Khalils and Mahmudzais. Thus, the whole of the Pashtu land along the Peshawar valley and the Kabul river, which was inhabited by the wild Afghan tribes was fired with enthusiasm for his cause. The persecutions which he suffered at the hands of the Sunnis drove him into bitter hostility towards them and led him finally to preach a war of annihilation on his opponents. His organization, with its graded hierarchy of spiritual disciples, worked wonderfully well. The turbulent Afghan tribes, which were already given to plunder and robbery found a religious sanction and spared neither the Hindus nor the Muslim Sunnis. His activities at last drew the attention of Mirza Hakim, who called him to his presence. By a clever exposition of his doctrine, he disarmed the suspicion of being an anti-Muslim and was, therefore, acquitted. This encouraged him to extend the field of his operations to the Terah and Safed Koh mountains, and in course of time to preach against the Mughal supremacy and for a general war of political and spiritual liberation. For achieving his object he raised an irregular force of cavalry. At last he came into conflict with the Kabul government, but was defeated and driven to such hardships that he died.

His mantle fell on Omar, but he estranged the sympathies of the Yusufzais, who were once ardent *Raushaniyyas*. He was defeated and killed. His youngest brother Jalala, a boy of 14 years, was taken prisoner and brought before Akbar in 1581 while he was returning from his first Kabul expedition. Akbar

treated him well and kindly, but he did not feel satisfied and fled from the Mughals. Then he began to preach violently like his father, and soon united the Bangash, Afridi and Urakzai clans, who inhabited the Khaibar route, into undisguised hostility to the Mughals and assumed the title of the King of the Pushtus. His followers roamed up and down the country plundering and robbing and making communications between India and the land of the Afghans well nigh impossibe. They even killed Saiyid Hamid Bokhari, the Mughal *jagirdar* of Peshawar with forty of his relations and besieged the fort in 1585.

On the 20th December, when Zain Khan was operating against the Yusufzais, and Shahrukh against Kashmir, Akbar ordered Man Singh to open the route to Kabul and subdue the *Tarikis* (*Raushaniyyas*). The Raja made terrible onslaughts on them and ruled with an iron hand which made the Afghans tremble and smart under Rajput repression. But the tribes proved intractable. It was about this time that the Turanian ambassador Mir Quraish came, but he could not cross the Khyber until Man Singh came and drove away the *Raushaniyyas* who threatened to plunder the Mir. About the end of October '86 Man Singh was laid up with fever which invalidated him for over a month and a half. The Afghans utilized the opportunity to recover their position in Terah and fortified the Khyber with stones. As soon as Man Singh was fit he again moved out and cleared the pass after "many hard contests among the snow of the mountains and wild defiles" (15th Dec. '86).

His colleague Zain Khan showd his usual thoroughness and established military posts from Kabul to the Indus, thus ensuring the safety of the route to Kabul. Man Singh adopted a policy of severe repression, which led to his recall by Akbar. Jalala once more fell upon the Mughal army of Abul Matlab Khan, but was defeated and obliged to fly into the mountains. The new commander Sadiq Khan reconciled, for the time being, the Afridi and Urakzai tribes who were the chief

supporters of Jalala. Jalala was obliged to flee to Turan and his family was delivered by the Afghans to the Mughals (1588). Three or four years later Jalala returned from Turan and inspired the tribes to take up arms once more against the Mughals. The Emperor ordered the Kabul and the frontier forces under Qasim Khan and Asaf Khan to attack them (1592). Later on Zain Khan Koka was despatched to Swat and Bijaur where also, sympathetic rebellions had broken out. Soon after, the Kakiani and Mahmudzai Afghans joined the rebels. Zain Khan Koka pressed upon them and attacked their new headquarters in Kafiristan where they had built a fort to take shelter in case of retreat. Zain had already strengthened his rear by establishing military forts at each stage of his march, and so he could bring great pressure on them. Nevertheless, it was after a severe battle that he could capture their main fort of Chankari.

The operations of Zain Khan and Qasim Khan were fairly successful. The Afghans of Tirah submitted and the fort of Kanshali in Kafiristan was also captured. The *Kafirs* were so chastised that some of them even offered to help the Imperialists. Mahdat Ali, the leader of rebels, was captured and the entire hilly country up to the borders of Kashghar and Badakhshan came under the Mughal domination (1593). In 1594 Abdullah Khan Uzbek definitely recognized the Hindukush as the boundry between Turan and the Mughal Empire. Jalala was, however, still at large. He fled to Tirah, but the Afghans there refused to give him shelter. Qasim Khan was ordered to go back to Kabul.

While preparations were being made to invade Qandahar, Qasim Khan, the governor of Kabul, was assassinated in his sleeping apartment by a band of conspirators headed by Muhammad Zaman and the refugees from Badakhshan. But Hashim Beg, the brother of Qasim, soon succeeded in defeating the conspirators, killing every Badakhshi he could find and restoring order (1549). The death of Qasim Khan was a signal for another rising of the *Raushaniyyas*, but the

new governor Quli Khan dispersed them. Once more the Emperor sent Zain Khan to set the affairs of Kabul in order (1597).

The arrival of Zain Khan Koka and the news of the death of Abdullah Khan Uzbek weakened the enthusiasm of the rebels. They fled to Safed Koh, and Tirah was once more recovered (1598). Zain Khan ruled Kabul wisely and won the sympathy of the people by procuring a remission of 12.5% of the land-rent for eight years. In Aug. 1600 Jalala was found at Ghazni in the guise of a merchant. He had gone there to support the Nohanis against the Hazaras at the request of the former. But the Hazaras opposed him when, on 26, August, 1600 he wanted to get out of the city. He was badly wounded and fled to Rabat hill, but was pursued and his head was cut off by Murad Beg.

Thus, by 1601 the position of Akbar in the north-western frontier was quite strong. No doubt, in 1602 Ahdad, son of Jalala, once more stirred up strife in Tirah and rallied to his support the well-known recalcitrant tribes of the Afridis, Panis, Orakzais and Suris, but it was a local affair of no great magnitude. Takhta Beg led a punitive expedition against them and they were easily brought under control. Ahdad had to flee for his life and was not heard of during the rest of Akbar's reign.

With a view to conquer Qandahar Akbar wanted to hold himself in readiness to take immediate action when possible. The Qandahar and Biluchistan operations involved a thorough control over the province of Sindh. Bhakkar was already in the hands of the Mughals and Akbar now decided to round off his empire in that quarter by conquering Thatta. Abdur-Rahim Khan-i-Khana was sent to conquer Thatta, which was then ruled over by Jani Beg, who had not yet offered personal submission to Akbar. The Khan-i-Khana besieged Sehwan. Jani Beg came to its relief with a strong flotilla which was partly manned by Europeans. Two battles were fought in which the Mughals, in spite of considerable losses and hardships, inflicted a defeat on the Sindhis. Both Thatta and Sehwan fell to the

Mughals (1591-92). Jani Beg was enrolled among the *Amirs* of the Court, and was sent to fight for the empire in the Deccan. The whole of Sindh became a part of the Mughal Empire. Jani Beg was given the province of Multan and a *mansab* of 3,000.

Since its transfer to the Persian government in the early part of Akbar's reign, Qandahar was held by Sultan Husain Mirza, a nephew of Shah Tahmasp. In spite of the confusion which overtook Persia, the Emperor made no attempt to recover it. This attitude, no doubt, was partly due to the friendly relations which Sultan Husain maintained with Akbar, but it was largely due to the fact that Akbar was engrossed in internal affairs and the extension of the empire within the boundaries of India. It could hardly have been possible for him to capture and hold Qandahar without first strengthening his position on the frontiers and Sindh. There is, however, no doubt that Akbar was extremely anxious to have Qandahar which was rightly considered as one of the two eyes or gates of India.

In 1576 Sultan Husain Mirza died leaving four sons who remained in possession of the territories of Qandahar. The elder brother Muzaffar Husain held Qandahar proper, while Zamindawar was held by Rustam Mirza and his brothers. In course of time they declared their independence of Persia and acted as independent rulers. But civil war broke out between Muzaffar and Rustam, in which the latter was eventually the loser. Rustam then opened negotiations with Akbar who was on the north-western frontier. Akbar welcomed him (1594), gave him a mansab of five thousand with the government of Multan and Biluchistan.

Akbar was building up his frontier and was anxious to get Qandahar. He had, therefore, given shelter to Rustam Mirza. It was possible that Muzaffar Mirza might throw his lot with either Shah Abbas I of Persia or Abdullah Khan Uzbek, who had captured Khurasan. But Muzaffar Husain also sought the protection of Akbar. Immediately, correspondence began between the Persian and Indian governments,

Akbar promised to give help to the Shah of Persia should occasion arise, against his enemy, the ruler of Turan, Abdullah Khan, but expressed his desire to get Qandahar. The Shah of Persia was not in a fighting mood. For fear of the Uzbeks he had already signed reluctantly a treaty with Turkey and solicited the support of the Mughal Emperor.

Akbar did not wait long. Sindh had already been conquered and the Mughal arms had penetrated as far as Sibi (in Biluchistan), a fort near Qandahar. A Mughal force was sent to occupy Qandahar. Muzaffar Husain Mirza delivered the fort to the Mughals without any opposition and came to the court of Akbar, who honoured him with a *mansab* of five thousand and the *Sarkar* of Sambhal (1595). The people welcomed the Mughals and drove out the Uzbeks who had occupied Zamindawar and Garmsir. Both these divisions easily passed under the Mughals.

When Raja Man Singh came to Bihar, he subdued Raja Puran Mal of Gidhaur and Sangram Singh of Kharagpur. He sent an expedition against Anant Cheru of Gaya and subdued the Afghans who had been creating unrest in the districts of Purnea, Tajpur and Darbhanga (1588-89). The Raja invaded Orrissa by the Jharkhand route. Orissa was then the home of the Afghans who had become rebellious under the leadership of Qutlu Khan Nohani. The Afghans came out to fight and defeated Jagat Singh, son of Raja Man Singh, near Raipur. Man Singh then pushed forward to fight but before any decisive results could follow, Qutlu died. Khwaja Isa then declared Nasir, son of Qutlu, as his successor, but the Afghans, finding their position weak, agreed to submit and read the *Khutba* and strike coins in Akbar's name (1590).

The treaty made with the Afghans by Raja Man Singh was very reluctantly ratified by the Emperor, for he had design of extending his influence and power in the Deccan, and Orissa was an important key to it. So long as Khwaja Isa, the *Vakil* of Qutlu, lived, the treaty with the Mughals was respected. After his death

the Afghans lapsed into turbulence, plundered and desecrated the temple of Jagannath and the estate of Raja Hamir of Bishangarh (Vishnupur) in the Bankura district, who was a friend of the Mughals. Man Singh, therefore, declared war and opened attack from both Bihar and Bengal sides (1591). Said Khan, the governor of Bengal, was lukewarm and did not extend his full cooperation. The brunt of the struggle fell almost entirely on the Bihar army. On the northern bank of Subarnrekha at Binapur or Malnapur, some ten or twelve miles from Jalesar, Man Singh engaged the Afghans. The battle was a sanguinary contest, but the Mughals were victorious. They captured Cuttack and Sarangarh and annexed large tracts of land (1592.)

The Bengal insurgents were not confined merely to the regions of Sonargaon and Satgaon. They were aided by the Magh rulers and some *Zamindars*. Their main strength lay in the rivers and the flotilla. But the Mughals, at one time losing, at another moment gaining, maintained a constant pressure on them. At last, Man Singh dealt them a heavy blow at the battle of Bikrampur; Kedar Rai was mortally wounded and lost his life. The Magh chief realizing the futility of resisting the Mughals retired to his own territory, and Usman with his Afghans was isolated (Sept.-Oct. 1603). The backbone of the Afghan opposition was practically broken. Man Singh retired to Dacca and reported to the Emperor that the Bengal affair was practically settled. The Emperor was indeed so much elated that he ordered Man Singh to report to him, and raised his mansab to seven thousand Zat and six thousand *Sawar* a unique distinction.

The rigour with which Man Singh handled the Raja of Kharda, who had recognized the sovereignty of the Mughals did not however, please the Emperor. He was asked to go slow. He, therefore, recalled his troops from the territory of the Raja, and the Raja also pacified Man Singh by giving him his daughter in marriage.

Some of the leading Afghans chiefs, like Sulaiman and Usman, the nephews of Qutlu, were shifted from Orissa and assigned *jagirs* in eastern Bengal. This could hardly be liked by them; but matters became worse when they were called to the camp. They refused to go and broke into open rebellion.

The Mughal officers were driven out and the Mughal troops were not sufficient to stem the tide of the Afghan rebellion which soon spread to Satgaon. They were also helped by Isa, the most powerful *zamindar* of Bengal in the district of Dacca. The absence of Man Singh from Bengal gave them opportunity to strengthen their power. In view of the Afghan rebellion, Akbar sent him back. Man Singh marched to Ghoraghat, but there he fell ill. The Afghans, therefore, supported by Isa Khan and Masum Khan Kabuli, gained enormous strength. But they were driven back when Man Singh took the field again (1596).

In 1596, Man Singh succeeded in persuading Raja Lachmi Narayan of Cooch Bihar to accept the Imperial suzerainty. But Isa Khan at once threw his weight on the side of Raghudev, a cousin and rival of Lachmi Narayan, and marched on to help him. Man Singh sent his son Durjan Singh to prevent the junction, but Isa and Masum gained a victory and Durjan was killed (1597). Isa Khan, however, decided to make peace with the Muhgals. In May 1598 Masum Khan Kabuli died; and next year Isa Khan followed him. Their death weakened the Afghan power in southern Bengal. Man Singh was called to the Court and Bengal was governed in his name by his son Maha Singh, a boy of tender age. His weak administration encouraged Usman Khan and Sajawal Khan to create disturbance. The Mughal troops sent to fight them were defeated at Bhadrak in May 1600 after a hot engagement. Even the *Bakshi* of the Mughal army was made prisoner. Man Singh was at this time in Mewar with Prince Salim. On hearing of the news, he hastened to Bengal. The Afghans faced him near Sherpur Atai, but lost the battle (1601). The Turani rebel, Muzaffar

Khan submitted with the son of Masum Kabuli to the Mughals. Man Singh now made Dacca his headquarters and began to conciliate the *zamindars*. He consolidated the conquered territory and drove Daud and Sulaiman back to Sonargaon (1602).

CHAPTER XV

THE DECCAN

While Akbar was busy consolidating his empire and placing on a permanent footing its defences along the north-western frontier, he was not indifferent to the political and religious situation in the Deccan. Apparently the Vindhyas seemed to seperate the north from the south; but in reality, culture, commerce and politics had easily transcended these barriers. From the earliest recorded period the two halves of the country had been developing contacts irrespective of the differences in the characters of their political organizations. The impacts of the imperial powers apart, even the provincial kingdoms could not afford to follow a separatist or isolationist policy either in the pre- or post-Turkish periods of Indian history. The states of Gujrat, Malwa and Orissa were constantly involved in the vortex of south Indian politics. It would have been nothing short of a miracle if the Mughal empire that succeeded to these kingdoms could remain aloof. A host of questions relating to boundaries of states, spheres of influence, migrations, commerce, religious policy and the like, constantly crept up demanding new adjustments. The fate of north seems to have been inter-linked with that of the south; may be because nature had planned India as one well-defined unit. The riddle of the relationship between the two regions could be solved only along the lines chalked out by nature, whatever be the complexion or character of prevailing political conditions.

The close of the fifteenth century witnessed the dissolution of the Bahmani kingdom and the advent of the Portuguese on the western coast of India. Babar was invited to restore the integrity of the Bahmani kingdom, which obviously he could not accomplish. Humayun and Sher Shah both were undoubtedly

interested in their own ways, in the developments taking place in their day in the Deccan, but they had no opportunity or occasion to take an active part in them. Even Akbar had to keep himself aloof till his conquest of Gujrat. It was after the conquest of Malwa and Gujrat that he interested himself actively in the Deccan politics.

In 1560 the Vijaynagar and Bijapur kingdoms combined to defeat and impose humiliating terms on the kingdom of Ahmadnagar which was then a powerful state. Akbar who had annexed Malwa in 1561, must have watched with apprehension the extension of the Vijaynagar power so close to his territory. Luckily for him, the fate of Vijaynagar was sealed at Talikota (January 1565), while his own power had grown substantially in Rajputana. With Rajputana and Malwa under his control, he could succeed easily in conquering Gujrat in 1572. The relation of Gujrat with Khandesh had been so close that the ruler of the latter kingdom, Muhammad Shah II, laid his claim to the kingdom of Gujrat. He came in conflict with the Mughals as early as 1562, when Pir Muhammad entered, on his own initiative, the territory of Khandesh where the ex-king of Malwa, Baz Bahadur, had taken refuge. The expedition ended in failure.

The annexation of Berar to the kingdom of Ahmadnagar in 1574 caused alarm to the rulers of Khandesh. Bijapur and Golkunda too might have drawn the attention of Akbar to it. Muhammad Shah II, the ruler of Khandesh, marched to help a claimant to the kingdom of Berar, but was defeated. Burhanpur was plundered and Asirgarh was besieged. The army of Murtaza Nizam Shah advanced as far as the Mughal frontier. His movements could not have escaped Akbar's notice. In 1577 Akbar encamped on the bank of the Narbada while Nizam Shah's troops were posted on the frontier of Berar. Among the officers in command of the Ahmadnagar forces was one Muzaffar Husain Mirza, a rebel from the Mughal empire. Good sense prevailed when the Nizam was advised by his nobles to send away the Mirza and thus assuage the anxiety of the Emperor. Still the

situation was so tense that even Muhammad Shah of Khandesh sent a strong army to strengthen the hands of the Nizam who had made Daulatabad his headquarters. Since Akbar had other plans before him, he connived at the military demonstrations of the Deccan states, broke up his camp and returned to the north. The crisis was over for the time being, but the problem of the Deccan soon presented itself to the Emperor with all its implications.

Muhammad Shah II died in 1577. After a short interlude he was succeeded by Raja Ali Khan (Adil Shah IV). Abkar sent a force to recover tribute from him. Murtaza Nizam pressed him to refuse the payment of any tribute and promised to give him his full military support. But Raja Ali was fully aware of the policy of the Nizam towards smaller states like Berar and Bidar and looked at the future of his own kingdom with apprehension. He, therefore, paid tribute to the Mughal Emperor, handed over Muzaffar Husain Mirza and allied himself with Akbar. This was the first landmark in the advance of Mughal policy in the Deccan.

The kingdom of Khandesh formed a sort of link between Gujrat and the kingdoms of the Deccan and, therefore, to the Mughal government its alliance was not only important for the defence of Gujrat and Malwa but, if necessary, it could be utilized as a stepping stone for advance in the Deccan. Raja Ali Khan's natural sympathies were with the Deccan, but the policy of aggressive expansion, lately decided upon by the kingdoms of Ahmadnagar and Bijapur, had caused consternation among the rulers of smaller kingdoms. Sandwitched between the two aggressive states, Khandesh decided in favour of the stronger.

Politics in the Deccan soon took a happy turn for the Mughals. The infatuation of Murtaza for a handsome eunuch led to a conspiracy and rebellion in his state. Jujaar Khan released from his custody Burhanuddin, brother of Murtaza, and espoused his cause for the throne. But Burhan was defeated (June 1579) and after

roaming about here and there finally sought refuge at the Court of Akbar where he was treated with kindness (1588). Murtaza Nizam Shah's cupidity was excited further, when Ali Adil of Bijapur was murdered (1580) and Ibrahim, a boy of nine, was placed on the throne. He induced Qutub Shah of Golkunda to join him in invading Bijapur. The invaders failed to achieve anything, not because of the strength of Bijapur but because of the treacheries and jealousies in their own camp. The affairs of Bijapur continued to deteriorate. Religious fanaticism and persecution of the Shias made confusion worse confounded.

While Bijapur was passing through a sort of chaos, the affairs of Ahmadnagar also showed deterioration. Murtaza Nizam Shah gradually became insane, so much so that he wanted to burn his son Husain. It was, however, the son who succeeded in boiling the father to death (1588). Husain was intolerably blood-thirsty and dissolute. He was deposed and murdered (April 1589). His cousin Ismail, son of Burhanuddin, was placed on the throne. The faction supporting Ismail was led by Jamalkhan, who was a rabid Mahdawi. He made Mahdawism the state religion, started bloody persecution both of the Shias and Sunnis, and exiled the foreigners.

Political chaos, ugly outburst of racial and religious fanaticism, and furious persecutions in the states bordering on the provinces of the Mughal empire were a direct challenge to the plans and policy of Akbar. They could easily spread in the Mughal provinces. Akbar thought that Burhan-ul-mulk who had received favours from him and had good opportunity of studying his ways and policies would not only be friendly but administer Ahmadnagar in conformity with the principles of the Mughal empire. He, therefore, readily accepted the request of Burhan to help him recover the throne of Ahmadnagar from his son (1589). Aziz Koka the governor of Malwa, was commanded to give him adequate support.

On reaching Malwa, Burhan represented to Aziz

Koka to let him go alone with a small escort so that the people of Ahmadnagar might not suspect him of bringing in a foreign army to conquer them. The presence of a large Mughal army might lead to an organized resistance and create complications. Aziz agreed to the proposal and held back. Burhan-ul-mulk entered Berar, but instead of inspiring enthusiasm in his favour he found stiff resistance. Having failed there, he fled to Raja Ali Khan for help. Raja Ali had already induced the ruler of Bijapur to invade Ahmadnagar about the same time when he moved against it. Jamal Khan, the commander of Ahmadnagar, fell upon the Bijapur army and defeated it. He then returned to fight the army of Khandesh but was defeated and killed at the battle of Roshan Kheda (May 1591). Burhan ascended the throne of Ahmadnagar as Burhan Nizam Shah. Aggressive Shiaism was re-established as the state religion and it was the turn of the Mahdawis to be persecuted.

Since Burhan got the throne with the help of the ruler of Khandesh and not because of any direct support of the Mughals, he felt little obligation towards Akbar. He, therefore, ignored Akbar and his policy and began to rule independently. His accession did not effect any improvement in the political situation of the Deccan, or in the government of his own kingdom. On the contrary, he plunged headlong into senseless debauchery, clashed unnecessarily with Bijapur, and prematurely invited a conflict with the Portuguese. He allowed his licentiousness to go to the length of violating the personal safety and honour of the wives and daughters of his nobles.

In spite of his defeat by the Portuguese, he rushed into a war with Bijapur as a supporter of Ismail, a younger brother of Ibrahim Adil Shah II. He was again defeated. His failures encouraged the Mahdavis to hatch a plot to dethrone him and massacre the foreigners. Although the rebels were beaten back, the tension in the state continued. In April 1595 Burhan died.

The attitude of Raja Ali Khan was also not quite clear. His behaviour in 1585 clearly proved that he could act as turncoat in time of crisis. The part he played in helping Burhan Nizam could easily inflate his vanity and make him feel as a king-maker. Akbar could not feel sure of his unqualified support in case he decided to bring pressure on Ahmadnagar, or, for the matter of that, on any of the Deccan states.

There was one more important consideration before Akbar. In his dealings with the Portuguese he had learnt that it was not an easy task to dislodge them from their foothold in India. Their behaviour on the Arabian sea, their interference with Indian shipping, their religious bigotry, persecution and conversions weighed heavily on his mind and he wanted to sweep them away from at least the Arabian sea. The Deccan states had tried to subdue them but in vain. In 1569-70 the rulers of Ahmadnagar, Bijapur and the Zamorin had made a united effort which proved unsuccessful. In 1580 the Sultan of Bijapur had lost Goa to them and all the Muslim men, women and children were slaughtered. Ahmadnagar had entered into an offensive and defensive treaty with the Portuguese. Akbar's apprehensions were confirmed further in 1592 when Burhan Nizam's attack on Chaul failed ignominiously.

Similar were the experiences of the rulers of Gujrat. The Portuguese had won a decisive victory over the combined fleet of the Egyptians and Gujratis in 1509 at a time when Gujrat was at the height of its power under Mahmud Begadh. Without any provocation they sacked and burnt down the prosperous towns of Rander and Surat in 1530. Next year they stormed Diu and killed every one on the isle, and the port could be saved with difficulty by a combined effort of the ruler of Gujrat and the fleet of Amir Mustafa of Yaman. Nevertheless they burnt several ports with impunity. Taking full advantage of the misfortune of Bahadur, they made him cede Bassein and permit them to build a fortress at Diu (1534-35).

The dismal failure of the eastern fleet of the

Ottoman Sultan Sulaiman (1551-54) encouraged the Portuguese further. By false promises they secured the port of Daman (1558) and stuck to it. When Akbar conquered Gujrat he found the Portuguese well established all along the western sea-board of India. The obstacle offered by the Portuguese to the royal aunt and ladies (1575) while on a pilgrimage to Macca, the futility of the expedition to recover Daman (1582) and their attempt to "lay hand on Surat" which was saved by the timely arrival of a Mughal army proved conclusively that the Portuguese menace was a serious one. If Akbar could build a navy strong enough to deal with them, he might have tried. But for a variety of reasons it was not practicable. The other alternative before him was to pool the resources of the Deccan states and his empire and organize well-coordinated and centrally directed operations all along the western sea-board. Such an effort would involve a whole hearted cooperation on the part of the Deccan states or better still a recognition of Akbar's supreme leadership.

The necessity of a well-planned Deccan policy for the Mughal empire was clear. The ideals of Akbar were to achieve for India peace and order among her mutually warring states, a well planned and uniform system of government for whole of the country, religious toleration and cultural understanding among the various communities, and a progressively enlightened and strong foreign policy. These led his steps inevitably to the Deccan. The Deccan policy of Akbar was not a display of mere personal ambition or lust for conquest, but an expression of the enlightenment of a great monarch.

Akbar's active contact with the Deccan states started shortly after the conquest of Gujrat. In 1573 he sent Mir Hasan to the ruler of Ahmadnagar asking him to deliver up Muhammad Husain Mirza. The request was not complied with. In 1577 there was an exchange of embassies with the Nizam. Two years later embassies were sent to Bijapur and Golkunda. In 1585 missions were sent to Nizam Shah and Raja Ali Khan and a military demonstration was staged in Berar. The

campaign might have developed into a full-fledged war if the Mughal officers had not been divided among themselves. Nevertheless, it showed to the Deccan rulers that the Mughals had ample resources and it would not be wise for them to fish in the troubled waters of Gujrat. In 1589 Burhanulmulk was backed up by Akbar in his claim to the throne of Ahmadnagar. The affairs of the Nizam Shahi continued to deteriorate to the disappointment of the Emperor. Therefore, in 1591 Faizi was sent to warn Raja Ali Khan of the serious consequences of his dubious policy. Embassies were sent to Golkunda and Bijapur to pursuade their rulers to recognize the suzerainty of Akbar. They could not see their way to accept the invitation. They dismissed Akbar's envoys with polite words and presents. The behaviour of Burhan Nizam was very annoying. He treated the Imperial emissary, Aminuddin, in a most clumsy manner, charged him with plundering some merchants and dismissed him summarily. Of all the Deccan rulers, Raja Ali Khan was the only one who could be consider friendly. The rulers of the Deccan ought to have realized that the annexation of Orissa in 1592, the appointment of Prince Murad as the first Viceroy of Gujrat, and Shahrukh Mirza, son-in-law of the Emperor, as the governor of Malwa indicated the seriousness of Akbar's resolve. They might have thought that he was deeply engrossed in the affairs of the north-west frontier and would not be able to undertake large operations in the Deccan. They were unwilling to recognize any superior authority over them, but were quite contented with mutual and futile wars, factious strifes, religious persecutions, bad administration and an all-round demoralization. The five kingdoms which had grown from the ashes of the Bahmani kindgom were administered by foreign adventurers and fortune seeker. They could hardly claim to be the natural leaders of the people of those states. Their rulers had no more claim to rule over the people of the Deccan than the Mughal Emperors. They could not claim to derive any moral or spiritual vitality, superiority or energy from the natural patriotism

of the people of the Deccan. They could not impart strength or inspire enthusiasm enough to protect the Deccan from the ever growing menace of the Portuguese; they could not even maintain law and order in their own states.

The death of Burhan Nizam Shah plunged the state of Ahmadnagar into a civil war. The new Sultan Ibrahim Nizam Shah who was nominated by Burhan was a worthless prince. The nobles were divided into two parties: one was led by Miyan Manjhu and the the other by the African leader Ikhlas Khan. In spite of the opposition of Miyan Manjhu, the nobles insulted the ambassador of Bijapur and went to war with that kingdom. To the last, Miyan Manjhu tried to avert war with Bijapur, but the Abyssinian war-party and Ibrahim Nizam deliberately invited a conflict. The result was that Ibrahim was killed in the battle and the army of Ahmadnagar was defeated.

The death of Ibrahim made matters at Ahmadnagar still worse. Miyan Manjhu raised to the throne one Ahmad of dubious lineage. Ikhlas Khan supported a child, whom he had picked up in the bazar, and honoured him with the title of Moti Shah. Abhang Khan sponsored the cause of Ali, the old son of Burhan Shah I ; and Chand Bibi, the daughter of Husain Nizam Shah I and the widow of Ali Adil Shah, stood for Bahadur, the infant son of Ibrahim Nizam Shah. Thus, there were four claimants to the throne and the kingdom of Ahmadnagar was involved in a disastrous civil war. In despair, Miyan Manjhu, the leader of the Deccan party, invited Prince Murad, Abdur Rahim Khan-i-Khana, and the governor of Malwa to come and restore peace and order in the Deccan. Since Akbar had already prepared them for action, there was little difficulty in setting the armies in motion. Raja Ali Khan was also directed to join the Mughal army with his troops.

By the time the Mughal army could reach Ahmadnagar, Manjhu had gained a victory over the Abyssinians, and political affairs had begun to shape themselves gradually according to his wishes. Manjhu, therefore,

repented for the folly of having invited Murad, and began to prepare for the defence of Ahmadnagar. With a view to unite all parties, he removed restrictions which had been imposed on Chand Bibi, tried to worm himself into her favour, and endeavoured to conciliate the Abyssinians and his other enemies. Moreover, he opened negotiations with Bijapur and Golkunda and invited them to resist the Mughal aggression in the Deccan. To fight the Mughals, Miyan Manjhu entrusted the Regency to Chand Bibi and himself moved out of the fort. But most of the officers rightly pointed out that there was little hope of success unless the armies of Golkunda and Bijapur joined him in time. They urged upon the Miyan to avert the conflict till their arrival. The Miyan agreed with this view, but Chand Bibi thought that it was unwise to remain inactive and permit the Mughals to bring pressure on the fort. She, therefore, summoned from his retirement Mujahiduddin Shamsher Khan, an experienced and able African, worked upon him, and persuaded him to take active offensive and defensive measures against the Mughals. Manjhu, however, stuck to his plans and leaving Shamsher Khan to defend Ahmadnagar, himself went toward, Bijapur and Golkunda to expedite the despatch of military reinforcements. But he took care to take Ahmad Nizam Shah with him. It was believed by some that the obstinacy of Miyan Manjhu was not due to his desire to help Ahmadnagar but was an act of treason and treachery. The decision of Chand Bibi and Shamsher Khan to fight encouraged some officers, even foreigners, to abandon the Miyan and join the gallant lady.

Miyan Manjhu took a wrong decision and acted unwisely for either he was too timid or treacherous. It is difficult to believe that he could have been quite ignorant of the dissensions that had broken out among the Mughal generals. If he had taken advantage of them and enthusiastically supported Chand Bibi, the position of the Mughals would have become extremely difficult. It was left to Chand Bibi to bear the entire

burden of defence and the difficult task of restoring unity but Chand Bibi rose to the occasion. The first thing that she did was to win the support of Muhammad Khan, the most influential of the Deccan leaders. Next, she got rid of Ansar Khan, the *Kotwal* of Burhanpur, who was a partisan of Miyan Manjhu and was left by him to defend the fort. Chand Bibi now declared her nephew, the infant Bahadur, as king and began to rule in her name, assisted by Muhammad Khan. She gained a great point when she persuaded the Abyssinian general Ahang Khan, who was so far supporting the claim to the throne of Shah Ali, son of Burhan Nizam Shah I, an old man of seventy, to join her against the Mughals.

About the middle of Dec. 1595 Prince Murad arrived in the vicinity of Ahmadnagar. He tried to win the support of the people by proclaiming that no plunder or molestation of the *ryots* and the citizens would be allowed and care would be taken to ensure the safety of their lives, honour and property. But Shahbaz Khan's men, with his connivance or his neglect, did some plunder. The Prince flew into rage when he heard of it, and ordered several of these men to be publicly executed. The inhabitants, however, were alarmed, and distrusting the reassurances of the Prince fled away in large numbers. The Prince, however, besieged the fort of Ahmadnagar on Dec. 18, 1595. In its early stage, the siege operations were loose, which enabled Ahang Khan to surprise the Mughal besiegers on the eastern side of the fort and cut his way into it. But that incident made the Prince more vigilant and careful. The fort was surrounded on all sides, and vigorous attempts were made to press forward the sap and trenches. Indeed, the Prince was most active and "personally spent most of his time in the trenches, supervising the filling in of the ditch, and the erection of a tower overlooking the wall" of the fort.

In spite of the great effort of the prince the affairs of the Mughals did not proceed satisfactorily. The jealousy and rivalry between Sadiq Khan and Shahbaz divided and distracted the Mughal officers. Delay in

capturing the fort gave time to the supporters of Ahmadnagar to rally and take active measures. Venkoji, the Koli chief, threatened to cut the communications of the Mughals with Gujrat. Saiyid Raja, who was sent to fight him, was outnumbered, defeated and killed. A few days after, one Saadat Khan surprised and captured a large quantity of treasure, stores and munitions, which Saiyid Alam was carrying from Gujrat to the Mughals. The victory which the Mughal officer, Daulat Khan got over Ikhlas Khan, the supporter of Moti Shah, resulted in driving him into the arms of his rival Miyan Manjhu, who was organizing a grand coalition of Bijapur, Golkunda and the nobles of Ahmadnagar against the Mughals. Besides the rising volume of opposition, Murad had to face the lack of provisions caused by the desertion of the terror-stricken *ryots*. Finally, treachery was also active in the camp. Shahbaz Khan and the Khan-i-Khana were believed to be the partisans of Prince Salim and consequently did not like Ahmadnagar to fall and shed glory on Prince Murad. Khwaja Muhammad Shirazi, a Persian, informed the besieged of the position of the mine in Sadiq Khan's battery. The ruler of Khandesh, Raja Ali Khan, who secretly sympathized with Ahmadnagar, connived at the supplies which were thrown into the fort whenever required.

Undismayed by the worries and the pressure of work, the Prince "was in trenches from morning to evening directing the operations". He was still engrossed in pushing on the siege when he learnt that Miyan Manjhu had succeeded in his mission. He did not only got the support of Ikhlas Khan, but had also persuaded Adil Shah II to send twenty-five or thirty thousand horse under his able commander, Sohel Khan. Qutb Shah despatched Mahdi Quli Sultan with ten thousand horse and twenty thousand foot. The combined army of the allies totalling 70,000 concentrated at Shahdurg with the intention of relieving the fort. Under the circumstances, it was decided to launch a vigorous attack on the fort before the arrival of the allied army. Fire was set to mines. Secret information of Khwaja

Muhammad had enabled the besieged to empty two mines. Only one mine exploded blowing up about fifty yards of the wall. The Mughals, who had a sad experience at Chitor, waited till the second mine exploded. This interval of suspense was utilized by the besieged to get ready. It was a bit too late when to their amazement the Mughals learnt that the second mine had also been emptied. Still the Mughals made a desperate attempt to rush through, filling up the ditch with their bodies.

The defence was determined and gallant. As no attack from the quarter of Ṣadiq Khan was launched, the defenders found it possible to concentrate their whole strength and energy in defending the breach. Shamsher Khan, Ahang Khan, Muhammad Khan, and all the officers ran to the branch to keep back the Mughals. The excitement was so great that even those who were not used to war hastened up to fight. Then it occurred to some foreign officers and the ambassadors of the other Deccan states, who were at that time in the fort, to bring Chand Bibi, for her presence was likely to create enthusiasm and give great encouragement. She was approached and she readily agreed to the proposal. Glittering with armour, a veil on her face and a naked sword in her hand, she came to the scene riding an elephant. When the soldiers saw the Queen under the royal umbrella their courage rose high. The news of the presence of the queen at the breach inspired even old men and boys to rush to defend the fort. Cannon balls, musket shots, hand-grenades and arrows fell on the Mughals like hailstorm. If the other Mughal officers had also come up to reinforce the storming party, the Mughals might have gained the day. But the failure of the mines and the ceaseless and terrific fire from the ramparts deterred them from doing their best. Desperate fight raged for four hours. The storming party sustained heavy losses, and the attack was beaten back. Chand Sultana remained on the spot till the breach was built up.

Prince Murad was sorely disappointed, but was

not discouraged. Next morning he marshalled his forces and decided to lead an attack personally. He requested Khan-i-Khana to co-operate with him, but the latter made lame excuses. Undismayed, he spurred his horse on. As he wished to enter the ditch, his well-wishers caught hold of the reins of his horse. He got down and ordered the Ahdi corps, the choicest fighters of the army, who have been likened to the "gentlemen of the life guards", to attack. Several compact mass-charges were vigorously made, but the defenders, who were encouraged by the success of the previous evening, rained fire. The Mughals showed the greatest valour humanly possible, fought from sunrise to sunset, but they appeared striking against wall of iron. After heavy casualties, they were obliged to withdraw.

The Mughals were bitterly disappointed. They feared the prolongation of the war. The scarcity of provisions was growing acute while the allied army was reported to be steadily moving up. The defenders were also extremely anxious for a settlement, for they had seen the gallantry of the Mughal army which had all but captured the fort. Moreover, the supplies in the fort had almost exhausted and starvation stared them in the face. Chand Sultana also possibly suspected the intentions of Miyan Manjhu, who had brought armies from Bijapur and Golkunda. He could press with their support the claims of his own candidate, Ahmad, and she could not hazard the chances for the throne of Ahmadnagar of Ibrahim Nizam Shah's son, Bahadur. At last, the negotiations were opened. There was some higgling over the cessation of Berar and Daulatabad, which Sadiq Khan insisted upon. Chand Bibi got anxious and wrote to her ambassador Afzal Khan "to hasten by all means in his power the conclusion of peace", for her men could not hold out any longer. Owing to the failure of the supplies, most of the garrison had decided to let themselves down over the wall, and flew to the Mughal camp. Lavish presents to the high Mughal officers, distribution of gold and the offer to cede Berar, at last, brought about the settlement. The Mughals ceased to press their

demand for Daulatabad. Bahadur was recognized by them as the ruler of Ahmadnagar under the suzerainty of the Mughal Emperor (20th March 1596).

After the return of the Mughals, Muhammad Khan became practically all powerful, and Bahadur Nizam Shah was acknowledged as the titular king of Ahmadnagar. Miyan Manjhu, however, continued to press the claims of his candidate, Ahmand, but at the request of Chand Bibi his attempts were frustrated by the intervention of the king of Bijapur. At last, Manjhu renounced interest in Ahmadnagar politics and took service under Bijapur. At first, Chand Bibi had complete confidence in Muhammad Khan, but when he put Ahang Khan and Shamsher Khan in confinement and began to fill high officers with his own men, the queen got alarmed and again appealed for help to Bijapur. Accordingly, Bijapur sent an army under Suhail Khan, who laid siege to Ahmadnagar. Muhammad Khan retaliated by asking for the help of the Mughals, but this measure excited furious opposition, and eventually led to his imprisonment. In his place, Ahang Khan was appointed the Peshwa (1596). Chand Bibi seemed to be satisfied and the army of Bijapur was ordered to withdraw.

The Bijapur general, Suhail Khan, was anxious to have some excitement and keen to try swords with the Mughals. The new minister of Ahmadnagar, Ahang Khan, was also anxious to recover Berar which had been ceded to the Mughals. The opposition of Chand Sultana to the policy of provoking the Mughals proved ineffective. A cause for quarrel was soon found in the allegation made by Suhail Khan that the Mughals had encroached upon territories not included in the peace treaty. Suhail loitered in Ahmadnagar till he received orders from Bijapur to drive the Mughals out. Golkunda also joined the anti-Mughal alliance. A combined army nearly sixty thousand horse, now moved against the Mughals,

The Mughals too had their grievances. Berar was not peacefully evacuated by the Nizam Shahi officers, some of whom had actually organized a force

of about ten thousand to harass the Mughals. But at this time the Mughal army was weakened because Shahbaz Khan had left for Malwa without taking the permission of the Prince, and the officers could not come to sound understanding among themselves. When the Prince saw the volume of opposition rising, he called a council of war and asked their opinion regarding the attitude he should adopt. It was finally decided to hold the ground whatever might happen.

The Mughal army of about twenty thousand under the command of Shahrukh Mirza and the Khan-i-Khana, supported by Raja Ali Khan, marched out to meet the Deccan armies, and halted on the southern bank of the Godavari near Sonpet. On 5th February 1597 a battle was fought at Ashti. The Mughal advance and left were broken by the Bijapur army. Among the heavy casualities that the Mughals sustained, the most glaring was the death of Raja Ali Khan of Khandesh. But the Mughal centre and right maintained their ground and eventually drove back the Nizamshahi and Qutubshahi troops. The armies separated in the evening; the leaders on both sides were in doubt as to what precisely was the position. When the day dawned the Khan-i-Khana was shocked to find himself face to face with Suhail Khan who commanded an army three or four times larger and was flushed with the hope of victory. The Mughals fought with the courage of despair while Suhail Khan also exhibited prodigious valour. Suhail Khan was badly wounded and fell from the horse. This was followed by a panic, and the Bijapur troops, having picked him up, beat back their retreat. The Mughals were tired, hence no pursuit was attempted.

Prince Murad was anxious to push on to Ahmadnagar, but the Khan-i-Khana did not agree with him, and favoured postponement till the following year. Shortly after, Sadiq Khan, the right hand man of Murad and one of the most distinguished generals, died. Consequently the Mughals could not undertake any serious operations. At Murad's request the Khan-i-Khana was recalled. The death of Sadiq Khan and the recall of

the Khan-i-Khana enabled the Nizamshah to keep up pressure on the Mughal outposts. The Mughals, nevertheless, conquered the forts of Gawilgadh, Mankar, Lohagarh (1598), Kherla and Nasik (1599).

(B)

On Feb. 4, 1598 Abdullah Khan Uzbek, the terror of Central Asia, died, and Turan was thrown into confusion. This event eased the situation on the frontier. Moreover, Akbar had almost completed his task on the frontier by consolidating his position from Kashmir and Kabul to Qandahar, Baluchistan, Makran and Sindh. He could now turn his attention to the Deccan politics which was in a state of hopeless muddle. He had recalled the Khan-i--Khana and superseded Prince Murad by Prince Daniyal. He sent his confidential and most loyal secretary, Abul Fazl, to send back Murad, reorganize the Deccan affairs and submit a detailed report on the situation, based on his personal enquiries. Meanwhile, he began to prepare for a personal visit to the Deccan.

The first thing which Abul Fazl noticed on his arrival in the Deccan was that the new ruler of Khandesh, Bahadur Khan, was not willing to support the Mughal arms in the Deecan. The next disappointment was the illness and eventual death of Prince Murad. Since the death of his son Rustam in Nov. 1598, Murad was extremely sad and took to heavy drinking to forget his sorrow. This led to an attack of epilepsy and chronic dyspepsia. But he did not pay sufficient attention to his ailments and continued to drink and tour. When he came to know that he had been recalled from the Deccan and Abul Fazl was coming to escort him back, he set out to conquer Ahmadnagar inspite of his bad health. His condition suddenly took a serious turn, fits grew violent and on 2nd May 1599 he passed away in a state of unconsciousness, delirious tremens, while he was yet some forty miles from Daulatabad.

In spite of the drawbacks caused by the refusal of

the new ruler of Khandesh to help, the death of Prince Murad, the interested idleness of old officers in the Deccan and want of money, Abul Fazl applied himself whole-heartedly to his task. His energy and activity inspired other officers to come round. He managed to organize the defence of the Mughal territories except that of Nasik. He sent reinforcements and eventually relieved Bir which was hard pressed by the Ahmadnagar troops and was gallantly defended by Sher Khwaja. Meanwhile, Abul Fazl had opened communications with Chand Bibi and had received encouraging replies. He even intended to go to Ahmadnagar, but he learnt that Shamsher Khan had entered Berar and Prince Daniyal was expected to arrive soon, hence he retreated.

While the siege of Asirgarh was dragging on, Prince Daniyal was conducting operations in the territory of Ahmadnagar. At this time, Ahmadnagar had two governments. In the fort itself Chand Sultana ruled in the name of her nephew, Bahadur Nizam Shah, while outside Ahang Khan was the master. Ahang Khan wanted to capture the fort, but in vain. Chand Sultana had communications with Abul Fazl and had even offered to surrender Ahmadnagar to the Mughals should they allow her to occupy Bir. But the ratification of such an arrangement could be possible only when the Mughals had dislodged and broken the power of Ahang Khan.

When Daniyal pushed on to Ahmadnagar, Ahang Khan attempted to check his progress at the Jaipur-Kotly pass. The Prince avoided the pass and marched by another route. Ahang then retreated to Ahmadnagar and wanted to come to some compromise with Chand Sultana, but at her refusal fled to Junnar. Daniyal then came up and laid siege to Ahmadnagar. Chand Sultana was naturally diffident of the ability of the troops of Ahmadnagar to stand the Mughal attack, especially when the Emperor himself was within a measurable distance. For several months, the fort had been under the siege. She was willing to accept the

proposal she had made to Abul Fazl, but her officers were against peace and wanted war. In her perplexity, she turned for advice to Chita or Hamid Khan , a eunuch, and discussed the proposals with him. But Chita Khan ran out in the streets loudly crying that the queen was in league with the Mughals. The Deccanis got infuriated and some of them, led by Chita Khan, broke into the queen's apartment and killed her.

The Mughals were ready to take up the challenge. Mines had already been run and the ditch filled up. On 18th August 1600 the mines were exploded. They blew up the Laila tower with seventy feet of the wall. Immediately a vigorous attack was made and the fort was captured by storm. Bahadur Nizamshah was taken prisoner and fifteen hundred men of the garrison were put to sword. Besides the capital and the fort and ammunition, a "noble library" fell into the hands of the Mughals.

With the fall of Ahmadnagar, the power of the kingdom was broken, though resistance to the Mughals continued. At Daulatabad, a grandson of Burhan Shah I was raised to the throne under the title of Murtaza Nizam Shah II. His chief supporter was Malik Ambar, the Abyssinian, who was destined to play an imporatnt role in the history of resistance to the advance of the Mughals in the Deccan. Another influential noble, a rival of Malik Ambar, who claimed loyalty to Murtaza II, was Raju the Deccani. While the Malik held the country from the border of Telang to a few miles up to Bir and Ahmadnagar, his rival exercised control from Daulatabad and a few miles from Ahmadnagar to the frontiers of Gujrat. Abdur-Rahim Khan-i-Khana knew well that the two leaders would not co-operate. He, therefore, sent troops to capture from Ambar some districts on the side of Telang. Malik Ambar organized a counter attack and recovered several *thanas* from the Mughals. Near Nander a sharp engagement was fought in which Ambar was severely wounded, but was carried away by his followers. After his recovery he visited the Khan-i-Khana and

negotiated a territorial settlement with the Mughals.

Situated on a strong solid rock some nine hundred feet above the plain, and supported by the fortresses of Maligarh and Kamargarh, the famous fort of Asirgarh commands the main road to the Deccan. In the words of Faizi Sirhindi, "it was impossible to conceive of a stronger fortress , or one more amply supplied with artillery, warlike stores and provisions". It could act as a lever for the conquest of the Deccan States, if held by a friendly power. Under a hostile one, it could prove a most serious obstacle in the way. The late ruler Raja Ali Khan was on the whole a friend of the Emperor, but his son and successor Qadr Khan Bahadur Shah held different views.

In spite of their mutual wars, the states of the Deccan could not but view with grave concern the increasing pressure of the Mughal Empire. Even Raja Ali Khan, who was believed to be the best friend of the Empire, had his qualms and, at times, aroused suspicion of duplicity. But he fought for the Mughal cause and fell fighting gallantly at Sonepet. Finding him absent, and unware of his sacrifice, the Mughals suspected him of treachery, and plundered the camp of Khandesh. When they came to know the truth, they felt ashamed and tendered apologies, but the harm was done. The nobles of Khandesh and Bahadur Khan, the son of Raja Ali Khan, were highly outraged and embittered. Apart from that, Bahadur was weak and sensual and, therefore, was more likely to be swayed by nobles and favourites. The nobles of the unconquered states could not tolerate the domination of any other state, much less of the Mughals.

At Ujjain, Akbar learnt that Bahadur Shah did not come to pay respects to Prince Daniyal and that latter was meditating to send an expedition against him. The Emperor ordered the Prince to go to Ahmadnagar without delay and leave the problem of Bahadur to him Three successive messages were sent to Bahadur, but he gave evasive replies and showed no intention of coming in person. This stubbornness on his part

annoyed Akbar who then moved to Burhanpur to lay siege to Asirgarh. Bahadur sent his mother and son to crave for his indulgence, but the Emperor insisted on his personal homage. The siege continued in spite of the difficulties of procuring supplies and lack of heavy siege guns. Although news of disturbances in Bengal and of the rebellious behaviour of Prince Salim reached Akbar, he refused to relax the siege or to return to Agra.

The fall of Ahmadnagar and the determination of Akbar to intensify the siege operation must have caused considerable anxiety to Bahadur, but he continued to pin his faith in the invincibility of the fort of Asirgarh. With the capture of Sapan hill, the fall of Maligarh and the occupation of Korhe hill, Asirgarh was stripped of its outer defences and exposed to a more effective onslaught.

While the military position of the Mughals improved and the siege was perilously tightened, affairs in the fort went from bad to worse. The nobles of Bahadur Khan were divided in their opinions, and "lewd followers of the baser sort" acquired more influence on him. The salaries of the troops had been in arrears, and the supplies were getting putrified. Lack of foresight was responsible for allowing a very large number of refugees and cattle to get into fort without making any provision for sanitary arrangements. Consequently, a peculiar kind of pestilence broke out in the fort. Although it was not fatal, it paralysed the lower limbs and damaged the eyesight of its victims. People began to get weary of the protracted siege and progressively deteriorating situation. The defiance of Bahadur Shah seemed 'petulent and foolish'.

Mughal diplomacy and gold were also actively employed to break the morale of the defenders. The Deccan states had used these weapons effectively against the Mughals who in their turn decided to pay them back in their own coin. All factors combined to weaken resistance. At last, a conspiracy was hatched to deliver up Bahadur to the Mughals and secure peace. Bahadur got an inkling of it. He called a council of officers and

asked for their advice regarding the course of action to be adopted to meet the situation. It was finally decided that he should offer submission provided Akbar left him in possession of the fortress and kingdom and promised security of life, honour and property to the garrision. These proposals were sent to the Emperor through Saadat Khan, but the latter went over to the Mughals. However, Akbar sent Ram Das to ascertain the actual situation. He returned with Muqarrab Khan, son of Yaqut and an influential noble of Bahadur, who formally placed the proposal before Akbar. The Emperor accepted other proposals, but appears to have insisted on the surrender of the fort. Bahadur was then advised by his conucillors to surrender the fort and offer personal homage to Akbar, though the commander of the fort, Yaqut, was deadly opposed to the advice. Muqarrab Khan some how persuaded Bahadur to come out of the fort. As desired by him, Bahadur was escorted by the Khan-i-Azam to the Court. After he had paid respects to the Emperor he was placed under the surveillance of Farid Bukhari.

It is not quite clear if Muqaraab Khan had represented correctly the whole situation to Bahadur. Bahadur's reluctance to write a decree for the surrender of the fort has been attributed to his duplicity and policy of outwitting Akbar. It is more probable that he was not apprised of the obvious determination of the Emperor to demand the surrender of the fort. Under pressure Bahadur wrote to Yaqut to surrender the fort. When the order was conveyed by Muqarrab Khan to Yaqut the latter rebuked and reproached him bitterly for "having thrown his master into bonds and surrendered the fort". Having lost simultaneously the trust and regard of his king, the Emperor, and his father, Muqarrab was bitten by anguish and self-reproach so much that he stabbed himself to death.

Malik Yaqut tried to persuade some of the princes in the fort to accept the crown and carry on war with the Mughals, but none came forward to undertake the responsibility. Nor did he get adequate encouragement

or support from the nobles, who were reluctant to prolong the agony. In utter dismay, his jealous patriotism led the Malik to commit suicide. His death removed the only obstacle, and the keys of the fort were surrendered on Januarty 15-16 (1601) to Abdur Rahman son of Abul Fazl. Bahadur was sent with his family to Gwalior; the Faruqi dynasty came to an end, and Khandesh was annexed to the Empire under the name of Dandesh.

Some have charged Akbar of treachery in regard to his transactions leading to the capture of the fort of Asirgarh and detention of Bahadur Khan. It is impossible to believe that Bahadur could have voluntarily surrendered himself only to be kept in prison. It is equally impossible to accept that he had gone to Akbar simply because Akbar had called him for an interview 'swearing on his own royal head that the visitor would be allowed to return in peace'. If Bahadur's position was as strong as the Jesuit writers describe, where was then the necessity for him to risk his person ? Moreover, the main cause of quarrel between the Emperor and Bahadur was the demand of personal submission and the surrender of Asirgarh, hence it is difficult to see why Bahadur after a successful resistance, should have suddenly decided to go to the Emperor. Did he, then, go to offer personal submission? If he voluntarily offered submission, why did he refuse to surrender Asirgarh? Had Akbar given him to understand that he would waive his demand for Asirgarh should he undergo the show of submission ? Why should have Akbar thrown away the military advantages that he had gained after a hard labour of several months? True, that Salim had rebelled, but the command of the Deccan could be left to Daniyal, who had just scored a victory at Ahmadnagar and had shown his desire to punish Bahadur for not coming to pay respects to him. These are some of the many difficulties which require solution before any final verdict can be passed against Akbar. The probability , however, is that Muqarrab, either in his anxiety to terminate the war or to please

the Emperor, had concealed some facts from Bahadur, especially Akbar's insistance on the surrender of the fort. This hypothesis is at least more plausible and explains the surprise of Bahadur and his refusal to accede in writing to the surrender of the fort. It also explains the charge of treachery brought against Muqarrab Khan by his father and the exasperation of Akbar, and supplies a good reason for Muqarrab's death. Had Bahadur willingly surrendered the fort, Akbar might have treated him better, but his refusal changed the circumstances and Bahadur Khan instead of being treated like a guest was dealt with like an enemy and sent to Gwalior.

The conquests of the forts of Ahmadnagar and Asirgarh opened the gates to the Deccan, established the Mughals on a firm footing and cleared the way for an effective use of diplomacy and military power against the remaining states of the Deccan.

Prince Salim, the eldest son of Akbar, was a child of many a prayer. The Emperor gave him a liberal and artistic education and had high hopes of him. But the ease-loving habits of Salim, his love for wine and the society he had collected round himself disappointed Akbar. Gradually the relations between the father and son became unhappy. From 1591 or a little earlier, Akbar was definitely displeased with him and lost whatever trust he might have reposed in him. He had administered a sharp rebuke to Salim for ignoring the royal commands. In 1591 Akbar had a severe attack of colic which was attributed to poison secretly administered by Salim. The Prince on his part became more and more indifferent to duty. He expressed his unwillingness to lead an army either to Transoxiana (1598) or to the Deccan (1599). He thought it unwise to go so far from the capital lest his absence should injure his interests in some form or the other. In spite of these delinquencies, Akbar retained a soft corner in his heart for him, hence he did not take any drastic measure against him. He had deputed Salim to reconquer Mewar while himself leaving for the Deccan.

Salim did not go to Ajmer and practically remained idle. Instead of showing energy in conducting military operations, he revelled in vigorous drinking, which was the bane of all the sons of Akbar. As the result of it, he began to lose his grip on his mind and allowed it to be swayed by his unworthy companions. He was advised to take advantage of the absence of the Emperor in the Deccan, withdraw himself from the fruitless and unprofitable campaigns in Mewar, and direct his energy to something more profitable and ambitious. Opinion was divided as to wether he should go to the Punjab or to the eastern provinces. In either case he had to go to Agra and see what he could get there in money and material. Luckily for him, Shahbaz Khan, a very successful and rich noble, died leaving behind property estimated at a crore of rupees. Salim laid his hand on as much of it as he could. He then went to Agra, which at that time was in charge of Qilij Khan. The Prince was received with respect, but he could not persuade Qilij Khan to give any help. The Prince then was not prepared to use force; he, therefore, listened to the suggestion of Man Singh and decided to cross the Jamuna (July 1599) and established his authority up to the confines of Bengal. He made his headquarters at Allahabad, appointed governors at Kalpi, Jaunpur and Bihar, and seized the treasury of Bihar which contained thirty lacs of rupees.

Akbar naturally became anxious on hearing the reports of Salim's activities. He sent Sharif to admonish the prince and bring him back to obedience, but Sharif himself went over to the Prince. Akbar now decided to hasten back to Agra and left Burhanpur on 21st April 1601. Shortly after his arrival at Agra, he learnt that Salim was coming to the capital at the head of thirty thousand cavalry, on the pretext of paying respects to him, but was plundering the country on his way. The Emperor sent a firm note to Salim either to come alone if he really wished to see him or return to Allahabad. Salim, therefore, returned to Allahabad. The provinces of Bengal and Orissa were

given to him and he was asked to send some of his men to take over a formal charge of them. But the Prince ignored this proposal, remained at Allahabad and began to issue coins in his name. Akbar refused to be provoked. He did not invite an immediate conflict; because first he was a loving father; secondly, the rebellion of the Afghans in Bengal and of Raja Basu in northern Punjab had not yet been fully suppressed; and finally he had full confidence in his strength and knew Salim quite well. He, therefore, left it for time to set the Prince right.

The Emperor, however, thought it desirable to call Abul Fazl from the Deccan. As the Prince was now in open rebellion, and Abul Fazl by his energy and loyalty had vindicated himself, Akbar wanted him to return to the Court, where his brain and pen might prove more useful. On receiving this order, Abul Fazl immediately started for Agra and proceeded with rapid marches. Prince Salim was very much perturbed when he heard of the coming of Abul Fazl and decided to get rid of him. For this act he engaged Bir Singh Deo, a Bundela chief of the house of Orchha. When Abul Fazl reached Sironj his men were tired by rapid marches. The local officer Gopal Das advised him to leave his men behind and take fresh soldiers he had newly raised. Abul Fazl also learnt that Bir Singh Deo meditated evil designs against him. Still he adopted the advice of Gopal Das and leaving his best men behind marched on. Heedless of all warnings, he pushed on until he was waylaid between Sarai Bar and Antri on 9th August 1602. Bir Singh Deo was willing to let him go safely, but Abul Fazl spoke angrily and Jabbar Khan losing his temper attacked Bir Singh. Jabbar was killed and Abul Fazl's head was cut off and sent to Salim. When the news of Abul Fazl's murder reached the Emperor, he was over-whelmed with grief and for some time became insensible. He wept and beat his breast and it took several days before he could recover. He, however, ordered a relentless chase and punishment of Bir Singh Deo. The Bundela chief was literally chased from place to place

but he eluded arrest in his jungle retreats. Akbar was naturally angry with Salim.

At last, the exertions of Akbar's mother and Gulbadan Begam softened the wrath of the Emperor and procured his permission to send Sultan Salima Begam to induce Salim to mend his ways. Her mission was successful. The Prince formally requested for the Emperor's pardon, eventually came to Fatehpur with her, and rubbed his head on the feet of his father. The Emperor received him kindly, and to allay his fears and satisfy his ambitions placed his own turban on his head, thereby declaring him to be his successor.

After some time, in October 1603, Salim was again deputed to subdue Mewar. He went to Fatehpur and from there represented his inability to undertake the expedition owing to insufficient force under his command and inadequate equipment, and asked permission to go back to his *jagir*. Akbar knew what he wanted and ordered him to go back to Allahabad and "enjoy himself". At Allahabad Salim resumed his old ways and lived like an independent ruler (Nov. 1603).

A few months after Akbar learnt that Salim was not only ruining himself by excessive indulgence in base pursuits but also at times resorted to revolting cruelty. About this time Man Singh's report from Bengal set "his mind at ease about the settlement of Bengal", and he decided to march upon Allahabad to bring Salim back to sanity. On 21st Aug. 1604 he actually started from Agra, in spite of the news of the fast-failing health of Prince Daniyal and of his own venerable mother. But the boat on which he started in the night was stranded, while it continued raining heavily for three days. Before that was over, there came the news that Mariam Makani's health had taken a turn for the worse. The Emperor, therefore, returned only to find his mother in her last moments. Her death was a heavy shock to the Emperor. The expedition was inevitably delayed.

Prince Salim knew that once having set his heart on the expedition the Emperor would not abandon it.

He, therefore, availed himself of the opportunity offered him by the death of his grandmother and came to Agra to offer condolence. Though in public he was graciously received, in the private apartment Akbar admonished him sharply, ordered him to be kept in confinement and deprived him of wine and opium. It was after full ten days that he was released and permited to attend the Court.

On 19th March, 1605 Prince Daniyal died of inebriety at the age of thirty three years and six months, after an illness of about forty days. His constitution had already been much undermined owing to hard drinking and he had grown very weak on account of protracted illness. But the immediate cause of his death is alleged to be the draught of double-distilled wine which had been secretly administered to him by Murshid Quli in the rusted barrel of an old gun.

Akbar had been suffering for many years from some serious stomach trouble. In the last week of September he had an attack of dysentery. For some time no medicine was given, as it was probably expected that his strong constitution would tide over the trouble. But his condition grew worse, and he began to pass blood. Hakim Ali then adminisetred a powerful astringent which suddenly stopped dysentery, but brought costive fever and strangury. His health began to fail fast. Hakim then gave a strong purgative which resulted in a violent diarrhoea. All attempts to stop it proved futile and after an illness of twenty-three days, the Emperor breathed his last on 16th October 1605. Stories and canards about his death soon began to go round. Some said that he swallowed by mistake a poisoned pill by which he intended to kill Man Singh; others believed that it was not Man Singh whom he wanted to kill, but Ghazi Beg, son of Jani Beg, governor of Thatta. A third rumour was that Salim had poisoned his father.

The reasons for such suspicions were many. The strained feelings of Akbar and Salim were no secret. Then Hakim Ali, who was "on the whole bad-hearted,

and of an evil spirit", was favoured by Jahangir, who himself confesses that "he had perfect loyalty towards me" and that "I was very fond of pleasing him", and that some of Hakim's friends had tried to do away with him by poisoning him. The anxiety of Salim was believed to be due to an alleged conspiracy that had come to light during the illness of the Emperor. The object of Aziz Koka, Khan-i-Azam, the father-in-law, and of Man Singh, the maternal uncle, of Prince Khusro was to set aside the demoralized drunkard Salim and raise the young, genial, cultured Khusro of an irreproachable character to the throne. It was also believed that Akbar gave preference to Khusro and countenanced the plot. It was alleged that their plan was to arrest Salim when he came to pay respects. But Salim got an inkling of it in time through Ziaulmulk Qazwini and refrained from going to the Emperor. Then the Raja and the Khan-i-Azam called a council of nobles and asked their opinion regarding succession, but they were vehemently opposed by Malik Khair and Said Khan Chaghtai on the ground that the succession of the son in the life-time of his father was "contrary to the laws and custom of the Chaghtai Tartars, and shall never be". The council ended in a fiasco. Murtaza Khan, known later as Saikh Farid Bukhari, then called in the Saiyids of Barha and other supporters of Salim such as Rukunuddin Rohilla, Mutamid Khan and Mirza Sharif, and approched the Prince. They took a promise from him to defend Islam but to seek no revenge on the supporters of Khusro, and then declaring Salim as the Emperor "began to beat the drums to celebrate the day". Under their escort, Salim went to see, for the last time, his dying father, but found him in his last agonies. The Emperor had lost his speech but not his senses. He beckoned his attendants to place his turban on Salim's head and gird him with his own dagger. The Emperor then closed his eyes and quietly passed away on 16 October 1605. "His body was washed next morning according to the rites of Islam and carried to Sikandara."

Akbar was the greatest king which historic India had ever had. He was at once the child and the father of his age. The problems before him were more complicated than those of Chandragupta, Asoka, or the Guptas. He was a foreigner, a Turk, and a Muslim. He had to deal with such heterogeneous communities as the Indians—Hindus or converted Muslims—Turks, Mughals and Persians. Later on, he had to deal with Christians also.

By his natural gift of insight and his associations and experience, he had arrived at some basic principles which motivated all his actions. Firstly, he was convinced of the urgent need of bringing about unity at least between the two major communities in India. In pursuit of this object, he stopped repressive methods and removed religious disabilities. Pilgrim taxes, *Jizya* and extra duties were abolished ; State services were liberally opened ; and closer social contacts and sympathetic understanding between different religious communities encouraged in a variety of ways. Sanskrit and Hindi were patronized while the study of Persian was encouraged . The Hindus were soon made to feel that the Emperor considered himself as much their protector as of any one else. By his policy of *Sulh Kul*, namely, peace with all, the Hindus were brought round to feel enthusiasm for the Mughal Empire and shed their blood for it. In fact, they felt proud of the Empire and the part which the Hindu nobles had played in building it up under the leadership of Akbar.

Akbar believed that there must be some basic factors common to all religions since all religions claimed divine origin and were preached by prophets. Their aims were more or less the same. Somehow these have been concealed by details, inventions, speculations, superstitions and such other factors. If they could be discovered by means of dispassionate and intensive inquiry, they might prove of immense value in uniting men religiously. Ceaselessly he kept on his researches and sometime he felt that he almost found them. He had implicit faith in God and always prayed for

His guidance in all matters. In his enthusiasm for discovering the fundamental unity of all religions , he sometimes overlooked the factors responsible for disunity. He had little sympathy for fanatics and bigots and, at times, lost patience with them. Himself deeply religious and mystically inclined, he took delight in the company of similar persons and spent much time in night vigils and prayers.

Akbar's next ideal was to unite the warring world under one authority. He had inherited this ideal from Islam and Chingiz Khan. He had not only dreamt of a united India as a first and immediate step towards the realization of his ideal but had worked hard to create it. He did his best to bring the country under one rule by a uniform system of administrative, judicial and currency measures and agrarian and commerical laws. If his plan had been fully appreciated by the states of the Deccan and they could co-operate with him, India would have been possibly the strongest and most prosperous country in Eurasia, and her history would have been different. After uniting India, Akbar wanted to unite the mid-east and western Asia with her as a very important step towards the establishment of a world Empire.

As a ruler of men, he was benevolent and enlightened. Since he believed royalty as a great responsibility entrusted by God, he considered every act as a sort of dedication and sacred offering. Consequently, he was very thoughtful and cautious in handling the business of the State. He somehow found time to look into almost every detail of administration and thus exercised a close control over it. When circumstances required, he showed extraordinary capacity for work and endurance, quick decision and dynamic action. He did not set his hand to any task without deep deliberations and methodical preparations. Once he took a decision, he would carry it out with unflinching determination and tenacity, irrespective of time and pains it might involve. He was taciturn but when he spoke, he was brief, thoughtful and clear. In his deportment and manners, he was distinguished and

dignified. His personality was impressive and imposing. He did not like the company of low and vulgar people and mere flatterers. He chose his companions wisely from amongst distinguished, able and worthy persons. In Council or in the field of battle, he proved himself master of the situation. As a general and soldier, as a statesman, organiser and administrator, he surpassed all his contemporaries. He was not keen to go to war without exploring all avenues of peace in consonance with his ideals and ideas. When persuasions and reasonableness failed, he unsheathed his sword and usually achieved his specific objective. In theory, he was despotic, but in practice, modest , sympathetic reasonable, accommodating and kind. His interest was not confined to the collection of revenue, maintenance of peace and extension of the sphere of his power and influence. He was equally interested in social reforms and the removal of mendicancy and poverty. Unfortunately, the means at his disposal and methods of approach known in his days were very limited, hence his success was not quite spectacular.

Akbar was a judicious patron of arts and literature. Although he did not learn the art of writing and did not like reading even if he could, he was learned and acute enough to understand fine points of poetry, ethics, religion and philosophy. Endowed with an amazingly powerful and tenacious memory, he had acquired a fund of knowledge that commanded the admiration even of his critics. He was an active patron of high class and genuine poetry, but he did not like shallow effusions and vulgarity of expression. The art of painting and architecture owes a good deal to his initiative, direct interest and judicious encouragement. He was fond of classical music, both vocal and instrumental, and extended his patronage to worthy musicians and artists. Statuary sculpture he did not patronize due probably to his Islamic background and leanings, but decorative carving on stones made a remarkable progress under his supervision.

Although in his early youth, Akbar was fond of

vigorous sports, strong wine and spectacular acts verging on rashness, as he grew up, he became more dignified and reserved. In his habits, he was simple and moderate. In his later days, he became progressively abstemious. He ate little, drank rarely and lightly, and took opium in small quantities. He had no weakness for women and had no sexual vices of the Persian or the Turks. His living and thought were clean. He listened to all but acted upon his own judgment. In spite of the fact that he was a good shot, he practically gave up hunting on a large scale. He had a very soft corner for his relations and connived at their actions as far as he could. His elder relations, particularly the ladies, he held in high esteem and respect. He hated to disallow their requests though normally he behaved in a fashion that they could not take undue advantage of his sentiments for them. Therefore, he was never under petticoat influence so far as the affairs of the State were concerned. He fondly loved his children and grandchildren. No doubt, he provided them with good education, but apparently he allowed them to grow in their own fashion, which ultimately caused him considerable disappointment, embarrassment and heart-break.

Taken altogether it may safely be said that Akbar was one of the greatest kings of all times.

CHRONOLOGY OF AKBAR :—

Birth of Akbar	15 Oct. 1542.
Accession at Kalanur	Feb. 1556.
The *Khutba* read in his name at Delhi	14 Feb. 1556.
Tardi Beg's flight from Delhi	7 Oct. 1556.
Battle of Panipat. (Second)	5 Nov. 1556.
Death of Adil Shah	April 1557.
Sikandar's surrender of the fort of Mankot	24 May 1557.
Regency of Bairam	1556-1560.
Dismissal of Bairam	March 1560.
Conquest of Malwa	1561.
Akbar's pilgrimage to the shrine of Khwaja Muinuddin Chishti	14 Jan. 1562.
Death of Adham Khan	16 May 1562.
Matrimonial alliance with the house of Ambar	1562.
Conquest of Merta.	1562.
Abolition of the custom of enslaving prisoners of war	1562.
Abolition of Pilgrims' Tax	1563.
Abolition of *Jizya*	1564.
Conquest of Gondwana	1564.
The Uzbek Rebellions	1564—67.
Retreat of Mirza Hakim	Nov.-Dec. 1566
Siege of Chittor	1567—68.
Acquisition of Ranthombhor	1568.
Conquest of Kalinjar	1569.
Humiliation of Marwar	1570.
Rebellion of the Mirzas	1572—73.
Conquest of Guzrat	1573.
Conquest of Bihar and Bengal	1574—76.
Organisation of the *Mansabdari* System	1575.
Orders for the Construction of Ibadat Khana	1575.
Battle of Haldighati	1576.
Akbar himself read the *Khutba*	26 Jan. 1579
Decree announcing Akbar as Imam-i-Adil	21 Sept. 1579
Rebellions in Bengal	1579—80.
Removal of Abdulla and Abdun Nabi	1580.
Revival of the Nauroz feast	1580.
Reorganisation of the Provinces	1580.
Invasion of Kabul	1580—81.
The Uzbek menace	1580—1598
Akbar reaches Kabul	10 Aug. 1581
Second Instalment of Reforms at Agra	1582.
Close of the Ibadat Khana	1582.
Introduction of the *Ilahi Era*	1584.
Annexation of Kashmir	1585.

Surrender of Yakub	1589.
Conquest of Sindh	1590—92.
Conquest of Orissa	1592.
Conquest of Biluchistan	1595.
Acquisition of Qandahar	1595.
Battle of Ashti	5 Feb, 1597.
Death of Murad	2 May 1599.
Fall of Ahmadnagar	Aug. 1600
Surrender of the fort of Asirgarh	Jan. 1601
Abul Fazl way-laid	Aug. 1602
Revolt of Salim	1603.
Death of Daniyal	1604
Death of Akbar	16 Oct. 1605

FOR ADVANCED STUDY :

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Ain-i-Akbari, 3 Vols., Eng. Trans. by H. Blochmann and H. S. Jarrett.
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Khafi Khan : Muntakhab-ul-Lubab.
Muhammad Qasim : Gulshan-i-Ibrahimi, known as Tarikh-i Farishta, Eng. Trans. by Lt. Col. Briggs.
Nizamuddin Ahmad : Tabqat-i-Akbari, 3 Vols, Eng. Trans. by B. De.
Sujan Rai : Khulasatut Tawarikh.

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Du Jarric : Akbar and the Jesuits, Trans. by Payne.
Monserrate : Account of India, Trans. by Hoyland.
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ENGLISH (MODERN) :—

Von Noer : Emperor Akbar.
Wilson, H. H. : Religious Innovations of Abkar.
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Abdul Aziz : Mansabdari System.
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URDU :—

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CHAPTER XVI

JAHANGIR

REBELLION OF KHUSRO; THE SIKHS; AND MARRIAGE OF NURJAHAN

Salim formally ascended the throne on 24th Oct. 1605 with the title of Jahangir, which according to the rules of *Abjad*, incidentally had the same value as Allah-o-Akbar. A grand coronation was held, and the event was celebrated with the release of a large number of prisoners, the issue of new coins with new names and a declaration of general amnesty to all those who had ventured to oppose his succession. Most of the officials were confirmed in their offices and a set of new regulations was announced. The Emperor ordered the abolition of '*tamgha*' and *Mir Bahri* (river toll), prohibited the manufacture and sale of wine, abolished the practice of cutting off noses or ears of criminals. It was ordered that the officers of the crown-lands and *jagirdars* should not enter into matrimonial relations with the *ryots* in their jurisdiction without permission, or cultivate on their own account their lands, or take possession of any one's house. It was prohibited to open the bales of merchants without their knowledge and consent. The heirs were allowed to inherit the entire property without interference. Accounts of the escheated property of heirless men were ordered to be kept seperately for "lawful expenditure", such as building of mosques, serais, bridges, tanks and wells. The *jagirdars* and officials were ordered to establish serais and encourage habitation along lonely roads which were most exposed to robbery and thefts. The government officials were asked to construct hospitals "in the great cities" and the State was to meet all expenditure for maintaining them. Slaughter of animal for food was prohibited from 18 Rabi I, the

birthday of the Emperor, for as many days every year as the years of his life, and also on Thursdays and Sundays every week. These regulations were based on the reforms of Akbar and were calculated to carry them further. It is not possible to say to what extent these regulations were actually put into practice, but there is no doubt that they meant well, and would not have gone quite in vain. It is clear, however, that these rules were of a general character and showed no special favour to Islam or the Muslims. They were partly calculated to inspire confidence among the subjects that the new Emperor contemplated no radical change in the general policy of his father.

Prince Khusro was the eldest son of Jahangir. His mother was the sister of Raja Man Singh and he was married to the daughter of Aziz Koka. Although he had promised on oath to Raja Man Singh that he would do no harm to the Prince, Jahangir kept him in a state of semi-confinement. He was ill at ease so long as he could not be sure that the young Prince had banished from his mind the idea of capturing the throne of Agra, and his powerful supporters had definitely ceased to back him up. The attitude of Abdur Rahim Khan-i-Khana was also not quite clear. Jahangir, therefore, decided to undermine the influence of those high grandees of the time of Akbar who were likely to support the cause of Khusro or any one of the children of his brothers. From them he planned to transfer power to such men on whom he could completely rely.

In persuance of that policy he raised to the highest office of Amir-ul-Umara, Muhammad Sharif Khan, son of the famous painter and calligraphist Khwaja Abdus Samad. Sharif was largely responsible for widening the breach between Salim and Akbar. For fear of the latter he was hiding himself in hills and forests and passing through very hard times. At the accession of Jahangir he emerged from oblivion and although he was a man of no special qualification, and was looked down upon by the grandees of the Empire, he was favoured with high honour. Similarly, Mirza Ghiyas

Beg, although a man with a *mansab* of one thousand only, was honoured with the title of Etmaduddaula and raised to the office of the joint *Wazir*. Except in a few cases, the choice of Jahangir was generally not good, probably because the circle of his admirers and supporters was limited to mediocrites, like himself, and he could not command or place confidence in the old pillars of the Empire. In his anxiety to placate the army, he increased the scales of pay by 20 to 400 per cent on the strength of the rich treasury he had inherited from his father.

On April 6, 1606 prince Khusro fled from Agra with not more than 350 horse. At Mathura he persuaded Husain Beg Badakhshi to join him with two or three hundred Aimaq soldiers. By way of Delhi he proceeded towards Lahore, capturing the treasure of a lac of rupees which the *Diwan* of Lahore, Abdur Rahim was conveying to Agra. By the time he reached Lahore he had raised an army of twelve thousand men. The Governor of Lahore , Dilawar Khan, reufsed to let the prince enter the town. Hardly nine days had passed when Jahangir arrived with a large army and artillery. Refusing to submit, the Prince gave a battle at Bhairowal, but was defeated and forced to fly for his life. Disregarding the advice of his Indian and Afghan followers to raid Agra and then go to his maternal uncle Man Singh in Bengal, he accepted the suggestion of Husain Beg Badakhshi to go to Kabul by way of Rohtas. Consequently, he was deserted by most of his followers. With a handful of men he tried to escape. While attempting to cross the Chenab near Sodharan, his boat ran aground. He was captured (April), and bound in chains and handcuffed he was taken to Lahore and thrown into prison. He had to suffer the pangs of being led through a long double row of gibbets over each of which lay one of his followers writhing in agony. That gruesome sight haunted him; he wept for several days and never smiled again till his death. It is alleged that Jahangir appointed Parviz, his second son, as the crown prince. Among the more important persons who were punished for some

connection or the other with the rebel prince were Etmaduddaula and his eldest son Muhammad Sharif. The former was thrown into prison but later on released on payment of a fine of two lacs, while the latter was executed. Shaikh Nizam of Thanesar was deported to Macca. Abdur Rahim was tortured brutally but pardoned. Regarding the Sikh Guru, Arjun, Jahangir ordered him to be executed should he fail to pay the fine. His sons and property were made over to Murtaza Khan.

In the reign of Sikandar Lodi, Guru Nanak laid the foundation of the Sikh movement which was destined to play a great role in Indian history. Son of Mehta Kalu, a *patwari*, Nanak was born at Talwandi (now Nankana) on 15 April 1469. After finishing his education in the three R's he studied Persian and the conventional Islamic literature from Saiyid Hasan. His brother-in-law secured for him the job of a store-keeper of a state granary. His interest in spiritual and religious quest led him to give up the service at the age of twenty-seven in spite of the fact that he had two sons and two daughters. He travelled far and wide—from Assam and Dacca to Baghdad, and from Tibet and Orissa to Ceylon—and had personal contact with saints and *faqirs* and watched critically their faiths, beliefs, manners and morals. It is alleged that he was much influenced by a saint named Murad Shaikh Sharaf, Shaikh Bahauddin, and the teachings of Kabir. It is, however, doubtful if he had any formal initiation, for he says that his guru was God. The sack of Saidpur and the massacre of its inhabitants in 1521 by the order of Babar, who like a ravenous lion fell upon a herd of cows, produced a powerful impression upon his mind. On that occasion he is said to have been arrested, but later on released. In his old age he settled down as a farmer at Kartarpur and closed his worldly career on 22nd September 1539.

Nanak was a reformer like Kabir with more restraint and dignity of expression. He was utterly dissatisfied with the social and political conditions of

the country. "The age is knife." said he, "kings are butchers; justice hath taken wings and fled......I weep in sorrow, how shall deliverance be obtained.?" On another occasion he said: "Men nowadays are men only in shape and name, in action they are dogs." He condemned the mimicry, hypocrisy, baseness and poltroonery of the people and deplored the degeneration that had set in among his countrymen. The social aspect of his religious thought is well reflected in his sayings. "He who looks on all men (possibly women also) as equals is religious," and "abide pure amid the impurities of the world". He raised the status of women almost to the level of men. Inter-dining was instituted to break the rigour of the caste system. Wine and pork were prohibited. He repudiated polytheism idol worship and belief in incarnation of God, denied the validity of the caste system, of mythological beings, of formal rituals and ceremonials. Instead, he laid emphasis on moral virtues. He did not recognise any basic difference between Hindus and Musalmans since all were children of God.

Nanak wanted his mission to continue after him. He had established *Sangats* at different places and appointed men to look after them. In choosing his successor he exercised great care, and gave preference to one of his disciples, named Lehna, over his sons. The reason for his choice lay, on the one hand, in the superior character and devotion of Lehna and, on the other, the other-worldliness of his eldest son. Apparently enough, Nanak did not want his movement to preach flight from the problems of the world, and seek shelter in renunciation. He proposed to infuse religious spirit into the common people living a normal life. Sikhism was meant to be "essentially a religion of householders" as was the case with Islam.

Guru Angad (Lehna) compiled the sayings of Nanak, which were written in a "modified form of Bhatakohri", which was current in the plains of the Punjab. It is connected with Landa and has a sort of affinity to the Mahajani. Thus the sacred book of the Sikhs

was composed in the language of the people and written in the simplified script of the people of the Punjab. There was nothing unusual in this since most of the saints and some *Faqirs* also had adopted vernacular languages and current scripts for religious purposes. Guru Angad continued to preach and propagate the message of Guru Nanak in a peaceful and dignified manner. He developed the common dining halls into socio-religious institutions. Angad died in March 1552. He had appointed Amardas to be his successor in the face of the opposition of his sons. The Sikhs seemed to have been divided into two groups. The major group decided to follow the leadership of Guru Angad and his successor, while the minor one, known as the *Udasis* (recluses), recognized Baba Sri Chand, the eldest son of Guru Nanak, as their Guru. The *Udasis*, as the name suggested, followed the ideal of asceticism and apathy to things of the world.

Guru Amardas did not approve the idea of renouncing the world. He himself practised trade and agriculture. He placed before his followers the ideal of a "house-holder saint" and asked them to pin their faith in "one Guru, one word and one interpretation". He maintained that the *word* was the final authority and superseded all scriptures. He organized the Sikh community methodically by establishing twenty-two *gaddis* (dioceses), each presided over by a person appointed by the Guru. His duty was to preach and look after the interest of the Sikhs. The kitchen of the Guru was open to all, Hindus or Mohammedans, rich and poors. While the Guru lived on coarse and simple food, the guest in the public dining hall were given good food, seasoned with sugar and *ghee*. As in the case of the Mahdawis, "whatever was daily received was daily spent and nothing was saved for the the morrow". During the ministry of the Guru, several Mohammedans are alleged to have adopted Sikhism. Owing to the opposition of the descendants of Guru Angad, Amardas shifted his headquarters to Goindwal. Here the Guru had a *bawli* (well) dug under his own

supervision for the use of pilgrims. While touring through the Punjab, Akbar saw the Guru and proposed to make a gift, which he politely refused to accept. The Emperor was impressed by his personality and abnegation, and was pleased to make a grant of several villages in the name of the Guru's daughter Bibi Bhani, and exempt the Guru and his followers from paying the Pilgrim tax. The Guru simplified the ceremonials connected with marriage and death and discouraged *sati*, *purdah* and the use of wine. By the appointment of Ramdas husband of his daughter Bibi Bhani, to be his successor, the Guru unwittingly introduced a practice which later on proved a source of trouble. "Ramdas," said the Guru to the assembled Sikhs, "is a perfect being, who hath become incarnate, and the world following him shall be saved." He thus gave the guruship a definite and quasi-divine, if not divine, character. He exhorted the Sikhs "to entrust body soul and wealth to the Guru and obey his order if they really wanted to succeed-". Amardas died in September 1574.

Guru Ramdas was also favoured by Akbar. He gave him (1577) a grant of five hundred *bighas* of land, containing a natural pool for seven hundred rupees. The pool was changed into a tank and round about it grew the city of Amritsar, which became the Macca of the Sikhs, both religiously and commercially. The choice of the site was very wise for the country round about was inhabited by hardy Hindu peasants, who could provide robust recruits to the new community. A commercial town was bound to increase progressively the revenue of the Church, and prove advantageous for the propagation of the new dispensation. The importance which the Guru attached to trade and commerce stressed the dignity of labour, encouraged crafts, arts and industry and fostered the spirit of enterprise, which proved to be a great asset not only to the Sikhs but, in the long run, to the Hindus of the Punjab also. Ramdas nominated his third son Arjun, a young man of eighteen, to be his successor since he was the ablest and the most promising. With this appointment

the principle of hereditary succession was virtually established. Such a practice was widely prevalent among the religious sects and orders in India. It was, however, undemocratic. Ramdas died in September 1581.

The theory that the spirit of the Guru is one and the same although it shines forth from the preceding to the succeeding Guru was fully propounded by Ramdas. Referring to the meritious qualities of Arjun, he declared that "the Guru's spirit hath passed unto him, just as one lamp is lighted from another". In other words, the spirit of the Guru transmigrates from one to the other. As a corollary to it, each Guru deserved the same measure of devotion and faith and possessed one and the same changeless ego, "indivisible and continuous". Guruship was of "divine Origin".

The nomination of Arjun caused great disappointment and clamour among his brothers, but the Guru, by his patience, tact and spirit of accommodation, overcame their opposition for the time being. He then set himself to the task of consolidation and organization of the Sikhs. He went on tour, preaching and organizing *Sangats* or congregational worship, which he declared to be of greater merit than individual worship. He reorganized and gave a permanent character to '*Masands*' or missionaries, who were appointed by his predecessors to spread the Sikh religion and collect the offerings of the faithful. The Sikhs were exhorted "to give a tithe of their substance to God". In a way, such offerings were made compulsory. The *Masands* or their deputies, called 'meoras', collected the offerings from place to place. They were not allowed to use the revenue thus collected for their own use. Thus a steady flow of revenue to the central treasury at Amritsar was assured, which made it possible for the Guru to found towns like Tarantaran and Kartarpur and undertake extensive building and excavation operations. In the middle of the Amritsar tank he began to build the Golden temple, which was calculated to become a central place of worship for the Sikhs—a sort of Kaba. One of his most remarkable works was the compilation of the hymns of the preceding

Gurus, including his own, and also of at least five Muslim and ten Hindu saints. It is known as the "*Adigranth*" (1604). It became the *Bible* of the Sikhs and came to be regarded by the faithful as "superior to the *Vedas* and the *Quran*". It was installed in the Golden Temple in 1604.

The darbar of the Guru acquired so much magnificence that it could put to shame the splendour of the court of many a grandee of the Mughal Empire. He was believed to live up to the ideal of Raja Janak, whose life was a perfect unity of spiritual and temporal ideals. The same ideal he placed before his followers. Along with spiritual and moral culture they were encouraged to cultivate martial qualities and the spirit of commercial enterprise. The Sikhs took to horse trade, which was most profitable business in those days, and incidently was calculated to develop horsemanship among them. "He who practiseth martial exercises shall become fearless in the battle field. He who resolveth to conquer or die in arms, and he who when dying claspeth the true name to his heart, shall efface the sins of many births and obtain deliverance". All these factors contributed to make the Sikhs intensely conscious of themselves and their community. It grew in wealth, vitality and power and was bound to attract the notice of other communities, religions and political interests.

The latitudinarian policy of Akbar gave the Sikh Gurus an opportunity to carry on their socio-religious work as best as they liked. The Emperor saw nothing particularly objectionable either in the movement or in the organization. But it must have been an eye-sore to the landed and religious aristocracy of the Punjab. At this time Sirhind was the centre of a very orthodox revivalism among the Muslims. It was led by Shaikh Ahmad al Faruqi as Sirhindi (born 1563-4) head of an orthodox Sufic order. About the close of the sixteenth century he was initiated in the Naqshbandi order at Delhi. He claimed to unite in him the spiritual powers of all the religious orders of orthodox Islam. Jahangir had

claimed that even at the time of his birth he was chosen as the ruler of Hindustan by the will of Heaven. So also Shaikh Ahmad claimed to be pre-destined to be the leader of the religious and spiritual affairs of the Islamic world by the will of God. Both were Emperors in their respective spheres. He was a very learned divine and commanded respect widely. He was acclaimed as a saint, and the revivalist and renovator of Islam of the second millennium (Mujaddid-i-Alf-i-Sani). He aimed at purging Isam of all heretical accretions. Among other things he bent his energies and talents to destroy the growth of Shiaism and *Din-i-Ilahi*, carried on extensive propaganda among the nobles and soldiers, and won over a number of influential nobles to his way of thought. The names of such persons at the Khan-i-Khana, Saiyid Sadr-i-Jahan, Khan-i-Jahan and Mahabat Khan are mentioned among those of his admirers. These were the last years of Akbar and his thoughts and energy were directed to the affairs of the Deccan and the rebellion of prince Salim. Moreover, Akbar's position was so strong that it was not easy to start, in the plains of India, any fanatical movement. During his last days, however, some nobles, headed by Farid Bukhari, commander of the guards of Agra, and supported by the Saiyid of Barah, loudly backed up the accession of Salim. They had offered their enthusiastic support on condition that Salim would defend Islam, by which they probably meant that he would support the cause of orthodox Islam, as distinguished from the policy of Akbar. Immediately after the accession of Jahangir, Shaikh Farid was raised to the *Mansab* of five thousand and appointed *Mir Bakhshi* of the Empire. Farid was in close touch with Shaikh Ahmad.

Thus, in the Punjab were born two religious movements of great potentialities for good or evil. Each one in its own way profoundly influenced the religious and political life of the Empire in general and of the Punjab in particular. Since by their faith and fervour, as well as by vigorous leadership, they promised to take a socio-political turn, Jahangir had to reckon with

both of them. He had heard something about Sikhism and its Guru who "was noised about as a religious and worldly leader" and initiated even the Muslims in his creed. "Many a time it occured to me," he goes on to say, "to put a stop to this vain affair (Sikhism), or to bring him (the Guru), the insignificant fellow, into the assembly of the people of Islam."

The occasion came when during his flight through the Punjab, Khusro the rebel Prince, met the Guru, who is alleged to have congratulated him, put saffron mark on his forehead, given him his blessing and some financial help. Khusro's rebellion had aroused violent irascibility in Jahangir and made his temper brutal. Arjun's plain explanation that he had no other motive than of showing kindness and gentleness to the grandson of the late Emperor, in his forlorn and miserable condition, did not carry any weight with Jahangir, who imposed a fine of two or two lacs and a half on the Guru. The Guru refused to pay on the ground that he had no money of his own, for "all his money was for the poor, the friendless and the stranger". At this the Emperor ordered that the Guru be imprisoned, his residence and children handed over to Farid Bukhari (now styled as Murtaza Khan), his property confiscated, and he himself put to death. Jahangir, however, did not say or do anything against the Sikhs as such. There was no charge against them and he had no taste for persecution on purely religious ground. None the less the punishment inflicted on the Guru was quite out of proportion to the alleged crime and seemed abhorrent. It was contrasted with the treatment given to Abdur Rahim and Shaikh Nizam. The Guru would neither pay the fine himself nor allow his followers to raise the amount. According to Sikh traditions Chandu Shah, for personal reasons, subjected him to so much torture that the Guru died. His body was thrown in the Ravi (30th May 1606). The death of the Guru pleased Shaikh Ahmad, who hoped that it would give a great blow to the Sikh movement and his followers. Its reaction on the Sikhs,

however, was very different. It sent a thrill of horror among them. They endured it with grim patience. It brought them a clear realization that "they must arm themselves and fight if they wanted to live".

The disquieting and sad news of the painful death of Guru Arjun was conveyed to his eleven-year old son and successor, Hargovind, along with an inspiring message. It ran thus : "Bid him (Guru Arjun's successor) not to mourn or indulge in unmanly lamentation, but sing, God's praises—Let him sit fully armed on his throne, and maintain an army to the best of his ability." The martyrdom of the Guru proved to be a turning point in the history of the Sikhs, inasmuch as it made quite patent what was so far latent in the Sikh movement. The message was a new charter to include deliberately and develope methodically righteous militancy, make Sikhism a Church-militant and the Guru a soldier-saint. Holy war, like that in Islam, was included among the religious duties enjoined on the faithful.

Guru Har Govind took the dying injunction of his father to heart. He got the *Granth Sahib* chanted with instrumental accompaniments for ten days. Then he was installed on the *gaddi*, and though, as a matter of custom, he received the Seli and the turban, he ordered them immediately to be deposited in the treasury saying "my seli shall be the sword-belt, and I shall wear my turban with a royal aigretee". He then girded two swords "as emblems of spiritual and temporal authority". The mother of the Guru privately remonstrated to him, but he said, "have no anxiety whatever for me, everything shall be according to the will of God."

Hargovind now ordered the *Masands* to realize offerings from the Sikhs in the shape of arms and horses rather than money. He permitted animal diet to his followers. He laid the foundation of what is known as "Takht Akal Bunga", a corridor of solid masonry, and took his seat on it. The city of Amritsar was strengthened by a small fortification, which he called Lohgarh. His fame as a patron of martial spirits

attracted best warriors and wrestlers, from amongst whom he selected his body-guards and enlisted soldiers. The soldiers were not mercenary; the best of them were either honorary volunteers or took only two meals, a uniform, a horse and weapons. Wrestling, fighting and chase became the order of the day. "Accompanied by an army of forest-beaters, hounds, tame leopards and hawks of every variety, he (daily) used to sally forth and traverse long distances." But religious preaching was not negelcted. "The Guru rained instruction like clouds in *sawan*, and the Sikhs flourished under it like the rice fields." The Sikhs were enjoined to settle all disputes among themselves.

But the Guru had no intention of coming soon to clash with anybody, much less with the Mughal Emperor. He even decided to go to the Emperor Jahangir, who apprehensive of his dual sovereignty and Akal Takht had summoned him (1612). He was asked to remit the fine imposed on his father, but he refused. He was consequently sent as a prisoner to Gwalior for a term of twelve years.

For some time he was kept confined but was otherwise given good treatment by the *Qiledar* of the fort. After some time the Guru's mother sent Bhai Jetha to Delhi to secure his release. His mission succeeded with the help of Wazir Khan. The Emperor's displeasure was assuaged. He released the Guru and even handed Chandu over to him to punish him as best as he liked. The total period of imprisonment is estimated at two years. There was no further trouble between the Sikh Guru and the government during the time of Jahangir. The Guru continued to work out his plans and policy in spite of the protests of a section of the Sikhs which found eloquent expression in the language of Bhai Gur Das.

At Lahore Jahangir learnt that the governor of Farah and the Malik of Seistan, with the help of Husain Khan Shamlu, governor of Herat, had laid siege to Qandahar. Soon after the death of Akbar and the rebellion of Khusro, such a development was not at all surpris-

ing to the Emperor. He was also not ignorant of the fact that some followers of the dispossessed Mirzas were communicating with the Persian officers of the border-land with a view to invite them for an invasion of Qandahar, and that the Persians, who were anxious to recover it, would not fail to make an attempt on hearing of the death of Akbar. The Emperor, therefore, decided to stay on at Lahore and, if necesaary, to move on to Kabul, although some of the officers had advised him to return to the capital to direct the affairs of Gujrat, Bengal and the Deccan, where "much was going amiss". Mirza Ghazi Beg, son of the well-known ruler of Thatta, Jani Beg, was sent with a strong force for the relief of Qandahar (1607).

Shah Abbas, the ruler of Persia, had connived at the invasion (1606) but had taken little active part in it, probably because he was at war with the Turks. The invading force was therefore not so well-equipped and efficient as to capture Qandahar quickly. Fortunately for Jahangir, Qandahar was at this time governed by Shah Beg Khan, an able, brave, experienced and loyal officer, who was prepared to meet the danger. He had strengthened the fortfications and kept the garrison in good humour. The siege dragged on till Ghazi Beg reached the vicinity of Qandahar. The Persians had not taken into calculation the possibility of swift action on the part of the Indian Emperor and were therefore, much perplexed by the arrival of Ghazi Beg. They were not prepared to fight; hence raising the siege they beat a hasty retreat across the frontier. Shah Abbas pleaded his ignorance of the short-sighted action of his governors who had invaded without his permission, and pointed out that no sooner did he come to know of the siege he sent a *farman* commanding the invaders to return immediately. He also sent Husain Beg as his envoy to protest his friendship and amity to the house of Timur (Feb-March 1607). It seems, however, that the Shah expected that Jahangir would be persuaded to deliver Qandahar to him. Through his ambassador Yadgar Ali Sultan Talish and others, more than once, he

broached the question of the transfer of Qandahar to the Persians, but Jahangir ignored the request. Failing in his diplomatic attempts the Shah decided to use force.

"When I was at ease about Khusro's disturbance, and the repulse of the Qizilbash had been brought about in a facile way, it came to my mind to make a hunting tour to Kabul." Accordingly, on March 27 1607 he left for Kabul by easy marches and arrived there early in June. There he enjoyed the beautiful scenery of Kabul, races, hunts, entertainments and drinking parties. He also directed the improvement of some buildings, roads and gardens. He showed some interest in the affairs of Badakhashan, and asked Mirza Husain, the alleged son of Shahrukh Mirza, to come to the Court to discuss the question of military assistance he had requested for. A punitive expedition was sent against the Bangash Afghans, and another was despatched "to secure the Ghazni road in such a way that travellers from Qandahar might reach Kabul with ease". To signalize his state entry and also to win the sympathies of the Kabulis, he did away with the entire customs dues and charges at Kabul. After a stay of about eleven weeks Jahangir started on his return journey (Aug. 1607).

Hardly a week had passed since Jahangir left Kabul that an alleged conspiracy to assassinate him at Surkhab, was unearthed. Prince Khurram, the third son of the Emperor, was a rival of Khusro. He told the Emperor, on the authority of his *Diwan* Khwaja Wais, that at Khusro's instigation a number of young men including Muhammad Sharif, son of Etmaduddaula, a joint-*Vazir* (or *Diwan*); Nuruddin, nephew of Jafar Beg Asaf Khan, the *Vakil* of the Empire; and Fathullah, son of the late Hakim Abul Fatsh, had conspired with four or five hundred men to kill the Emperor. He presented a paper containing the names of the alleged conspirators. Jahangir, who had begun to relent towards Khusro, was so much rattled that he readily accepted the suggestion of Khan-i-Jahan to throw the paper in fire without any examination of its contents. Without any further enquiry or trial, the

Emperor, who boasted of his justice by putting the famous golden chain, executed Nuruddin, Sharif and three others, alleged to be the leading conspirators. Etamaduddaula was placed in confinement, but was released on payment of a fine of two lacs though he was not restored to his high office. The unfortunate prince was ordered to be blinded. "When the wire was put into his eyes, such pain was inflicted on him, that it is beyond all expression." The dirty work was done by Mahabat Khan with his own hands. It, however, appears that the prince did not lose his sight completely, for when paternal love reasserted itself, Jahangir showed great anxiety to restore his eye-sight. Hakim Sadra at least succeeded in restoring fully the sight of one eye, and partially of the other also.

What would have been the history of India had Khusro succeeded Akbar instead of Jahangir is a question no historain can undertake to answer. There is, however, no doubt that though the son of Jahangir, he was in many respects superior to his father. He had received education of a high order under Abul Fazal and Abul Khair, studied Indian philosophy with Shivadutta, a renowned scholar, and was as good with the sword as with his pen. Thoughtful, cultured and sober, he had none of the vices which disgraced the character of Jahangir. He had no fondness for wine, nor any weakness for women. His pleasant features, personal charms, social grace, purity of character, liberal views, dignified manners, and kind and affectionate heart had made him a pet of his grand-father Akbar, and extremely popular with the masses, and a large section of nobles. It was believed, for good reasons, that he had imbibed the spirit of his grand-father more than any one of his descendants and was expected to carry on his policy more faithfully and successfully than any one else. His chief drawbacks, however, were that he had no experience in the difficult art of intrigue which his father possessed, and that his most powerful supporters, Aziz Koka and Man Singh, did not exert themselves fully for him either because of their regard for

the wishes of Akbar or respect for the throne, personal consideration or fear of a civil war. It was their indecision and hesitation which, more than anything else, was responsible for his ultimate failure to secure the throne. Finally, his liberal opinions in religious matters, and the fear of the second and third rate nobles that his accession would perpetuate power in the hands of Aziz and Man Singh, weakened his cause to no small degree. The orthodox section of the nobles preferred Jahangir to him for obvious reasons.

In spite of his failure and misfortunes, sympathy for Khusro did not die out quickly. Four years later when one Qutb of the family of Uch gave out in Bhagalpur (Bihar) that he was Khusro himself and had managed to escape from the prison, a large number of supporters rallied round him. The Pretender captured Patna (April 1610) when the governor of Bihar Afzal Khan was away on an expedition. On hearing of the capture of Patna, he returned, fought and defeated Qubt on the bank of the Pun Pun river. Qubt fell back upon the fort of Patna, but was compelled to surrender. With many of his followers he was executed.

Prince Salim had been assigned the task of the subjugation of Mewar more than once by Akbar, but he had refused to put his heart into it. After coming to the throne he decided to carry out the wish of his father and, incidentally, to inaugurate his reign with a holy war, which was likely to strike the imagination of his orthodox supporters. Shortly after his accession he sent his second son Parviz with 20,000 horse 'to make a holy war against the Rana...a foul infidel'. Able officers like Jafar Beg, Asaf Khan and Raja Jagannath were sent with him. Rana Sagar, a renegade brother of Maharana Pratap Singh, was also sent. He was given Chitor with the major portion of the Mughal territory in Mewar. The Emperor might have expected that the recognition of Sagar as the lawful Rana at Chitor would inspire confidence and hope among the people of Mewar, who would eschew the policy of defiance to the Mughal Emperor and rally round him. If that happened, well

and good, or at least it would weaken the united front of Mewar and make the task of conquest easier. Parviz was instructed to call upon Rana Amar Singh to offer submission and repair with his son prince Karan Singh to the Court. Should the Rana refuse to submit, adequate military measure should be taken to bring him to his knees.

Rana Amar Singh, who had seen the hardships of his illustrious father, and had a better estimate of the resources and power of the Muhgal Empire,was reluctant to fight, either because Mewar had not recovered till then from the ravages of the wars of three generations, or he shuddered to think of the consequences of a prolonged war with the Mughals. His views were not shared by his nobles who stood to lose heavily in power and prestige, and were not willing to give in without a keen contest. The inspiration which they drew from Rana Pratap had not yet faded out. They meant to keep the crimson flag flying and prepared to follow the thorny path of the great Rana. Amar Singh had to bow before their enthusiasm and wish. Minor skirmishes were fought in a desultory manner. The Bhils got busy in cutting off the Mughal supplies. The attempt of the Mughals to negotiate the Dewar pass was frustrated. The Mughals ravaged the country as far as they could reach. The tempo of war gradually rose higher.

Before any decisive engagement had taken place, orders for the recall of Parviz were received owing to the rebellion of prince Khusro. Along with the war Mughal diplomacy was also active. Asaf Khan represented to Parviz that the Rana was willing to send one of his sons Bagha to the Court. The Prince refused to entertain the proposal, but was willing to negotiate peace should the Rana come personally or send prince Karan Singh. No further developments followed. The prince and Asaf Khan repaired to the Court leaving Raja Jagannath with some other officers to keep a watch on the movements of the Rana and protect the Mughal territory. The Rana on his part refrained from

further military operations (1606).

The lull was broken when Jahangir, who was 'determined to conquer the Rana', sent Mahabat Khan (1608) to renew the operations. Mahabat Khan was a tough and straight-forward Kabuli, who 'combined in a pre-eminent degree capacity for organization, boldness in conception, celerity in execution, adaptability, resourcefulness and tenacity', and was one of the best generals who could be entrusted with the task of conquering Mewar.

Mahabat Khan did not begin well. At an early stage of his invasion he was attacked at night, at Untala, by Megh Singh. His camp was plundered. Many lives were lost though Mahabat escaped.

Mahabat then laid waste the countryside and forced the Rana to seek shelter in the hills. Raja Kishen Singh Rathore, the maternal uncle of prince Khurram, fought gallantry and defeated a Mewar force killing twenty nobles and capturing 3,000 soldiers. This was the highest achievment of Mahabat Khan in Mewar. His arms made no furhter progress and it was suspected that his Rajput troops did not put their heart into the task. Consequently, on the pretext of "arranging certain matters at headquarters", he was recalled in 1609, and the Mewar operations were entrusted to Khwaja Abdullah Khan who had distinguished himself against the Bundela Raja Ram Chandra, and had captured and slain Badiuzzaman, son of Mirza Shahrukh, who had attempted to join the Rana (in 1607). Jahangir considered him "a manly and zealous man...... and a faultless hero". Abdullah conducted the campaign very energetically and, as usual, compelled Rana Amar Singh to retire to the hills. Though at Ranpur pass he sustained a heavy defeat (1611), he made up for the losses soon and retrived his prestige by inflicting a severe defeat on Prince Karan, for which his rank was raised to 5,000 and the title of Firoz Jang was bestowed on him.

Abdullah does not seem to have made any further progress. As his services were required in the Deccan,

he was withdrawn. At his request the Mewar command was given to Raja Basu of Mau (Punjab hills), but he failed completely and could not boast of getting anything except an idol, alleged to have been worshipped by the inspired poetess of Mewar—Mira Bai, along with a village for its upkeep. It was a present which he received from the Rana as a token of his friendship and goodwill.

In May 1611 Jahangir married Nur Jahan, who was destined to play a great part in the history of her times. Nur Jahan was the daughter of Mirza Ghiyasuddin Muhammad of Tehran and his wife Ismat Begum. In 1576 Khwaja Sharif, the father of Ghiyas, died leaving his family to suffer the pangs of poverty. In his distress Ghiyas decided to migrate to India with his children and wife, who was in an advanced stage of pregnancy. On his way he was relieved of his property by robbers but he was allowed to trudge on with his family. At Qandahar his wife gave birth to a second female baby (1576-77) only to cause Ghiyas greater embarrassment. But the leader of the caravan, Malik Masud, gave him every kind of help and enabled him to reach Fatehpur Sikri safely with his family. He even introduced Ghiyasuddin to Akbar, who at once recognized his merits by taking him in his service. By his industry and ability Ghiyas prospered steadily. In 1595 he was appointed *Diwan* of Kabul and finally settled down as *Diwan-i-Buyutat* of the Imperial Workshops. On succeeding to the throne Jahangir made him a joint-*Diwan* with the title of Etmaduddaula.

Ghiyas seems to have given much care to the education of Mihrunnissa. With her natural beauty she combined the most fascinating manners and high intellectual attainments. Her quick wit, charming and refined conversation, elegant manners, graceful and dignified deportment and keen intelligence made her a most welcome companion in the circle of the ladies of rank and the royal family. When she reached the age of 16, she was married to Ali Quli Khan (1594), a Persian adventurer, who had distinguished himself

during the invasion of Thatta by the Khan-i-Khana. Ali Quli was appointed by Akbar to serve under Prince Salim in the Mewar campaign. The Prince was so pleased with the courage and bravery that he conferred on him the title of Sher Afghan. Sometime during the rebellion of the Prince, Ali Quli transferred his loyalty to Akbar. When Jahangir ascended the throne he took no action against him as he had granted amnesty to all. The Emperor's displeasure or mistrust, however, was reflected in his unwelcome appointment of Ali Quli at Burdwan on the eastern edge of Bengal. With his wife he settled down in that unhealthy and unsettled district. Apparently, Ali Quli was not pleased with the appointment. Like Raja Man Singh, he showed no enthusiasm in dealing with the unrest created by the rebellious Afghans there. He was even suspected of defection verging on treason. There was, however, no positive evidence. Yet it was thought desirable to recall him. There is no reason to suppose that the recall of Sher Afghan had anything to do with Mihrunnissa.

The anti-Mughal forces in Bengal had gained both in volume and strength. *Musnad-i-ala* Musa Khan of Sonargaon, with his famous fraternity known as twelve *Bhaiyas* ; Usman Khan Nohani of Bokainagar, and his brothers; Anwarkhan of Baniachang; and Bayazid Karrani of Sylhet were the more powerful leaders of the Afghans who were the avowed enemies of the Mughals. They were directly or indirectly supported by the powerful Rajas, like Pratapaditya of Jessore, Pratap Singh of Assam, Shatrudaman of Kachar, Yasomanikya of Tippera, Salim Shah of Arakan. The *Firangi* (mostly the Portuguese) pirates also helped the anti-Mughal forces. While opposition to the Mughal was gaining ground and aggression was rife, Raja Man Singh, the governor of Bengal, and his subordinate officials were inexplicably, rather confoundingly, inactive. It was no pleasure to serve in Bengal, particularly when the Emperor looked upon them with suspicious eyes. Jahangir, therefore, decided to replace such officers as were simply inactive in that

province. He transferred Man Singh to the province of Bihar and appointed his foster-brother Qutubuddin Khan in his place. Sher Afghan was also recalled, and instructions to that affect were given to the new governor.

On his arrival in Bengal, Qutubuddin called Sher Afghan to the provincial headquarters at Rajmahal. Sher made excuses and ignored the orders. The governor decided to visit Burdwan and personally deal with the contumacious officer. On his arrival, he demanded the presence of Sher Afghan, who went out to meet him only with two men. Sher Afghan might have thought that his personal presence without an escort or retainers might remove the suspicion of sedition and disloyalty and assuage the displeasure of the governor. This behaviour was almost similar to what Bairam Khan had shown to Humayun at Qandahar when the former was suspected of seditious intentions and disloyal design. The governor unfortunately did not take it in that light. He seems to have been offended more by Sher Afghan's unceremonious and informal behaviour, which he constructed as deliberate insult. Qutubuddin, therefore, ordered his men to surround him. The ungenerous and cowardly attitude of the governor exasperated the gallant young Turk, who administered an angry rebuke and then struck the governor with his sword and inflicted a mortal wound. The retainers of the governor closed in on Sher Afghan, and although he killed with one blow the chief assailant, he was overwhelmed and cut to pieces (30 March 1607). The stupidity and tactlessness of the governor and the irascibility of Sher Afghan ended in a tragedy of far-reaching consequence.

The tragedy of Sher Afghan happened only three days after Jahangir had left Lahore for Kabul. It is not clear where he got the news from Agra, but it did not change his programme. He reached Kabul in early June (3rd June 1607). The news of Sher Afgan's death must have caused serious misgivings and anxiety to the father and brother of Mihrunnissa, who held high offices in the government. It was alleged that some

officers were in favour of killing Mihrunnissa but she was protected and looked after by a Kashmiri till she was called up by order of the Emperor. The Emperor, therefore, sent an express message to the officers in Bengal to send the family of Sher Afghan, which was imprisoned, safely to Agra. Unfortunately, at that time the eldest son of Etmaduddaula, the father of Nurjahan, along with several accomplices, was involved in a conspiracy to set Khusro at liberty. He was executed and Etmaduddaula was removed from the office of joint *Vazir* and thrown in prison. It was not till at least two years after that he was restored to his post.

The absence of Jahangir and Etmaduddaula in far off Afghanistan and the misfortune which overtook the family of the latter explain fairly well why Mihrunnissa was detained at the capital and assigned to the service and care of the most elderly lady, Ruqaiyah Sultan Begam, the daughter of Hakim Mirza, and the first wife of Akbar. There she lived in safety and honour. She continued to enjoy the privilege of her position for about four years. In the beginning of the sixth year of his reign, on the occasion of the festive celebration of Nauroz, Jahangir saw her in the fancy fair. He took a fancy for her, in fact he fell in love with her and married her (March, 1611). The marriage proved to be very happy and successful for she continued to enjoy perfect confidence, respect and love of the Emperor and remained a most worthy, loving and devoted wife and queen. She came from a respectable and distinguished family and by her personality, character and accomplishments enhanced its position and prestige much further. The halo of myth, fiction and romance thrown round the affair began to grow among the supporters of Shah Jahan, as early as she succeeded to the influence and prestige of Etmaduddaula after his death. It was largely due to jealously and heartburning. It had no justification.

As was usually the custom, the closest relations of the Queen were favoured with higher *mansabs*. Since they happened to be able, tactful and cultured men,

it cannot be maintained that they received undeserved favours and honours in the state. The marriage alliance only contributed to the rapid advancement of their ranks. It is a mistake to believe that Etmaduddaula owed his promotion, distinction and strong position in the government entirely to the influence of his daughter over the King. It was his personal capacity, efficiency and literary accomplishments which had impressed the King when he appointed him the joint *Diwan* of the Empire in the very first year of his reign. "On the basis of seniority in service, extent of sincerity and experience in the affairs of government", wrote the Emperor, "the office of *Vizarat* was conferred on Etmaduddaula". Almost similar was the case of Etqad Khan (later on honoured as Asaf Khan) whose "versatile talents" had been improved by a sound and varied education. He knew something of every science. Literary studies had made him a master of Persian style and expression. But his mind was essentially practical. As a financier, he stood unsurpassed in the Mughal Empire. As an administrator, he always displayed the highest capacity for mastering facts and devising expedients. He had remarkable "painstaking habits".

PEACE WITH MEWAR AND WAR WITH AHMADNAGAR

The policy towards the States of the Deccan was inherited from his father by Jahangir. He intended to conquer the whole of the Deccan, but the progress he actually made was very modest. The main obstacle in the way of the Mughal advance was Malik Ambar—a man of remarkable organizing ability, tenacity and resourcefulness. Bought in the market-place of Baghdad by one Qasim Khwaja, he was sold at Ahmadnagar to Mirak Dabir Chingiz Khan, the able and distinguished minister of Murtaza Nizam Shah I. After the fall of Berar and Khandesh in the hands of the Mughals, Ambar took service in Bijapur. Since Providence had made him for Ahmadnagar, he returned and was

employed by Abhand Khan (Ahang Khan) as a *mansabdar* of one hundred and fifty horse. When Daniyal invaded Ahmadnagar, Malik Ambar and Malik Raju were assigned the task of devastating the Mughal territory. During this period his followers had increased substantially. The sphere of Ambar's operations extended from the confines of Telangana to Bir and Cheul, including some tracts of Ahmadnagar and Ahmadabad. After the fall of Ahmadnagar they continued their devastation and caused great worry to the Mughals.

The first serious conflict between Ambar and the Mughals took place in 1601-2. Mirza Iraj, son of Abdur Rahim Khan-i-Khana, commanded the Mughal army. At Mander a severe battle was fought in which Ambar was badly wounded. He was, however, carried away by his devoted followers.

The rivalry and hostility of Raju was a serious obstacle in the way of Ambar. Since no way could be found to come to settlement with him, Ambar decided to make up with the Mughals, settled the boundary question with them and ingratiated himself with the Khan-i-Khana. Some of his followers , who could not see eye to eye with him in this change of policy, left him and went over to Murtaza Nizam Shah. The Nizam Shah sent an army against Ambar, but it was defeated (1603). It gave him an opportunity to capture the fort of Parenda, which offered a badly—needed asylum to his family.

When Daniyal invaded the Deccan, Ambar who had been won over by Nizam Shah harassed the Mughals, but was careful to avoid an open conflict. Disgusted with the half-hearted support of Ambar, the Nizam Shah turned to Raju for help in subduing Ambar. Finding himself unable to cope with Raju, Ambar again requested the Mughals for help. The policy of the astute Khan-i-Khana was to keep a balance between the two rivals and thus keep them busy in their own affairs. With the support of Adil Shah, the Nizam Shah arrested Raju in 1607. The removal of Raju from his way left the field open for Ambar.

Ambar was a man of great energy, organizing power and military talent. "In warfare, in command, in sound judgment and administrative skill he had no rival or equal." The respite of six years that the Deccanis got, between the fall of Ahmadnagar and the defeat of Khusro, was most wisely utilized by Malik Ambar in carrying out a series of reforms, which made the peasantry happy and enriched the state. He drew his inspiration probably from the system of Todar Mal, which must have crossed the Vindhyas in the train of the Mughal army. He abolished the vicious system of revenue-farming and revived and reorganized the village administration. At first, he tried the system of revenue in kind, but finally adopted the method of cash payments, based on measurement of the land actually tilled. The government demand was two-fifths or about one-third. The revenue management was usually entrusted to the Hindus, but Mohammedan officers supervised the administration. Under his reformed system, cultivation thrived and people flourished, and, at the same time, the Exchequer found enough money in the coffers to meet the high expenditure of the state due to military and diplomatic exigencies.

Ambar was shrewd enough to realize that it would be impossible for Ahmadnagar with its limited resources to fight the Mughals successfully with their system of warfare, as was clearly demonstrated by past experiences. He saw clearly the advantages of guerilla warfare, which the Hindu Rajas of Mewar, Bundelkhand and the frontier tribes of Afghanistan had employed to their great advantage against the Mughals. Indeed, in a hilly country no other system could be so successful as the guerilla tactics; for less resourceful states it was the only method. The Marathas were trained in guerilla tactics, which avoided as far as possible a pitched engagement and consisted mainly in harassing and wearing out the enemy by cutting off supplies, by surprises, ambushing, skirmishing, terrorizing and alluring the enemy into impossible situations. Malik Ambar increased the strength of the Maratha light horse and

gave them an intensive training in guerilla warfare. Ambar was not oblivious of the importance of navy for protecting the commercial and trade relations of his state with Persia. About twenty miles from Rajgadh he chose an island popularly known as Jinjira (Jazira) for the naval outpost. He got his warships manned by Abyssinians claiming Arabian descent. They were known as the Sidis (Saiyids). These Sidis continued to hold their own even after the fall of the Mughal Empire, and remained a headache to the Marathas and the Europeans for a long time.

With these preparations, Malik Ambar turned his energies to recovering the territory of Ahmadnagar lost to the Mughals. Fortunately for him, the Mughal government of the Deccan was at that time weakened by jealousies and dissensions of the Mughal officers; these were partly but uniformly maintained by the corrupting gold of the southern states and the long-drawn hill campaigns which the Mughals did not relish.

Though Jahangir could not give full attention to the Deccan politics, yet he sent his very best officers in whom he could repose confidence. In 1608 he sent the astute Khan-i-Khana Abdul Rahim who had enormous experience of the Deccan warfare and politics at his own request. The Khan-i-Khana gave an undertaking in black and white to "complete this service", provided he were given twelve thousand additional cavalry and ten lacs of rupees. Jahangir accepted his conditions and presented him with the best horse from the Royal stable, five elehphants, a jewelled sword and robe of honour. As the Khan-i-Khana did not show enough enthusiasm in conducting the war, Prince Parviz and the prime minister, Sharif Khan, were also sent with additional forces (1610). But all efforts on the part of the Emperor produced little result. The Mughals could make no headway against Ambar who had rallied under his banner a large army. At one time Jahangir himself thought of going there and set matters right but he was dissuaded by the nobles, particularly the Khan-i-Jahan who promised to bring the Deccan war to a

successful end. Evidently, few Mughal officers had any clear grasp of the actual political and military conditions of the South and the resourcefulness of the enemy.

Before fresh reinforcements could reach the Deccan, the Khan-i-Khana suffered a great set-back. His attempt to surprise Ahmadnagar failed as the enemy refused to give an open battle, and employed guerilla tactics so successfully that the Mughal army landed in difficult passes and their supplies, already scanty on account of famine, were cut off. The Khan-i-Khana suffered terribly and was forced to patch up a peace and retreat to Burhanpur. The price of the failure was nothing less than the surrender of Ahmadnagar by the Mughals (1610).

Jahangir was led to believe that the root cause of the Mughal reverses was the duplicity of the Khan-i-Khana. It was whispered that he was in collusion with Ambar, who was supposed to pay one-third of the revenue of the Nizam Shah's kingdom to the Khan-i-Khana. He was, therefore, recalled and the Deccan command was given to Khan-i-Jahan Lodi. Like the Khan-i-Khana, the Khan-i-Jahan also wrote to the Emperor that should he fail to bring the task to a successful conclusion, "he might be debarred from the good fortune of paying his respects, and would not show his face to the servants of the Court". The Emperor had high opinion of the Khan-i-Jahan and placed much confidence in him. He was, therefore, pleased to agree with his proposal and sent him with two thousand Ahdis, ten thousand horse and 35 lacs of rupees. The Emperor himself put his turban on the Khan-i-Jahan's head. Moreover, Abdul lah Khan was sent from Mewar to Gujrat, with instruction to collaborate with Khan-i-Jahan and operate on the Nasik front.

The Khan-i-Jahan and Man Singh led the main army from the side of Berar and Khandesh, while Abdullah Khan marched via Nasik (1611). The armies were to converge on and meet at Daulatabad. Relying upon his undoubted abilities, Abdullah tried to annex the whole credit to himself. He entered into the enemy country as

far as Daulatabad without any regard to the movements of the main army. He had to repent for his temerity, for the light cavalry of Ahmadnagar, by means of guerilla tactics, played havoc with him, cut off his supplies and plundered his baggage. At last, he decided to make good his retreat and fighting his way back reached the territory of Gujrat after losing some brave and able officers. The Commander-in-chief, the Khan-i-Jahan tried to explain away the disaster as due to dissensions among the nobles and charged the Khan-i-Khana of wilfully detaining his army at Zafarnagar and of downright treason. The Emperor, however, attributed it largely to the rashness of Abdullah Khan. The Khan-i-Jahan was superseded and the command of the Deccan army—was once more given to Abdur Rahim Khan-i-Khana (1612). For the time being, the military interest of the Emperor shifted to the operations in Mewar.

The failure of Raja Basu to achieve anything gave colour to the rumour that he was not putting his heart into the matter as he was essentially a well-wisher of the Rana. He was, therefore, superseded by Khan-i-Azam Aziz Koka who wanted to get out of the muddle of the Deccan politics and had, therefore, requested the Emperor to transfer him to Mewar. When Aziz took the charge of the Mewar army he wrote to the Emperor that "without the movement of the royal standards to those regions, the completion of the affairs was not free from difficulty".

Accordingly, in 1613 Jahangir came down from Agra "to put a stop to the affairs of the rebel Rana" and fixed his headquarters at Ajmer. At the request of the Khan-i-Azam, he sent Prince Khurram also to the campaign. The haughty and ambitiouus Prince could not get on well with the old, upright, frank and self-respecting Khan-i-Azam. The Prince made a report against the Khan-i-Azam to the Emperor, who sent a message conveying at once an appeal and a warning to the Khan-i-Azam. But matters did not improve; rather they grew worse till the Prince ordered the Khan into custody. The Emperor sent the Khan-i-Azam

to the fort of Gwalior. He was, however, released after some time.

With enormous resources Prince Khurram commenced his operations in right earnest. "Fields and orchards were burnt, villages and towns were plundered and temples demolished." The Mughals had already laid waste the open country and hardly left any vestige of cultivation. A number of military posts were established even "in places where, most people said, it was impossible to place them." Flying columns ceaselessly kept up the search and pursuit of the Rajputs "without regard to heat or excessive rain". Close blockade, ceaseless fighting, lack of supplies partly due to famine and pestilence all combined to break the resistance of the Rajputs. Desertion became common until Rana Amar Singh was left with a handful of followers. Under these circumstances it was impossible to carry on war against the might of the Mughal Empire. The nobles and Prince Karan, all advised the Rana to come to terms. Amar Singh promised to wait on Khurram and send his son Karan to the Mughal Court, and keep a contingent of 1000 to serve in the Mughal army. The Rana, however, requested to be exempted from personally going to the Court. These proposals were forwarded by Khurram to the Emperor who was only too glad to receive them. "My lofty mind," says Jahangir, "was always desirous, as far as possible, not to destroy the old families." He wanted only submission. Moreover, the affairs in the Deccan were quite unsatisfactory and demanded full attention, which Jahangir could not give so long as the Mewar war continued. The only condition which Jahangir imposed on the Rana was that he should not fortify Chitor.

Rana Amar Singh paid a visit to Khurram and was treated most politely and graciously. Presents and gifts were exchanged on an impressive scale. The Rana was allowed to return promising to send Prince Karan. As soon as Karan reached the camp, Khurram started with him for Ajmer. The Emperor received Prince Khurram with "heart-stirring" generosity, rewarded

him with a *mansab* of 20,000 zat and 10,000 sawar, and placed him 'in the front, on the right hand of the circle', a rare honour at the Mughal Court. "As it was necessary to win the heart of Karan, who was of a wild nature.... I everyday showed him some fresh favour." When presented before the Empeoror in the *Darbar*, Prince Karan was graciously received. Jahangir called him within the railing and embraced him. This was a rare honour of the Mughal Court. Karan was literally overwhelmed with present from the Emperor and Nur Jahan Begam. A few months later he was given a *Mansab* of 5,000 zat and 5,000 sawar. After the conclusion of peace, all the territory taken from Mewar during the reigns of Akbar and Jahangir , including the fort of Chitor, was restored to the Rana. Besides, a substantial *jagir* was granted to the Prince. About two years later two marble equestrian statues of Rana Amar Singh and Prince Karan were placed at Agra in the garden just below the Jharokha. No amount of Imperial favour, however, could satisfy the wounded self-respect of the son of Rana Pratap, whose anguish became so galling that he ultimately abdicated the throne in favour of Prince Karan and retired to spend his last days in a secluded place at No-choki. But Jahangir was generous enough not to recognize formally the abdication till the death of the Rana.

Thus came to a close the long protracted duel between the House of Timur and Chitor, which began in 1526, but became serious and continuous after 1567. The history of this war of resistance for half-a-century is full of the most thrilling events, prodigious valour, amazing loyalty, wonderful sacrifice, extraordinary endurance, nobility of character and high patriotism. Never before was the Rajput valour and idealism put to so severe a test and never did it shine forth with so much glory and splendour. It requires far nobler qualities to fight a losing battle against heavy odds for five decades, suffer untold miseries and sacrifice all comforts for a sentiment and a cause. If all the Rajput states had shown even half of that

enthusiasm for independence, the history of the Mughal Empire would have been different for good or evil. But few outside the orbit of the Mewar group regarded this struggle as national or were disposed to recognize it as a war between the Hindus and the Moslems, or a war of Hindu independence.

Looking at the whole affair in cold historical perspective, it is a matter of regret that the refusal of Maharana Pratap Singh to recognize the fact of the superior military power and unlimited resources of the Delhi Emperor, cost so much blood-shed and suffering and continued to inspire the conflict for twenty years more after his death. It is equally unfortunate that the diplomacy of the Mughal Emperors, even of Akbar, failed to inspire any confidence in the Ranas. If Rana Pratap had offered the terms which his successor offered to Jahangir, in all probability, Akbar would have gladly welcomed them. Whatever pride Jahangir might have taken in his achievements, he ought never to have forgotten that Mewar under Amar Singh was considerably weaker than what it was under Rana Pratap, and that it was not till the nobles and the Crown-prince had urged to make peace, that Amar Singh finally laid down his arms. It was after spilling the noblest blood of Mewar that its ruler and nobles realized that "the peace of the people of Mewar demanded peace at the sacrifice of independence, as that sacrifice meant nothing more than bare recognition of Imperial suzerainty". The rulers of Mewar strained every nerve and spared no pains humanly possible to keep the crimson banner of state independence flying. Therein lies their glory. But their inability to appreciate the force of facts produced nothing except a brilliant romance, which all lovers of chivalry will undoubtedly treasure. The struggle proved the vitality of the workdone by Rana Kumbha, Rana Sanga and Maharana Pratap. Much credit is due to Jahangir, who treated the brave descendants of Mewar with chivalry and offered them a generous treatment which contrasts with the vulgarity of their co-religionists, the Marathas.

CHAPTER XVII

PACIFICATIONS : FRONTIER PROBLEMS

LATER DEVELOPMENTS

Freed from the Mewar entanglement, Jahangir now turned his arms against Malik Ambar. The Mughals were making extremely slow progress in the Deccan. The diplomacy of the Khan-i-Khana succeeded in seducing from Malik Ambar some able military officers, like Yaqut Khan, Adam Khan, Jadhavrao and others, who joined Shah Nawaz Khan, the eldest son of the Khan-i-Khana. Shah Nawaz Khan then marched from Balapur, and routing a Deccani force on his way, took their post behind a deep ditch at Roshangaon with ten thousand troops (1615). The combined forces of Ahmadnagar, Bijapur and Golkunda numbering forty thousand were lured into launching an attack. The Deccanis were brought to a sudden stop before the ditch and huddled together only to be decimated by the Mughal artillery. Ambar was signally defeated. He fled for life and took shelter in the fort of Daulatabad. The whole of the Deccan artillery and an enormous quantity of ammunitions, besides camels, elephants and horses, fell into the hands of the Mughals. As darkness fell and the Mughals and their horses were tired, the victorious army returned after pursuing the enemy for four or five miles. The Mughals marched upon Khadki, which was evacuated by the enemy, burnt and razed it to the ground and returned to the camp (Feb. 1616).

Then followed the deadlock in the Deccan, Prince Parviz and the Khan-i-Khana did not pull on well. It is alleged that the latter was so anxious to get Parviz replaced by Prince Khurram that he encouraged Ambar to ravage the Mughal territory as far as he could. The trick worked well. Parviz was transferred to the province of Allahabad and the command of the Deccan

was given to Khurram, who had won his laurels in Mewar. In Nov. 1616, Khurram started for the Deccan loaded with presents and honoured with the unique title of *Shah*. To support the Deccan operations, Jahangir also moved his camp forward and reached Mandu on 6th March 1617.

The arrival of Shah Khurram in the Deccan and the encampment of Jahangir at Mandu produced a spectacular effect on the rulers of the Deccan and somewhat alarmed them. Corrupted by Mughal gold and the diplomacy of the Khan-i-Khana, they readily listened to accept his proposals. The ruler of Bijapur pretended to act as an intermediary and promised to get the Deccan affairs settled in a satisfactory manner. Ambar was easily persuaded to restore to the Mughals Balaghat and Ahmadnagar together with some other forts. This so-called victory was imaginary and "advanced the Mughal power no further than it had stood when Akbar left the Deccan". But the stage-managed peace was made much of. Jahaingir was led to believe that "all the chiefs laying the head of duty in the noose of obedience had consented to service and humility". The messenger who conveyed the news to the Emperor was given a large *jagir* and the so-called victory was celebrated with eclat and high pomp. Without showing his face, on the recommendation of Khurram, Adil Shah got the rare title of *Farzand* (son) for sending rich presents and acting as a sort of mediator. At the request of Khurram, who had married a grand daughter of Abdur Rahim Khan-i-Khana (Aug. 1617), the latter was appointed the governor of the Deccan. The Prince returned to the Court. The Emperor honoured him with the title of Shah Jahan, raised his *mansab* to 30,000 Zat and 20,000 sawar and gave him the rare distinction by allowing him to sit on a chair near the throne in *Darbars*. Magnificent and very rich presents were exchanged between the Prince and the Emperor and Nur Jahan. "The glitter of jewels, and the revelry of banquets shed a false lustre round Shah Jahan's achievements." As a substantial recognition of the

services rendered by him, Shah Jahan was appointed the governor of Gujrat. Nevertheless, the whole show was intended to have a political significance for all parties concerned.

But Ambar was not a man to sit idle and let the Mughals have their own way. In the 15th year of Jahangir, when the Emperor was absent in Kashmir, he took the field once more and snatched away from the Mughals large portions of Ahmadnagar and Berar. It is alleged that the Khan-i-Khana had deliberately encouraged Ambar to ravage the Mughal territories with a view to oblige the Emperor to send Shah Jahan to the Deccan. Ahmadnagar was besieged and the Mughals had to evacuate it. The Mughals were driven out from the various thanas and pursued up to their headquarters at Balapur. The Khan-i-Khana reported to the Emperor that the Mughal troops were in sore want of money and supplies. The Emperor ordered twenty lacs of rupees to be sent immediately and soon after nominated Shah Jahan to go once more to conduct the Deccan compaign for the recovery of the lost territories. A sum of one crore of rupees was placesd at his disposal. The Prince realized the gravity of the situation and made peace with God by giving up the use of wine and taking a vow not to use it in future. All wine in the cellar was thrown into the Chambal and all utensils of gold and silver were broken. By the time he reached Ujjain he learnt that the Deccanis had grown more powerful, even ventured to cross the Narbada, and were burning and pillaging as they marched. The Prince, therefore, hastened up to Burhanpur. The Deccanis fell back. Shah Jahan spent nine days in preparations and collection of supplies and then opened a vigorous campaign.

The Mughal army was divided into three parts, six thousand horse each, and placed in the command of Darab Khan. Abdullah and Khwaja Abul Hasan. The whole direction of the campaign, though nominally left to the Khan-i-Khana, was in reality entrusted to Raja Vikramjit. With great exertion, Khadki, the

new capital of Ahmadnagar, was captured by the Mughals. It was utterly destroyed. They pressed upon Daulatabad and also marched for the relief of Ahmadnagar, which gallantly held out under Khanjar Beg. Malik Ambar now got alarmed and sued for peace. He restored to the Mughals the territories he had captured and withdrew his army from Ahmadnagar (1621). The terms of peace imposed by the Prince were light probably because the supplies were running short, or the developments at the Court made him anxious. In addition to the territories which Ambar had captured from the Mughals, he had to cede a tract of twenty-six or twenty-seven miles and pay a tribute of eighteen lacs. Since Bijapur and Golkunda were in league with Ambar they were fined twelve and twenty lacs respectively. The success of the Mughals was a serious setback to the efforts of the Deccan states to expel them from the South, but it did not demoralize them completely. The Mughals had entrenched themselves strongly in northern Deccan. The nature and measures of resistance of the Deccan states to oppose the Mughals determined the tone of the policy of the Mughal Emperor. Politics in the Deccan moved in a vacious circle.

The absence of Man Singh from Bengal during the last days of Akbar gave a respite and an opportunity to Usman and other rebels to raise their heads again. On coming to the throne, Jahangir sent back Raja Man Singh, but before long he was recalled because he had been in the charge of that province for a long time and the Emperor had no trust in him. He was succeeded (1606) by Qutbuddin Khan Koka, who was killed by Sher Afgan. The next governor Jahangir Quli died of illness in the very year of his appointment. He was succeeded by Shaikh Alauddin, grandson of Shaikh Salim Chishti. Known by his title of Islam Khan, whom Jahangir regarded as a "brave and well-disposed youth" and for his sincerity had "honoured him with the title of son" (1608). As he was a young man and was believed to have no more experience than what a very brief governorship of Bihar could have given him,

the high officials objected to his appointment. Islam Khan, however, justified his selection within a short time.

Islam Khan gave evidence of his foresight and energy in methodically-planned punitive expeditions and short campaigns and in cleverly and diplomatically handling the *zemindars*. From Rajmahal he removed gradually the possible obstacles on the way to Dacca, which he had chosen for making the base of his military operations. Dacca was strategically situated for offensive and defensive purposes. From there he could keep his communications clear and control the recalcitrant chiefs with comparative ease. The Raja of Jessore (Pratapaditya) and a few others easily offered their submission. The expedition against the Raja of Kuch Hajo (Assam) failed, but it had no effect on Islam Khan's military manoeuvres, which were mainly directed against Musa Khan, the powerful ruler of Sonargaon and the leader of the Twelve *Bhaiyas*.

In 1609 Islam Khan fortified Dacca and made it his headquarters and mobilized his forces against Musa Khan. The Mughals fought several well-contested engagements and captured Jatarpur and Dakchara, the two bulwarks of defence, and cleared the way to conquer Sonargaon. After recouping his losses and reorganizing his forces, he again opened his campaign (1610). Musa Khan offered determined resistance, but the progress of the Mughal arms was so steady that Musa Khan thought it advisable to evacuate Sonargaon which was occupied by the invaders (1611). After some desultory and futile attempts to recover his balance, Musa Khan lost his nerve and surrendered himself (1611).

Islam Khan next turned his arms against Usman, the nephew and successor to Qutlu Khan Nohani. In spite of treason in the Imperial camp, Islam Khan handled the situation so tactfully and firmly that he captured Bokainagar and compelled Usman to flee for his life. Pratapaditya, who had broken his promises with the Mughals, was also attacked. His navy was destroyed and he offered submission. His request for

amnesty was refused; he was thrown into prison and his principality was annexed.

Usman Khan had taken shelter under Bayazid Karrani of Sylhet. He was asked to submit to the Mughals, but he refused to do so. Both the Afghan chiefs were attacked. At Daulambapur in twenty-four *Parganas* a bloody battle was fought. The Mughal army was almost broken, and it appeared that their defeat was certain. But an arrow shot at close range by Abdul Jalil pierced through the right eye of Usman and killed him. Without the redoubtable leadership of the gallant Afghan chief, the resistance broke up and the Afghan army fled to the great surprise of the Mughals (March 1612). The latter had suffered so heavily that they had no spirit to chase the Afghans. The head of Usman was went to Jahangir.

The death of Usman was followed by a serious difference of opinion among the Afghans. Khwaja Wali, the Minister of Usman, and several others were in favour of peace, while the rest were anxious to pursue war to the bitterest end. The Khwaja with several hundred 'notables' offered submission. They were very generously treated and honoured. The estate of Usman was annexed. The backbone of the Afghans was broken. It was easy to subjugate and annex Sylhet. Kachar was also taken from its Raja.

The extension of the Mughal territory in the East and the policy of bringing pressure on Kamrup necessitated the transfer of capital from Rajmahal to Dacca, (1612) which began to develop rapidly.

In 1613 Islam declared war on Raja Parikshit of Kamrup because the latter had attacked a vassal of the Mughal Emperor and captured his family. In spite of great difficulties and obstinate resistance, the Mughals maintained progressive pressure. At last the Raja sued for peace, but Islam Khan insisted on unconditional surrender. So the war continued till Kamrup was annexed (1613).

Islam Khan died in 1613. His brother and successor to governorship, Qasim Khan, was a mediocre. He was

tactless and injudicious. The failure of his campaign in Kachar encouraged the King of Arakan and the Portuguese pirates to launch a joint attack on the Mughal territory. The allies fell out and quarrelled. The campaign, therefore, utterly failed. Nevertheless, it brought discredit to the governor. The King of Arakan made another effort which proved disastrous to him. He was, however, allowed to go after surrendering all his officers and equipment to the Mughals (1616).

The misplaced ambitions of Qasim Khan led him to launch an invasion of Assam. Not only did it fail miserably , it ended with the practical destruction of the Mughal army and flotilla. The prestige of the Mughals received a deplorable setback. To retrieve his honour, Qasim sent a strong expedition against the King of Arakan. This was so badly managed that it ended in the loss of Mughal artillery and the ignominious retreat of the invaders. A more glaring evidence of Qasim Khan's incompetence was not needed. He was, therefore, recalled and the governorship of Bengal was given to Ibrahim Khan (1617). Moreover, the policy of aggression was given up and that of reconciliation was inaugurated. Ibrahim Khan was the maternal uncle of Nur Jahan and enjoyed the confidence of the Emperor. He was energetic, farsighted, honest, resourceful, prudent, cool and cautious. Able and tactful as Ibrahim Khan was, he did not find it difficult to restore peace and order in the province. Under his benign government, the province of Bengal recovered from long-drawn suffering and was placed on the road to prosperity. In spite of slight and occasional frontier disturbances, peace reigned in Bengal for six years (1617-23). On his advice, the Emperor was pleased to allow several princes and *zemindars* of Bengal who were detained at the Court to return to the province. Even Musa Khan was released from custody and his estate restored to him. This gesture had a very salutary effect. It was deeply appreciated and bound the persons concerned in gratitude and

loyalty to the Emperor. The moral and material strength which the policy of Ibrahim generated made it relatively easy for him to conquer Tipperah (1618), repulse the invasion of the King of Arakan, and suppress the rebellion of the *zamindar* of Hijli.

One of the few achievements of which Jahangir could boast was the capture of the fort of Kangra, which was well-protected by a number of mountain fastnesses and was regarded as one of the strongest forts of the Punjab. The fort was even then regarded as "so old that no one can tell at what period it was built". "From the time when the voice of Islam and the sound of the established religion of Muhammad reached Hindustan, not one of the Sultans of lofty dignity had obtained victory over it." This statement of Jahangir, though not quite correct, indicates the vain-glorious manner in which he exaggerated his successes however small they were. In 1615 Jahangir ordered the governor of the Punjab, Murtaza Khan, to reduce the fort. Suraj Mal, son of Raja Basu of Mau, was ordered to assist him. These operations failed, probably because Suraj Mal was in secret league with the ruler of Kangra, and did not wish that the fort should fall. On Murtaza Khan's death, he was given supreme command, but he rebelled against the Imperial authority. Jahangir undertook to conquer the place. He sent Sundar Das, known as Raja Bikramjit Baghela, to conquer the fort. The Raja laid siege to the fort early in October 1620. So completely were the besieged isolated that after a few months they began to starve; "there remained in the fort no grain that they could eat, for four months they boiled dry grasses with salt and ate it. When destruction was imminent, and no hope of escape was left, they asked for quarter and surrendered the fort" (16th Nov. 1620). Eager to see the scene of his victory Jahangir visited Kangra about the beginning of February 1622. He ordered the *Qazi* and other divines who accompanied him to "carry out in the fort whatever was customary, according to the religion of Muhammad......and by the grace of God,

the call to prayer and the reading of the *Khutba*, and the slaughter of a bullock, which had not taken place since the commencement of the building of the fort till now, were carried out in my presence". This ritualistic display was uncalled for and unnecessary. It was a freak of his mind and an isolated event which was by no means indicative of any change in the general policy of toleration followed by him.

The Raushaniyya movement, with its avowed hatred of the Mughals and the domination of Sunnism, continued to give trouble to the Mughals. As early as 1611, Ahdad, the leader of the movement and the recalcitrant Afghan tribes, had raided Kabul. But Muizzulmulk, with the enthusiastic help of the citizens, especially the Farmuli tribe, beat them back. As the officers at Kabul were believed to have been lax in their duties, Quli Khan was sent to Kabul with increased honours and the definite object of driving back "Ahdad and the upcountry robbers". But he could not get on well with the officals of Kabul particularly with the Khan-i-Dauran. He was, therefore, sent to Peshawar where he died shortly after. The failure of the Mughals encouraged Ahdad to resume his raids but he was cornered by the Khan-i-Dauran and besieged at Charkh. He, however, managed to escape cutting his way through, towards Qandahar. In 1617 Mahabat Khan was appointed as the Governor of Kabul. Raja Kalyan, son of Raja Todar Mal, was sent to act as his chief-lieutenant in Bangash. With their arrival, the situation deteriorated further, for, the grandson of Bayazid, who was sent to pacify the Afghans, himself revolted. As his son and brother were in the rigorous custody of the Mughals and as he found in Mahabat Khan an energetic opponent, he repented for his folly and requested for pardon. His submission made little difference to the recalcitrant Afghans, who, as usual, continued to pursue their own ways. Once they succeeded in completely overpowering a Mughal detachment that had been sent to collect revenue in Bangash. Mahabat Khan got furious at the news and rigorously

persecuted them; "wherever they found a trace of these illfortuned ones, they did not fail to slay or bind them." The Mughal repression did not crush the rebellious spirit of the Bangash tribes, but it kept them within reasonable bounds and did not give them any other opportunity of collecting any considerable force, even though Mahabat Khan was recalled from Afghanistan in 1622 owing to the rebellion of Shah Jahan. Zafar Khan, however, relentlessly pursued Ahdad and, with the help of Yalanktush Uzbek, succeeded in besieging his haunt. After a long struggle Ahdad was killed and his head was presented to the Emperor when he reached Kabul.

The Afghan tribes had hardly been subdued when trouble brewed up at Qandahar. Quite early in the reign of Jahangir (1606-7), the Persian ruler had made a half-hearted attempt to capture Qandahar, but the tact and gallantry of the governor, Shah Beg Khan, and the swift action of the Emperor had frustrated his designs. But Shah Abbas kept his eyes fixed on Qandahar and tried to corrupt the governor of Qandahar, Mirza Ghazni Beg, but in vain. Then he changed his course of action and opened most friendly correspondence with the Emperor, sent presents and at intervals sent at least four ambassadors. By those means he expected to persuade Jahangir to transfer Qandahar to Persia. He at least succeeded in throwing him off his guard. The military equipments of Qandahar were neglected and its garrison was allowed to dwindle. The most fatal step was taken when, in 1621, the governorship of Qandahar was entrusted to a young officer, Khwaja Abdul Aziz Naqshbandi. The same year it was rumoured that the Shah of Persia had collected a large army with a view to capture Qandahar. "Although, looking to our previous and present connections, it appeared very unlikely and beyond all calculations, that such a great king should entertain such light and crude ideas, and himself come against one of my humble slaves who was in Qandahar with three or four hundred servants." Yet the Emperor was not much perturbed

and did not think it worthwhile to postpone his tour to Kashmir. However, by way of precaution, he sent (March 1622) a *farman* to Shah Jahan to come to the Court with his army, elephants and artillery. For leading the grand army no other Prince than Shah Jahan could be thought of. He was the ablest, the most competent and successful general. But before any adequate measures could be taken, the governor of Multan, Khan-i-Jahan Lodi, in whom Jahangir placed great reliance, reported that Shah Abbas had come personally and besieged Qandahar. He urged upon the Emperor the necessity of taking quick and immediate action. The Emperor immediately decided to return from Kashmir, sent the *Diwan* and the *Bakhshi* in advance to Lahore to expedite the return of the armies of the Deccan, Gujrat, Bengal and Bihar. Khan-i-Jahan Lodi was instructed to wait till the concentration of the army was carried out. The ruler of Samarquand, Imam Quli Khan, also offered to help the Emperor by invading Khorasan when the Mughal army concentrated on Qandahar.

While Jahangir was anxious to organize a "grand army" he was shocked to learn, that Shah Jahan had refused to go to Qandahar immediately. It is suggested that he was probably afraid lest his long absence from India and his removal to a distant place like Qandahar should give an opportunity to Nur Jahan, who then favoured Shahriyar, to undermine further his position and strengthen that of his enemies. This conjecture does not appear to be sound, for the command over a powerful and large army which Jahangir had decided to send, would have given Shah Jahan sufficient means to hold his own; and if the worst came to the worst, he could easily secure the alliance of the Shah of Persia. But Shah Jahan had not refused to go to Qandahar. What he wanted was simply to be allowed to stay on at Mandu till the end of the rains; and if he was asked to go to Qandahar he wanted to have an absolute command of the army and full control of the Punjab. Shah Jahan had good experience of the Mughal army and nobility and knew well how jealousies and misunderstandings

of officers and commanders hampered military operations; hence he was naturally anxious to get absolute command of the army. He was also aware of the importance of a full and unqualified co-operation of the provinces situated on the main road and contiguous to the field of operations. Therefore, he wanted full sway over the province of the Punjab. Further, he wanted to give some time to his men to prepare for the arduous campaigns in a distant country. On those conditions, Shah Jahan was willing to march on Qandahar at the end of the rainy season. Apparently, the attitude of the Prince was plausible. But the Emperor, who wanted to concentrate immediately all the available forces and save Qandahar before the Persians had consolidated their position, was deeply vexed at the conditions proposed by Shah Jahan and his proposal to wait till the rains were over. He thought these were mere excuses. There could be no doubt that Shah Jahan had evil designs, for not satisfied with the obstructions he threw in the way of Jahangir, he went so far as to send Zahid Beg with presents to Shah Abbas and wished him good luck. The Shah received Zahid with favour.

While the Emperor was still engaged in collecting the army and settling the affairs of Shah Jahan, the Persian king captured the fort of Qandahar after a siege of forty-five days. It was indeed a great blunder on the part of Jahangir that he did not act according to the advice of Khan-i-Jahan Lodi, who had urged immediate reinforcement of Qandahar, and decided to wait till a grand army could muster and the internal affairs were settled. The bones of Akbar would have smarted in his grave at the inability of Jahangir to retain Qandahar which was so much prized by him. Jahangir was still anxious to recover Qandahar if he could, for when the Shah of Persia sent his ambassador Haider Beg with a letter stressing the claims of Persia over Qandahar and expressing his intention of maintaining friendly relations with the Mughal Court, the Emperor replied, "What could be in a petty village (Qandahar) that he should set out to take it, and he should shut his eyes

to so much friendship and brotherly feeling?" The Emperor says, "I devoted all my energy to urging on the Qandahar force". Some interesting developments might have followed, but the outbreak of Shah Jahan's open rebellion disabled Jahangir from giving his attention to Qandahar, which was lost together with Zamindawar.

Taking advantage of the rebellion of Shah Jahan and the loss of Mughal prestige caused by the fall of Qandahar, Nazar Muhammad, the Uzbek lord of Balkh, sent an expedition against Kabul and Ghazni in the 19th year. The Uzbek commander Yalanktush captured some territory of Ghazni and wanted to subdue the Hazaras,. But Khanazad Khan, the son of Mahabat Khan, who was at this time governor of Kabul, reinforced the Hazaras. An engagement was fought in which the Uzbek officer was defeated. To seek revenge, Nazar Muhammad, with the permission of his brother Imam Quli Khan, the ruler of Turan, invaded with ten thousand Uzbek and Alman cavalry. Khanazad Khan also summoned the Mughal officers of the various military stations, and moved out to fight. At Sherkhir, twenty miles from Ghazni, a battle was fought in which the Uzbeks were again beaten. The Mughals followed up their victory and gained some minor successes. The Uzbeks fled leaving their baggage to be plundered. The Uzbeks now relaized the futility of their attempt and Nazar Muhammad sent a letter of apology saying that Yalanktush had done the mischief without his permission. He also begged the Emperor to recall Khanazad Khan who was believed to foment trouble. Jahangir, therefore, transferred Khanazad to Bengal and gave the governorshsip of Kabul to Khwaja Abul Hasan.

Of all the sons of Jahangir, Shah Jahan was undoubtedly the ablest and the most ambitious. The rebellion of his eldest brother Khusro had opened the field for Shah Jahan and inspired him with the hope of succeeding to the throne after the death of his father. That there was a party of nobles in favour of Khusro

could not be doubted, but among the supporters of Shah Jahan was the whole family of the Prime Minister Etmaduddaula including Nur Jahan.

It was not till Nur Jahan married Ladli Begam, her daughter from Sher Afghan, to Shahriyar, the youngest son of Jahangir, that the seed of trouble between her and Shah Jahan was sown (1620). It was naturally presumed that she would throw her influence on the side of her son-in-law. The successes of Shah Jahan in Mewar and the Deccan, and the high esteem in which he had risen had made him vain and haughty. But these were precisely the reasons which could alienate Shah Jahan from Nur Jahan. A sort of mutual jealousy between the two was suspected. As far back as 1616-17 Shah Jahan had made an attempt to get Khusro in his custody, but he could not succeed. As the health of the Emperor began to fail, Shah Jahan's anxiety for the throne increased. In 1620, when Shah Jahan was asked to take once more the charge of the Deccan armies against the confederacy of the rulers of the Deccan and the Marathas, organized by the able Abyssinian leader Malik Ambar, he refused to march unless Prince Khusro was placed in his charge. On this occasion, however, Jahangir accepted his request and delivered the unfortunate prince to his care. In his Deccan campaigns Shah Jahan was eminently successful. His phenomenal success gave great satisfaction to everyone and raised still higher his prestige in the Empire.

CHAPTER XVIII

REBELLIONS: SHAH JAHAN: MAHABAT KHAN

About the end of 1620 Jahangir fell ill. Prince Parviz came from Patna to see his father, but he was ordered to go back immediately. In January 1621 Etmaduddaula, the Prime Minister, died. The Empeor was pleased to give "the establishment and everything belonging to the government and Amirship of Etmaduddaula to Nur Jahan Begam", and ordered "that her drums and orchestra should be sounded after those of the King". The office of *Diwan-i-Kul* was given to Khwaja Abul Hasan. Although, for all practical purposes, the administration of the office was in the hands of the Khwaja, yet the transfer of the paraphernalia and dignity of the prime minister to Nur Jahan created a tremendous sensation. Nobles, like Mahabat Khan, could hardly think of such a high official dignity being conferred on a woman, however able she might be. Shah Jahan was also dissatisfied and looked at Nur Jahan's rise with serious apprehension. He considered it expedient to start by removing at least one rival who could prove formidable. He had Prince Khusro strangled to death at Burhanpur on 22nd Feb, 1621, but gave out that he had died of colic. In this very year the Persian king invaded Qandahar.

However plausible the proposals of Shah Jahan might appear, there seems to be hardly any doubt that they were mere excuses. His proposals would have virtually placed in his charge the provinces of the Punjab, most of Rajputana, Malwa, the Deccan and Gujrat. He might have also demanded similar authority over the province of Kabul. Besides, he had his *jagirs* in the Doab and near Delhi. As a corollary to these proposals, only the provinces of Delhi, Agra, Allahabad, Bihar and Bengal would have been left out of his control. It appears that he was planning a coup,

and wanted to avail himself of the situation created by the invasion of Qandahar by the Shah of Persia. His treacherous intentions find support from the fact that he stooped so low as to send Zahid Beg with presents to the Shah of Persia and wished him good luck in his Qandahar enterprise. He had also arranged for "a plentiful supply of money from the rulers of the Deccan and the *Zamindars* of Gondwana". His aggressive and preposterous demands were made most offensive by the rude and exasperating tone of the communications he sent to the Emperor. There was hardly any alternative left to the Emperor but to conclude that Shah Jahan was bent on mischief. He did not yet seem to have realized that Shah Jahan was on the verge of rebellion. He was obsessed with the idea of the recovery of Qandahar. For leading the grand army his next choice fell on Parviz. The original plan of sending him with Shah Jahan had to be abandoned.

Shah Jahan had applied to the Emperor for conferring on him the *jagir* of Dholpur which was not far from Agra. But it was already given to Shahriyar and was in the charge of his men. Shah Jahan felt offended and sent a posse of men who drove off by force the servants of Shahriyar and took possession of the *jagir*. Jahangir was highly displeased with the behaviour of Shah Jahan, but kept his wrath under control. However, he rebuked the Prince, threatened to punish him if he did not watch his steps and confiscated his *jagirs* in the Doab and Hissar Firoza. Much has been made of the *jagir* of Hissar Firoza which has been supposed to be a special preserve for the crown-prince like the Duchy of Cornwall in England. It was nothing of the kind. Nur Jahan had "apparently done nothing to give Shah Jahan a cause of complaint". The latter, on the other hand, found it convenient to put all the blame on her.

Shah Jahan, who was jealous of the Queen and had probably his own plans, was unwilling to do anything for the defence of Qandahar. Indeed, in his underserved hatred for the Queen and his anxiety to humiliate the

Emperor, he had sent Zahid to the Shah. The failure of the Imperial government in defending Qandahar, the loss of prestige caused thereby, and the dissatisfaction of some powerful nobles with the appointment of the Queen to the prestige of *Vakil* offered Shah Jahan a favourable opportunity to pick up a quarrel with the Queen, throw the whole responsibility on her shoulders, and unfurl the standard of rebellion. He laid his hands on Dholpur, which was quite near Agra but was in the *jagir* of Shahriyar, and snatched some other tracts belonging to the *jagir* of the Queen. The Emperor quickly retorted by giving the leadership of the Qandahar campaign to Shahriyar and depriving Shah Jahan of his *jagirs* in Hissar and Doab. But this punishment was tempered, for Jahangir was willing to give *jagirs* of the same value of Shah Jahan in the Deccan. Shah Jahan ought to have made no complaint. For, the same reasons which he had adduced to get full control over the northern provinces of the Punjab held good in the case of Shahriyar who willingly offered himself to serve at Qandahar.

But Shah Jahan grumbled and made a cynical apology couched in a language of hollow flattery, with malicious reflections on Nur Jahan. The Imperial government was rightly convinced that the Prince meditated mischief. Nur Jahan was shrewed enough to realize that the obstinate non-compliance of Shah Jahan to send the Deccan army forboded serious developments, and that Asaf Khan's coldness was due to his sympathies for his son-in-law. She, therefore, decided to reconcile Mahabat Khan and by her tact succeeded in persuading him to take over the command. That rough soldier and able general, who only some time ago was the loudest in denouncing Jahangir for "permitting a woman to have so great an influence over him", now gladly accepted a higher *mansab* and decided to fight against Shah Jahan.

The fall of Qandahar was due largely to the inactivity of Shah Jahan; and as he was the first to demonstrate his power by snatching the *jagir* of Shahriyar and the

Queen and mobilizing his army from Mandu, the Imperial government took up the challenge. Imperial *farmans* for rally against the rebellious Prince were promptly obeyed. The army on the eastern front of Bihar, under Prince Parviz, the Rajas of Jaipur, Jodhpur, Kota, Bundi and Orchha—all flocked quickly under the Imperial standard, and Mahabat Khan was also quite ready to march on at the shortest notice. Before the actual conflict the Imperial government made one more attempt to dissuade Shah Jahan from his evil ways but this brought forth sterner demands from the Prince, couched in rude and insulting language. By this time the Prince's army, alleged to be seventy thousand strong, had reached Fatehpur Sikri and it was his plan to surprise and capture Agra before it could be put in the position of defence. The capture of Dholpur was just a preparatory step. He was partly successful in plundering Agra. But for the tenacity and courage of Etbar Khan, Agra would have been lost. Muhammad Amin's version of these events seems to be fanciful and apologetic.

"What weighs heavily on my heart", wrote the Emperor, "and places my eager temperament in sorrow is this, that at such a time when my prosperous sons and loyal officers should be vying with each other in the service against Qandahar and Khurasan......this inauspicious one (Shah Jahan) has struck with an axe the foot of his own dominion, and become a stumbling block in the path of the enterprise. The momentous affair of Qandahar must now be postponed, but I trust the Almighty God will remove these griefs from my heart." Jahangir had probably forgotten that the Almighty God was punishing him for his similar behaviour towards his noble father, and that it was nemesis that had overtaken him!

At the Court, Shah Jahan had his supporters among such high-placed officers, as Asaf Khan and Mutamid Khan and others. From them he might have heard that Asaf Khan had been asked to bring treasure from Agra to Lahore. It was his plan to intercept the

treasure and also capture Agra. But Etbar Khan did not hand over the treasure to Asaf Khan, and thus saved it. Frustrated in his designs, Shah Jahan marched towards Delhi. By this time Mahabat Khan mobilized his army and contacted Shah Jahan's forces near Biluchpur. In spite of the treachery of Abdullah Khan Firoz Jang, the leader of the Imperial vanguard, which "threw 10,000 cavalry into confusion", the Imperial army gained a victory, and Raja Vikramjit , a supporter of Shah Jahan, was killed. But for the cool courage of Bhim Singh, Prince of Mewar, the army of Shah Jahan could not effect a retreat and might have been utterly broken. Frustrated in his initial attempts and crest-fallen, the Prince beat a hasty retreat to Mandu.

Shah Jahan had incited Jagat Singh, son of Raja Basu, who had rebelled under similar conditions in the time of Akbar, to create diversion in the Punjab, but the Imperial government was now ready to cope with any such distraction. Undeterred by it, Mahabat Khan pressed on Mandu while another army, under Prince Dawarbakhsh, commonly called Bulaqi, son of Prince Khusro, was sent to recover Gujrat which Shah Jahan had given to Abdullah Khan. To infuse energy and supervise the movements of these two armies, Jahangir move his camp to Ajmer. By this time Prince Parviz also arrived. These energetic measures made the position of Shah Jahan untenable at Mandu, and brought some able leaders, like the gallant Rustam Khan and Barqandaz Khan, over to the Imperial side. Shah Jahan's "hand and heart were paralyzed on hearing this news". Moreover Abdullah Khan, called La'natullah by Jahangir, who held the city of Ahmadnagar, was out-matched and driven out from Gujrat by Safi Khan, who recovered the city and the province for the Emperor. Malwa and Gujrat could no longer shelter Shah Jahan. He had to save himself by crossing the Narbada. Prince Parviz and Mahabat Khan were commanded to pursue him.

Shah Jahan found some respite, as the governor

of the famous stronghold of Asir delivered the fort to him. Here came Abdullah Khan, who had been driven from Gujrat. From this place Shah Jahan opened negotiations with Malik Ambar of Ahmadnagar, but the latter was at war with Bijapur, hence he refused to be drawn into a conflict with the mighty Delhi government. Muhammad Adil Shah, the new ruler of Bijapur, also treated the messages of Shah Jahan with indifference. These constant failures in all quarters disillusioned Shah Jahan and compelled him to open communications with the Emperor. AbdurRahim Khan-i-Khana, who was confined in the internment camp, was sent on the suggestion of Mahabat Khan to plead for forgiveness, but Mahabat's main object was to separate the Khan-i-Khana from Shah Jahan. Before AbdurRahim reached Mahabat Khan, the Imperialists crossed the Narbada, breaking through the stout opposition of Bairam Beg. The crossing of the Narbada and the separation of AbdurRahim Khan-i-Khana from the Prince encouraged Mahabat Khan to continue the war. It was indeed extremely hard for Shah Jahan to find himself driven to utter helplessness owing to the aggressive policy of Mahabat Khan. There is no doubt that at this time Shah Jahan was really anxious to come to terms with his father as is clear from the most pathetic lamentations of Mumtaz Mahal, the Begam of Shah Jahan, and her sons. Just on the eve of the departure of AbdurRahim Khan-i-Khana, according to the statement of Jahangir himself, Shah Jahan had told the Khan-i-Khana, "My times are hard and my position difficult; I make myself over to you, and make you the guardian of my honour. You must act so that I may be no longer under contempt and confusion." Since the Khan-i-Khana, in spite of the word of honour given by him to Shah Jahan, had offered submission to Parviz and given up the cause, the proposals of peace fell through.

Either swayed by the influence of the opponents of Shah Jahan or with a view to reducing him to utter helplessness, the Emperor sent orders to Parviz not to

"relax his efforts, but must determine either to take him alive or to drive him out of the Imperial territory". Shah Jahan was literally hounded out. He crossed the Tapti under heavy rains, which was then in floods, and entered Golkunda with his wife and sons and followers, including Bhim Singh. His army had dwindled to less than five thousand cavalry and five hundred elephants and about ten thousand infantry. The Imperial army now gave up the pursuit, for it involved an encroachment on a Deccan state, which could not be risked without a definite permission of the Emperor (1623).

Jahangir knew well that Shah Jahan would not stay long at Golkunda, and would try to come to Hindustan through Orissa and Bengal. He, therefore, appointed Mirza Rustam as governor of Allahabad. No special arrangement were made in Bengal and Orissa; for the province of Bengal was governed by the able and tactful Ibrahim Khan, who was a maternal uncle of Nur Jahan, and Orissa was administered by Ahmad Beg Khan, a nephew of Ibrahim Khan. They were expected to act loyally.

Shah Jahan received no military help from Sultan Muhammad Qutubulmulk of Golkunda except some subsidy in cash and other presents. But he was given all possible assistance in getting necessary supplies. Shah Jahan had promised to quit the territory of Golkunda in a short time. He, therefore, moved on and by way of Muslipatam entered Orissa through the Chhatar Diwar pass. Ahmad Beg was taken by surprise at the sudden arrival of Shah Jahan with several thousands of cavalry and infantry. He lost his courage and fled to Bengal. The road thus clear, Shah Jahan pushed forward *via* Midnapur, and captured Burdwan from Faujdar Mirza Salih.

Shah Jahan tried to persuade Ibrahim Khan, the governor of Bengal, either to continue as a virtual governor of Bengal under the nominal Viceroyalty of Prince Aurangzeb or to quit Bengal and go wherever he pleased. But Ibrahim refused to entertain any such proposal and resolved to fight, in spite of his relatively

weak position and the presence of some treacherous elements among the Afghans and the Portuguese. A well-contested battle was fought at Akbarpur,, a few miles from Rajmahal. Ibrahim Khan's forces were broken, but he refused to quit the battle-field and died sword in hand (20th April 1624). Shah Jahan occupied Dacca, the capital, where he got 30 lacs of rupees in cash and five hundred elephants, besides a large park of artillery and the flotilla.

The news of the entry of Shah Jahan into Orissa had reached the Emperor. He ordered Prince Parviz and Mahabat Khan to hurry back to the *Suba* of Allahabad and Bihar. They obeyed the orders promptly and proceeded by forced marches towards the Eastern provinces. Before leaving Mandu, Parviz had established friendly relations with Adil Shah of Bijapur, who had sent a contingent of five thousand to serve under the Mughal command. Mahabat ignored Malik Ambar.

With the vast resources of Bengal and the high spirit of his soldiers, Shah Jahan found no difficulty in taking Bihar. Bhim Singh met no opposition in capturing Patna as the defeat of Ibrahim Khan had so completely demoralized the Imperial officers that they did not venture to offer any resistance. Saiyid Mubarak, the *Qiledar* of Rohtas, hastened to make a voluntary surrender of the fort. Shah Jahan despatched two armies, one to Manikpur under Darya Khan, and the other under Raja Bhim and Abdullah Khan, against Allahabad. Sometime after Shah Jahan moved himself and occupied Jaunpur.

Abdullah Khan reached Jhusi, a place on the other side of the Ganges, opposite Allahabad fort. The Bengal flotilla also arrived, hence Abdullah crossed the Ganges under cover of artillery. Fortunately, Allahabad was held by the gallant Rustam Khan. It was by no means easy to capture it. The siege dragged on till it was rumoured that Mahabat Khan and Prince Parviz had arrived, and, with the help of Bais Rajputs, succeeded in crossing the Ganges some eighty miles above the

river. The Bengal flotilla and some of the casual supporters of the Prince deserted him. His supplies were cut off and his position became precarious. Abdullah Khan advised Shah Jahan to leave Allahabad and make a dash upon Delhi by way of Oudh, for he thought that the rebel army was numerically too weak to be effective, as the Imperialists commanded 40,000 against 10,000 of theirs. But Raja Bhim and other officers opposed the suggestion and advised him to fight. Raja Bhim even went so far as to say, "such marching and moving about was against the rules of the Rajputs", and if it were persisted in, they "should not reckon upon his support". Bhim Singh probably knew that an attack on Delhi was bound to end in a miserable failure, for Mahabat Khan was on the track, and Agra was held by another able Afghan general Khan-i-jahan Lodi. Moreover, it was probable that Rustam Khan, who was holding Allahabad, might try to cut off their retreat. It was finally decided to make a supreme effort. A battle was fought at Damdama, at the confluence of the Tons and the Ganges, in which Raja Bhim after exhibiting the traditional valour of the house of Chitor lost his life. The rebel artillery fell into the hands of the Imperialists, and Shah Jahan's horse was wounded. The rebels recognized themselves as beaten and retreated.

Leaving his Begam at Rohtas, Shah Jahan retreated to Bengal. He could not expect to get any substantial support in that quarter, for the diplomacy of Mahabat Khan had induced the *zemindars* to desert the Prince, and Darab Khan, the governor of Bengal on behalf of Shah Jahan, was unwilling to fight for a forlorn cause. Finding his position untenable, Shah Jahan collected whatever baggage and ammunition he could get, and fled to the Deccan by the same route by which he had come.

When Shah Jahan reached the Deccan he was gladly welcomed by Malik Ambar who was then at war with the Mughals and Bijapur, and had gained a decided advantage over them. Mahabat Khan had made an

alliance with Bijapur and rejected the submissive proposals of Malik Ambar. The latter waited for an opportunity. As soon as Mahabat and Parviz were called out to fight Shah Jahan in the north, Malik Ambar attacked Bijapur, scored several victories and laid siege to the capital. The Mughal officers came to help Bijapur. At first, Malik Ambar sought for peace, failing which he made a supreme effort and by skilful movements defeated the combined armies of the Mughals and Bijapur at Bhaturi, near Ahmadnagar. This defeat disorganized and broke the Mughal and Bijapur armies and encouraged Ambar to lay siege to Ahmadnagar and Bijapur almost simultaneously. He also captured Sholapur from the Bijapurians, and threatened the Mughal headquarters of Burhanpur, where Sarbuland Rai, the deputy of Parviz, had shut himself up.

Malik Ambar was pleased to let Shah Jahan conduct the siege of Burhanpur. The Prince had made two vigorous attempts to storm it, but failed. Meanwhile Mahabat Khan and Prince Parviz again arrived on the scene. Shah Jahan was obliged to raise the siege. This failure told on Abdullah Khan and Shah Jahan severely. The former renounced the world and the latter was taken ill. His anguish was great when he found most of his supporters deserting him. Still he tried his luck in Balaghat. Driven to despair he beseeched the Emperor to forgive him and retired to Balaghat.

Jahangir was not willing to persecute the repentant Prince any more. He had suffered much, tried everywhere and failed, and at last had thrown himself once more at his mercy. Nor did Nur Jahan Begam offer any obstacle in the matter. The Emperor granted him pardon on condition that he should surrender the fort of Rohtas in Bihar, and Asirgarh in Khandesh, and send his sons Dara and Aurangzeb as hostages to the Court. Shah Jahan accepted all these conditions and was consequently pardoned. The territory of Balaghat was given to the Prince for his maintenance.

The failure of Shah Jahan was due largely to his miscalculations. He thought that Jahangir's illness

would prevent him from taking energetic action, while Asaf Khan, the *Diwan*, who was Shah Jahan's father-in-law, would do nothing to weaken his cause. He expected that the social and quasi-political exaltation of the Queen would alienate most of the high nobles and military commanders. His vanity and arrogance led him to believe that the latter would naturally flock under his banner as he was ablest, the most dignified among the princes and above all the most successful army leader and diplomat. He was under the impression that he commanded the largest army which was actually on the field and ready for action, while the Emperor might not be able to muster quickly an army large and strong enough to cope with that of his own. The pressure of Persia and others on the North-west would not permit him to withdraw the forces from the western front. With all such advantages, he would find no serious opposition and his victory would be sure and quick.

Shah Jahan forgot that the Crown commanded the loyalty of the overwhelming majority of the people of the Empire and of the nobles. Akbar had thrown such a lustre on the Crown that it came to be feared, respected and loved. Moreover, in spite of his ill-health, Jahangir showed considerable energy and gave full attention to the affair. The Shah of Persia was not prepared to go further than the capture of Qandahar for, shortly after its fall, he sent an ambassador to Jahangir and expressed his wish to maintain concord and cordiality with the Mughal Empire. That relieved Jahangir of great anxiety and he could recall some of the ablest commanders, like Mahabat Khan and Khan-i-Jahan, with their divisions to fight the rebels. As for Nur Jahan, in spite of mischief-mongering and vilification on the part of some interested persons and her so-called unpopularity, she was far more respected and loved than her detractors would admit.

The determination of Jahangir, the ready and growing response to his call by the nobles from Kabul to Bihar, and the good-will of the Shah of Persia not only paralysed the supporters of Shah Jahan at

the Court but caused defection among some, disheartened many of his followers, and discouraged the Deccan powers from taking sides. Further, the vigilant and vigorous action, military and diplomatic, did not give him a good chance to stay long anywhere and consolidate whatever advantage he could gain in Orissa, Bengal, Bihar and Oudh. He could not, therefore, count upon any serious reinforcements in case his resources in men, money and material failed, nor could he fall back on the support of any strong friendly power in the East. To make matters worse, some of his most ardent followers, like Raja Vikramjit and Prince Bhim Singh, were killed, while Abdur Rahim Khan-i-Khana and his son had failed him. His cheap glory and reputation as a great military strategist, commander or diplomat lay exposed as soon as he lost the backing and prestige of the Emperor.

So long as Shah Jahan was up in arms his father-in-law Asaf Khan could not seriously adopt any measure that might betray his anxiety for him. His attitude was suspected at the beginning of Shah Jahan's rebellion, hence he studiously kept himself in the background. When he saw that his son-in-law was hounded out from one place to the other, through the energetic efforts of his enemy Mahabat Khan, he became alarmed. He ingratiated himself with his trusting sister Nur Jahan and began to play a game too subtle to be easily understood. His sole object was to weaken the power of Mahabat, and by separating him from Parviz, weaken both.

The rebellion of Shah Jahan focussed light on the danger of leaving for a long time an astute commander with a large and victorious army in intimate association with a Prince of the Royal family. The combination of Abdur Rahim Khan-i-Khana and Khurram had resulted in a formidable rebellion and what wonder could there be if Parviz and Mahabat Khan, intoxicated with their victories, had adopted a similar course of action and proved too powerful for the Empire. This supposition got some colour from the fact that Mahabat Khan had

neither sent the elephants nor given any account of the booty captured in Bihar and Bengal, nor of large sums he had appropriated from the revenues and from the *jagirs* of the rebellious *zemindars* that had been snatched away from them, and to which the *Diwan* had taken serious objection. As a matter of policy or precaution it was thought desirable to separate the Prince from Mahabat Khan. This view was also supported by Abdur Rahim Khan-i-Khana, who was already sowing seeds of dissension between Parviz and Mahabat Khan.

In 1625 an order was issued from the Court directing him to take the governorship of Bengal and hand over the *vakalat* of Parviz to Khan-i-Jahan Lodi, the then governor of Gujrat. The insalubrious climate of Bengal made its governorship unenviable. But the situation of the *Suba* was such that ever since the days of Akbar some of the ablest and well-tried nobles were appointed to govern it. The Prince showed some reluctance to relieve Mahabat Khan, which might have further strengthened the suspicions of the Imperial government.

The slight reluctance showed by Parviz and Mahabat Khan to carry out the Imperial command gave an opportunity to Asaf Khan to poison the mind of the Emperor. In a more peremptory language the command was repeated and, therefore, the Prince and Mahabat decided to obey it forthwith. The latter gave the charge of his office to Khan-i-Jahan Lodi and leisurely left Burhanpur.

Mahabat Khan requested the Emperor to allow his son Khanzad Khan to return from Kabul and take over the government of Bengal as his deputy just as he was doing at Kabul. The request was granted. Officially Mahabat Khan became the governor of Bengal. Asaf Khan then took the third step. As *Diwan* of the Empire he reopened the demand for submission of the accounts of war-booty and the sums of money placed at his disposal as also of surrendering the elephants. At the same time Abdur Rahim Khan-i-Khana appealed to the Emperor against Mahabat Khan whom he charged with murdering his son and other

members of his family and looting their property. In spite of her alleged political sagacity and shrewdness, Nur Jahan failed to probe into the deep-seated motives of Asaf Khan, whom she fondly continued to trust. Since Mahabat was not believed to be her particular adherent or protege, she did not take any interest in the matter, and allowed the apparently reasonable demands of Asaf Khan to take their own course.

Mahabat Khan returned all the elephants and in a leisurely fashion moved from Burhanpur to Ranthambore, which was his *jagir*. Since he had not gone personally to Bengal and no special duty was assigned to him, he was called to the Court. An officer with one thousand Ahdis was sent to bring him. This unusual procedure led Mahabat Khan and others to believe that he had lost the favour of the Emperor, and, therefore, few *mansabdars* showed their willingness to accompany him to the Court. Yet he collected under his flag about four thousand Rajputs and two thousand Mughals who went with him. The Emperor refused to grant him an interview until he had submitted satisfactorily the accounts called for by the *Diwan*. The cup of his humiliation was filled to the over-flowing when his son-in-law Barkhwrdar Khan was beaten and sent to prison, and the dowry which Mahabat Khan had given him was confiscated. The charge against him was that the marriage was performed without the permission of the Emperor. Marriages among the nobles were settled with the consultation of the Emperor. It was also strongly rumoured that Asaf Khan was planning the arrest of Mahabat Khan. The latter now fully realized that an iron wall had been built up between him and the Emperor by his detractors, particularly, Asaf Khan. He became desperate and made up his mind to break it.

When Mahabat Khan arrived in the camp, the Emperor was on his way to Kabul. He waited for his opportunity. One day when the Imperial cortege had crossed over to the other side of the Jhelum and the Emperor was yet on this side, Mahabat Khan

forced his way to the Emperor and prostrating himself before the Emperor said that "being driven to despair and fearing utter disgrace from Asaf Khan he had thrown himself under the protection of the Emperor ; if he found him unworthy of his service, he might put him to death". Jahangir was taken by surprise when he found that the camp was in the possession of Mahabat Khan's men. Mahabat Khan then suggested that if the Emperor were to ride out with him for a hunt, people would take that his action was quite according to the wishes and orders of His Majesty. The Emperor coolly agreed, and was taken to Mahabat's camp.

In the excitement of his extraordinary daring, Mahabat Khan neglected to take Nur Jahan into custody. When he realized his mistake he came back to the Royal camp, but found that she had gone over to the other side.

Nur Jahan was a lady of great sagacity and courage. The unusual behaviour of an officer annoyed her, but the main problem before her was to rescue her husband as much for the security of his life as for maintaining the dignity of the Crown. She summoned all the chief nobles, including Asaf Khan. Rebuking them for their negligence and mismanagement which had brought shame upon all, she commanded them to retrieve their honour by rescuing the Emperor. It was decided that they should re-cross the river and fight the rebel. When Jahangir came to know of this plan, he expressed his disapproval as it might lead to a bloody conflict and even endanger his life. But no heed was paid to his advice and the plan was executed. Nur Jahan herself mounting an elephant watched the movements of her soldiers. Unluckily, the ford which they selected for crossing was one of the worst of its kind and was at places quite deep. While attempting to ford the river all order was lost and confusion followed. The men of Mahabat Khan, who were holding the other bank of the river, took advantage of it, and made a counterattack before the soldiers and officers were able to reach the land. The royalists were thrown in utter confusion

and hopelessness; quite a large number of them were killed and many more were drowned. The elephant of Nur Jahan fled; Asaf Khan took to his heels and the royalist coup ended disastrously. Asaf Khan fled precipitately for his life and took shelter in the fort of Attock. Fidai Khan, who had almost reached the camp of Jahangir, had to beat a retreat and seek protection in the fort of Rohtas. The royalists having been scattered, further resistance was out of the question. Nur Jahan, therefore, surrendered herself and was allowed to live with the Emperor.

With his mind at rest, Mahabat Khan sent his son Bihroz to Attock, and himself marched slowly towards Kabul in the train of the Emperor. Unable to defend the fort, Asaf Khan offered submission. He was placed in custody. Mahabat Khan moved on and reached Kabul, taking the Emperor, the Empress and the ex-minister with him, (May 1626). The life at the Court seemed to be normal.

Mahabat Khan might have been afraid of dire consequences or swayed by high-mindedness; he did not go beyond the limit of keeping their Majesties and Asaf Khan under reasonable watch. He did not meddle much with the administration, except probably in the appointment of a few governorships which he secured for his own supporters. He left almost complete freedom to the Emperor, who held darbars, received an embassy from Turan and went out for hunting. It seems that he had no greater ambition than the removal of the Emperor from the vicious influences of his opponents and reconciling him to his own interest. But the Empress felt it beneath the dignity of the Crown to remain in a sort of tutelage to a *mansabdar*. She tried to undermine his power and plotted with the discontented officers. Yet Mahabat Khan did not at all interfere with her liberty or exhibit his temper.

The Empress tried every possible method to shake off Mahabat Khan, and deliver her brother from his custody. She found her opportunity in the growing unpopularity of Mahabat Khan, which was due not

so much to his own abuse of power as to the influence which the Rajputs exercised over him and the jealousy of other officials. Mahabat Khan seems to have been singularly devoid of tact and sociability for, instead of securing sympathy and support for his cause, he was being rapidly isolated. He was essentially a soldier and not a tactful diplomat in time of peace. The Emperor, however, showed no ill-feeling towards him for some reason or the other. Unhappily, the situation was further worsened by an armed conflict between the Ahdis and the Rajputs on the trifling question of grazing their horses. The incident though petty had far-reaching consequences, for it ended in the death of several hundred best Rajput fighters in the service of Mahabat Khan, and made him more unpopular.

It was about this time (1626) that news arrived that Shah Jahan had left the Deccan and was moving towards the capital. The Imperial camp, therefore, left Kabul for India and orders were given to raise fresh troops. This was the opportunity for Nur Jahan. She had already exploited the unpopularity of Mahabat Khan. By means of bribes and promises of favours she won a good number of officers to her side and raised troops which would stand by her. In Lahore a couple of thousand soldiers were recruited in her name and instructions were issued to them to join the Royal camp. Mahabat, however, did not show any sign of agitation or anxiety, for the Emperor had led him to believe that he was quite reconciled to him. Asaf Khan must have felt quite amused and satisfied with the developments which were in his favour though sponsored by his sister.

By the time the Imperial cortege reached Rohtas, Nur Jahan found her position strong enough to take the offensive, and the position of Mahabat proportionately weakened. The Emperor began by expressing his wish to hold a review of his cavalry and asking Mahabat not to come or bring his men lest some disturbance should arise. Shortly after, another order was issued that Mahabat should move a stage ahead, which in plain

language amounted to an order to leave the Royal camp. Mahabat now realized that his position was hopeless. He obeyed the orders and, instead of halting at the next stage, fled precipitately towards Thatta, taking Asaf Khan and the sons of Daniyal with him. In doing this, Mahabat had no designs except his personal safety, for as soon as he found himself at a safe distance from the Imperial camp, he allowed all of them to go back and join the Emperor. Thus ended the dramatic *coup d'etat* of Mahabat Khan. Asaf Khan was again free to sway the destinies of the Empire, while the Empress had the satisfaction of freeing the Emperor and her brother. She did not quite realize that her confidence in her brother was utterly misplaced, and unwittingly she had sown trouble for herself.

Mahabat Khan did not go to Thatta. For sometime he loitered in Hindustan, for he was expecting the arrival of twenty-two lacs of rupees from Bengal. But the Imperial government came to know of the convoy and had it intercepted. Sorely disappointed, Mahabat Khan took shelter in the hills of Mewar, and then opened communications with Shah Jahan, who was only too glad to welcome him in his service.

Although Shah Jahan had been pardoned by the Emperor and allowed a *jagir* for the maintenance of his family, he could have been the last person to reconcile himself to his unenviable position. He must have received full information regarding the developments at the Court and the position of Mahabat Khan. He must have been aware of the declining health of the Emperor and Prince Parviz. He had been trying get the help of the Shah of Persia, if for nothing else at least to secure better treatment from the Emperor. But the Shah advised him "to remain loyal and obedient to his father". Shah Jahan felt that the opportunity had come when he should move from the Deccan. He gave out that he was going to the north to punish the rebel Mahabat Khan and free their Majesties from his domination. He expected Khan-i-Jahan Lodi to join him, but the latter decided to stay out, for either he was

not fully acquainted with the affairs of the Imperial Court, or he did not want to associate himself with the suspicious activities of the Prince.

At Ajmer Shah Jahan failed to muster up any large following or inspire enthusiasm for his cause. His position, in fact, was weakened by the death of one of his chief supporters, Kishan Singh, son of Raja Bhim Singh. There he changed his plans and decided to go to Sindh. From there he could be in closer touch with the Imperial Court, as well as with the Shah of Persia. If developments were favourable, he could quickly move up. If things went against him, he could go to Persia and try his luck there. On reaching Sindh, with a few thousand cavalry and infantry, he wanted to take possession of Thatta, which was a busy and commercially prosperous town besides being the headquarters of the government. He failed to produce any moral or material impression on Sharafulmulk, the Commander of the garrison. Losing hope and health, he drifted to Gujrat, where he got the news of the death of Parviz, who could be a rival for the Imperial throne. Mahabat was already out of favour with the Court, if not definitely outlawed. The removal of the two from the scene inspired hope and courage in Shah Jahan, who then decided to go back to the Deccan and watch further developments. There he received the request of Mahabat Khan to place his services at his disposal. Shah Jahan was too glad to accept the offer. Thus, by the stupidity of Nur Jahan and the sly machinations of Asaf Khan and the well-wishers of Shah Jahan, Mahabat Khan was driven into the arms of Shah Jahan.

The alliance between Shah Jahan and Mahabat Khan, who was outlawed, must have made the Emperor uneasy. Nothing more, however, could be done than to ask Khan-i-Jahan Lodi, the Comander-in-chief of the Deccan army, to remain alert, watch the steps of the new allies and, in case of need, take necessary measures.

During the hot months of 1627 Jahangir's health began to fail him. The attack of asthma became severe and he lost his appetite. Everyday his weakness

increased. While returning from Kashmir to Lahore, he had a severe attack on the way, near Rajuri, which proved to be fatal and on 28th October 1627 he died at the age of sixty.

Jahangir was endowed with fine literary and artistic tastes. His appreciation of nature, flora and fauna, and of the beautiful was equal to his power of description. His memoirs possess an individuality, and bear the stamp of his scientific inquisitiveness, love of nature and general ability. They are recognized as one of the best of their kind and take their place by the side of those of Babar. Some critics holds that they contain twice as much matter in them as Babar's memoirs and are by far the more entertaining of the two works. This estimate is a bit exaggerated, for they do not possess that naivety, insight, originality and masterly grasp and expression which are found in the memoirs of Babar. However, the memoirs show Jahangir's virtues and vices fairly clearly. They give a vivid picture of some of the political developments and personalities, life and affairs of his day. They form the most important, if not the only, source of our information about his reign.

Jahangir had a great love for justice, which he dispensed even when he happened to be ill. Long after his death, he was remembered as one of the most just kings. It was largely due to his zeal for justice that he sometimes inflicted severe punishment on criminals. Though normally kind, humane, forgiving and generous, he could at times become shockingly hard-hearted and cruel. In his religious views he was not narrow and took delight in conversing with men of other faiths. His inclination was, however, more towards Sufism. None the less, he was more orthodox than his father and less than his son Khurram. It was only to placate the orthodox section of Muslims, that he sometimes acted in a way prejudicial to the principles of toleration established by Akbar and generally followed by himself. His anxiety to show himself as an upholder of the Muslim law was not deep but was quite sufficient to

give a lever to the forces of reaction. It was unfortunately in his reign that the seed of religious persecution was unwittingly sown once more. The Sikh Guru Arjun and the Seora Jains suffered not simply because they were suspected of treason, but also because Jahangir had conceived a sort of abhorrence for their creeds. Kaukab, son of Qamarkhan, Abdullatif, son of Naqib Khan, and Sharif were thrown into prison and flogged for their opinions. The author of *Maasiri Jahangiri* says that it was done to protect holy Shariat law. It was by Jahangir's orders and in his presence that a bullock was slaughtered in the temple of Kangra, though it should not be forgotten that cow slaughter was not permitted if the Hindus paid for such concessions. It was he who gave orders for the desecration and destruction of the temples near Pushkar in Ajmer in his eighth year. On the whole, however, it must be recognized that Jahangir did not countenance any general persecution, and, broadly speaking, tried to maintain the policy of his father. He made practically no difference between the Hindu and the Mohammedan or the Christian subjects or officials and continued to celebrate the national Hindu festivals, like Dasehra, Diwali, Shivratri and Rakshabandhan.

Jahangir was also a patron of arts and literature. It was in his reign that the art of painting reached its highest water-mark, that new elements were added to architectural decorations, and literature maintained its vitality, though only a shade less than that in his father's time.

CHRONOLOGY : JAHANGIR

Accession of Jahangir	24 Oct. 1605
Khusro's flight from Agra	5 April, 1606
Guru Arjun's death	30 May 1606
Qandahar besieged by the Persians	1606
Invasion of Mewar	1606
Arrival of Husain Beg, the envoy from Persia	Feb-March 1607
Jahangir's arrival in Kabul	3 June 1607
Marriage with Nur Jahan	1611
Guru Hargovind summoned by the Emperor	1612
Transfer of Bengal's capital from Rajmahal to Dacca	1612
Annexation of Kamrup	1613
Subjugation of Mewar	1613-15
Khurram's departure for the Deccan	Nov. 1616.
Conquest of Tipperah	1618.
Conquest of Kangra	16 Nov. 1620.
Jahangir at Kangra	Feb., 1622.
Loss of Qandahar	1622.
Revolt of Prince Khurram	1622.
Uzbek's raids in Ghazni and Kabul	1623.
Mahabat Khan's Coup	1626.
Death of Jahangir	29 Oct. 1627.

PERSIAN :—

Jahangir : Tuzuk-i-Jahangiri, Sir Syyed Ahmad Khan's edition, English translation. 2 Vols. by A. Rogers and H. Beveridge.

Mohammad Sharif Motamid Khan: Iqbalnama-i-Jahangiri.

Niamatullah : Makhzan-i-Afaghina.

Khwaja Kamgar Ghairat Khan : Maasir-i-Jahangiri.

Shitab Khan : Baharistan-i-Ghaibi, English translation by Dr. Borah.

Sujan Rai : Khulasat-ut-Tawarikh.

Khafi Khan : Muntakhab-ul-Lubab.

EUROPEAN :—

Besides those mentioned on Akbar, consult the following also:—

De Laet's work translated into English by J. S. Hoyland.

Thomas Roe : Journal, 2 Vols. Hakluyt Society.

Terry : Voyage to East Indies.

Pelsaert : The Remonstranie, English Translation by Moreland and Geyl.

Elliot and Dowson : Relevant Volumes.

ENGLISH :—Modern

Beni Prasad : History of Jahangir.
Banarasi Prasad : History of Shah Jahan.
Payne: Jahangir and the Jesuits.
Banerji: Evolution of the Khalsa.

HINDI :—

Ojha G. H. : Rajputana Ka Itihas.

URDU :—

Zakaullah : Tarikh-i-Hindustan.

For advanced study:—

Consult also the works dealing with the reign of Akbar for the activities of Jahangir as a Prince.

CHAPTER XIX

SHAH JAHAN

ACCESSION TO THE SECOND BUNDELA WAR

The death of Jahangir, besides causing Nur Jahan deep heartache and agony, was to her a mishap of no mean consequence. The behaviour of her brother at this time must have given her another great shock. Asaf Khan, whom she had gone out of her way to help, flatly refused to take any part in the obsequies of the late Emperor, or to confer with her regarding the urgent affairs of the Empire. He did not have the courtesy even to sympathise with her lot. His action has been condoned on the ground that his clever sister might have laid a snare for him, made plans to have him arrested, if not murdered, had he decided to see her. If he was so much in awe or suspicion he could have taken adequate measures for his safety. But it appears that his plan was to isolate the Queen completely and let everybody know that he had nothing to do whatsoever with her and that now she was not worth much in the realm. Instead of wasting time in formalities and mourning he thought he could utilize it better in implementing his own plans. His attitude might have incidentally shown to Nur Jahan that she did not come in the picture where high politics were involved, and it pleased Shah Jahan as well. Left alone to herself, Nur Jahan bitterly bewailed and cried her heart out. She took the body of the Emperor to Lahore and gave it a burial in her own garden known as Dilkusha.

At the time of Jahangir's death Shahriyar was at Lahore taking treatment for alopecia. Since Shahriyar wanted to go for treatment to Lahore, the charge of Prince Dawar Baksh, son of Khusro, was given to Iradat Khan, the *Mir Bakhashi* who was a creature of Asaf

Khan. The sons of Shah Jahan—Dara, Shuja and Aurangzeb—were with Nur Jahan. If any struggle for the throne was to take place at the headquarters, it was likely to be confined to the princes present there.

To keep Nur Jahan and her sister under rigorous watch and isolate them completely, Asaf Khan placed strong guards at their residence. Thus they were virtually reduced to the position of state prisoners. They were not allowed to send or receive any communitions or persons. The sons of Shah Jahan were taken away from Nur Jahan's care with the assistance of Khwaja Abul Hasan.

The first act of Asaf Khan was to send Banarsi Das post-haste to Shah Jahan, inform him of the situation at the headquarters and urge upon him the desirability of reaching Lahore by rapid marches as time was a very important factor. A message was sent to Mahabat Khan also asking him to throw all his weight in favour of Shah Jahan.

But the most momentous step taken by Asaf Khan was to place Prince Dawar Baksh, son of Khusro, on the throne just to fill the vacuum caused by the death of Jahangir. The Prince was extremely unwilling to assume the Imperial title, for he had a premonition of his tragic end, but he was not allowed to wriggle out. All sorts of assurances on sacred oaths were given him by Asaf Khan and Iradat Khan. If these nobles had not been blinded by selfishness and partizanship, they would have been entitled to praise, for after all Dawar Baksh was the son of the eldest son of Jahangir. They would have earned the honour of reinforceing a healthy precedent even at a critical time, just as Babar, Humayun and Akbar had done. They had neither the vision nor the will to do so. Their object was to prevent the possible disintegration of their party at least till the arrival and enthronement of Shah Jahan. It is true that Islamic law does not stress the principle of primogeniture, and prefers to leave the question of succession to election, but the trend of history of the Islamic people had shown beyond doubt that the elective principle had progressively faded

away giving place to either hereditary succession or sheer usurpation. There was every probability that Shah Jahan would have taken up arms to capture the throne, but it could be defended for the sake of a princpiple which contained lesser evil than the other. If the nobles had risen to the occasion, they might have been just as successful as formerly against Shah Jahan's rebellion or later, on Shahriyar's defiance. Their action, however gave evidence of cunningness and Machiavellian craft rather than statesmanship or far-sighted wisdom.

It was given out that Jahangir on his death-bed had declared Dawar Baksh to be his successor. That was not improbable. Dawar Baksh was, therefore, hoisted on the throne with the title of Sher Shah and the *Kutba* was read in his name in the mosque of Bhimbar on the 12th of November 1627 and later coins were struck in his name.

At Lahore Shahriyar in his fatuity congratulated himself as Emperor (*Shah-i-Shahan*) and issued coins in his name. He could think of no other plan to win the support of the nobles and the soldiers but by lavishing gold on them. Within a fortnight he distributed seventy lacs of rupees among the worthless nobles and improvised troopers. This was probably the only method that he could take recourse to, for his bald personality, weak character, lack of experience, inefficiency and short-sightedness might have scared away all the nobles. Under the command of Mirza Baisanghar, son of Daniyal, he sent a force to deal with the pretensions of Asaf Khan and his puppet.

Asaf Khan, the *Vakil*, was too strong for them, supported as he was by Khwaja Abul Hasan, the *Diwan*, and the Saiyids of Barah of the Imperial army. Abul Hasan came out to fight, but had not to exert himself much. Shortly after the first collision the troops of Shahriyar broke; some fled away, while others joined the party of Asaf Khan. Shahriyar now shut himself up in the fort with two or three thousand men, but he could not hold it even for a few days as treachery was active among his men. He was delivered up to his

enemies by Firoz Khan Khwajasara, taken before the puppet Emperor and ordered to be blinded and thrown into the prison. Similar treatment was meted out to the sons of Daniyal, Tahmuras and Hoshang.

Banarsi Das reached the Deccan from Kashmir in twenty days. He was quite successful in his mission. Mahabat Khan was pleased with the news and communicated it to Shah Jahan who was encamped at Junner. Hardly four days had passed when the camp of Shah Jahan moved towards Ahmadabad apparently to take possession of that province before striking at Delhi. The only ominous event was the unwillingness of Khan-i-Jahan Lodi, the *Subedar* of Burhanpur, and the Commander (Khan-i-Khana) of the Imperial army to join his camp. Shah Jahan had no time or resources to get entangled with him. Therefore, he contented himself by sending a letter in his own hand conveying his kind and good wishes. But the Khan-i-Jahan ignored the letter and gave no reply to it. He was disappointed because Shah Jahan had already conferred the title of the Khan-i-Khana on Mahabat Khan.

Shah Jahan entrusted Gujrat to Sher Khan who had promptly offered his allegiance and ordered the arrest of Saif Khan, who was seriously ill. At the pleading of Mumtaz Mahal, whose elder sister was married to Saif Khan, Shah Jahan warned Sher Khan not to inflict any injury on him. About the same time Isa Khan was raised to the rank of five thousand and was made the Governor of Thatta.

By this time Shah Jahan had learnt from a communique of Asaf Khan of the defeat and imprisonment of Shahriyar and his supporters. He extolled the loyalty of Asaf Khan, congratulated him at his triumph, and with a view to getting rid of possible rivals once for all and testing his sincerity requested him to execute Shahriyar and the sons of Daniyal. Asaf Khan was glad to carry out his wishes to the very spirit and letter. He got the princes executed and had the *Khutba* read in the name of Shah Jahan at Lahore. Little did Shah Jahan or his followers realize that by their ruthless and

diabolical slaughter they were establishing a dangerous precedent which was calculated to sap the vitality and prestige of the house of Babar and undermine the Mughal Empire. If not others, Shah Jahan at least lived long to reap the first harvest of his policy.

On his way to Agra, Shah Jahan received the homage of Rana Karan of Mewar. At his own request Mahabat Khan was given the *Jagir* of *Suba* Ajmer. Having thus strengthened his position in Rajputana and Gujrat, Shah Jahan marched to Agra on Feb. 1620.

Wading through the blood of his brothers, cousins and nephews, Shah Jahan ascended the throne at Agra on 4th Feb. 1628 amidst all the pomp and eclat that is associated with the Mughal pageantry. Following the practice of his father, he assumed the title of Abul Muzaffar Shihabuddin Muhammad Sahibi Qiran Sani Shah Jahan Padshah Ghazi. The Emperor signalized his accession to the throne by abolishing the *Sijdah* ceremony, introducing his own era and ordering the inscription, on one side of the new coins, of the names of the first four Caliphs and on the other his own. Lavish presents and large gifts were made to the ladies and princes of the blood. It is said that on his coronation Shah Jahan spent a sum of one crore and sixty lacs of rupees. Of this sum only thirty lacs went to the nobles, the rest was given away in the shape of gifts and presents to the members of his own family. His supporters were confirmed in their offices, if not raised to a higher status. They replaced as usual, those nobles whose loyalty was either doubtful or suspected.

Shah Jahan was good enough to settle a pension of two lacs of rupees a year on Nur Jahan. It is not clear if it was by way of recognising the favours which she had bestowed on Shah Jahan in the regime of Etmaduddaula, or soothing his conscience for the wild charges and undeserved insolence, which for political strategy he had levelled against her. Nur Jahan being a lady did not find a contemporary chronicler who could do justice to her. Her husband, for reasons of propriety

or sentiment, did not write much about her except showing a casual appreciation of her loyalty and devotion to him and her generosity and ability. For her qualities of head and heart, artistic gifts, literary merit and wit, dignified deportment, grace, charm, magnetism, courage, sports, urbanity and companionability, she won the most enviable but well-deserved title of *Padshah Begam* or the "First Lady of the Realm" (1622-23) and the rarest honour of having her name inscribed on coins like that of Turkan Khatun, the mother of Sultan Allauddin Takash of Khwarizm (d. 1200). The open and official recognition of the status of a queen appeared to many as an innovation of an infatuated Royal lover, and some expressed their disapproval. For an average Indian of those days, it was difficult to appreciate such an honour extended to a queen. There was, however, nothing wrong or reprehensible in it; on the other hand it was a progressive measure of a broad-minded and enlightened sovereign. There is nothing on record to suggest that Nur Jahan requested for, or insisted on, it and the Emperor had to yield to her pressure. Nor is there any positive evidence to show that she abused her position or flaunted it to the annoyance of either the ladies of the Imperial household, the servants of the State or the general public. She could not help if a few persons were smitten with jealousy and envy.

Nur Jahan was highly intelligent and ready-witted, and was endowed with strong common sense. She loved refinement and smartness and shared with the Emperor his love for arts and ornamentation. She decorated whatever she touched. Thus, she became a cultural force and leader of fashion, which was combined with dignity, beauty and modesty. There was nothing cheap, bizarre, grotesque or fantastic about her. In fact, she represented the highlight of Persian culture and civilized modes.

Nur Jahan was endowed with great vitality and driving power. Within the sphere of her action she put a stamp of her generosity on everything she did.

In abundant measure, she possessed generosity, charity and kindness. Her readiness to help the poor, the oppressed, widows and orphans was well known. Poor girls who could not be married for want of money could count on her help. One could feel her influence not only in styles of dress and costumes or in designs of jewellery or perfume, but also on architecture and court manners. She was an accomplished horse-rider and an excellent shot even while tackling big game. The finest demonstration of her cool composure and undaunted courage was seen when she led an attack against Mahabat Khan to rescue her husband. But all these activities were nothing in comparison with the unqualified and ceaseless devotion to and service of her paramour and husband. That was at once her main delight and chief occupation in life. With that magic key she ruled the heart of the Emperor and commanded greatest admiration, respect and love.

The influence which she exercised over her husband was mostly moral, emotional, spiritual and possibly intellectual. It, however, led some people to believe that in political sphere also her influence was equally great and the politics of the day, particularly after the death of her father, was entirely dominated by her. This suspicion was strengthened by her interested detractors who wanted to exploit it for their own ends. Opinions are easily formed and popular currency is given to them equally easily. If facts are stripped on opinions and scrutinized on their own merit, they hardly support the popular view. To argue that a lady of such energy, vitality and personality could hardly resist the temptation of meddling in politics is to beg the question and take to unscientific reasoning. Only once did she take an appreciable part in war and politics, not for love of them or her inquisitiveness or ambition, but to rescue her husband from the grip of Mahabat Khan. The driving motive was her love for her husband and brother and incidentally a desire to uphold respect for and vindicate the dignity of the Crown of which she was also an ornamental part. Her responsibility for the rebellion of

Khurram or Mahabat Khan or the so-called struggle for succession is a figment of imagination and popular myth and is as fanciful as the responsibility of Jahangir for the murder of Sher Afghan. The facts, however, indicate that far from being an evil genius hovering over Jahangir she was his guardian angel.

Nur Jahan had a weakness for her family and reposed unquestioning trust in her brothers. She was scarcely inclined to question their motives or scrutinize their activities. Her elder brother Asaf Khan took the fullest advantage of her position and tenderness, and used her as a cat's paw to serve his own ends and those of his son-in-law. His unscrupuluous and wily politics and cleverly-screened designs could not be understood by his sister either because she had little aptitude for Machiavellian politics or in her blind trust and regard for her brothers, she did not care to understand them. Her name was dragged into affairs with which she had hardly any concern. The fact of Shahriyar being her son-in-law subjected her to all sorts of insinuations, accusations and stigmatizations, which are not borne out by positive facts and sober history.

After her retirement from active life she passed eighteen long and tedious years in silent sorrow and mourning. She kept her dignity and self-respect and resigned herself to the will of God. The only consolation in her loneliness was her widowed daughter, who was also a victim of misfortune. Nur Jahan died in 1645 A.D. and was buried near the tomb of her husband.

For having murdered Abul Fazl, who was an eyesore to Prince Salim, Raja Bir Singh Bundela had risen high in the estimation and favour of Jahangir. The Raja took the fullest advantage of the opportunity, acquired a large *jagir* and amassed great wealth. Relying on the kindness of the Emperor, he even ventured to lay hands on the property of other *zemindars* and extend the sphere of his encroachments to the Imperial domain. In 1627 he died. His eldest son Jujhar Singh succeeded him.

On the occasion of the coronation of Shah Jahan,

Jujhar Singh went to Agra to offer personal homage. During his absence from his state, the administration was run by his son Vikramjit with greater unscrupulousness and cruelty. A strong complaint was lodged by an old and respected servant of the State, Sita Ram, who was subjected to humiliation and torture by Vikramajit. Since Shah Jahan had no love for the Rajas of Orcha, and was in no mood to connive at the depredations and and brutalities of its rulers, he admitted the complaint and decided to institute an inquiry into the reports and the sources of their unusual wealth. The Emperor, however, did not adopt any unfriendly attitude towards Jujhar Singh. On the other hand, he allowed him the *mansab* of four thousand zat and an equal number of sawar. But his order to institute an enquiry into the affairs of the state alarmed the Raja, who sought safety in an unceremonious flight from the Court to the hilly fastnesses and dense forests of his state.

The abrupt disappearance of the Raja from the Court at once gave umbrage to the Emperor and colour to the reports against the rulers of Orcha. He, therefore, decided to punish Jujhar Singh for his discourtesy. Since the military operations ordered by Akbar against Bir Singh had not been quite fruitful owing to the geographical make-up of Bundela State, and its resources had enormously improved during the quarter of a century, Shah Jahan rightly guaged that the operations would require attention and plans on a comparatively large scale. Moreover, it was going to be the first military campaign of his reign, and that too against a new dynasty of Rajas; failure would cast a gloom on his realm at the very outset, damage his prestige and bring ominous discredit to his reign.

Mahabat Khan was ordered to move from Gwalior with ten thousand horse and two thousand matchlock-men; Saiyid Muzaffar Khan Barha and other officers were sent to ravage the country. Khan-i-Jahan Lodi, the then governor of Malwa, was commanded to march from that side and co-operate with Mahabat Khan with eight thousand horse. Abdullah Khan Firoz Jung was

similarly ordered to move from Kalpi side. The operations were indeed extensive and were taken up with all seriousness. To ensure success, the Emperor himself moved down to a camp at Gwalior under the pretext of hunting.

Such an all-round enveloping movement under the vigilant eye of one of the ablest Mughal Emperors was not likely to end in nothing. The fort of Erach was stormed and the garrison (3000) was put to sword. Jujhar Singh realized fully his desperate situation and his utter inability to fight the Emporor successfully. He had not yet been able to consolidate and oraganize his kingdom and he had to reckon with Bharat Singh Bundela, who was now in the Imperial camp, his rival and a claimant to inheritance. Jujhar Singh, therefore, offered submission. He was pardoned on payment of a fine of one thousand *Asharfis*, fifteen lacs of rupees and forty elephants, and restitution of the territories nibbled by his father. Jujhar was confirmed in his original rank and was ordered to go with two thousand horse and infantry of equal strength to serve in the Deccan.

Pir Khan, known by his title of Khan-i-Jahan Lodi, was a great favourite of Jahangir and had the honour of being an intimate companion of the Emperor. He had been appointed as the Commander-in-chief of the Army (the Khan-i-Khana) after the death of Abdur-Rahim. He was entrusted with the governorship of the Deccan as a bulwark against the possibility of rebllion by Mahabat Khan or the aggressive coalition of that redoubtable general with Prince Shah Jahan. At a time when the health of Jahangir was causing all-round anxiety, and both Shah Jahan and Mahabat Khan were at large and highly discontented, it was feared that serious complications and conflicts could arise at any moment. The Khan-i-Jahan, therefore, adopted a policy which was subjected to severe criticism by the goverment of Shah Jahan.

The Khan-i-Jahan's policy was to avoid military complication with the Deccan states and to bring about some sort of settlement with the kingdom of Ahmadnagar

which might prevent the possibility of Shah Jahan's or Mahabat Khan's entering into a coalition with the rulers of that state. In other words, he wanted to remove even the possibility of temptation by removing the chief object of it. At this time the wife of Hamid Khan, the Abyssinian, had created a great sensation in the politics of the Deccan. By her personal charms and tact and ability to inspire men to action, she had brought the Nizamulmulk and the entire government of the kingdom of the Deccan under her control. She was very popular with the army which went to war under her personal command. In this respect she excelled even Chand Bibi. Under her command the army of Ahmadnagar had inflicted a heavy defeat on that of Bijapur.

Through her husband Hamid Khan she opened negotiations with the Khan-i-Jahan and succeeded in gaining his good will. It is alleged by some chroniclers that the Khan-i-Jahan had reasons to fear Shah Jahan and, therefore, was anxious to establish friendly relations with Ahmadnagar. He hoped to find an asylum there, should a crisis so force him. It is more likely that his object was to assure himself of peace in the Deccan and, if possible, the support of Ahmadnagar if he where called upon to take part in quelling a well-organized rebellion, or a war of succession. Anyway, the Khan-i-Jahan wanted peace in the Deccan and to hold himself in readiness for action. Since the affairs of the Imperial Government seemed to be far from clear he could not correctly guage the situation nor could he be certain of effective support from Delhi. He was a hot favourite of Emperor Jahangir , but the latter seemed to be fading fast. For the time being his policy was to keep himself away from all encumbrances and entanglements, maintain cool neutrality, organize and improve his resources and wait for further developments. His views were shared by the *Diwan* of the Deccan.

Accordingly, the Khan-i-Jahan welcomed the negotiations with the government of Ahmadnagar. He agreed to restore Balaghat to the Nizam Shah on payment

of a reasonable amount of money, which was estimated at three to thirty eight lakhs of rupees. Whether it was a direct case of bribery or a substantial part of the amount that was to go as *peshkash* to the Emperor is not clear. The latter, however, seems to be more probable.

Whether the Khan-i-Jahan was a traitor or not to the Empire and Emperor Jahangir, it seemed clear that he had no intention of being a camp-follower of Prince Shah Jahan, although he had shown great regard and respect for the latter. Yet he declined to go with him to the North to quell the so-called rebellion of Mahabat Khan or later on to claim the throne from Dawar Baksh at the invitation of Asaf Khan. He might have even resented the alacrity with which Prince Shah Jahan had given the title of the Khan-i-Khana to Mahabat Khan. This action of the Prince made it clear to him that he had little chance to hold his dignity in his regime. However, he prepared to keep aloof from the activities of Shah Jahan and allowed the *Khutba* to be read in the name of the then occupant of the throne, Dawar Baksh. He did not also stand in the way of Shah Jahan or Mahabat Khan when they marched to Delhi. In fact he remained in a state of suspense or neutrality and preferred to watch further developments.

It was not quite clear whether Shah Jahan would ultimately get the throne and, therefore, the honours which he had conferred on Mahabat Khan or other officers were more of a sort of promise and had little legal validity. Khan-i-Jahan Lodi was yet the Khan-i-Khana and the orders of the Imperial Government to suppress the rebellion of Mahabat Khan had not been withdrawn. When he learnt that Prince Shah Jahan had appointed Mahabat Khan to take charge of the province of Malwa the Khan-i-Jahan considered it his clear duty and responsibility to prevent the illegal occupation of an important province which had a great strategic importance. Apart from his responsibility as the Supreme Commander of the Deccan forces he could not allow a wedge to be driven between the North and the

Deccan which was as much against the interest of the Empire as of his own. Moreover, since his family also was at Mandu, he was anxious about its safety. He could not sit idle. He pushed northwards and took Malwa in his direct control. He had no intention to take an offensive unless forced to do so. The situation was so uncertain that leading personalities were tempted to form their own plans. While the Khan-i-Jahan was yet in suspense, some of his officers like Raja Jai Singh and Gaj Singh decided to leave him. By the time Shah Jahan reached Agra, it was quite clear that he was destined to sit on the Imperial throne. The Khan-i-Jahan then hastened to apologize for his behaviour, to offer his allegiance to Shah Jahan with a string of costly pearls as *peshkash*. The Emperor gave him the governorship of Berar and Khandesh and commanded him to recover the territory which had been restored by him to the ruler of Ahmadnagar. The Khan-i-Jahan returned to Burhanpur and began to reorganize the government. It was not long before the charge of the Deccan affairs was transferred to Mahabat Khan while the Khan-i-Jahan was ordered to take charge of Malwa.

Before the Khan-i-Jahan had settled down there he was ordered to march against Jujhar Singh Bundela. He obeyed the orders in spite the fact that he might have been required to serve under Mahabat Khan. Shah Jahan, however, appreciated the delicacy of his sentiments and withdrew Mahabat Khan from Bundelkhand.

After the close of the Bundela war the Khan-i-Jahan was called to the Court. The atmosphere of the Court was quite cold and unfriendly. Since his position at the Court in Jahangir's time was very high, he felt himself humiliated in the new set-up. Those who were jealous of him were anxious to lower his dignity. The old nobility of Jahangir was being replaced, as usual, by those who were in favour with the new Emperor when he was a Prince. There was hardly anything to cheer him up or to hold a promise. To confirm his misgiving, as

it were, he was asked to disperse his men, and some of his *jagirs* were also resumed. He was positively alarmed when he heard that he was to be placed in custody. He stopped going to the Court and placed strong guards at his residence. On being apprised of the circumstances and at the personal request of the Khan-i-Jahan the Emperor himself wrote a letter granting him general amnesty. Although Asaf Khan also held out an olive branch, yet in view of his antecedents the suspicion of the Khan-i-Jahan could not be allayed.

Eight months were long enough to watch the trend of affairs and the turn of the wheel of fortune. The Khan-i-Jahan could bear it no longer. He broke away from Agra (Oct. 1629). It was indeed a false and risky step which ultimately led to his ruin, but he could see no other way as he was not given any assignment outside the capital.

The news of his flight was communicated to the Emperor by Asaf Khan. Troops were immediately sent in pursuit. Near Dholpur he was overtaken because arrangements to cross the Chambal could not be made quickly. A miniature battle was fought in which the Imperialists lost about a hundred in officers and men and the rebels sixty. Among the latter were two sons and a son-in-law of the Khan-i-Jahan. The skirmish was so sharp and the number of injured officers so much that the Imperialists had to give up the pursuit till fresh reinforcements arrived. The Khan-i-Jahan availed himself of the chance, crossed the Chambal and fled away, though he had to leave behind all his camp, treasure and most of his women. Marching through Gondwana and Berar he managed to cross into the kingdom of Ahmadnagar.

The Khan-i-Jahan was cordially welcomed by Murtaza Nizam Shah II, who seated him on the royal cushion, offered cash present and settled on him the *jagir* of Bir. His followers were given *jagirs* in the Mughal territory and asked to take possession of them. Thus the Nizam Shah wanted to use the Khan-i-Jahan to recover the territory which the Mughals had conquered

from Ahmadnagar.

The Khan-i-Jahan had been in communication with the Afghans of the North-west frontier and Afghanistan. He was successful to some extent. For, the intractable tribes like the Khalils, Mohmandis, Daudzais, Yusufzais, Lodhis and the Rohillas, who were at this time inspired by religious fanaticism, broke the barriers and attacked Peshwar. So also Bahlul Miana and Sikandar Nohani unfurled the banner of rebellion and joined the Khan-i-Jahan in the Deccan.

The arrival of the Khan-i-Jahan in the Deccan made matters more complicated and bitter in the relation between the Imperial Government and the state of Ahmadnagar and its ally Bijapur. The Nizam opened the offensive and drove out the Mughal officers from their posts. The Emperor ordered Abul Hasan to proceed straight to the Deccan to fight the Afghans and their Deccan allies, recover the Mughal territory that had passed to the Nizam, and snatch as much as could be possible.

It was expected that the Deccan war, as usual, would assume great magnitude, hence the governor of Gujrat, Sher Khan, was ordered to proceed to the Deccan and act in co-operation with Khwaja Abul Hasan. Sometime after the *Vakil* of the Empire, Asaf Khan, also was sent to infuse vigour into the army operating in the Deccan and co-ordinate the plans of different commanders. Shah Jahan himself came down to Burhanpur (1630). The flight of the Khan-i-Jahan to the Deccan gave him no rest, rather his presence in the Deccan obliged him to fall in line with the military plans of the armies of the Deccan states. Soon after the Khan-i-Jahan found that while he was closely watched and vigorously pursued by the Mughal Commander Azam Khan, he was not receiving adequate help from Muqarrab Khan, the Nizamshahi Commander.

After a series of tactical enveloping movements, Azam Khan succeeded in cutting off the retreat of the Khan-i-Jahan and bringing him at bay near Bir. Though outmatched in numerical strength, the Khan-i-

Jahan did not lose his courage. He sent his gallant nephew Bahadur to engage one corps while he tackled the other. The battle was well-contested and desperate. The Afghans fought most gallantly, but had to yield before the Mughal army. They broke and fled. Bahadur was severely wounded by a shot and could not flee. His head was cut off and sent to Azam Khan. The Afghans lost their baggage, but effected their escape; for the Mughals were so much beaten up that they could not pursue them.

The Khan-i-Jahan and his followers once more took shelter in the maze of hills, but had finally to emerge near Daulatabad, for the ravages of war and famine had much impoverished the country and brought great scarcity of provisions and fodder. The causes which had brought to a standstill the Mughal pursuers equally affected the fortune of the Afghans. For, they soon led to misunderstanding between them and the Nizamshahis. Scarcity of provisions and, worse than that, bad blood with his chief supporters, the Nizamshahi officers, at last obliged the Khan-i-Jahan to leave that country and try his luck in the north of the Narbada (Nov. 1630). Nizamshah was not sorry at his departure as the expectations he had entertained of him were not fulfilled.

At last the Khan-i-Jahan crossed the Narbada at Dharampuri. Shah Jahan was quite vigilant; he ordered Abdullah Khan, Muzaffar Khan and others to pursue him relentlessly. In spite of it the Khan-i-Jahan succeeded in raiding Sironj and making away with fifty Imperial elephants. Finding his roads blocked by the Imperial troops on all sides, he entered the Bundelkhand territory once more. One this occasion he did not receive any support from Vikramjit who, on the other hand, came out to fight him. Vikramjit overtook the rearguards of Dariya Khan and compelled him to fight, Dariya Khan fought gallantly, but lost his life. The death of this gallant and able commander was a blow from which the Khan-i-Jahan could never recover (1631).

The Bundela chief thought that he had killed the

Khan-i-Jahan, hence he allowed his soldiers to engage in plundering the Afghan camp. But the Khan-i-Jahan was alive. He fled away. The Mughal officer Muzaffar Khan Barha, however, gave him no time to rest. Driven to despair the Khan-i-Jahan sent away as many of his men and followers as he could spare and turned back with five hundred men to give battle to the relentless pursuer. The conflict between the Lodi Afghans and the Barha Saiyids was quite in keeping with their best traditions. Each party admired the bravery of the other. But bravery alone was of no avail. One son of the Khan-i-Jahan, Mahmud, whom he loved much, was killed; his other son was dangerously wounded, while he himself had received several bad cuts. Finding further resistance impossible he fled once more. But there was not rest for him. He touched Kalinjar, but the *Qiledar* of the fort, Saiyid Ahmad, captured his elephants and took one of his sons, Hasan, with a number of his followers as prisoners. The Mughal troops were close by, hence the Khan-i-Jahan made one final attempt at flight. For forty miles at a stretch he galloped with his followers, but always found the pursuers at his heels. At last, he grew weary and desperate, thanked his followers for their disinterested loyalty, asked them to leave him to his own fate, and effect their safety. With a handful of his most loyal followers, who refused to leave him in spite of his repeated requests, and his dearest son Aziz, he turned round bent upon dying, but with sword in hand. The fight was, of course, desperate and bitter, but the conclusion was foregone. The Khan-i-Jahan lay dead at Sihonda (District Banda) pierced by the ruthless Rajput lance of Madho Singh. His head was cut off and sent to the Emperor (Feb. 1631).

Early in the reign of Shah Jahan, the Sixth Guru of the Sikhs came into conflict with the Emperor. The cause of the conflict was indeed almost insignificant. While the Emperor was hunting near Amritsar, one of his favourite hawks flew to the Guru's camp which was far off. The Sikhs siezed the bird and refused to give

it up. A punitive expedition was, therefore, sent under Mukhlis Khan against the Sikhs. Several minor skirmishes took place in which the Sikh leaders, Bhai Bhanu and Singha, lost their lives after a gallant fight. But Painda Khan, the Commander of the Sikh troops, stemmed the force of the enemy while the final charge led by the Guru himself completed the route of the Mughal troops (1628). This was the first conflict of the Sikhs with a Mughal force. Wazir Khan and other well-wishers of the Guru at the Imperial Court appeased the Emperor's anger and hushed up the matter.

But the enemies of the Guru were also active. They persuaded the Mughal officer at Jullundhar, Abdullah Khan, to lead another expedition against the Guru who was building a new city, subsequently called Srihargovindpur, on the edge of the Bias, just between the Manjha and the Doab tracts in the Punjab. The establishment of a new city in the heart of the country of warlike peasants would have deprived the Mughals of the advantage gained by the ruin of Amritsar. Moreover, the governor was partly moved to take action against the Guru for his followers in a quarrel had killed Gherar, the Chaudhri of the locality, who had opposed the founding of a new city, and also the propaganda of the Guru. A message was sent to the Guru asking him to refrain from his intention of laying out a new town there, but the Guru refused to listen to it and continued the work. Consequently, an attack was made on the Sikhs, but the Guru gained the upper hand.

The third conflict came off as a result of the theft by one Bidhi Chand, once a notorious robber, but a devoted disciple of the Guru. He stole two of the best horses from the Imperial stables and presented them to the Guru, who unfortunately accepted them. A strong Mughal force was sent against the Guru, but it was routed (1631). Another force was sent soon after under Kale Khan. This time the Mughal army was larger than before, while Painda Khan, one of the best officers in Guru's service, had quarrelled with the Guru and joined the Mughals. But the Guru decided

to make a stand. At Kartarpur a furious battle was fought in which Painda Khan was killed. The Sikhs also lost heavily, but in the end gained a victory. In this battle, Tegh Bahadur, who later on became a Guru, distinguished himself as a good fighter.

Constant pressure, which the Mughals brought upon the rising power of the Sikhs, not only brought to a standstill the work of religious propaganda but resulted in much suffering to the Sikhs, and threatened to annihilate the Sikh fraternity which stood almost on its own strength and received little support from the Hindu population of the Punjab. The Guru was shrewd enough to see that his limited resources would not stand for a long time the unlimited pressure of one of the most resourceful of Mughal Emperors. He, therefore, decided to give some respite to the community and spend his time in meditation and recouping his strength. Consequently, he retired to the Kashmir hills and took residence at Kiratpur. Here he passed his last days in quiet meditation and preaching, and died in 1645 after installing Har Rai, son of Hargovind's eldest son, to the Guruship. No further trouble was given to the Sikhs afterwards. It is alleged that it was Guru Hargovind who permitted the Sikhs to eat meat.

The relations between the Mughal Empire and the States of Bijapur and Golkunda were already strained, and a state of war existed. The victory of Baqar Khan over the Golkunda commander Sher Muhammad, and the capture of Mansurgadh in the teeth of stout opposition (1629) made no serious difference in the situation. The welcome given to Khan-i-Jahan Lodi by the ruler of Ahmadnagar precipitated the matter. Ahmadnagar had taken an offensive and driven out the Mughal officers from the posts.

Shah Jahan was not a man to be terrified. He had a good personal knowledge of the military and political situation of the Deccan. He probably felt that he would sooner or later overcome all his enemies in the South, for all the three states of the Deccan were rotten to the core. Indeed none of the three

states—Ahmadnagar, Bijapur or Golkunda—had a strong and capable ruler, and all of them were suffering from the selfish intrigues and short-sighted policies of political parties, led by unscrupulous or incapable officers. There was no stability in the Deccan states, hence it was difficult to put any reliance on the understanding arrived at between them and the Mughal Empire. On one point, however, all the three states were more or less at one, and that was their dislike of the Mughal domination. Simple dislike or hatred of the Mughals could not do much good until they could arrived at a well-thought-out plan of united and sustained action against the Imperial power; but this was precisely what they were incapable of doing.

In 1629 the Imperial Army was galvanized into action by the appointment of officials like Abul Hasan and Azam Khan. To co-ordinate their operations Asaf Khan, the *Vakil* of the Empire, was posted in the Deccan. The Emperor himself moved on and made Burhanpur his headquarters. The Mughal army invaded the kingdom of Ahmadnagar at three points—Balaghat, Nasik and Telangana. Their first objective was to capture the Khan-i-Jahan. After the flight of the Khan-i-Jahan from the Deccan, the Mughals were free to deal with the Southern kingdoms.

The first heavy stroke fell on Ahmadnagar. This kingdom had been considerably weakened by internecine party strife. The treacherous murder of Jado Rai, a Maratha chief of noble extraction and an influential *jagirdar*, alienated largely the sympathies of the Marathas, and drove men, like Jagdeva and Shahji Bhonsla and Maloji, to join the Mughals, who treated them generously. Some of the Mussalman officers, like Saadat Khan, Khudawanda Khan, Yaqut Khan and Shirzah Khan, also joined the Imperial service. To make matters worse, a severe famine had visited the Deccan, which brought in its train an appalling mortality and scarcity of food and fodder. True it is, that it hampered, nay, even suspended for some time the progress of the Mughal invaders, but in the long run it was Ahmadanagar that

suffered most. In 1630 Abul Hasan scored a victory over the Nizamshahi governor, and captured a large booty. Another Mughal commander, Azam Khan, captured Dharwar and drove the Nizamshahi troops back as far as Daulatabad. He might have even besieged this strong fortress, but was prevented by famine. As Bijapur had now openly given support to the Nizamshahis, Azam Khan turned on Parenda, and although he battered the town wall and plundered the town, he failed to capture the fort. He, therefore, fought his way back to his headquarters at Dharwar.

The Mughal honour, however, was saved by the conquest of Satwandah by Sipahdar Khan, and the remarkable victory of Nasir Khan. This intrepid and gallant officer laid siege to Kandahar in Telangana, which was held by Sadiq, son of Yaqut, and compelled him to surrender it. Indeed, it was a great achievement. Before reaching the fort he had to defeat the force of Sarfaraz Khan, and while he was prosecuting the siege he was attacked in the trenches by a combined force of Bijapur and Ahmadnagar, led by such able men as Randaula and Muqarrab Khan. Though caught up between the terrific fire from the fort and a determined attack in the rear, Nasir Khan did not lose his courage and presence of mind. He fought most gallantly and finally gained victory over his enemies.

About this time a revolution broke out in Ahmadnagar. Nizamshah, in his anxiety to get the support of the Abyssinians, released Fateh Khan, son of Malik Ambar, from the prison and raised him once more to the dignity of the *Vakil* and Peshwa. The rise of Fateh Khan demoralized Muqarrab Khan who was the leader of the anti-Mughal movement in Ahmadnagar. In his chagrin he went over to the Mughals, who welcomed him cordially and gave him the title of Rustam Khan. Fateh Khan was, however, uncertain of his future, and opened secret negotiations with Asaf Khan, requesting the favour of the Emperor. To prove his sincerity or rather to secure his position, he even went to the extent of putting to death by poison the im-

becile puppet king Murtaza II and placed upon the throne Hussain Shah, a lad of only ten years. But Mahmud Khan, the governor of Jalna, refused to recognize the authority of Fateh Khan and surrendered the fort to the Mughals (1631).

Fateh Khan did not fail to realize that the Mughals were not prepared to act up to his wishes. The fact that his rival Muqarrab Khan and his other enemies had been so warmly welcomed by the Mughals excited his suspicion. He turned for help to Bijapur and Golkunda. For the time the prospects of Ahmadnagar seemed better; first, because the Maratha leader Shahji, resenting the transfer to Fateh Khan of some districts given him, had deserted the Mughals and even taken up arms against them; and secondly, because the Bijapurians responded to his request for help. Lastly, the crop in Golkunda was almost completely destroyed by heavy rains and floods.

Shah Jahan was not fully satisfied with the attitude of Fateh Khan. He demanded from him the surrrender of the elephants and jewels. Since Fateh Khan hesitated to comply with the demand, military operations were renewed to capture Daulatabad which was one of the bulwarks of the Nizamshahi system of fortification. To prevent its fall into the hands of the Mughals, Fateh Khan sent a present of jewels worth eight lacs of rupees, thirty elephants and a few horses. Besides, he read the *Khutba* and struck coins in the name of Shah Jahan. The Emperor was quite satisfied with these gestures. The military operations led by Wazir Khan had already been successful and Berar had been recovered for the Mughal Empire. The death of Mumtaz Mahal, his devoted Queen (June 7, 1631) was corroding Shah Jahan's heart and blunting his interest, at least for the time being in the South. His mood was further depressed by the long-drawn famine and its usual consequences. Since he felt that his task of reducing the kingdom of Ahmadnagar was practically finished, he broke up his camp at Burhanpur (March 1632) and returned to the North.

Muhammad Adil Shah, the ruler of Bijapur, had no

definite policy of his own. His two powerful nobles, Randaula Khan and Mustafa Khan, held divergent views. The latter was friendly to the Mughals and would not interfere with the policy of the Mughals towards the kingdom of Ahmadnagar. The former, on the other hand, was in favour of saving that kingdom and preventing the advance of the Mughals in the South. For the time Adil Shah chose to follow the policy of Mustafa Khan.

Randaula Khan was directed to help the Mughals, but he had no heart in the task. He requested Asaf Khan to transfer to Bijapur the fort of Dharwar, which had been captured from Ahmadnagar. Asaf Khan refused to accept the request as the fort was of considerable strategic importance. Randaula pretented to be friendly to the Mughals, but did nothing to help them. On the other hand, he sprang a surprise attack on the Mughal force and captured its commander Bahadur Khan. His duplicity was completely exposed and led to the stiffening of the Mughal policy towards Bijapur.

After the submission of Fateh Khan and the settlement of Ahmadnagar, Shah Jahan commanded Asaf Khan to invade Bijapur (1631). The Mughal army captured Kandahar, plundered Gulbarga and massacred a large number of its residents. But the fort of Gulbarga, which was well-manned and adequately provisioned refused to surrender. Since Mughal advance was of a demonstrative character, Asaf Khan passed by the fort and pushed on to Bijapur carrying everything before him. The capital was laid under siege. But soon he found himself in difficulties. In spite of all precautions and endeavour he could not get enough provisions. His foraging parties were often surprised and cut off, while he was beguiled by the Bijapur dictator Khawas Khan with peace proposals. Indeed, a sort of peace was patched up; Bijapur promised to pay a tribute of forty lacs of rupees in jewels, elephants, precious stuff and hard cash. But all this was a bluff. At last Asaf Khan was shaken from his slumber when he found that his men and animals were actually

dying of starvation in large numbers, while the rains were ahead. Baffled and bewildered, Asaf Khan retraced his steps to the Mughal territory (1631), plundering, ravaging and enslaving even women and children. He was pursued by Bijapur forces, which practically chased the Mughals out of their kingdom.

The failure of the Mughals against Bijapur disgusted Shah Jahan. He got dissatisfied with the operations of Azam Khan and Asaf Khan, and ordered their recall. Mahabat Khan Khan-i-Khana, the veteran Commander-in-Chief, was made *Subedar* of the Deccan and ordered to proceed immediately. Mahabat Khan's experience, decision and military abilities were beyond all shade of doubt. The Deccanis now saw that Shah Jahan was not to be hoodwinked and that his seriousness of purpose was equal to the vast imperial resources at his command.

The political situation of the kingdom of Ahmadnagar was far from satisfactory. Fateh Khan stood in sharp contrast to his illustrious father. His shifty and unscrupulous policy had made him unpopular with the people of Ahmadnagar, and failed to inspire trust among the Mughals. Although he had given a sort of submission to the Mughals, he had serious misgivings, particularly because they had shown favour to the Maratha chieftains who were hostile to him.

The Maratha leader Shahji Bhonsla, who had deserted to the Mughals and joined as a *Mansabdar* took umbrage when he was directed to return to Fateh Khan some of those districts which were transferred to him. He resigned the Mughal service and took up arms in support of the Nizam Shahi kingdom under the banner of Bijapur. He urged upon Adil Shah the desirability of an immediate attack and the capture of the fort of Daulatabad which was held by Fateh Khan. His proposal was accepted by Adil Shah, who sent a large force to serve under his command.

Fateh Khan was frightened. He requested Mahabat Khan to come to his rescue and promised to deliver him the fort. Accordingly the Khan-i-Khana sent a large army under the command of his son. This

alarmed Randaula Khan, who changed his policy and opened negotiations with Fateh Khan. He argued that the surrender of the fort to the Mughals would spell ruin of the kingdom of Ahmadnagar and prove fatal to the interest of other states of the Deccan. Fateh Khan was advised to make a joint effort with Bijapur to stem the Mughal advance. If he agreed to the suggestion and gave up his claim on Sholapur and its five and a half districts the whole might of the Adilshahi kingdom would rally to his support and he would be left in possession of Daulatabad. Moreover, he would get in cash three lacs of *huns* and liberal supplies of provisions. Fateh Khan was taken in and decided to resist the unsuspecting Mughals.

The alliance of Bijapur with Ahmadnagar against the Mughals was inspired by fear of the Mughal Emperor. But Bijapur had another motive which was bound to prevent a permanent unity. For some time the rulers of Bijapur and Golkunda had come to realize that the kingdom of Ahmadnagar was doomed to fall owing to its internal strife and the external pressure of the Mughal Empire. In this disruption they wanted to get for themselves as much as they could lay their hands upon. Hardly did these kingdoms ever think that they were also decaying fast and that the same calamity that befell Ahmadnagar might some day overtake them.

Early in March 1633 Mahabat Khan reached the Deccan. He was wild with rage at the treachery of Fateh Khan. As his preparations were complete he laid siege to the Ambarkot fort on the next day of his arrival. The fort of Daulatabad was protected by two other fortresses, Ambarkot and Mahakot. In spite of every measure taken by Fateh Khan to strengthen the fort and to relieve it, and the unquestionable bravery of the defenders, the fort was taken by storm. Nasiri Khan of the Kandahar fame, supported by Mahesh Das Rathor and others, broke through the resistance in the teeth of furious and desperate opposition of Khairiyat Khan, the Commander of Bijapur. The advantage gained by the Mughals was further pushed. The supplies were so

completely cut off by the Mughals that the besieged had to live on boiled skins of dead animals. Mahakot was also captured, nowithstanding the supreme efforts of Fateh Khan, who was defending it in person along with his Bijapur ally. The Mughal diplomacy and terrible famine and scarcity had weakened the morale of the Deccanis. Indeed, famine had driven a number of Bijapurians to seek the shelter of the Mughals. Fateh Khan now got alarmed, and completely lost his courage on hearing of the fall of the fort of Jalna. In his helplessness he sent his eldest son Abdurrasul as hostage and asked permission to evacuate the fort of Daulatabad with his family. Mahabat Khan was extremely delighted at this request. He sent Fateh Khan elephants and camels and two lacs and fifty thousand rupees in cash. The fort was occupied by the Mughals on 17th June 1633 and enormous quantities of war material fell into their hands. Fateh Khan and Husain Shah, the last Nizamshahi king, were presented at Agra before the Emperor (Sept. 1633), who honoured Fateh Khan with a *Khilat*, gave him an annual grant of two lacs and restored all his property to him; while the poor, helpless and innocent Husain Shah was sent to Gwalior to weep over his misfortunes! This policy was probably due to the desire of Shah Jahan to annex the kingdom of Ahmadnagar, win over the party of Fateh Khan and isolate Bijapur. He was on the whole successful in his object, but could not prevent Shahji from setting up another Prince as the *de jure* ruler of the Deccan and back him up with his arms. The work of consolidating the advantage gained by the Mughals had to go on slowly.

The brilliant successes of the Mughals and the fall of the Nizamshahi kingdom opened the eyes of Bijapur. They fought for peace, but their request was contemptuously rejected by the victorious Mughals, who were now, more than ever, conscious of their strength in the Deccan. In disappointment and alarm the Bijapurians attacked Daulatabad which had not yet been properly strengthened. But the tact of Nasiri Khan, now Khan-i-Dauran, reconciled the people of Daulatabad to the Mughal

regime, while his gallantry kept the invaders at a distance. The news of the march of Mahabat Khan to relieve the place obliged the Bijapurians to raise the siege and beat retreat.

Encouraged by his successes Mahabat Khan advised Prince Shuja, the Viceroy, to capture the fort of Parenda, which was taken from Ahmadnagar by Bijapur and made a basis for their operations against the Mughals. Parenda was besieged by the Mughals under the command of Allahvardi Khan. But the dissensions of Mahabat Khan and Khan-i-Dauran, the failure of mining operations, and the scarcity of provisions among the invaders helped the Bijapurians to defend the fort successfully. The Mughals were compelled to raise the siege and retreat to Burhanpur. Before any fresh operations could be undertaken Mahabat Khan died of fistula (Oct. 1634). It was not easy to find a man of his experience, ability and position as his subtitute. Moreover, the rebellion of the Bundela Raja turned the attention of the Emperor to another quarter. The first phase of the Deccan operations closes practically with the collapse of the Nizamshahi kingdom that had been resisting the Mughal power for half a century. In spite of the fact that the Marathas in the West and some nobles in Balaghat continued to defy the Mughals the kingdom of Ahmadnagar had lost its strength, individuality and importance.

SECOND BUNDELA WAR

After the death of Mahabat Khan, Jujhar Singh, who was serving with the Imperial army in the Deccan, returned to his kingdom with the permission of Mahabat Khan, leaving his son Jagraj. His restless spirit, combined with the traditional cupidity of the Bundelas towards Garha-Katanga, led him to invade that kingdom. The Raja of Garha was slain and the capital Chauragarh was plundered. The son of Prem Narayan was at that time in the Deccan serving in the army of the Khan-i-Dauran. Supported by the Khan-i-Dauran, he made an appeal to

the Emperor. Shah Jahan realized fully that the aggression of one Raja upon another estate within the Imperial protectorate was an attack on the very foundation of Imperial edifice. It was a central principle in the Imperial policy that no two chieftains living under the aegis of the Empire could go to war without the permission of the Emperor. Shah Jahan, therefore, admitted the appeal and ordered Jujhar Singh to surrender the conquered territory to the Crown and ten lacs of rupees from the treasure he had plundered, or in the alternative give up the *jagir* that he held in Bundelkhand equal to what he had annexed from Garha-Katanga. These proposals might have been advantageous to the Emperor, but there was nothing in it to console the Rajas of Garha-Katanga. How Shah Jahan intended to recompense them is not known. If he just ignored their claim this policy was too selfish and objectionable. Neither proposal could be acceptable to Jujhar Singh and war seemed inevitable. Before the Imperial *Farman* could be despatched Jujhar came to know through his *Vakil* at the Court the demands of the Emperor. He, therefore, wrote to his son Vikramajit (Jagraj) who was in the Deccan to return to Bundelkhand at once. Accordingly, Vikramajit fled from the Deccan camp and, in spite of the Khan-i-Dauran's attempt to capture him, managed to join his father.

Exasperated at the behaviour of Jujhar and his son, Shah Jahan declared war on them, and despatched twenty-two thousand horse under the nominal command of Prince Aurangzeb to attack them from three sides. The Emperor offered the kingdom to Raja Devi Singh, a representative of the eldest branch of Orcha and a rival of Jujhar for the kingdom. Jujhar also had an army of fifteen thousand, two-thirds of which was infantry.

Finding the Emperor serious and determined and the hostile forces stronger than his own, Jujhar persuaded Asaf Khan to use his influence to reopen negotiations. The Emperor showed his willingness to give peace provided the Bundela Raja paid thirty lacs of rupees, gave up his *jagir* of Sarkar Biyawan in place of Chaura-

garh, sent Vikramajit back to the Deccan for the usual service and his grandson to the Court as a hostage. These terms were apparently harsh, but not so in reality. Jujhar, however, refused to accept them. The Mughal army, therefore, went into action.

On Nov. 22, 1634 the Mughals took Orcha by escalade and installed Devi Singh, son of Raja Bharat Bundela , as Raja. Soon after Dhamuni, a strong and well-garrisoned fort was captured. Jujhar Singh had fled to Chauragarh, but when the Mughals reached there he was compelled to evacuate it, though not without blowing up the old palaces and burning all the property there. Then followed the pursuit of Jujhar through the difficult country of Gondwana. So hot and determined was the pursuit that the Mughals had all but captured Jujhar and Vikramajit. Three sons, a grandson of Jujhar, and the dowager Rani were captured, but Jujhar and Vikramajit fled into the wild forests where they were murdered by the Gonds while sleeping off their fatigue. Their heads were sent to the Emperor (1635).

The Emperor was completely successful in the second Bundela war. He annexed to the Empire the *pargana* of Chhapra, which yielded a revenue of eight lacs of rupees, and by a minute search of hidden wealth managed to get over a crore of rupees. The kingdom of Bundelkhand was given to Devi Singh, but restlessness and commotion continued among the Bundelas. The Emperor's glory was, however, tarnished by the exhibition of fanaticism , quite unbecoming of the grandson of Akbar. The Rajput ladies who had survived were forced to serve in the Imperial harem or with nobles, while the two sons and one grandson—all of tender age—of Jujhar were converted to Islam. His old minister Shyam and his another son Udayabhan, who refused to accept Islam, were executed. Moreover, the state entry of Shah Jahan in Orcha was celebrated by the demolition of the massive temple of Bir Singh, desecration of the idols and the erection of a mosque on its site.

The Bundela war brought Gondwana into a closer

touch with the Mughal ruler. The ruler of Chanda was compelled to offer a *peshkash* of five lacs and one lac to the Mughal officials.

CHAPTER XX

SECOND PHASE OF THE DECCAN WAR AND AFTER

Freed from the Bundela war and elated by its successful termination, Shah Jahan took up the affairs of the Deccan in right earnest. He had conquered the kingdom of Ahmadnagar, yet it had not been fully subjugated, pacified and consolidated. The defiance to the Mughal authority was directly or indirectly supported by Bijapur partly for its own safety and partly to get a substantial share from the disintegrating kingdom of Ahmadnagar. Shah Jahan knew that the pacification and consolidation of his conquests in the South was impossible unless Bijapur was subdued.

The most important opponent of the Mughals in the defunct kingdom of Ahmadnagar was Shahji Bhonsla, son of Maloji, a *jagir-holder* of the districts of Poona and Supa in the kingdom of Ahmadnagar. Shahji was married (1605) to a daughter of Lukhaji Jadavarao, a powerful noble of the Nizam Shah. Maloji had earned a reputation as an army commander and a diplomat in the regime of Malik Ambar. He died in 1620 when his son Shahji was 26 years of age. By his energy, ability and loyalty he "became a right-hand man of Malik Ambar". He enjoyed the confidence and commanded the loyalty of his own brother and also of the brother and sons of Maloji. With their followers they rallied round Shahji. In the famous battle of Bhatavadi (1624) Malik Ambar scored a victory over the combined forces of the Mughals and Bijapur. Shahji took an active part in it and gained both experience and distinction.

As Shahji became more and more conscious of his strength and capacity, he preferred to stand on his own resources rather than continually lean on Malik Ambar. He even left the service of Ahmadnagar and

joined that of Bijapur (1625), but he retained his grip over his Poona *jagir*. After the death of Malik Ambar (1626), his son Fateh Khan enlisted the services of Shahji to fight the Mughal advance in the Deccan. Shahi supported Khan-i-Jahan Lodi though no positive advantage came out of it.

When the Nizam Shah treacherously murdered Lukhaji Yadava and most of his descendants, Shahji was alarmed. He deserted to the Mughals and remained in their service for two years in spite of the wrath of Bijapur. But the Mughal negotiations with Fateh Khan and the restoration of his *jagir*, which was partly held by Shahji, disgusted the latter. He relinquished the Mughal *Mansab* and decided to support the party hostile to the Mughals. He joined hands with the Adilshahis in opposing Fateh Khan's policy and fighting the Mughals.

After the surrender of Husain Nizamshahi to the Mughals by Fateh Khan the kingdom of Ahmadnagar was supposed to have become extinct and annexe to the Mughal Empire. Shahji refused to recognized both the propositions or facts. Somewhere or other he discovered another descendant of Ahmad Nizam Shah, proclaimed him king, and declared himself regent during the child's minority. The infant king, whose origin and descent were not clearly established, was proclaimed as Murtaza Nizam Shah III. In the name of the pretender Shahji continued to defy the Mughals and carry retaliatory raids in their territory. He was supported by the ruler of Bijapur to the annoyance of the Mughal Emperor.

For conducting the Deccan policy vigorously, and for reasons of administrative efficiency, a new province consisting of the districts of Ahmadnagar and Daulatabad was created. An army of fifty-eight thousand was concentrated on the Deccan frontier and the Imperial camp was fixed at Daulatabad. The diplomatic and military plans of Shah Jahan were conceived on a large and comprehensive scale. To begin with, an ultimatum was sent to Bijapur and Golkunda. The ruler of Bijapur was called upon to return whatever territories

he had taken by force from the kingdom of Ahmadnagar, expel from his state all such leaders, Marathas or others, who were hostile to the Mughal rule, remain a faithful ally, and pay tribute to the Mughal Emperor regularly. The ruler of Golkunda, who had for over thirty years recognized the suzerainty of the Shah of Persia, was now asked to acknowledge the supremacy of the Mughal Emperor, as it appeared odd that he looked for authority or support outside India. Moreover, he was required to stop the practice of cursing the first three Caliphs of Islam, for while it served no useful purpose, it fanned bigotry, fanaticism and unnecessarily hurt the feelings of the Sunni population. This proposal did not necessarily mean an interference with Shia religion as such, for execration could not form one of the fundamental principles of Shiaism. The Shia practice was the reaction of the offensive execration of Ali, encouraged by Muawiya but stopped by Umar III. Some sects of the Shias, like the Zaidits, did not approve of the practice of cursing at least the first two Caliphs. Since the Mughal Emperor did not allow cursing of any of the religious leaders of the Shias, there was no reason why the state of Golkunda should permit a practice which was at once offensive and challenging to the Mughal Emperor and the Sunnis. Since the ruler of Golkunda recognized the sovereignty of the Mughal Emperor, it was perfectly logical that the *Khutba* approved for the Empire should be read in his state also, and coins struck in the name of the Emperor. The third demand was the payment of a large amount of *peshkash* which was due from Golkunda in cash and kind.

The rulers of Golkunda had supported Malik Ambar against the Mughals throughout the reign of Jahangir without being too loud or fussy like Bijapur. Their help was largely financial. In 1621 Golkunda was made to pay rupees twenty lacs of tribute to the Mughal Emperor. Muhammad Qutbshah had dealt gently with Shah Jahan when he had rebelled against Jahangir. Although his help was not effective, yet it made some impression on the rebel Prince.

When Abdullah, a child of eleven, became Qutbshah (1626), factions and parties among the nobles assumed an uglier shape. The Peshwa and his assistant could not see eye to eye in matters of policy. The relations of the state with the Mughals were formal and incomprehensible. Apparently Shah Jahan had no evil intentions against Golkunda, for when the latter complained against the aggressions of the governor of Orissa (1630-31), the Emperor pulled up the latter and ordered him to keep away from the kingdom.

When Asaf Khan invaded Bijapur (1631), the Emperor asked the Qutbshah to send a substantial *peshkash*, but the latter procrastinated with a view to watch the outcome of the Mughal invasion. Since the invasion proved a failure, Qutbshah dismissed Shah Jahan's envoy without any *peshkash*. Qutbshah, however, was wise enough not to contribute any military help to the joint effort of the Bijapur and Ahmadnagar nobles against the Mughals. He removed from power Khawas Khan, who was anti-Mughal, and surrendered to the Mughals the relatives of Jujhar Singh, who had taken refuge in Golkunda. It was obvious that while he did not want any conflict with the Mughal Emperor, he was not inclined to offer any *peshkash* or tribute or recognize the Mughal suzerainty definitely and openly.

Shah Jahan was determined to bring pressure on Golkunda with the intention of clarifying his relation with that kingdom. Abdullah Khan Firoz Jang and the Khan-i-Dauran were allowed to make a strong military demonstration near the frontier of the kingdom and threaten an all-out invasion if the demands of the Mughal Emperor were not quickly met. Abdullah Qutbshah thought it wise to offer his loyal submission and acceptance of the Imperial demands.

In May-June 1636, a treaty was signed by the Qutbshah to the satisfaction of the Mughal Emperor. It was stipulated that along with the names of the first four Caliphs, the name of the Mughal Emperor would be included in the *Khutba* and coins bear his inscription. The ruler of Golkunda promised to remain

loyal to the Emperor for all time. In case of disloyalty the kingdom of Golkunda might be conquered. The Shah undertook to pay from the 9th regnal year (the current one) an yearly tribute of two lacs of *huns* to the Mughal Viceroy of the Deccan. Of the balance of arrears amounting to thirty-two lacs, one-fourth was to be paid immediately along with the tribute for the 9th year. Regarding payments in elephants, etc., the basis of calculation was to be prices current at the Imperial headquarters. Any difference between them was to be made good. The Mughal Emperor was to extend his protection to the kingdom against the aggressions or encroachments of Bijapur or the Marathas, and compensate for any loss inflicted by them.

While negotiations were going on with Golkunda the Mughal armies were vigorously operating against the Maratha leader Shahji and the Adil Shahi kingdom of Bijapur. Although Shahji could muster about twelve thousand troops and conduct raids in the Mughal territories, he could not hold out for long against the Mughal division led by Shaista Khan, who captured the fort of Trimbak. Shahji looked for support from Bijapur.

But the kingdom of Bijapur itself was suffering from internal confusion and external pressure. Muhammad Adil Shah had lost his control over the factious nobles. Khawas Khan had thrown his rival Mustafa Khan into prison, and with the help of Murari Pandit exercised complete authority in the State. But Randaula Khan, a powerful military commander, in combination with Sidi Rihan and with the connivance of Adil Shah, overthrew the government and killed Khawas Khan and Murari. Mustafa was released from the prison and installed on the *gaddi* of the Peshwa. The Mughal agent at Bijapur, Makramat Khan, reported to the Emperor that jingoism and chauvinism characterised the mood and policy of the new party in power, and their show of friendliness was a mere pretence. At this, Shah Jahan unleashed the war machine, and the kingdom of Bijapur was invaded from three sides. It was a sort of

total war in which ruthless destruction of life and property, men and material and relentless terrorization were employed. No distinction of combatants and non-combatants, age or sex, was made. The Mughal officers carried fire and sword in their rapid march. The desired psychological effect was produced. Shahji fled for safety, and Randaula and Mustafa Khan sued humbly for peace. After an exhibition of temper and show of reluctance, Shah Jahan was pleased to impose on Bijapur the terms of peace.

The rulers of Bijapur recognized the sovereign authority of the Mughal Emperor and accepted his arbitration if any conflict of interest arose between them and the Qutbshah. Bijapur was not to take any military action against Golkunda. A *peshkash* of twenty lacs of rupees in cash and kind was paid by Bijapur to the Emperor, who was pleased to restore Parenda, Bidar, Gulbarga and Sholapur. Besides, a slice of the extinct kingdom of Ahmadnagar on the Kokan side, including the territory between the Sina and Bhima, was given to Adil Shah. Adil Shah promised not to extend support to any pretender to the extinct kingdom of Ahmadnagar. The terms of the treaty as offered, and as accepted, have been very unsatisfactorily described, yet it may be reasonably doubted if Adil Shah was required to pay a tribute of at least nine lacs of *huns*, let alone 20 lacs of *huns* a year for the *Mahals* of Sholapur and its adjoining territory. It was stipulated that no attempts would be made to seduce or corrupt the officers of one party by the other. Bijapur undertook the responsibility of subduing Shahji should he resfuse to surrender the forts of Junnar and Trimbak.

The treaties of 1636 between the Mughal Emperor and the states of Bijapur and Golkunda form an important landmark in the history of the Empire, as also of the Deccan. They brought to an end the Nizamshahi dynasty and closed an important chapter in the post-Bahmani history of the Muslim states in the Deccan. The balance of power which existed in the South was destroyed to the advantage of the Marathas and the

Mughals. Akbar had destroyed the kingdom of Khandesh and Shah Jahan that of Ahmadnagar which stood as the bulwarks of the Deccan against the Mughals. The kingdoms of Bijapur and Golkunda had to recognize the sovereignty of the Mughal Emperor, his right to arbitrate in the quarrels between the two states, and his claim to tribute from them. In Golkunda the *Khutba* was read and coins struck in the name of the Emperor, who had undertaken the responsibility of protecting it from the aggression of its neighbour for a consideration of two lacs of *huns* a year. It was only half of what Golkunda paid to Malik Ambar for the same purpose. The whole arrangement was a sort of "subsidiary system". No such request for protection was made by Bijapur. Thus, the grip of the Mughal Emperor over the Deccan states was tightened and the stage was set for final annexation, should he think it expedient. Moreover, the responsibility of controlling the Marathas was placed on Bijapur to the relief of the Mughals. Peace, thus established, continued for at least twenty years, during which the two Deccan states recouped themselves, improved their economic life and increased territorial jurisdiction in the east, west and the south. Indeed, the relations with the state of Bijapur were so satisfactory and the position of the Emperor in the Deccan so good that Shah Jahan raised no objection to the territorial expansion of it, on the other hand, he was pleased to confer the title of *Shah* on Adil Shah.

The settlement with the two leading states of the Deccan left the Maratha leader Shahji in the lurch. He was hounded by the Mughal and Bijapur forces from fort to fort. He was driven to seek the support of the Portuguese, but in vain. Cornered tightly in the fort of Mahuli, he decided to surrender himself to Randaula along with the puppet Nizam Shah. Junnar, Trimbak and several other forts he handed over to the Mughal Commander Kahan-i-Zaman, along with the young Nizam Shah (Nov. 1636).

The arms of Shah Jahan were so far successful in every direction, but his experience in the north-west

was not quite so happy. For the internal defence of India, the Mughals regarded the control of Kabul and Qandahar as absolutely essential. But it was here that they had to face the greatest possible difficulty; for, besides the pressure of the Uzbeks in the north and of Persia in the west and south of Afghanistan, the population of Afghanistan and Biluchistan was as unmanageable as the frontier tribes. Tribal autonomy and highland freedom were ingrained in their minds, and in spite of the fact that the Mughal administrative policy was one of least interference with their internal affairs, they could hardly reconcile themselves to any sort of domination for a long time.

As described earlier, the tribes along the Kabul river and the west of the Indus were stirred up by a religious movement which, besides giving a sanction to their lawlessness, encouraged their revolt against the Mughals, and partially also against the established Sunni law. Quite early in the reign of Shah Jahan the governor of Kabul, Lashkar Khan, had reported to the Emperor regarding the defiance of the *Shariat* law by the Afghans. The Emperor in reply ordered the governor to enforce the law and punish any defiance or disorder. But it was realized that the Afghans were too intractable for the provincial authorities, as they had always been ever since the days of Babar. The recalcitrant Afghan tribes instead of submitting, retaliated by invading Peshawar. It was, indeed, with some difficulty that the Mughal officers could save it from falling into the hands of the rebels. The situation on the Multan and Biluchistan frontiers was equally unsatisfactory. The Hot and the Nohani tribes and their subordinate clans were equally unwilling to settle down as peaceful subjects of the Empire and were always ready to prey on the Mughal territory.

Elated by his success in the Deccan and Northern India, Shah Jahan decided to pick up a quarrel with the Astrakhanids, without calculating his strength and the volume of trouble on the north-west frontier, undeterred by the hostility of the frontier tribes and

the enormous difficulties of mountain warfare. It is true, that just on the eve of Shah Jahan's accession (1628), Nazar Muhammad, a brother of the Imam Quli, the ruler of the Uzbek tribes had besieged Kabul and tried to capture the fort of Zohak in vain and the Mughals had retaliated by capturing Bamiyan (1629). But since then the situation had changed and an exchange of missions had established friendly relations for all practical purposes. But it was as difficult for the successors of Babar to forget their claims over Central Asia as it was difficult for the Uzbeks and their successors to forego their designs upon Kabul and Qandahar. These were, however, matters of sentiment and ambition. The practical problem centred round Balkh and Badakhashan, which were at once the keys of Kabul and Central Asia. Mughal diplomacy had failed to retain these places but the Mughals were as keen as ever before to bring them back under their control.

In 1639 Shah Jahan visited Kabul with a military escort of fifty thousand to subdue the Afghan tribes, consolidate the government of Afghanistan, and study the situation of Central Asia. However, he did not then open a conflict with the Shaibanids and returned.

In 1640-41 Central Asia was thrown into turmoil. The ruler of Samarqand, Imam Quli Khan was deprived of his throne by his ambitious and restless younger brother, Nazr Muhammad, who was the governor of Balkh (1641). His usurpation, arrogance, harsh government, attempt to abolish the *jagir* system, and interference with rent-free land and religious endowments led to a revolt of the nobility which soon spread over the entire confederacy. Nazr Muhammad's own sons too were drawn into the movement. One of them, Abdul Aziz, proclaimed himself the ruler of Bukhara and started on a career of conquest. Finding his position precarious, Nazr Muhammad appealed to Shah Jahan for help. That suited the ambitions and policy of the Mughal Emperor, who ordered the mobilization of a large army (1646) under the command of Prince Murad and Ali Mardan Khan. They conquered Qunduz, Khost,

Badakhashan and occupied Balkh (July 1646). The advance of a large army, the methodical occupation of forts, and the presence of Shah Jahan at Kabul aroused fear in Central Asia. Even Nazr Muhammad fled precipitately, leaving all his property to be plundered by his followers or the Mughals. To direct the operations Shah Jahan proceeded to Kabul. It reflects great credit on the Emperor that he showed so much energy in taking a successful offensive and above all in keeping the line of communication between Delhi and Balkh perfectly open for military operations. More progress might have been made in Cental Asia and the newly conquered country would have been properly consolidated had not Prince Murad in utter disregard of the wishes of the Emperor and the request of the Prime Minister returned to India.

Shah Jahan entrusted the governorship of Balkh to Aurangzeb and mustered a large army all along the route from Peshawar to Kabul to be set in motion immediately when required. In May 1647 Aurangzeb reached the field of operations, but he found that the drafts made on his army for defending and garrisoning important and strategical places left only about half of that which Murad commanded. By this time the Astrakhanids had mustered an army three times as much as that of the Mughals. Moreover, it was not easy to overpower them for they always tried to avoid pitched battles and relied largely upon raids, surprises and forays.

The Mughal army scored initial success, cleared the ravines and hills of the nemies and reached Balkh. To organize and expedite the operations Shah Jahan himself established his camp at Kabul. Leaving his eldest son and Madhu Sinha Hada at Balkh, Aurangzeb marched to Aqcha, forty miles north-west of Balkh, where the Uzbeks had concentrated their force. Cutting its way through the Uzbek obstructions the Mughal army reached Timurabad. Here the Astrakhanids attacked it from all sides, but were again defeated and driven back. In spite of all their efforts, they could produce little impression on the Mughals who pushed on

and captured the main camp of the enemy at Pashai. This was indeed an act of daring, but it was unwise to have penetrated so far leaving the rear and the defence of Balkh weak.

At Pashai Aurangzeb learnt that an army led by Subhan Quli was moving up Balkh. He, therefore, decided to retreat and although the Astrakhanid ruler Abdul Aziz had also arrived with strong reinforcements, and the combined forces brought a tremendous pressure to bear on the Mughal army, it managed to reach Balkh fighting all along the line of retreat. This retreat proved fatal for it undid the work of the Mughals, and taxed their endurance to the utmost. But the enemies too now fully realized the superior discipline, warlike character, and skillful generalship of the Mughals. They frankly recognized that if they could find as capable generals as were commanding the Mughal army, they would soon conquer the Turkish Empire. Both the sides were fed up with war. While in the Mughal camp each loaf of bread was sold at one or two rupees, and drinking water was equally costly, the Astrakhanids were passing through the stress of a terrible famine. The treasury of Bukhara had touched the very verge of bankruptcy, and the tribal units were rapidly dispersing after their failure. If the Mughals could hold out for some time more, financial collapse and desertions in the army would have overwhelmed the Astrakhanid empire. Nevertheless, their difficulties were so serious that for want of money, their army dispersed, like summer clouds, selling their horses to Mughals!

It is indeed strange why Aurangzeb failed to take advantage of the miserable plight of the Astrakhanids and did not immediately take another offensive which might have succeeded. It might be that Aurangzeb felt that his men were so demoralized and homesick that they could not be persuaded to stay on in that inhospitable country, and that the famine conditions in Central Asia would seriously hamper prolonged operations, without Bukhara and Samarquand could hardly

be reached. It is difficult to accept the suggestion that the Transoxianians as such were up in arms and would not have allowed the Chaghtais to dominate over them. For the Astrakhanids by no means formed the bulk of the Central Asian population; they were congeries of miscellaneous tribes who had off and on formed varying combinations to impose their authority on the reluctant people of Central Asia only two generations back. The descendants of Timur always evoked the sympathy of the masses of Central Asia, and it is possible that the capture of Bukhara and Samarqand, supported by the Mughal gold and generosity, might have led them to prefer the Chaghatais to the crude, ill-mannered and semi-barbarous tribal rulers.

The Uzbeks were anxious to come to terms with the Mughals to avoid utter collapse. Abdul Aziz requested Aurangzeb to bestow Bukhara on his younger brother Subhan Quli Khan, while Nazr Muhammad also sued for peace and requested for the restoration of Balkh and Badakhashan. Shah Jahan was also in a mood to listen to such overtures. His repeated visits to Afghanistan and a long stay on this occasion determined military operations which gradually reached the dimension of a major war and the discomfiture of the Uzbek grand army were causing serious misgivings at the Court of Persia. The establishment of Mughal authority in Central Asia could hardly be relished by the Shah who patronized Nazr Muhammad and was contemplating an attack on Qandahar. More distressing was the problem of getting food and fodder for men and cattle since the war had devastated the land, and the agrarian economy of the Central Asian territory within the reach of the Mughals, had completely broken down. Although the Uzbeks had lost in pitched battles, the loose tribal units of the nomads yet carried on guerilla tactics, making it more difficult to get supplies. The subjugation of the tribal bands of marauders and the consolidation of conquered territory could be effected only by prolonged operations and long-drawn work of organization. Prince Aurangzeb

had reported that the officers and soldiers of Mughal army were suffering from nostalgia and were getting impatient as winter was drawing nearer. Therefore, the request of Nazr Muhammad was accepted by Shah Jahan, and he was directed to offer personal submission formally. Nazr Muhammad had suffered at the hands of his sons and, therefore, he was afraid of the Mughals also. On one excuse or the other he did not present himself but sent one of his grandsons, Qasim Sultan, with Kafsh Qalmaq. Ordinarily, such a precedure could have been objected to, but the Prince was advised to accept the indirect submission, since winter snow would have blocked the road to Kabul and made military movements impossible. Accordingly, without waiting for further instructions from the Emperor, the Prince handed over Balkh to Qasim Khan and left for Kabul (Oct. 1647).

The Balkh war cost Shah Jahan an amount of four crores of rupees, which was less than the annual revenue of the provinces of Delhi and Agra, and a loss of over five thousand lives. As against that, the Uzbeks were financially ruined, their territory to the south of the Oxus was desolated, and their loss was six thousand lives. Although the war did not add new territory to the Empire, it gave the Uzbeks a sharp lesson and an unpleasant experience which destroyed some of the traditional illusions they entertained about their own superiority as soldiers and leaders of men, and raised the prestige of Mughal arms, organization and leadership. The Mughal Emperor also fully realized that while he was strong enough to defend the frontiers of his Empire, further extension of it, however, was fraught with serious political, military and administrative complications. In the past, throughout the long period of her history, no ruler of India had ventured on military operations in Central Asia. Shah Jahan was the first and the last.

The loss of Qandahar in the time of Jahangir was largely due to the rebellion of Shah Jahan. But when the Imperial responsibilities fell on him, he showed as

much anxiety as any one of his predecessors to recover it. In spite of an exchange of friendly correspondence and diplomatic missions, Shah Jahan had directed the governor of Kabul, Qulij Khan, to welcome any favourable opportunity to recover Qandahar and with that end in view open negotiations with Ali Mardan Khan who governed that place on behalf of the Shah. Ali Mardan was summoned to the Persian Court to explain why the revenue from his districts had been allowed to fall in heavy arrears. Since Ali Mardan did not obey the summons he was relieved of his governorship and ordered to hand over charge to Siya Wash, who was sent with a large army to enforce the command of the Shah. Fearing the wrath of the Shah, Ali Mardan listened to the Mughal proposals and finally handed over Qandahar to the Mughals (Feb. 1638). Shah Jahan at once honoured him with a *mansab* of 6000 and made him the governor of Kashmir. The governor of Kabul, Qilij Khan, also showed great energy. The Mughal troops under Said Khan and Jagat Singh beat back the Persians, re-annexed to the Mughal Empire all the territory of Qandahar, Bist and Zamindawar, which had been conquered by the Shah of Persia. Prince Shuja was sent to Kabul and a large army was despatched to defend Qandahar, should it be invaded by the Persians.

The Persians were not to let Qandahar go easily. The Shah clearly wrote to Shah Jahan that he could not afford to lose Qandahar at any cost. In 1639 a Persian army attacked Qandahar and succeeded in capturing the fort of Khanshi, near Bist. Owing to the war against the Turks and the problems of the western front, Shah Safi could do no more than collect a large army in Khorasan. In 1642 Safi died. His successor, Shah Abbas II, was a lad of eleven years and the administration was in a state of flux. In 1648 Shah Abbas II, now an ambitious youth of seventeen, took up in earnest the conquest of Qandahar and began to prepare for it on a large scale. Although he had closed the road of Herat, Shah Jahan was apprised of these preparations. He, there-

fore, ordered the recall of the commanders from different stations and himself prepared to move the Court to Kabul latest by the next spring. The governor of Kabul, however, immediately reinforced the garrison of Qandahar by sending five thousand men and five lacs of rupees.

At first, the Shah attempted to get Qandahar by diplomacy and persuasion, but failing in that he made up his mind to capture it by force. It was the shrewdness of the Persian government that they found out that the Mughal Emperor and his courtiers, being partly afraid of cold and partly relying on the improbability of a Persian invasion in winter, had postponed their programme of moving to Kabul to next spring. They, therefore, decided to act immediately, and in spite of the insufficiency of provisions and the inclemency of cold weather they invaded Qandahar and laid siege to it (Dec. 16, 1648). Simultaneous attacks were made on Bist and Zamindawar. The Mughal governor shut his best troops in the chief citadel and with strange negligence or incapacity to understand the problems of defence allowed the Persians to occupy the two towers which were specifically constructed for defensive purpose, and places from where successful bombardment of the town was possible. Yet for a month and a half the Mughals held their ground in the hope of receiving reinforcements. Meanwhile, the soldiers were corrupted and demoralized and were persuaded by some mischief-mongers led by Shadi Khan and Qipchaq Khan to desert the Mughal governor and open negotiation with the Persians. Daulat Khan committed serious indiscretion when instead of punishing the rebels swiftly he tried to argue them down and finally permitted them to do what they liked. The demoralization was complete when Bist fell into the hands of the Persians, and Daulat was also terrified into submission by the Shah, who threatened him with dire consequence should he prolong the resistance. Moreover, a considerable portion of the Mughal troops went over to the Persians. At last, on the promise of safe conduct, Daulat Khan surrendered

the fort (Feb. 11, 1649). In his fear and anxiety, Daulat failed to see that the Mughal garrison in spite of desertions was not so weak as he imagined, and that the Persians had sustained greater loss in men and their supplies were running short. His lack of judgment, want of energy, inability to grasp the military situation, and, above all, his pusillanimity were responsible for the loss of Qandahar and indirectly of Zamindawar as well.

It was in January, one month after Qandahar was laid under siege, that Shah Jahan learnt of it. Immediately he ordered Sadulla Khan, the Prime Minister, and Prince Aurangzeb to march with fifty thousand horse from Lahore and Multan respectively and make a joint attack. Shortly after, the Emperor himself moved his camp from Lahore to Kabul. The armies reached Qandahar in the second week of May and laid siege to it. But the lack of proper siege guns prevented the besiegers from doing anything substantial. After three months and a half the scarcity of provisions, the fear of coming winter and the arrival of Persian reinforcements from the Shah, who was watching the progress of the Mughals from Herat, obliged them to return. Although the Mughal attempts to capture Qandahar fortifications failed, the army established its superiority in the open field. Rustam Khan and Qulij Khan met the Persian army at Shahmir led by their Commander-in-chief Murtaza Quli. The Persian army was twice as large as that of the Mughals, and their commander had taken a vow not to break his fast till he had defeated his opponents. In spite of the initial advantage of being able to take the Mughal army in the rear and flanks, the Persian attack failed completely. They broke and fled, leaving behind some of their guns and matchlocks. The battle of Shahmir forms a glorious episode in the military history of the Mughal Empire.

The strain of the Balkh and Qandahar wars necessitated some respite and fresh preparations. In 1652 Shah Jahan again sent Sadulla Khan with fifty thousand cavalry and ten thousand matchlockmen, eight heavy and twenty light guns by way of Kabul and Ghazni,

while Aurangzeb marched along the Multan-Qandahar route. The operations were immediately begun, but the fort of Qandahar was now very well garrisoned and had plenty of stores and provisions and the defenders were extremely vigilant. The besiegers adopted every possible method to open some breach, but their guns failed them; eight guns cracked; others were not well handled, while munitions and provisions ran short. Moreover, the position of the Mughals was growing more precarious owing to the hostile movements near Ghazni of a large army of the Uzbeks and Alamans, who threatened to cut off their communications and retreat. After two months and eight days of futile attempts the Mughal army had once more to return disappointed from Qandahar. Shah Jahan flew into rage and transferred Aurangzeb to the Deccan.

Prince Dara, the eldest son of Shah Jahan, without fully appreciating the difficulties of operation undertook to conquer Qandahar. Consequently, the Emperor transferred to him the provinces of Kabul and Multan and nominated him to the command of the third expedition. For three months Dara exerted his best energies in making preparations on a grand scale. Large quantities of ammunitions were collected and liberal contracts were given to grain dealers to keep up a constant supply of foodstuffs. Efforts were made to improve the quality of guns. Dara marched by way of Multan as provisions and forage were abundant on that road. On the 23rd April 1653 the Prince reached Qandahar with seventy thousand men, seven big and forty-seven light guns of all calibres. According to the plan suggested by the Emperor, Qandahar was laid under rigorous siege, and heavy pressure was brought on other forts as well. It was expected that the fall of the forts, like Bist and Zamindawar would demoralize and frighten the Qandahar garrison to surrender. The gallant Rustam Khan succeeded in compelling the surrender of the forts of Bist and Garashk. But these captures produced as little impression on the defenders of Qandahar as the artillery of the Mughals. The Persians showed extra-

ordinary endurance and courage and frustrated all the attempts of the besiegers to overcome resistance by force or promises of favours. The siege was prolonged for full five months and had to be raised only when no gun powder or cannon balls were left, when fodder became scarce and people began to die in large numbers of starvation and severe cold. Foiled in their endeavours, the Mughal army retreated to Multan , being harrassed in the rear by the Persians and the Afghans.

The Mughal attempts to capture Qandahar ended in failure. In fact, Qandahar defences had never been broken by force either by the Persians or the Mughals. They were considered impregnable. The Mughal artillery was inefficient and inadequate to conquer it. The hardships caused by climate prevented prolonged and continuous operations. It was almost impossible to stay there for more than five months. Qandahar was lost once for all. It was only after the final failure to capture Qandahar that Shah-Jahan regretted his misbehaviour towards his father. The attempt to capture Qandahar not only cost about eleven crores of rupees to the Mughal Government, but demonstrated to it the limitations of campaigning and ambitious enterprises in the West. While the Persians could congratulate themselves on their defence of Qandahar and superior artillery, which had been very efficiently developed by Shah Abbas under European supervision to match the Ottoman, they too must have realized that Qandahar formed the limit of their ambition in the East, and that an offensive in the open field against the Mughal army was doomed to end in disaster.

Third Phase of the Deccan War :

The strain on the Imperial prestige and exchequer caused by the costly frontier wars of Balkh and Qandahar necessitated a strict realization of revenues and tapping, if possible, of new sources of income. In northern India little was left to conquer except the vast tracts of the unexplored and undeveloped Central Provinces

(Madhya Pradesh). But the crude state of civilization and the endless forests of this region prevented proper utilization of its natural resources. Kingdom of Deogarh, Chanda and even Mandla could not be considered wealthy. Of these states Deogarh was supposed to be the foremost. Its ruler was a vassal of the Empire, but of late had failed to pay tribute in time. In 1656 the Emperor ordered Aurangzeb to take vigorous action. An expedition was led against the Raja, who was obliged to pay some of the arrears and promise a regular payment of tribute in future.

The Deccan was another region always believed by the northerners to be a sink of gold and jewels. It was, therefore, natural that in his financial stringency the Mughal government should turn to this side. Shah Jahan pressed the viceroy of the Deccan, Aurangzeb, to develop the sources of revenues in the conquered territories, to make the country pay for the administration and, if possible, to contribute something to the Imperial treasury. But the Prince, who was himself in sore want of money, could hardly be expected to find any for the central treasury. The settlement of the Deccan, the reorganization of the revenues, and the expense of maintaining a strong frontier army taxed the energies of the Prince extremely and even led to some misunderstanding with the Emperor.

Aurangzeb was fortunate enough to have in his service one Murshid Quli Khan Khurasani, who had come to the Mughal service along with Ali Mardan Khan from Qandahar. He had served with distinction in the Punjab, and had been *Diwan* first of Balaghat and then of Payan Ghat in the Mughal Deccan. His ability, experience and enthusiasm had made him eminently fit to be entrusted with the task of rehabilitating the Deccan. The long and frequent wars in the Deccan had ruthlessly destroyed the social and agricultural economy, driven away the peasants and left a permanent trail of desolated villages and uncultivated fields. As a consequence of it, famine of a serious nature had come to stay to make matters worse

confounded. Murshid Quli threw himself wholeheartedly into the task of reconstructing rural and economic life, inspired as much by humanitarian reasons as by his desire to render memorable service to the province and the Empire. He very closely supervised the details of surveys and assessment and did not even hesitate to to take the measuring chain or rope in his hand and measure personally. For having evolved out a revenue system which was characterized by reasonable efficiency, moderation, sympathy and understanding, he made his name immortal in the Deccan as Todar Mal had done in northern India. His system was known as *Dhara* Murshid Quli Khan.

The basic ideas of the revenue system introduced by Murshid Quli Khan were derived from those of Todar Mal and Malik Ambar. An elaborate land survey by measurement through the agency of *Amils* was conducted. Land was divided into three categories—plains, hilly areas and ravines, and water courses. It was further subdivided according to the quality and kind of crops. There were three methods of assessment. First, the old customary one, such as that based on the number of ploughs and draught-cattle. It was technically called *Tashkhish Sarbastah*. The second was the well-known method of division of crops called *Bat* or *Batai*. The third was the one based on measurement called *Jarib*. The first apparently was not interfered with. The share of the state ranged normally from one-third in the case of land irrigated by wells to one-half for areas irrigated by rain water. For products other than grain crops, such as grapes, sugar-cane, plaintains, beans, pot-herbs and the like, the State demand swung between one-ninth to one fourth according to the amount of labour, expenses, time and such facilities as are laid down in the Islamic law of land revenue. From the area where the system of *Jarib* or measurement was applied the State usually charged one-fourth per *bigha* after measurement. This share was commuted in terms of money according to the qualities of produce and the prices current in the market.

To encourage cultivation advances—*Taqavi*—were

given to the peasants for purchasing cattle and such other articles as were required for agriculture. The amount of *Taqavi* was recovered at the time of the harvest in instalments. In each village, where no suitable hereditary headman was available, a headman was appointed. The agrarian reforms energetically worked out by Murshid Quli Khan improved agriculture, the condition of the *ryots* and the revenue of the province.

The second source of revenue—an important one—was the tribute from the Deccan state of Golkunda. Bijapur was exempted by the treaty from paying annual tribute, but Golkunda had promised to pay two lacs of *huns*, which according to the exchange obtaining at the time of the treaty amounted to eight lacs of silver rupees. Although the resources of Golkunda were rich and the state was wealthy, yet its ruler following the common practice of the chiefs and princes of those day had allowed the tribute to fall in arrears and turned a deaf ear to the constant reminders of the Imperial government. During this period, the value of *hun* had risen from 4 to 5 rupees each. The Mughals demanded all payments of arrears at the latest rate of 5, which meant an additional payment of twenty lacs of rupees by Golkunda. Thus, while the Mughal demand was being pitched higher, Golkunda was delaying payments indefinitely.

Apart from wilfully avoiding payment of arrears the kingdoms of Bijapur and Golkunda had extended by force of arms their authority over Carnatic. The Hindu Raja of Carnatic sought the protection of the Mughal Emperor for which he was prepared to pay fifty lacs of *huns* and was reported even willing to accept Islam. Aurangzeb was definitely and rightly in favour of supporting him, for besides the offer made by the Raja, obvious political and military advantages could be gained. For while the extension of these Deccan states in Carnatic was calculated to strengthen the power of those states and, by the way, of the Marathas, the Mughals could not gain any advantage. On the other hand, the establishment of a friendly state in the South would have not only

stopped the extension of the Deccan states and the Marathas, but would have created a sort of permanent military and political outposts for the Mughals in the far South and tightened their grip over Bijapur and Golkunda. Shah Jahan did not much care for the conversion of the Raja, but was inclined to accept the suggestion of Aurangzeb. In fact, he asked the Deccan states to keep their hands off Carnatic. He was, however, anxious to avoid any major conflict with them so soon after his wars against the Astrakhanids and Persia, which had cost the Empire so heavily. But the Deccan states hastened on the one hand, to complete the conquest of Carnatic and, on the other, to offer more substantial presents to the Emperor. While good time was wasted in inquiries and the examination of the case, Carnatic was partitioned and the Raja was reduced to helpless insignificance.

It is also possible that Aurangzeb and Dara viewed the question of Carnatic from their respective angles. While Aurangzeb wanted to put a rear-brake on the Deccan states in view of the probable future developments, Dara was equally anxious to strengthen the Deccan states, which would have acted as a check on Aurangzeb. Whatever might have been the wishes of the Princes, the Emperor looked upon the affair from his own view-point. So, after the *fait accompli* of the partition of Carnatic, he allowed the question to be dropped. There was, however, no reason why the Deccan states should not pay their dues, either presents or tributes or both. Shah Jahan, therefore, advised Prince Aurangzeb to take necessary measures to recover them. So far there was no question of a declaration of war in the mind of the Emperor. Accordingly the Prince sternly demanded the payment of arrears, tribute and presents.

The rulers of Golkunda and Bijapur had been given the privilege of communicating directly with the Central Government. In fact, they were treated an quasi-independent states. As the governor of the Deccan, Aurangzeb did not like this; for many a time he was left in ignorance of what transpired between

them and the Imperial Government. He had drawn the attention of the Emperor to it, but the latter did not accept his contention.

The ruler of Golkunda preferred to carry on his old policy of dilatory representations and prolonged communications with the Central Government by-passing the Prince. He was apparently not quite since in his intentions. He had not only failed to comply with the terms of the treaty of 1636, but had even gone to the extent of defying some of them. The success of the Persian monarch Shah Abbas II had encouraged him once more to entertain the suggestion of Shah not to count upon the tottering power of the Mughal Emperor, but to forge friendly links with Persia. Mir Jumla, who was the Prime Minister, might have encouraged or acted as a link in such negotiations. Besides that, it was reported that the ruler of Golkunda had revived the old practice of Shiaite *Khutba* in his realm, in direct contravention of the treaty .

Golkunda failed to realize that delay in the payment of tribute would give a handle to Aurangzeb, whose cupidity in the Deccan had been highly excited. His failure at Balkh and Qandahar naturally made him anxious to win laurels in some other and, if possible, more profitable direction. His financial difficulties and his future ambition to win the inevitable war of succession had whetted his appetite for money and stimulated his desire to hoard arms and ammunitions and keep a large, active army well practised in the field. Both these objects could be realized if he could be allowed to go to war against Golkunda and squeeze it. Aurangzeb was determined not to be fooled by the insincere, dilatory and suspicious behaviour of Golkunda and Bijapur states. It was not his fault that the Imperial Government did not permit him to invade that kingdom.

Aurangzeb was lucky in finding a useful person in Mir Muhammad Said, famous as Mir Jumla. This able Persian had come to Golkunda only twnety-five years back and had had a phenomenal success both as a diamond merchant and as a politician. He succeeded

in winning the favour of Abdullah Qutub Shah, who appointed him as Prime Minister. In a short time he brought under his thumb the entire administrative machinery and extended his power by conquering Carnatic from the Hindu Raja Sri Ranga Rayal. His plan was to keep Carnatic as a part of his personal *jagir*, but Qutub Shah wanted to annex it to his kingdom. The obstinate defiance of Mir Jumla opened the eyes of Qutub Shah and he came to realize the dangerous combination of immense wealth, supreme political power and boundless ambition in an adventurer. Mir Jumla was shrewed enough to see that his position in Golkunda would soon become untenable, hence he opened negotiations simultaneously with Bijapur, Aurangzeb, the Court of Delhi and even the Shah of Persia.

Meanwhile, the haughty and reckless son of Mir Jumla, Muhammad Amin, by his superior airs and insulting behaviour compelled Qutub Shah to throw him and his family into custody. Mir Jumla now quickly made up his mind and placed himself under the protection of Shah Jahan. The Emperor offered the Mir a *Mansab* of five thousand zat and sawar, his son that of two thousand zat and one thousand sawar, and wrote a note to Qutub Shah to let them proceed to Delhi. It was wise for the Mughals to have won Mir Jumla over to their side rather than to allow him to be driven into the arms of Bijapur or the Shah of Persia. However, it was construed as undue interference of the Delhi Court in the internal affairs of Golkunda. Qutb Shah was in a fix, and he could not make up his mind to give an immediate reply to the Imperial note. This disregard of the Imperial authority gave the opportunity to Aurangzeb to take the field against Golkunda and order his son Muhammad to invade Golkunda at once. He had not moved far when Abdullah received another note of Shah Jahan to release the family of Mir Jumla. Qutb Shah immediately obeyed the order and set them free. But Aurangzeb was in no mood to leave the affairs half-finished.

Having unsheathed his sword, he was anxious to settle accounts with Golkunda, beginning with the restoration of all property of Mir Jumla and Amin.

The court of Golkunda was alarmed at the attitude of Aurangzeb. They were taken by surprise and were entirely unwilling to be drawn into war, but had no means of escape. Qutb Shah shut himself up in the fort, and allowed Prince Muhammad to occupy Hyderabad and rifle the palace. He, however, made repeated offers of peace to Aurangzeb, who had marched out to direct the operations against Golkunda, but the Prince would give no ear to them. It was also rumoured that Bijapur had sent them a cavalry, fifteen thousand strong, under Afzal Khan, at the request of Qutubulmulk. Aurangzeb, on the other hand, exerted his best influence on the Emperor to listen to no peace proposal until a satisfactory settlement had been arrived at.

Frightened out of his wits, Qutubulmulk Shah persuaded Prince Muhammad Sultan to intercede for him with his father. He offered to pay forty lacs of rupees, as *peshkash*, the hand of his daughter to the Prince Muhammad and send the annual *peshkash* regularly. While negotiations for settlement were going on with the invaders, Qutbulmulk keenly awaited the result of his representations to Shah Jahan and requested Bijapur for aid. Since the Mughal and Golkunda soldiers frequently came in to conflict, the situation was deteriorating. Aurangzeb personally reached Golkunda on 6th February and laid siege to it. If left to himself, he would have preferred to conquer and annex Golkunda and thus solve one of the major problems of the Deccan. But Shah Jahan was not prepared to go so far. Much can be said for or against each of the two views. But Shah Jahan was to have the last word. He ordered Aurangzeb to stop the war and make peace. Had this news reached Qutbulmulk, he might have been inclined to make the most of it, water down the terms of peace or put Aurangzeb in the wrong. The latter, therefore, withheld the communication and kept the military pressure intact. Yet he showed his willingness to

listen to supplications. Accordingly, Qutbulmulk sent his old mother, who was introduced to Aurangzeb by Shaista Khan. It was agreed that Prince Muhammad would marry the daughter of Qutbulmulk and accept jewels, elephants, precious articles and cash to the total value of one crore of rupees. There was every likelihood of these terms being accepted, but the whole plan fell to pieces when a *farman* arrived from the Emperor ordering Aurangzeb to withdrew immediately with the army from the territory of Golkunda. There was no alternative left but to beat retreat. Aurangzeb's plan to annex Golkunda or at least to recover all the arrears, including a handsome indemnity, could not be carried out. He was sorely disappointed; first, because he felt that the conquest of that kingdom would once for all settle the issue between the Mughal Empire and the Deccan, and thus bring to a natural culmination the Mughal policy in the Deccan which Akbar the great had initiated and his two successors steadily pursued. Secondly, it would make his position vis-a-vis his brothers very strong politically, militarily and financially. If annexation was not found feasible the heavy indemnity and recovery of arrears would not only give him financial relief but enable him to pay off the debts he had taken to prepare for war with Golkunda, and strengthen his resources for the future.

The refusal of Shah Jahan to accept the proposals made by Aurangzeb is supposed to have been largely inspired by Dara and Jahan Ara. They were believed to be the leaders of the 'peace party' at the Court, while Sadulla Khan, the Prime Minister, Aurangzeb and Mir Jumla were the leaders of the 'war party'. There might be some truth in this hypothesis, but it has been highly exaggerated. It presumes that Shah Jahan had lost his vigour and judgement and was used as a tool by others. There is no ground for such an assumption. Irrespective of what the princes might have thought, Shah Jahan had his own reasons for the policy he pursued. He was very reluctant to get entangled in any prolonged war after the affairs of Balkh and Qandahar.

His experience of the Deccan affairs was both long and intimate. He understood the complications of the Deccan politics, its demoralizing influence both on the invaders and the invaded, and the difficulties of military operations in the South. He could not share the optimism and enthusiasm of Aurangzeb or persuade himself to believe that the fall of the fort of Golkunda would bring to an end the Deccan tangle. On the other hand, it might prove the beginning of endless trouble, as was the case before 1636. Hence, he preferred to make a strong military demonstration against Golkunda with a view to recover the arrears of the revenue, tighten his grip on the Deccan states and strike a gold bargain in Carnatic.

Shah Jahan gained his object to an appreciable measure. He recovered the tribute from Golkunda and annexed to the Empire the district of Ramgir, a place of considerable strategic importance. The Emperor not only prevented Qutbulkmul from annexing the Carnatic *jagir* of Mir Jumla, but tactfully managed to hold it in his own hands, which in simple language almost meant annexation. The transaction was of a dubious nature and, therefore, proved to be a bone of contention for the future.

Although the main objects of Aurangezeb could not be realized, he managed to get the daughter of Abdullah Qutbulmulk for his son Prince Muhammad Sultan with a promise of making him his heir. This matrimonial alliance was expected to be of some use at least politically. How far it was financially advantageous it is difficult to say. It is not quite clear if Aurangzeb and Muhammad Sultan had to deliver up the marriage presents just as the former had to disgorge the presents given to him as the Viceroy of the Deccan.

The events of Golkunda were bound to affect the relations between Bijapur and the Mughals. Like Golkunda, Bijapur also had extended its sway over Carnatic and annexed vast territories. The kingdom thus stretched from the Arabian sea to the Bay of Bengal. Since Shah Jahan had tactfully taken over that part of

Carnatic which Mir Jumla had decided to keep as his personal *jagir*, there was no reason why an attempt should not be made to lay hands on that part of Carnatic which was conquered by Bijapur. What was advantage ous to Bijapur and the Marathas was a clear disadvan- to the Mughals. Originally, the contention of the Imperial Government was that the states being under the wing of the Mughals had no right to extend their territories without the permission of the Emperor. Since they had already extended their territories they should either share the conquests or pay a substantial *peshkash* to the Emperor. Both Golkunda and Bijapur, but particularly the latter, denied that sort of authority to the Emperor and believed in their right to have independent foreign policies. Since the treaty of 1636 had not clarified the relationship between the Empire and Bijapur, both the parties interpreted it in their own way. Shah Jahan gave an inkling of his own attitude and policy by compelling Muhammad Adil Shah against his will to release Mustafa Khan from prison and reinstate him to Peshwaship (1643), preventing the Shah from holding elephant combats and conferring on his officials high titles, like that of the Khan-i-Khana. The Emperor once reprimanded Adil Shah for neglecting to move out four miles from his headqarters to welcome the Imperial *Farman*, as was the custom of the high officers of the Empire. But inaction over the extension of Bijapur authority in the Carnatic left sufficient ground for Adil Shah to believe that he was different from the feudatory Rajput states which were made practically an integral part of the Empire. The nature of relationship between the Empire and Bijapur required clarification. Shah Jahan was not anxious to provoke an open war because Muhammad Adil Shah had been behaving fairly well and was on the whole obedient. But the success of the Emperor in Golkunda, and the development of affairs in Bijapur brought the question into prominence. The governor of the Deccan, Aurangzeb, also strongly drew the attention of the Emperor to it. Muhammad Adil

Shah died in 1656 and was succeeded by his alleged son Ali Adil Shah with the support of the queen Bari Sahiba, who was the sister of Qutbulmulk. It was believed that Muhammad Shah had no son and Ali, who was of an obscure origin, had been adopted by Bari Sahiba. Aurangzeb communicated the reports to the Emperor along with his observations regarding the disorders and confusion in Bijapur following the death of Muhammad Shah.

Shah Jahan felt that the time had come to assert his sovereign power over Bijapur and reduce it definitely to the position of a vassal state, like Golkunda. Three charges were brought against it. First, that it had allowed the tribute to fall in arrears; secondly, that it had given a clear evidence of hostility by organizing an army to aid Golkunda; and thirdly, that he had encroached upon the territory which belonged to Mir Jumla in Carnatic. Aurangzeb was ordered to mobilize his army towards the frontier of Bijapur, try to conquer the state or at least recover those territories, which once belonged to the kingdom of Ahmadnagar, but were transferred to it. In case the latter alternative was adopted, Bijapur should be made to pay a crore of rupees in cash as *peshkash* to the Emperor, besides jewels and elephants, fifty lacs to the Viceroy of the Deccan and recite the *Khutba* and strike coins in the name of the Emperor, like Golkunda. Thus, the Emperor abrogated the treaty of 1636 and clearly decided to reduce Bijapur to vassalage, if not annex it. He instructed Aurangzeb not to launch a final invasion until he was joined by Mir Jumla with other commanders. With all that Aurangzeb was authorized to settle the affairs of Bijapur as best as he could.

Whatever might have been the hidden intentions of Aurangzeb, he was not keen apparently to undertake the invasion of Bijapur. His sad experiences at Golkunda, the vacillating policies of the Imperial Government and fear of hostile machinations at the Court had done much to tone down his enthusiasm. However, the fact that Mir Jumla and Shaista Khan, who were both

friendly and influential at the Court, were sent to co-operate with him held out some hope to him. The bright prospect of war with Bijapur, the largest and most prosperous state of the Deccan also promised him a chance to win military glory, replenish his treasury and provide his soldiers with an opportunity to fill their bags with plunder and get more practice in warfare. At last he decided to take a chance.

As soon as Mir Jumla joined the Prince, the Mughal army was set in motion (1657). The fort of Bidar, which was most gallantly defended by Sidi Marjan, could not withstand the onslaught of the Mughal artillery, and was eventually carried by storm. Sidi lost his life sword in hand. Besides large quantities of ammunitions, twelve lacs of rupees were found in the plunder. The name of Bidar was changed to Zafarabad.

The exultant Mughal army pressed on towards Kalyani, of course, burning and ravaging on their way. In vain did the best generals of Bijapur, like Afzal Khan and Khan Muhammad, try to check its progress. The Bijapurians were driven back and the Mughals laid siege to Kalyani. The former left no stone unturned to prevent the capture of that fort. They tried to cut off the Mughal supplies and their line of communication, created diversions, hounded Shivaji on the Mughal territory and made determined attacks on the besiegers, but to not avail. The fort of Kalyani was also carried by storm.

The fall of Bidar and Kalyani opened the road to Bijapur. Aurangzeb now moved forward confidently and laid siege to Bijapur. The Bijapurians while fighting desperately were also carrying energetic diplomacy. They promised to satisfy all the Mughal demands short of annexation of the kingdom. They agreed to pay 150 lacs in cash and valuables, cede all the territories the Mughals wanted, including Bidar, Kalyani and Parenda. The Imperial Government, therefore, excused fifty lacs from the tribute, ordered Aurangzeb to suspend war, withdraw the Mughal army from Bijapur and send Mir Jumla back to Delhi. These promises the

Bijapurians would have been forced to implement had the Imperial orders for the cessation of hostilities not relaxed the efforts of the officers who were ordered to return, and the news of the illness of Shah Jahan not obliged Aurangzeb to turn his attention to a great political gamble round the throne of Delhi. He took whatever the Bijapurians gave and returned to Aurangabad in disgust (Jan. 1658).

CHAPTER XXI

THE WAR OF SUCCESSION

It was on the 6th of September that Shah Jahan suddenly fell ill of stranguary and constipation. The trouble developed so rapidly that in a short time he was compelled to confine himself to his bed chamber and discontinue coming to the *darbar*. The removal of the sovereign from the public gaze gives rise to great uneasiness in all monarchies. In India this was regarded with great misapprehensions, and gave rise to wildest speculations. The reasons are not far to seek. The monarch was the symbols of the Empire, and the source of all power, peace and order. The change of sovereign usually led to a war of succession, which brought to a stand-still the machinery of administration, bred lawlessness, while the armed conflicts of the various candidates to the throne interfered with the normal activities of the peasants, merchants and servants of the state. Everything was thrown, as it were, in a melting pot; everything trembled in the balance. Every class, therefore, was deeply concerned in the change. The princes were anxious for the throne; the parties of the nobles were anxious to put up their own candidates; the Hindus were anxious for toleration and liberal administration; the orthodox Muslims wanted the preservation of the canon law; and all except the lawless elements in the state were anxious for peace and order.

To allay the anxiety of the people, Shah Jahan had to show himself at the *jharokha* more than once. An old man of over 65, Shah Jahan found that his strength was ebbing out fast. He, therefore, called his courtiers and nobles and in their presence declared Dara as his successor, and exhorted them to obey him in every matter. Not only was Dara the eldest son from a lawful wife, but the sovereing himself declared him to be his successor. Although the Muslim law of

succession recognizes the validity of the sovereign's choice, it gives right to every son—even of a concubine to succeed. As a matter of fact, the Muslim law was meant for democracy and not for monarchy. The Muslim public opinion in regard to succession was as lax and loose as the Muslim law. Every Prince, therefore, felt himself qualified to press forward his own claim and back it up with military force. The length of the sword decided the issue of succession. It is fallacious to argue that this method of succession always brought the best man to the throne, for victory in war is not necessarily a good test of administrative and political talent. At best, it entitles the conquerer to be regarded as a good military leader, or may be, a diplomat.

The difficulties of Dara, now successor to the throne, were great. He was called upon to play a double role, viz. that of the Deputy Emperor and of an individual claimant to the throne. If Shah Jahan had died he would have been spared the inconvenience of sailing on two boats. He could then carry out his plans, whatever, they might have been, without delay or modification. As a ruler he had to maintain law and order, put a stop to malicious and alarmist propaganda that was likely to throw the state into confusion, the administration out of gear, and precipitate a civil war. He had to put a stop to irresponsible communications by the interested reporters, spies, or official representatives at the Court of the various princes. It did not require any great insight to forecast unrest or the possibility of hostile military activities of the various princes. Consequently he had to keep the reins of administration rather tight, entrust them to those in whom he could confide and keep the army ready to suppress any open military demonstration. These very things, irrespective of motives, were enough to deepen the suspicion of his rivals, make them more uneasy and induce them to fly to arms, before they were chained down by the rigour of the Central administration. In plain language, they could say to themselves that Dara was exploiting his favourable position at Delhi to strengthen

his power with an eye to the future, and that they should be up and doing before it was too late.

Of the four rivals Dara was the eldest. A keen student of philosophy, mysticism and comparative religion, Dara had a broader outlook, which was essential to the government of a vast country, like India, with its multifarious faiths and social groups. His irreproachable character, liberality, kind heart, sympathy, compassion, generosity and his devotion to his father made him as much the favourite of the people as that of the sovereign. True it is, that the fondness of his father had never given him an opportunity of coming into closer touch with the actual and everyday working of local administration, but his experience of the main problems of government and difficulties of administration must have been considerable, for he was called upon to act as a deputy of the Emperor, and an enormous mass of state business had passed through his hands. His presence at the Court in the very thick of actual business must have familiarized him with the different branches of administration, and given him a good training in the difficult task of over-all comprehension, Imperial synthesis, co-ordination, and higher politics. There, at the metropolis of the Empire, he would have come into close touch with all those who were anything in the state and found a fine opportunity of studying the motives and actions of men and the play of conflicting impulses and interests. But his engrossment in political administration and studies stood in the way of that military training which brought discipline and prepared a candidate for the final appeal to the sword, which was believed to be the law of the day. It is doubtful if he was utterly unfit for war, for the enthusiasm with which he had thrown himself into the task of organizing military preparations and the energy with which he exerted himself in conducting the third Qandahar operations, show clearly that he possessed enthusiasm, courage and perseverance, and was capable of a brave stand. Some of these qualities were exhibited even at Samugarh and Deorai later on.

His failure at Qandahar is by no means a proof of his inefficiency, for it is doubtful if any other prince or even the Emperor could have been certain of success under those circumstances. His defeat at the hands of Aurangzeb does show the military superiority of the latter, but does not prove unfitness of the former. Success on the battle-field often hangs on things which are beyond one's personal control. His philosophical studies and exercise of enormous political power might have generated in him a sense of superior consciousness and a contempt for the ordinary and the petty and made him impatient of aristocratic arrogance. These qualities might have verged on vanity, but there is no proof and little likelihood of his being incorrigibly irascible and bad-tempered. Though generally polite, dignified and sympathetic, he sometimes got temporarily irritated and in his frankness made cracks or ironical remarks about persons. They can hardly be considered a justification for the later activities of nobles like Mir Jumla or Jai Singh. But the highest qualification he possessed was that he was the darling of the people.

The second son of Shah Jahan was Prince Shuja. He was a man of refined tastes and easy-going habits. Although he possessed great intelligence and courage and was gifted with common sense, he was pleasure-loving, negligent and partly indolent. The soft atmosphere of Bengal, 'the land of peace, plenty and prosperity', had given a long rope to his passions and slowly undermined his physical powers. But he was a lovable person and good soldier. It is said that his main strength lay in the Persians to placate whom he had adopted the Shia creed and manners.

Aurangzeb was the third son of Shah Jahan. He was orthodox and puritanical in his outlook, and this constituted both the strength and weakness of his character. It gave definiteness to his ideas and plans, produced energy and strength born of strong faith and austere character, created enthusiasm and sustained it, and generated a will to stick to and carry through his object. On the otherhand, it also produced a one-

track mind, narrow outlook, constricted vision, and wrong perspective. Such an outlook in a ruler was calculated to foment fanaticism and bigotry, and create a gulf between the various communities of the State. It could generate an attitude of contempt for followers of religious other than one's own and tend to disqualify him for holding the balance of justice even.

A fine writer and an able military leader, Aurangzeb could use both his pen and sword with equal success. His strong determination, will and perseverance were equalled by his insight into human weakness and political craft. His bravery and courage were tempered with caution and self-control. His power of endurance and coolness in moments of trial were as great assets to him as his capacity for hard work and indefatigable energy in dealing with details. His grave demeanour, natural reserve and sobriety inspired awe; while his rigorous policy and deep-laid diplomacy excited fear. He could command respect and awe and fear but could not inspire love for he was as cold as steel. In diplomacy and the handling of soldiers he clearly outmatched all his rivals. Whatever might be said of him, he could never be charged of weakness—physical, intellectual or emotional. He was, however, touchy, broody, rancorous and ruthless. He did not easily repose trust in men nor inspire it in others; and yet he knew how to take service from them. His experience was at best confined to provincial administration. He had hardly any opportunity of handling the larger problems of the Imperial Government as Dara had.

The fourth and the last Prince was Murad. He was impulsive and reckless. Like a medieval knight, he could throw himself into pleasures with as much impetuosity and zest as in the very thick of fight. He was brave, courageous, generous, but at the same time pleasure-loving, indiscriminate and indifferent. With all that he was foolish and short-sighted and possessed an impetuous and capricious temperament. He knew little of the political world, nor did he care to know it. Self-complacent, self-centred, quarrelsome and obstinate,

he was least fitted to undertake the task of government. He had none of that culture and large-mindedness of Dara or Shuja, or the sobriety and cool, calculating qualities of Aurangzeb. He could place confidence in or quarrel with anybody like a child. He never worried himself to learn either the art of government or of military leadership, but he yielded to none or rather surpassed all his rivals in his desire to be proclaimed as the Emperor of Hind.

At first Dara and the Emperor tried to stop the trickling of baseless rumours which were circulated everyday and were embellished and exaggerated by the servants of the various princes employed at the Capital. But they failed in their attempt in spite of all rigour and precautions. It was indeed difficult to do so when ever the Princesses, like Raushan Ara and Gauhar Ara, acted as spies to Aurangzeb and Murad respectively. His attempt to stop communications aroused the deepest apprehension of his brothers and led them to believe every rumour. Failing in this attempt, the Emperor tried to convince his sons that he was alive by sending them letters under his own seal and signature. But they simply refused to believe either in these letters or even their own confidential agents. The three princes refused to be sure of the Emperor's being alive unless they had seen him with their eyes. But the crowding of the armies of three of the biggest provinces at the capital was quite undesirable from all points of view—military, political and economic. If the princes had come alone only with necessary retainers, it would have been a different matter. But the princes could not venture to do that without possible danger to themselves as they had come to believe almost deliberately that Dara was supreme there and might do them harm. The events thus took a very awkward and vicious turn and got beyond the control of any individual. Only goodwill of the princes could save the situation and avert a fratricidal war, but that was sadly wanting.

Murad and Shuja were the first to believe seriously that Shah Jahan was dead. They, therefore, lost no

time in declaring themselves lawful rulers, assuming sovereignty, undergoing coronation ceremonies and having the *Khutba* read and coins struck in their own names. Murad went to the extent of inaugurating his own era. They were extremely anxious to march upon the capital and oust Dara before he could consolidate his position. With Aurangzeb the case was different. Not that he was less keen than his other two brothers, but his circumspection and prudence dictated to him a cautious move. He was not in such a hurry as his two brothers. For he was neither quite sure of the death of Shah Jahan, nor did he deem it advisable to leave the Deccan without making proper arrangements for its defence and administration.

The three brothers, Aurangzeb, Murad and Shuja, kept up regular correspondence between themselves and entered into a sort of agreement to act together to crush Dara. The understanding with Shuja was rather vague, as it was not so easy to exchange correspondence with him owning to distance; but between Murad and Aurangzeb a written treaty was most solemnly concluded for the partition of the Empire. The provinces of Kabul, Kashmir, Lahore, Multan and Sindh, according to the arrangement, were to be constituted into a separate kingdom to be ruled by Murad. Moreover, he would get a third of the booty gained in the war, while the rest was to be settled between Aurangzeb and Shuja, or rather go to the former. It was also deemed necessary to find out an effective slogan for war and the cry that was raised was the defence of the law of Islam from the heresies of Dara, whether Shah Jahan was alive or dead. Should the Emperor be still alive, they would free him from the thraldom and tyranny of that idolatord They arrogated to themselves the honour of being the defenders of Islam. The cry must have aroused a sort of fervour which has not yet exhausted itself totally. But it would be incorrect to hold that it divided the Hindus and the Muslims as such into two clear-cut camps. Hindu and Muslim officers served under the banners of the rival princes as before.

The slogan, however, had the advantage of giving the civil war the colour of a conflict of principles and not of personalities.

Prince Shuja was the first to take the field. By January 1658 he was at Banaras without any opposition or obstruction in his way. In February Murad and Aurangzeb were also on their way to Delhi. They were delayed by one month, because Murad had to get a forced loan from Surat, which he could not raise without capturing the town and taking the fort by storm. He had also cleared his way by putting to death, on a vague and doubtful charge of treason against himself, the *Diwan* of the province, Ali Naqi, whose loyalty to the Crown and honesty of purpose were his greatest drawbacks. Aurangzeb was delayed because he was in sore need of money and was, therefore, using threats and promises to get whatever he could from Bijapur and Golkunda, and also because he had to resettle the boundaries between the Mughal Empire and these states according to the treaties of 1656-57. These states had unfortunately come to know of the real situation of the Empire, hence they thwarted and evaded all demands. Failing in his attempts, Aurangzeb was obliged to plunder the wealth and property of Mir Jumla, the fattest sheep in the camp.

While these princes were making brisk preparations Dara was also not careless. He tried to conceal these facts from Shah Jahan, for he feared the news would tell on his weak health and might aggravate his illness. At last when things went too far and the two princes assumed sovereignty, he had to break the news to Shah Jahan. The old Emperor was indeed much perplexed. He tried to allay the apprehensions of his impetuous sons by writing letters to them in his own handwriting and under his own seal. The Emperor finally decided to send three armies—one towards the East under Sulaiman Shikoh, son of Dara; another towards the Deccan under Raja Jaswant Singh; and the third towards Gujrat under Qasim Khan—to prevent the princes from coming to the capital. But he was careful to

instruct them not to invite conflict but first try persuasion to turn them back and should they fail in their efforts they were to use force in a manner not to cause the death of any of the princes.

Having proclaimed himself a sovereign ruler with the title of Nasiruddin Timur III, Shuja had the *Khutba* read and coins struck in his name. Without losing much time he marched out with a large army, a strong flotilla and a considerable park of artillery. To deal with Shuja Shah Jahan sent a strong army under the command of Jai Singh and Diler Khan Ruhela, with an over-all charge to Dara's son Sulaiman Shikoh. Five miles from Banaras at Bahadurpur, the two armies came into contact on 14th Feb. 1658. The Imperialists launched a surprise attack in the early hours of the morning, which proved a complete success. In spite of his gallant stand and display of courage, Shuja had no other alternative left than to beat retreat. His rich camp was ruthlessly plundered and his army dispersed. Behind an improvised long wall, Shuja entrenched himself, while at a distance of fourteen miles the army of Sulaiman Shikoh halted. Here came the orders from the Court to Sulaiman Shikoh to come to terms with Shuja and hasten back as soon as possible, since the army of Jaswant Singh had sustained a defeat at Dharmat and the combined forces of Aurangzeb and Murad were moving northward. Accordingly, a treaty was quickly patched up, by which Orissa, Bengal and the territory of Bihar to the east of Monghyr was given to Shuja, who was to change his headquarters to Rajmahal (May 1658). But Jai Singh seems to have nursed an old grudge against Dara, who had once subjected him to redicule. He was in no mood to return quickly in spite of abject and repeated requests from Dara. In fact his movements after the victory of Bahadurpur were very dilatory. The Raja had reached Korah, one hundred and five miles from Allahabad, only to learn that the battle of Samugarh was lost to Dara. Leaving Sulaiman Shikoh and Diler Khan behind, the Raja marched rapidly to Agra to join Aurangzeb. This policy might have been

dictated by his anxiety to prevent the conquerors from invading Jaipur. He even persuaded Diler Khan to leave the prince to his fate and follow him up. He might as well have taken Sulaiman in his custody and offered him as a present to Aurangzeb! His behaviour nullified the advantage of his victory over Shuja. Had he acted loyally to Shah Jahan and Dara and persuaded Shuja to join his forces with those of the Imperialists, the events might have assumed a different colour.

Undeterred by the Imperial letters or disposition of the armies, Murad and Aurangzeb moved forward and joined near Dipalpur (April 1658). The movements of Aurangzeb were so secret that Jaswant Singh knew nothing of them. He was under the impression that he would fight with Murad alone, and when he found the brothers united he was taken by surprise. He was quite unprepared to face a combination of the Deccan and Gujrat armies under such gallant and able fighters as Murad and Aurangzeb. He tried to discuss with them the situation, but Aurangzeb was unwilling to lose the advantage he had got over him, and would demand nothing less than submission to him. To the proud general a rather unconditional submission to the rebel princes was out of the question. In spite of the fact that Qasim Khan was not pulling on well with him and the slogan of the princes had drawn the sympathies of some of the Mussalman officers, Jaswant Singh was forced to appeal to arms. With the high-mindedness of a Rajput he repudiated the suggestion made by his men of a night-attack to capture the artillery of the princes.

About the middle of April the inevitable conflict took place at Dharmat, some fourteen miles south-west of Ujjain. The initial advantage was with Aurangzeb, for Jaswant Singh had chosen a ground which was uneven and narrow and prevented the manoeuvre of the army and proper coordination of the various divisions difficult. Then again, one wing of his van, led by Qasim Khan, decided to act as passive

spectators. However, the other wing of the van, led by Mukund Singh, dealt a mass attack on Aurangzeb's artillery and in spite of terrible losses succeeded in driving the artillery-men and killing their chief. They then pressed and rolled back the front of the enemy's van after a well-contested fight and attacked its centre. Had they been supported vigorously by Qasim Khan or reinforced by Jaswant Singh, they might have destroyed the van, but the treachery of the former and the bad choice of the field by the latter left them alone to fight like tigers and die to the last man before the combined attack of Aurangzeb's van, centre and reserve. Meanwhile, Murad destroyed the left wing, and the artillery once more picked up and poured out terrific fire. Then again, the Sisodias under Rai Singh and the Bundelas under Debi Singh and some other Rajput chiefs left Jaswant Singh, and Qasim Khan also fled away at the critical moment when the enemies were drawing upon him from all sides. Most reluctantly, Jaswant Singh was ultimately obliged to leave the field wounded. Aurangzeb was victorious, and the first line of the Imperial defence was broken. As the victors were completely tired and there was plenty for looting in the Imperial camp, no pursuit could be possible.

The victorious brothers pushed on further. At Gwalior they were joined by Nasiri Khan, who had deserted the Imperialists. At the Court considerable confusion prevailed. Shah Jahan was inclined to allow the victorious princes to come to Agra and then persuade them to settle all matters amicably. But Dara had no reason to believe that the arrival of a large and victorious army at Agra was free from grave danger. While there was no absolute certainty of amicable settlement, such a course was calculated to undermine the morale of the officers and soldiers and encourage desertions on a large scale. It might, on the other hand, start a fracas between the soldiers, which could easily assume the proportions of a major armed conflict. It was, therefore, safe to prevent the hostile armies from crossing the Chambal while negotiations for amicable settlement

might be continued.

After the debacle of Dharmat, Dara thought it proper to supervise the effective guarding of the ferries. Some Hindu *zemindars* helped Aurangzeb to find out an unguarded ford at Bhadwar or Bhadroli, which the southern army crossed with enormous difficulties and heavy loss of life. This was another victory for Aurangzeb.

Last-moment efforts were made to prevent a bloody conflict. Jahan Ara advised Aurangzeb not to disobey his father and fight with his elder borther, but to stay where he was and represent his grievances which would be redressed. When the Deccan armies arrived Jahan Ara personally went to Aurangzeb to dissuade him on behalf of the sickly Emperor from causing an armageddon, and promising to get him appointed as an heir-apparent to the throne, the provinces of the Punjab and further western provinces assigned to Dara, Gurjrat to Murad, Bengal to Shuja and the Deccan to Aurangzeb's son Muazzam. Such dubious negotiations suggested in a way the nervousness and weakness of the Imperialist side. While Jahan Ara, Shah Jahan and, may be, Dara also looked upon the problem from a domestic, family or human point of view, Aurangzeb viewed it as a cold and ruthless politician and a religious fanatic. He was unwilling to relent and was bent upon settling his account with Dara once for all. In his case the certainty of political advantage combined with the intensity of his religious opposition to Dara.

Prior to the last-minute efforts described above, it was Aurangzeb himself who in reply to a previous proposal for peace had suggested that "as Dara cannot succeed against me it would be better for him to retire to his *jagir* in the Punjab and leave the service of your Majesty in my hands". That was before crossing the Chambal. But at Samugarh he had changed his mind, either on the ground that his earlier proposal had not been accepted or that he was not allowed to cross the river. But when those proposals were accepted before the battle at Samugarh, they were rejected by Aurangzeb to the extreme disappointment of Jahan Ara and Shah

Jahan. It was quite clear that war was inevitable.

Prince Dara had now to fall back. At Samugarh, eight miles east of Agra, he halted and waited with fifty or sixty thousand cavalry for his brothers to take the offensive. It was a great blunder on his part to have failed to hurl immediately his men on the army of his enemies which was tired of long marches. Either he was too sanguine of his success or he did not like to force battle till the enemies wanted it, or he did not realize the advantage of an immediate offensive. Probably all these elements combined to lead him to a course of action or inaction which proved highly prejudicial to his interest, for it shook the confidence of his soldiers in his leadership.

At last, on 29th May, on the sandy plain of Samugarh was fought one of the decisive battles in Indian history, and certainly the greatest among all the wars of succession. Dara's army was in many respects superior to that of his rivals. In its ranks were the famous Saiyids of Barah, who were always regarded as the backbone of the Imperial army of the Mughals; the Rajputs of the house of Bundi, renowned throughout the whole of India for their deathless valour, and also such able and gallant generals as Rustam Khan, Chatrasal Hada of the Balkh and Deccan fame and Diler Khan the irresistible Afghan leader. Dara possessed a fine park of artillery and an enormous cavalry. But the weak points of his army are also obvious. First and foremost among them was the absence of a commander-in-chief of the ability and grit of Aurangzeb. In sheer generalship Dara was no match to Aurangzeb. Then, there was the army of Shah Jahan which regarded itself as different and distinct from that of Dara, and was not prepared to put its best in the coming fight, and finally, his guns were heavy and incapable of being quickly moved according to the vicissitudes of the battle.

It is true that on the side of Aurangzeb, except Nasiri Khan and Bahadur Khan, there were no generals of the reputation of Dara's officers, but Aurangzeb and Murad offered a formidable combination of best general-

ship and valour and were a host by themselves. Then, the army of Aurangzeb was more disciplined and trained to obey his orders implicity; and his artillery was far more mobile and ably manned.

Dara opened the offensive by a terrific but absolutely ineffective fire from his guns, for the enemy was out of their range. As Aurangzeb did not keep up the futile fire, Dara thought that there had been some serious loss to his army. To press the advantage, his left wing, led by the gallant Rustam Khan, made a rush on enemy's artillery, but on reaching within the proper range they were met by such a steady and effective fire that they were compelled to change their direction and and make a run upon Aurangbzeb's van. They were, however, intercepted by Bahadur Khan, who was on the point of breaking, when powerful reinforcements arrived from the enemy's right wing. Rustam Khan was overwhelmed and was slain fighting like a lion. Dara, who was commanding the centre, tried to rush to his rescue, but in doing so he made a great blunder of throwing himself between the enemy and his artillery and thus making the latter useless. This movement dislocated and disorganized the centre and rendered the artillery valueless, without being able to save the left wing, which was utterly annihilated. The fate of Dara's van was equally tragic. Under the leadership of the terribly brave Chatrasal Hada, it attacked the enemy's left wing which was commanded by Prince Murad and after a well-contested and bloody fight in which prodigious valour was exhibited on both sides drove it back. It now turned upon the enemy's centre, commanded by Aurangzeb, where they met the stoutest opposition. Tired and thinned as the Rajputs were, they never stood in greater need of support than on this occasion. But Khalilullah Khan, the leader of Turani mercenaries and the commander of Dara's right, played a treacherous game and without seriously exerting himself enjoyed the fun. The Rajputs, of course, fought and fought till they were literally mowed down by superior numbers. Thus Dara's forces in the left and

the van were destroyed, and the right played false. His attempt first to help his left and then the van ended in nothing. He could help neither. At the critical moment the enemy's van, under Sultan Muhammad, which was as yet unemployed, fell upon the centre of Dara and was well supported by the artillery. The fire was indeed so brisk and overwhelming that the well-wishers of Dara requested him to come down from the *howdah* which had become the target of the enemy. Foolishly enough he acted upon their advice and riding on a horse tried to rally his wavering men. When his soldiers saw the *howdah* empty, they took it for granted that Dara was no more. They lost their enthusiasm and courage and took to their heels. Dara's attempt to rally them failed utterly. He was left on the field with a handful of followers and was ultimately obliged to flee with his son Sipahr Shikoh, who was weeping bitterly. With great difficulty he managed to reach Agra. His defeat was complete and his failure miserable (May 29, 1658).

At Agra Dara did not tarry long. He had no face to show to his father, who wanted to speak to him before he went anywhere else. He, therefore, left for Delhi with his family and children and as much of jewels and gold as he could carry.

Aurangzeb wrote a letter to Shah Jahan throwing all the burden of mischief on Dara, who wanted to prevent him from meeting his father and representing his grievances against him. As there was no further opposition the victorious princes marched up and halted near Agra. The Emperor tried to soothe Aurangzeb and made three attempts to induce him to come to an interview. As his love for Dara was well known, the Prince agreed with his courtiers who suspected some deep plot. He, therefore , declined all invitations and laid siege to the fort. Shah Jahan also tried to defend it as best as could be possible. As it was not easy to capture the fort, it was decided to cut off the supply of water from the Jamuna to the besieged. This was successfully done. The effects were quickly seen. In only

three days resistance grew slack. The frantic appeals of Shah Jahan to Aurangzeb to save the prestige of the Mughal empire fell on deaf ears. At last Shah Jahan was compelled to open the gates of the fort on June 8, 1658. The fort fell and with it came to an end the reign of Shah Jahan. Shah Jahan was a state prisoner confined in the *zenana* palace. On June 10 Aurangzeb held a *darbar* and began to rule without making much fuss or solemnity of a formal coronation which he postponed till he had done away with his rivals.

As Agra had fallen Aurangzeb did not think it advisable to begin vigorously the pursuit of Dara. He had yet to make proper arrangements at least to check Sulaiman Shikoh, who had defeated Shuja in February and commanded twenty-two thousand troops. Moreover, he had to deal with Murad, who had begun to adopt an independent policy, seduce Aurangzeb's soldiers by offering higher salaries and ranks and *jagirs* and bestow high titles on his own account. He even apologised for his behaviour to Shah Jahan, explained away his conduct and meekly asked for forgiveness. He had apparently no intention to dethrone his father and usurp the throne. His course was different from that of Aurangzeb, who left Agra for Delhi by slow marches followed by Murad with his own separate and independent army numbering twenty thousand. He could not give battle to Murad for the latter had so far made no open exhibition of hostility and, besides, it would have been unwise to invite a battle with Murad. Aurangzeb had other means to deal with him.

In honour of Murad's recovery from illness, Aurangzeb invited him several times to a feast, but met with polite evasion. He then corrupted one of his courtiers, Nuruddin. One day while Murad was returning from a vigorous hunt near Mathura and was feeling much fatigued, Nuruddin succeeded in persuading him to take rest in Aurangzeb's camp. Aurangzeb was extremely glad to receive the Prince with apparent cordiality, gave him a sumptuous dinner and probably plied him with wine. Then he asked Murad to sleep

away his fatigue. The Prince fell into the net, and went to sleep. His sword and shield were stealthily removed, and when he was awakened by a noise, he found himself a prisoner. His remonstrances proved futile, and he was sent away a prisoner to Delhi to be confined in the fort of Salimgarh. The followers of Murad were non-plussed as they knew not where their master had been sent. They were silenced on being taken in the service of Aurangzeb.

Freed from the proximate danger and strengthened by a large addition to his army, Aurangzeb could send Nasiri Khan to capture Allahabad and deal with Sulaiman Shikoh. As a further precaution against Sulaiman joining his father, two strong detachments were sent to prevent him from crossing the Ganges or the Jamuna.

Aurangzeb was now free to pursue Dara. His march frightened Dara so much that he could not stay at Delhi. He made no attempt to fly to the east to join Sulaiman for he thought it imprudent to throw himself between Aurangzeb and Shuja. Without waiting further for the arrival of Sulaiman Shikoh, he fled in the night towards Lahore. Aurangzeb got Delhi without fighting, and celebrated the capture of the capital by undergoing the coronation ceremony in the Shalamar garden. Without wasting much time he again started in pursuit of Dara.

Dara was at his wit's end. In spite of enormous cash and jewels, means of warfare and an army of 14,000, he could not muster up sufficient courage to make a determined stand. It seems that he had not recovered from the shock of his defeat. As the army of Aurangzeb crossed the Bias, he fled from Lahore to Multan. This lack of spirit and exhibition of weakness and indecision had a bad effect on his followers, who began to desert him in large numbers. Lahore fell to Aurangzeb without much exertion. Aurangzeb now pushed forward and reached Multan only to find that Dara had fled away to Bhakkar a few days before. Aurangzeb now fully understood the hopeless situation of Dara and,

therefore, leaving the pursuit to his two able commanders, Shaikh Mir and Diler Khan, turned back for Delhi. (Sept. 1658) to deal with Shuja who was marching towards Allahabad.

As soon as Sulaiman Shikoh had urtned his back, Prince Shuja received a letter from Aurangzeb conferring the province of Bihar on him. The defeat of Dara restored to him his dignity while the news of the absence of Aurangzeb from Agra encouraged him to make an attempt to capture it.

Accordingly, he set out from Bihar and in Dec. 1658 reached Allahabad, meeting with no opposition. Without wasting his time in an attempt to capture the fort of Allahabad, he pushed on further. His progress was suddenly stopped at Khajwa where the eldest son of Aurangzeb, Sultan Muhammad, was ready to challenge him. His hopes were dashed to the ground when he found that Aurangzeb, who was only a march or two behind, had joined his son on January 2, 1659, and that Mir Jumla had also arrived in the camp from the Deccan. Without losing any time, Aurangzeb commenced operations on the 3rd to provoke Shuja. On the night of the 5th the army of Aurangzeb was thrown into confusion by Jaswant Singh, who commanded its right wing. Jaswant Singh was in secret communication with Shuja and had planned with him to attack from the rear while Shuja was to launch simultaneously a frontal attack. Accordingly, Jaswant Singh fell upon the camp and plundered it. But Shuja remained inactive as he entertained sone suspicion against Jaswant. This saved Aurangzeb, who succeeded in allaying the tumult and restoring order in his camp. Jaswant Singh's object was not to fight but only to create confusion in favour of Shuja. As the latter did not move, Jaswant went away towards his home with the plunder.

In spite of the desertion of Jaswant Singh, Aurangzeb still had an army almost double that of Shuja. He now rearranged his army and prepared to fight. Shuja took the offensive vigorously, broke the left wing of Aurangzeb and pressed on the right and the centre.

Shuja's progress was, however, retarded by a ceaseless stream of fire from the guns and matchlocks of Aurangzeb's men. He began to shrink back. Just then, Aurangzeb ordered a general attack. As the fire was very brisk, Shuja was advised to come down from his elephant. He did so. When his men saw his *hauda* vacant, they lost courage, broked and fled. With his sons and a few followers, Shuja fled precipitately to Bengal. The defeat of Shuja has been ascribed to the desertion of his two important generals, Murad Khan and Abdur Rahman.

Aurangzeb despatched his son Muhammad and Mir Jumla to pursue Shuja. Shuja tried to take Allahabad, but the governor refused to surrender it. He, therefore, fled to Patna and thence to Monghyr. Here, he made a stand but Mir Jumla came up and threatened his rear. He continued his flight, pursued by Mir Jumla and the Prince. Thus, gradually, the whole of the country up to Hugli came under Mir Jumla.

Beaten on land, Shuja tried a naval war with the help of his big guns and European gunners. Mir Jumla was weak in naval armaments, and had a very small number of boats. He, therefore, relied on tactics and waited for an opportune moment. Once he made a rash experiment in which his men suffered a reverse with considerable loss of life. Encouraged by this success, Shuja attacked and recaptured Raj Mahal. But he failed to keep it for long and was finally driven out from there.

Meantime, Mir Jumla got fresh reinforcements in men and money and commenced his offensive vigorously. On the banks of the Mahananda, he gave a crushing defeat to Shuja's men and captured their guns. Pushing forward he captured Tanda. Shuja fled through Dacca to Arakan and threw himself under the protection of the Arakanese pirates (May 1660). Thence he disappeared for good from the scene. It is stated that he involved himself in a conspiracy to assassinate the king of Arakan, but the conspiracy was detected and he was killed. It was also rumoured that

he went away to Mecca.

Bhakkar had a very strong fortress which could be very well defended by a few thousand men. But Dara was so terribly frightened that he could not make up his mind to stay there for more than five days. He committed a great blunder in dismissing the ablest and most loyal of his officers, Daud Khan, whom he had begun to suspect even at Lahore. The cause of this foolish suspicion was a false letter which Aurangzeb had written to Daud Khan and had managed to get it intercepted by Dara's men. Daud protested his loyalty and is alleged to have gone to the extent of killing his women so that none may remain to interfere with his single-minded devotion to Dara. But Dara had lost the balance of his mind completely and refused to keep him in his service.

Dara might have fled to Persia if his wives had not refused to go through Biluchistan. He, therefore, turned to Sehwan. Here too his pursuers arrived before he could take that place from the reluctant *Qiledar*. He, therefore, fled via Thatta to Cutch. He was received well by the Rana, who gave the hand of one of his daughters to Sipahr Shikoh. From there he went to Jamnagar where also he was cordially received. He must have felt a transport of delight when Shah Nawaz Khan, the governor of Ahmadabad, willingly admitted him into the town and offered his help. Here he could raise once more an army of 22,000 (January 1659).

There were two alternatives before Dara. He could either go to the Deccan and induce the Deccan states to support his cause as he had done theirs in their struggle with Aurangzeb, or he could move up to the north, receive the support of his Rajput friends and make an attempt on Agra. The latter alternative he chose; first, because he had learnt that Aurangzeb had gone to the East to fight Shuja; and secondly, because Jaswant Singh had expressed his willingness to fight once more for him. With these hopes he pushed on to Ajmer.

Dara was highly disappointed when he learnt that

Aurangzeb had defeated Shuja and returned to fight against Jaswant. Raja Jai Singh's efforts to persuade Jaswant Singh to join Aurangzeb combined with the military operations of the latter to cow down the Rathor prince led him to change his mind. He was confirmed as the ruler of Marwar and appointed as the governor of Gujrat. The other important ruler of Rajputana, Rana Raj Singh of Udaipur , had already extended the hand of friendship to Aurangzeb , who, in return, had conferred on him a *mansab* of 6,000 zat and 6,000 sawar, besides giving him several paraganas, including Dungarpur and Banswara. Thus all the three important rulers of Rajputana were on the side of Aurangzeb. Dara's touching appeals to the Rana and references to help rendered by him when he had invited the wrath of Shah Jahan fell on deaf ears.

It was not possible for Dara to turn back or change his plans for Aurangzeb had arrived so close to his camp that retreat was out of the question. As the army of Dara was much smaller than that of Aurangzeb he could not fight in the open field. He, therefore, decided to hold the Deorai pass near Ajmer. The position that he had taken was so strong that the numerical superiority of Aurangzeb's army gave him no great advantage. After three days of fight, Dara's left rear was turned by the very treacherous Rajarup Raja of Jammu, whose men escaladed the hill. His left, which was commanded by Shah Nawaz, was utterly destroyed after a determined and most sanguinary hand-to-hand conflict. Although his right was intact, his position was so much weakened that he once more decided to take shelter in flight (March 1659). By way of Mertha he went to Ahmadabad, but here he found that the governor he had left behind had been arrested by the officials, who had declared for Aurangzeb. Admission into Ahmadabad was refused; while Raja Jai Singh was pursuing him vigorously. Once more Dara fled to Cutch, escorted by Kanhokji, a Koli outlaw. But Jai Singh's threats to the Rao obliged him to refuse help to Dara. In utter despair Dara once more fled to

Sindh (May 1659) with a view to retiring via Qandahar to Persia. But his dear wife Nadira Begam was ill, hence he could not go without leaving her at some safe place. As his slave Basant was still holding Bhakkar for him against the odds of Khalilullah Khan, the old traitor, he decided to relieve it with the help of some Biluchi chief. His eyes fell on one Malik Jiwan, whom he had saved from capital punishment inflicted on him by Shah Jahan. Malik Jiwan apparently welcomed him in his own house. Here Nadira Begam, the devoted wife, friend and solace of Dara, died (June 6,1659). leaving a request to give her a burial on the soil of Hindustan. Her body was sent to Lahore with a small guard—all that was left to Dara. Her death dealt a severe blow to Dara and deprived him of the handful of faithful followers who were left with him in this hour of trial. He was now absolutely at the mercy of Malik Jiwan who paid back the gratitude by plundering Dara and delivering him up to Bahadur Khan. Dara, now a prisoner, was taken to Delhi (Aug. 1659). After being humiliated and paraded through the city, he was thrown into prison. The popular sympathy for Dara at first took the form of lamentation, sobs and curses to the traitors, and after twenty-four hours burst forth into a violent attack on Malik Jiwan and his party. Some Biluchis were killed, and if the police had not come to his rescue he too would have been surely, murdered. Saved for the moment, Jiwan, on his way back to his *jagir*, was assassinated.

This outburst of popular sympathy hastened the fate of Dara. Except probably Aurangzeb, his younger sister Raushan Ara was most keen on the execution of Dara. The matter was referred to the "pillars of the canon law". A death sentence was pronounced by them on Dara, a "destroyer of public peace" on the ground of the protection of "the faith and Holy Law and also for reasons of State". Dara came to know of it. He made a pathetic appeal to Aurangzeb's mercy and requested a lease of life, promising to pass his days in retirement. But all was in vain. Aurangzeb was neither

Babar nor Humayun; he was the son of Shah Jahan and a cold-hearted man; to expect mercy from him was as good as an appeal to granite. On the night of August 30, 1659 the eldest son and the darling of Shah Jahan yielded to the daggers of the executioners. His head was sent to the Emperor, who refused to see it. His headless body was paraded through the streets and lanes and then unceremoniously buried in the tomb of Humayun.

Among the enemies of Aurangzeb, only one youth remained to be dealt with. This was Sulaiman Shikoh, the elder son of Dara. The effect of the defeat of Samugarh on the fortunes of Sulaiman was serious. His army of twenty-two thousand dwindled to only six thousand. Among the deserters were Raja Jai Singh of Amber and later on Diler Khan. Their desertion compelled Sulaiman to take shelter behind the walls of Allahabad fort. At the advice of the Saiyids of Barha he made an attempt to join his father in the Punjab, but failed and had at last to seek shelter in Garhwal with a handful of men.

Aurangzeb declared war on Raja Prithwi Singh, who was unwilling to deliver Sulaiman, and suggested to Jai Singh to use his influence and diplomacy with the Hindu Raja. The Raja still refused to stoop low and set at naught the Hindu traditions of hospitality to a refugee. But his son Medini Singh fell into Jai Singh's net, and delivered the Prince on Dec. 12, 1660. Sulaiman was sent as prisoner to Delhi. In January he was sent to Gwalior and by a process of slow opium-poisoning and grief he joined his father in May, 1662. Aurangzeb was good enough to spare the life of Sipahr Shikoh, who, after a comfinement in prison to twelve years, was released.

Only six months before (Dec. 1661), Gwalior fort had witnessed the execution of Sulaiman's uncle, Murad, the most unfortunate prince. He was executed on the charge of murdering Ali Naqi, his *Diwan* in Gujrat. This charge was brought against him by a son of Ali Naqi at the instigation of Aurangzeb. For Aurangzeb

was anxious to find out some legal pretext for doing away with Murad, particularly because he was loved by a certain section of the Mughal soldiers who tried to set him free. Indeed, he had all but fled. A rope ladder was there to help him in coming down the fort wall and a horse was ready below to carry him away. As he was about to descend his favourite concubine burst into loud lamentations which awoke the guards. The plot was unveiled and came to naught.

Thus within four years Aurangzeb got rid of all his rivals. It was an act of great magnanimity on his part that he allowed Shah Jahan to drag on through a few years more of his miserable old age, and permitted Princess Jahan Ara to tend and cheer him up. Nemesis had taken a cruel revenge on Shah Jahan for the murder of his brothers and nephews. In his old age, he had to hear of the executions of his sons and grandsons at the hands of Aurangzeb. Jahangir had escaped the misfortune which was in store for Shah Jahan. Kingship has no regard for kinship; but Providence has still less regard for Kingship. It is no wonder that Aurangzeb wrote to Shah Jahan, "How do you still regard the memory (of your brothers) Khusro and Shahryar, whom you did to death before your accession and who had done no injury to you?"

Shan Jahan passed the last days of his life in a sort of captivity. He was rigorously watched and guarded for there was fear lest he should rally his supporters, if there were any, to recover his power. No one was allowed to see him but in the presence of Aurangzeb's son Muhammad. Every act and every word of Shah Jahan was immediately reported to Aurangzeb and no correspondence was permitted. His jewels were gradually taken away from him, and at times he was worried even for little luxuries. Kambu says, "It is painful to describe the misery which befell the old Emperor". His only consolation came from the sermons and talks of Saiyid Muhammad, a scholar and divine of Kanauj, and the most tender and affectionate care which the lovely and saintly Jahan Ara bestowed on him. The

old Emperor assiduously prepared himself for the next world by punctilious performance of the religious obligatory duties. In the morning of Monday, January 22, 1666 with perfect composure and remarkable resignation, with his eyes fixed on the Taj Mahal, the "king of the world" went to join his beloved wife, by whose side he was laid.

The reign of Shah Jahan was prosperous. The Peacock Throne and the glitter of jewels dazzled the foreign travellers. The Taj Mahal, the Pearl Mosque, the Ali Masjid of Shahjahanabad and the fort of Shahjahanabad stand to this day to testfy to the greatness of the Mughal Empire and the glory of his reign. The gardens at Delhi, Lahore and Kashmir prove his love for plants and flowers and springs. It was in his reign that Ali Mardan Khan cut the Ravi Canal of ninety-eight miles and brought it to Lahore, and the Nahr-i-Shihab or the old Firoz canal which had silted up was not only reopened but extended by sixty miles and named Nahr-i-Bihisht. Khafi Khan says that in the whole line of the Timurids there was no ruler who could equal Shah Jahan in organization, improving the treasury, settlement of the country, and due recognition of the merits of officers and soldiers. He was always keen to protect the *ryots* and suppress tyranny. During his period, "profound peace reigned. The peasantry was carefully cherished; harsh and exacting governors were in many case dismissed on the complaint of the people". He was, "stern in punishing oppressive tax collectors and erring, if at all, on the side of excessive leniency".

Shah Jahan was a lover of grandeur, pomp and show and was jealous to protect and enhance the dignity of the Indian Empire in the eyes of the world . The gorgeous and monster tent *dalbadal* required several thousand men and several elephants to erect it in over two months. Above all was the Peacock Throne, which stood unrivalled as a piece of art and craft and magnificence. But Shah Jahan was neither a mere pleasure-seeker nor a lover of ease and comfort. As Prince, he

had distinguished himself as a man of action and enormous energy, and these traits he maintained almost up to the end of his regin. He was dignified in his behaviour, thoughtful in his speech and action, and fully alive to his duties and responsibilities. As long as his health was good and he could personally look into the affairs of the State, no officer, however powerful, or Prince could dare defy him or dominate over him. It was only when his health failed him that the disruptive forces appeared.

In matters of religion, he was much more orthodox than his father. Though he can not be definitely charged of bigotry, yet at times he betrayed symptoms of it. As early as 1632 he had an order issued for the demolition of all those temples which had been begun in the reign of his father "throughout all his dominions". In Banaras only seventy-six temples were razed to the ground. During the Bundela war his bigotry again found expression in the destruction of Hindu temples and the conversion of the sons of Jujhar Singh Bundela. Similar treatment was meted out to the Rani of Pratap Singh and the Raja of Kuch-Haju (1637). These instances show that the forces of reaction which had begun to assert themselves in the reign of Jahangir gathered considerable momentum in the first half of the reign of Shah Jahan. Later on his attitude changed; his character mellowed down and the fanaticism in him died out as is evident from his policy of non-interference towards temples and conversions. His reign was, by no means, an era of general religious persecution, bigotry or intolerance. At the same time it must be admitted that the policy of enlightened toleration of Akbar was being gradually abandoned. The fact is that in a Muslim state based on the ideas of the Abbasid and post-Abbasid lawyers toleration could be possible, but perfect toleration was out of the question. Akbar, was an exception to the rule, and Khusro and Dara, who were more like him in mental makeup, never ascended the throne. Though Jahangir and Shah Jahan could not rise to to the height of Akbar, they did not, on the whole,

ride roughshod over his policy. The Hindus in the time of Shah Jahan still held high offices and commanded honour and respect. But for the confidence which Shah Jahan inspired, the Hindu princes would not have almost solidly stood for the defence of the Empire and the Imperial honour. In his time it was still possible for the Crown prince to indulge in the study of comparative religions and entertain liberal views on religious matters without any interference whatsoever. Shah Jahan's reign is famous for the quality and quantity of Sanskrit works. Asaf Khan and Dara patronized Sanskrit literature of religious, cultural and scientific value, like the *Yoga-vasistha*, *Ramayana*, *Bhagwadgita*, *Vedanga* and *Sahitya Darpan*. Hindi and Sanskrit poets were honoured at the Court. There is considerable truth in the statement that Shah Jahan was not only chronologically but even culturally "Dara and Aurangzeb in one".

CHRONOLOGY : SHAH JAHAN

Accession of Shah Jahan	6Feb. 1628.
Khan-i-Jahan Lodi's flight from Agra	Oct., 1629.
Shah Jahan in the Deccan	1630.
Khan-i-Jahan's head sent to the Emperor	Feb. 1631
Death of Mumtaz Mahal	7 June 1631.
Invasion of Bijapur	1631.
Shah Jahan's return from Burhanpur	March 1632.
Mahabat Khan reaches Deccan	1633.
Imperialists occupy the fort of Daulatabad.	17 June 1633.
Extinction of Nizam Shahi	Sept. 1633.
Death of Mahabat Khan	Oct. 1634.
Imperialists storm Orcha	22 Nov. 1634.
Murder of Jujhar and Vikramajit	1635.
Treaties with Golkunda and Bijapur	1636.
Capitulation of Shahji	Nov. 1636.
Ali Mardan's surrender of Qandahar to the Mughals	Feb. 1638.
Shah Jahan's visit to Kabul	1639.
Persians, first attempt on Qandahar	1639.
Death of Har Govind	1645.
Mobilization of Mughal army for Balkh operations	1646.
Mughal occupation of Balkh	July 1646.
Balkh operations come to an end	Oct. 1647.
Persians besiege Qandahar	16 Dec. 1648.
Surrender of the fort to Persians.	11 Feb. 1649.
Failure of Mughal operations to conquer Qandahar	1652-53.
Death of Muhammad Adil Shah	1656.
Fall of Bidar and Mughal siege of Bijapur	1657.
Shah Jahan's sudden illness.	6 Sept. 1657.
Shuja's defeat a. the battle of Bahadurpur	14 Feb. 1658.
Shuja's treaty with the Imperialists	April 1658.
Combination of Murad and Aurangzeb at Dipalpur	April 1658.
Their victory at Dharmat	May 1658.
Dara's debacle at Samugarh.	29 May 1658.
Surrender of the fort of Agra to Aurangzeb by Shah Jahan	8 June 1658.
Aurangzeb's Durbar at Agra	10 June 1658.
Jaswant Singh's defection in favour of Shuja	5 Jan. 1659.
Shuja's escape into Arracan	March 1659.
Dara reaches Sindh	May 1659.
Dara's wife. Nadira Begams' death	6 June 1659.
Dara taken to Delhi	Aug. 1659.
Execution of Dara	30 Aug. 1659.
Dara's defeat at Deorai	May 1660.
Sulaiman Shikoh delivered to the Imperialists	12 Dec. 1660.

Execution of Murad in the Gwalior fort	Dec. 1661.
Death of Sulaiman	May 1662.
Death of Shah Jahan	22 Jan. 1666

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6. Muhammad Masum : Tarikh-i-Shah Shujai.
7. Shah Nawaz Khan : Maasir-ul-Umara.
8. Sher Khan Lodi : Mirat-ul-Khayal.
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